DISCOVRSES UPON *Cornelius Tacitus.*

Written in *Italian* by the Learned Marqueſſe *Virgilio Malvezzi.*

Dedicated To the *Sereniſſimo Ferdinand* the ſecond, Great Duke of *Thuſcany.*

And Tranſlated into Engliſh, by Sir *Richard Baker*, Knight.

LONDON, Printed by *E. G.* for *R. Whitaker*, and *Tho. Whitaker*, at the Kings Armes in S. *Pauls* Church-yard.

1642.

DISCOURSES

UPON

Tacitus.

1642.

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TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
WILLIAM
Lord Viſcount Say, and Seale,
Maſter of his Highneſſe Court of *Wards* and *Liveries*, and one of his Majeſties moſt Honourable Privy Counſell.

Moſt Honoured Lord,

I Should not have the boldneſſe to preſent this booke unto your Lordſhip, if (beſides the great ſervice I owe you) the Argument of the Booke did not invite me to it: for conſiſting of Politique Diſcourſes and conſiderations of State; it is moſt fit to be preſented to Counſellours of State; amongſt which I knew not whom better to preſent it to, then to your Lordſhip: and no

leſſe then the Argument of the Booke, the Authour thereof invites me to it; for being a learned Lord of *Italy*, none more fit to entertaine him then ſome learned Lord of *England*; of which number this Kingdome affordeth none more eminent then your Lordſhip: I muſt not ſpeake ſo much as I think, for offending the modeſty of your eare; but I may boldly ſpeake ſo much as all the world ſees; that nature and Art have joyned together, to make you perfect in your place, which is to be a faithfull Counſellour to the King, and a loving Patriot to your Countrey: for both which, if I ſhould not my ſelfe acknowledge an obligation to you, I might worthily be thought, unworthy to be accounted, which I ſpecially deſire to be,

Your Lordſhips humble

and devoted ſervant,

RICHARD WHITAKER.

TO THE SERENISSIMO *FERDINAND* the second, great Duke of *Thuscany*, my most gracious Lord.

SEeing to nothing I am more bound; then to serve your Highneſſe, I cannot conſequently have any greater deſire then to be accounted your ſervant: that as the benefits which our Houſe continually receiveth, are publikely knowne; ſo the markes of my devotion may publikely appeare; which after dedicating my ſelfe to your Highneſſe, I cannot better manifeſt, then by offering theſe Diſcourſes; which are ſo farre unequall to your greatneſſe, and to what I ow you, that it may well appeare to be rather done for confeſſion of my debt, then for ſatisfaction of that obligation, which as it can onely receive abatement from your commands, ſo commands comming from ſo great a Prince, will have force againe to make it the greater. Vouchſafe then to honour me with commanding me, thereby to make me the more obliged: and be pleaſed to accept theſe weake labours, with looking upon the value which your Heroicall Name gives them. And upon the weight which my devotion puts upon them, with which I wiſh to your Highneſſe all thoſe felicities; which as you give manifeſt proofes to merit, ſo by the divine goodneſſe you ſhall happily obtaine: And ſo I preſent you the moſt humble Reverence,

Of Your Highneſſe moſt devoted ſervant,

VIRGILIO MALVEZZI.

To the Reader.

That yong men may be good writers, in the Politicks: and why *Cornelius Tacitus* gives ſo great contentment to them that read him.

IN antiquis eſt ſapientia, & in multo tempore prudentia. *If it be true, as true indeed it is, which the holy Text by the mouth of* Job *intimates, that onely old men are wiſe, certainly it is in nothing more true, then in things which belong to action. Whereupon the Queene of* Saba *hearing the moſt wiſe* Salomon, *although by the anſwers he gave to her queſtions, ſhe found he was deeply ſeene in the ſecrets of Philoſophy, and in the myſteries of Divinity, yet ſhe made no ſhew of wondring at it: but when ſhe found him endowed with no leſſe excellency in things belonging to action, then ſhe brake forth into words of aſtoniſhment.* Major eſt ſapientia & opera tua, quam rumor quem audivi. Beati viri tui & beati ſervi tui, qui ſtant coram te ſemper, & audiunt ſapientia mtuam. *Shewing thereby, that it is no great marvell, for a yong man to be excellent in things of contemplation: the marvell is, if he be excellent in matters of action: ſeeing thoſe require onely, ſharpneſſe of wit, which eaſily growes in verdant ſpirits; theſe, ſoundneſſe of judgement, which gets not maturity but by long experience: and for this cauſe* Ariſtotle *excluded yong men from active Philoſophy: and a regard alſo to this had the Authour of the Tryviall ſaying, That young men may be good Mathematicians, but not good Philoſophers. Therefore may juſtly*

be

be taxed with over-great boldneſſe, to take upon me to ſpeake in matters of Action, being ſo yong a man as I am, when it were fitter I ſhould ſtand to learne of others, then to put my ſelfe forward to be a Teacher. And for this (as S. Gregory well obſerves) our Lord Chriſt, in his childhood, though he had taught and confounded the Doctours, yet by all meanes would have his mother finde him hearkning to them, as to learne of them. The conſideration of this would have ſtayed me from undertaking ſuch a worke, were it not that I deteſt ſo much the name of idleneſſe, that for avoyding of that, I rather venture to incurre the blame of too great boldneſſe. Publiſhing theſe my diſcourſes, which in one courſe of the Sunne have had their beginning, encreaſe and finiſhing; and God grant, that in the ſame yeere, after the order of nature, they have not alſo their decreaſe, and aboliſhing: and that in comming to the light, they beginne not (like their Authour) from darkneſſe, and then tarry in darkneſſe ſtill. Yet it is true, that I have waies enow, to defend my ſelfe from ſuch calumniations. And firſt, as to this particular objection, that yong men are not fit for action; we muſt know, that all action is preceded by contemplation, which is the action of the mind and underſtanding, ſeeing a thing cannot be in the will, till it be firſt in the underſtanding; according to that well knowne rule, Nihil volitum quod non ſit præcognitum. As for example, before it be determined to ſtrike battell, it is deliberated in counſell, which is nothing elſe, but to contemplate whether the action be good or bad. And this Salluſt ſheweth us, where he ſaith, Nam & priuſquam incipias conſulto; & ubi conſulueris, mature facto opus eſt. And therefore to execute and doe a thing well, it is needfull to have gotten a habit in the action, which habit growing from many acts often iterated, requires an experience which cannot be had without length of time, and oftentimes, not without a temper in the affections. Now for contemplating an action, there need not ſo many

things;

things; but as he that is to execute a thing, cannot doe it well if he have not the habit; and the habit he cannot have but by doing many Acts: so he that is to contemplate an action that is to be done, must necessarily have a knowledge of that action, which we may call a habit of the understanding; and if that arise from many acts iterated, this also is produced by many acts contemplated; and produced it cannot be, if there be not a knowledge of the things that have happened in the World: and such knowledge cannot be had, without reading of Histories, seeing a yong man by reading of Histories, can come to know more, then a man of a hundred yeeres old; because the one hath but seene and heard the accidents onely of his owne time, the other hath read all the principall things that have beene done from the beginning of the World to the present time. I conclude then, that in those things wherein contemplation and action belong both to the same; in those ordinarily a yong man cannot be fit; but where contemplation is not joyned with action, there he may be most fit. And therefore one that hath read Histories ought not to be blamed if he take upon him to write of things belonging to action, seeing affection cannot hinder him from speaking the truth, nor want of experience from finding it out. And this opinion of mine is no way differing from that of Aristotle: *who saith, That yong men are no good hearers of morall Philosophy, because action and contemplation in morall Philosophy are not distinct, but joyned together; and therefore said that he who contemplates well, and operates otherwise, cannot have the name of a good moralliſt: so as,* Aristotle *excludes not a yong man, as one that cannot contemplate well, but as one that cannot operate well, by reason of impediment of affection and want of habit. As to that other objection, that yong men should alwaies stand to heare and learne of others: I suppose I shall be excused by any that have observed in* Plato, *that they sufficiently reape profit by speaking, who while in speaking*

they

they ſhew their ignorance, give occaſion to others to correct them: and this alſo is my deſire, ſo as the correction come from the hand of Socrates. *Beſides, I am not without hope of commendation for my judgement, if not in the forme at leaſt in the matter; if not in the compoſition, at leaſt in the choyce. Rather indeed, ſeeing an ill-favoured Image, is yet well valued, if wrought in a Diamond: I am out of doubt, that theſe my Diſcourſes ſhall be valued by reaſon of the Authour, from whom I take their matter;* Cornelius Tacitus, *an Authour ſo famous, and ſo highly eſteemed through all the World, and eſpecially in theſe our times; and the matter ſuch, that I am enforced to ſeeke out the cauſes whereof in truth there may be found many: part taken from the things he relates; part, from the manner of his relating them. The things he relates are actions of Princes, and from thence the firſt benefit we take, is that we learne many profitable things, as living in an age, where all the World is governed Princes. Where in other times, as when in* Italy *there were many Common-wealths; we ſee, that expert Politicians, laying aſide* Tacitus, *gave themſelves to write Diſcourſes upon* Livy, *who will alwaies be more eſteemed of by men that live in a Common-wealth: as he, that ſhewing the waies how* Rome *came to be a free State, and how it grew great, will be a meanes of learning many excellent inſtructions. But now that we are under Princes, there is no doubt, but the greateſt content will be, to learne things of this nature; as the conditions of Princes, the cunning of Courtiers, and ſuch like. All this* Tacitus *expreſſeth, where he makes compariſon betweene the Hiſtories of others, and his Annals.* Igitur ut olim plebe valida vel cum Patres pollerent, noſcenda vulgi natura, & quibus modis temperanter haberetur, ſenatuſque & optimatum ingenia qui maxime perdidicerant, callidi temporum, & ſapientes credebantur; ſic converſo ſtatu, neque alia rerum quam ſi unus imperitet, hæc conquiri tradique in rem fuerit, quia

pauci

pauci prudentia, honesta ab deterioribus, utilia ab noxiis discernunt, plures aliorum exemplis docentur. *Secondly, the continuall slaughters of principall Senatours, the fall of Courtiers, the violent deaths of Princes, and such like; are things, from which the first delight we can take, is this, to know how much we are bound to our Lord God, that we are borne in so much better times, secure of our lives, of our goods and honours.* This delight Cornelius Tacitus *had, when considering with himselfe, the difference, that was betweene the times of those Emperours of whom he writ, and the times of* Trajan *and* Nerva, *he said,* Rara temporum felicitate, ubi sentire quæ velis, & quæ sentias dicere licet. *Another is, that finding their tragicall accidents, they worke in us the like effect, as a Tragœdy is wont to doe: which is to purge, (as one cals it) the affections of terrour and compassion: as it happens in a souldier, who being used to see wounded, and dead men, is never moved by any accident, either to pity or affrighting. He therefore that shall read in* Tacitus, *so many deaths, banishments, imprisonments, and other cruelties, will never for every light occasion, be either moved with terrour, or with compassion. Or else, as others conceive, these accidents moving us to terrour or pity, will purge our minds from such passions: as for example, when we read, that* Nero *through lust and cruelty, came to a miserable end; this by terrifying us, will make us resolve, to the end we may not incurre the like misery, to keepe our selves from the like qualities. And this effect* Tacitus *made account his Annals would worke in us, as he writes,* Exequi sententias haud institui nisi insignes, per honestem, aut notabili dedecore, quod præcipuum munus Annalium reor, ne virtutes sileantur, ut quæ pravis dictis factisque ex posteritate & infamia metus sit. *To these may be added, that speaking of bad Princes he can doe no lesse then alwaies to blame them: a thing which (as in another place I shall shew) not onely makes the Writer be held for truer, but makes the Readers pleasure be the greater, as taking it for a praise to himselfe, to be free from those vices,*

vices, which he ſees blamed in others. In regard whereof, Tacitus *ſaith,* Obtrectatio & livor pronis auribus accipiuntur. *And thus much concerning the pleaſure that is taken from the things he relates. Then concerning the pleaſure that is taken from his manner of writing: it conſiſts firſt in his Laconick ſtile, which is ſo much more pleaſing then the Aſiatick, as cleare Wine is then that which is mingled with water. Secondly, it gives great ſatisfaction, not to looſe time, in reading many lines, with little inſtruction. Thirdly, his very obſcurity is pleaſing to whoſoever by labouring about it, findes out the true meaning; for then he counts it an iſſue of his owne braine, and taking occaſion from thoſe ſentences, to goe further then the thing he reads, and that without being deceived, he takes the like pleaſure as men are wont to take from hearing metaphors, finding the meaning of him that uſeth them. But becauſe* Tacitus *in ſaying, that his Annals have little pleaſure in them,* Cæterum ut profutura, ita minimum oblectationis afferunt, *ſhewes to be contrary to this my opinion: It is therefore to be knowne, that for as much as concernes the preſent, there may two kinds of pleaſure be taken from a thing; one of the ſenſes, another of the underſtanding: as we may ſay in Muſicke, there are two pleaſures may be taken: one from the goodneſſe of the voices that ſing, another from the goodneſſe of the ſongs that are ſung: the firſt is taken by the ſenſe of hearing, whereof the ſound is object: the ſecond is taken by the underſtanding, which finding the Compoſers cunning in making of Deſcants, and helping of diſcords, takes great delight. The firſt pleaſure is common to all that have eares: the ſecond, of ſuch onely as underſtand it. The like happens alſo in painting, where one kind of pleaſure is taken from the daintineſſe of the colours, and the beauty of the picture: and another that is taken from the due placing of the parts, and reſemblance of the Muſcles: and of this, the pleaſure is ſo much the greater, in that it cannot be taken but by one of underſtanding, who therefore takes delight in anothers cunning, becauſe by it he diſcovers his*

owne.

owne. Thus when Tacitus ſaith, that his Annals are little pleaſing; he meanes, in the pleaſure which is taken by the ſenſe: and this appeares plainely, by the words he addes, where giving the reaſon, why other Hiſtories are more pleaſing then this, he ſaith, Nam ſitus Gentium, varietates Præliorum: Clari Ducum exitus, retinent ac redintegrant legentium animos. This difference of pleaſure, Seneca expreſſed, when he ſaid, that Virgill affords one kind of pleaſure, being read by a Humaniſt: and another, being read by a Philoſopher. I conclude then, that Tacitus is an Authour exceeding pleaſing; ſpecially to thoſe, who ſtudying the Hiſtories with underſtanding, little care whether the Latin be as good as that of Cæſar.

It remaines to advertiſe the Reader of theſe my Diſcourſes, that finding Hebrew or Greeke Texts cited in Latin, he may be pleaſed to conceive I did it, to avoyd cumbring the Leaves with allegations: ſeeing if they had been brought in the foreſaid Tongues, they muſt have been againe tranſlated, for their ſakes that underſtand not thoſe Tongues. I ſhould, I know, have done more conformable to cuſtome; if I had cited them in Italian rather then in Latin: but this alſo I avoyded, that I might not take away the force of ſenſe, which the words beare in that Language.

Laſtly, I will not ſtand to conteſt with thoſe, who have a cuſtome to be alwaies blaming: becauſe he that ſhall deale ſo with theſe my weake Diſcourſes, will find himſelfe much deceived in his opinion: for wherein he thinks to differ from me, he will directly agree with me; ſeeing I have printed them to no other end but to make my ſelfe known a ſervant of the Sereniſſimo the Grand Duke; who out of his benigne nature, will be pleaſed to accept that little which a ſervant is able to preſent unto him. Withall I advertiſe, that to blame a Book, may be the work of underſtanding men: but to blame the Authors of Books, the work of none but malignant men: That I leave to every mans liberty: This, I conceive, he deſerves not, that is not conceived of his owne wiſdome.

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CHAP. I.

Of the divers formes of Government, that Rome *had: and how it happens, that Cities for the most part, have their beginning under Kings rather then any other forme of government.*

The first Discourse.

THE Almighty God, understanding and comprehending himselfe infinitely; in as much as the understanding himselfe, proceeding from himselfe, returnes into himselfe: joyneth together by an admirable circulation, the beginning with the end.

The Angelicall Spirits as they have a twofold contemplation, so they cause a twofold motion: For by contemplating of God, their owne knowledge returning in an acknowledgement of its originall: they move the Heavens circularly, in a like motion to that of the first mover, from East to West: and by contemplating of themselves, they cause another circular motion contrary to the former, from West to East. And

seeing all mortall things are influenced by the motions and light of the Heavens. It followes necessarily, that they all follow the heavenly influences with moving in a circle. What marvell then, if the government of the City of *Rome*, (as here in few words is delivered by *Tacitus*) have had its circular motion; passing from a regall government, begun by *Romulus*; to a popular or free estate under *Brutus*; and from that, to an Aristocraticall government under *Pompey*, *Crassus*, and *Cæsar*; under *Lepidus*, *Anthonie*, and *Augustus*; and then at last, with a wonderfull circulation returning againe to a government Monarchicall, as it was at first. Whereupon the Prophet *Ezekiel*, not without great mystery, shewing us in his first vision, four beasts, which in the opinion of many, are figures of the foure Empires of the World; he sets before every one of them a wheele; to intimate in what a circulation they are turned about. And this circulation or alteration, though I cannot say, it is inalterable; yet I may truely say, It is so naturall, that even *Aristotle* himselfe, discoursing upon the passages of Rule and Dominion; foresees and observes that as a Philosopher; which *Tacitus* as an Historian, relates here of *Rome*. *Et ob hoc forsan Rex ab initio repertus est; quod difficile erat viros plures excellentis virtute reperiri, præsertim cum tunc civitates parvæ forent.* So *Tacitus* here, *Urbem Romam a principio Reges habuere.* *Aristotle* goes on, *Sed cum postea contingeret, ut plures pari virtute reperirentur, non amplius tolerarunt Regem; sed commune quiddam quærentes, respublicam constituere.* So *Tacitus* here, *Libertatem Lucius Brutus Instituit.* *Aristotle* proceeds, *Cum verò deteriores facti, lucrum sibi quærerent, ex gubernatione rerumpublicarum; Paucorum hinc potentiam exortam fuisse, credendum est: Honorabant enim Divitias.* So here we see, from whence the power came which *Pompey*, *Crassus* and *Cæsar* had; and from whence also the *Triumvirat* of *Augustus*. *Aristotle* againe, *Ex his verò*

in

in Tyrannides tranſiere. So *Tacitus* here, *Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Auguſtum ceſſere.*

But for as much as *Ariſtotle* ſhews, that from the end of one circulation another begins; while purſuing this Argument, he ſaith, *Ex Tyrannis rurſus ad Plebem:* he that will conſider in *Rome*, thoſe forms of government, which for their ſmall continuance, I have omitted; ſhall find plainly, that even in thoſe alſo, there hath been a manifeſt circulation: For after the Regall under *Romulus*; it came to be a free eſtate under *Brutus*; from that, to be a government of a few under the *decemviri*: laſtly, to be in the hand of a tyrant; under *Appius Claudius*; after whoſe death ſhe recovered againe her liberty; and then paſſing under the Power of a few, ſetled at laſt in a Tyranny under *Auguſtus*: and if there hapned afterward no new circulation, the reaſons thereof ſhall be ſhewed in another diſcourſe.

But conceiving it to be the fitteſt courſe for examining of theſe revolutions, to proceed by ſhewing the cauſes of them; thereby to make men the better ſee that the events of former times have not been caſuall, and hapned by chance; and alſo the better be able to prevent the like accidents that may hereafter happen; I will therefore make my beginning at the Power Regall; with which, it ought not to ſeem ſtrange, that *Rome* at firſt was governed; ſeeing it hath been the like in the foundings almoſt of all Cities: as both *Saluſt* witneſſeth, *Igitur Initio Reges; nam in terris, Nomen Imperii id primum fuit:* and *Juſtin*, *Principio rerum, Gentium, Nationumque Imperium penes Reges erat:* and alſo *Ariſtotle*, *Fuerat enim antiqua civitatum gubernatio pauorum & Regia:* and beſides theſe, there are many examples in the holy Scripture, that ſhew it, to have been ſo: *Cain*, before the flood, was founder of the firſt City that ever was in the World; and he, as S. *Auſtin* writes, was a King; as alſo his ſucceſſours: likewiſe after the flood,

the great City *Babylon* was scarce built; when *Nimrod*, (as the Scripture saith) *Cœpit esse Potens in terra.*

There being therefore no doubt of the ease: having so many and great authorities to confirme it; the next thing is, to search out the causes; amongst which, the first may be taken from the first founding. For Cities are sometimes founded by one alone; and he a Private man; as *Rome*, by *Romulus*: sometimes by one alone, but he a Lord of other Cities, as *Constantinople* by *Constantine*: oftentimes by many joyning together; and those many, either all of one Country; who for shunning of danger, assemble themselves into one City: as the Athenians did at *Athens*: or else such as quite leave and forsake their ancient habitations; which may happen, either in time of peace; when men are forced by the great overswarming of people to seeke new dwellings; as the French did, when they built *Milan*: or else in time of warre; when men flying from a Country wasted; retire themselves into fresh places: and this may happen, under some one that is Head or Chieftaine; or without Head: without a Head, as *Venice*; under a Head, as *Lavinium*, *Padoua*, and *Athens*: the first, built by *Æneas*; the second, by *Antenor*; the third, by *Theseus*.

Now a City which is built by one alone, whether he be a Private man, or a King; is no sooner founded, but it comes presently to be under a Power Regall: Those againe that are built by many joyning together: whether it be, that they fly, by reason of warre; or whether it be, that in peace, to enlarge themselves, they seeke new countries: These also fall presently under the power Regall; because these things cannot well be done, but where there is a superiour, that is Head; as *Milan* did under *Bellovisus*; *Padua* under *Antenor*; *Lavinium* under *Æneas*; and *Athens* under *Theseus*.

But if a City happen to be built by many that are

equals and have no chiefe amongst them: in this case onely, it may be that Cities have not their beginning under Kings: of which, there may be many occasions. First, when the end was not first publique to build a City; but rather for private commodity; where men might place their persons and goods in safety; which in other places by reason of warres they could not do; and in case of such danger, many building houses, now one and then another, have thereby made as it were a Village, and at last a City. Which having beene built insensibly and by fits, is therefore not governed by Regall power; which it would have been, if it had been built at once by a number of people united together: a thing impossible to happen, where there is not a Head: as *Plato* in his Dialogue of Lawes hath learnedly taught. And therefore *Venice* having beene founded in the foresaid manner; hath beene able to begin; is and will be able to maintaine it selfe a free City; there concurring together with the wisedome of him that built it; the valour of him that governes it. Secondly, this may happen thorough the condition of those, who without a Head joyne together to the founding of new Cities, for if they be pious and religious; of quiet dispositions, not greedy of command, and such as have had their education in a Common-wealth, where they have learned rather to content themselves with equality, then to aspire to soveraignty: there is no doubt but they will rather set up a free estate, then a Regall; as it was at the founding of *Venice*. Thirdly, it may happen by reason of their weakenesse who were the founders; amongst whom there being none fit or worthy to be a King, they are all Commanders. For this reason (though falsely) *Tarquinius* speaking to the Thoscans and Veientanes, would have it, that the City of *Rome* was become a Republique: *Se Regem augente bello, Romanum*

Imperium a proximis scelerata Conjuratione pulsos eos inter se, in quia vero Unus satis dignus Regno visus sit, partes Regni repusse.

These are the occasions by which it happens, that sometimes Cities in their beginnings are not governed by Kings: but because it is a thing that seldom hapens, we may well say; that the first reason, why the greatest part of Cities, in their beginnings, are governed by Kings, is their founding: which without a head, can ill be done. A second reason we may take from the Inhabitants; who in the beginning being but few; are apt to tolerate the Regall Power: an instruction that *Aristotle* gives, *Propter paucitatem enim hominum, non erat magnus numerus mediocrium; itaque pauci cum essent, multitudine & Institutione; magis ferebant ab aliis gubernari*: and this certainely *Livie* meant when he said; that if *Brutus* had deposed any of the first Kings, while the multitude was yet unfit to beare any other government then the Regall; the Common-wealth had thereby been Endangered. *Dissipatæ res nondum adultæ Discordia forent, quas fovit tranquilla moderatio Imperii, eoque nutriendo perduxit, ut bonam frugem libertatis, maturis jam viribus ferre posset.* A third reason and like unto this, may be taken from the difficulty to finde many in the first founding of a City, that are of ability and fit to governe: for which reason perhaps, *Aristotle* saith, *Rex ab Initio repertus est, quia difficile erat, viros plures excellenti virtute reperiri.* And so much the more, the City being then, (as *Lucius Florus* saith) in her childhood; and consequently, wanton and given to pleasures; and therefore had need of such a schoolmaster as a King is, to keep them in awe; whom liberty else would soone corrupt. And to this purpose it is that *Livie* speaks, and that of the liberty of *Rome*. *Quid enim futurum fuit, si illa Pastorum convenarumque plebs transfuga ex suis populis, sub tutela Inviolati Templi, aut libertatem*

aut

aut certam impunitatem adepta, ſoluta Regio imperio, agitari cepta eſſet Tribunitiis procellis. No man therefore ought to marvell, that our Lord God, in the time of the Moſaicall Law, never gave to the Hebrews a Commonwealth, as long as either immediately by himſelfe, or elſe by the meanes of Kings or Judges, he governed them in feare, under ſevere lawes; whereof when men came to be more perfect, he abated the rigour; as Saint *Auſtin* excellently expreſſeth, ſaying; *Deus Hebræis diverſa pro qualitate temporis, impoſuit Præcepta; erant enim ſub lege quaſi pueri ſub Pædagogo inclusi:* and therefore Saint *Paul* ſaith; *Sub lege cuſtodiebamur in Chriſto, nutriens nos tanquam parvulos ſub rigore & Diſciplina.* The laſt reaſon is, becauſe a City in its Beginning hath need of Lawes, which may better be given by one alone, then by a multitude; whereof *Ariſtotle* gives the reaſon, *Quia Unum nanciſci & paucos facilius eſt quam multos qui recte ſentiant, & poſſint leges condere, & jus conſtituere.*

Now having ſhewed, that not without juſt cauſe, the City of *Rome* was in its beginning governed by *Romulus*: it will not be amiſſe, to examine the ſcituation of the City, and therein to ſhew the Founders wiſdome in the building it. Firſt therefore the ſcite of a City, (according to *Ariſtotle*) ought neither to be too remote from the ſea, nor yet too neer it; to the end, that by too much remotenes, it be not deprived of many commodities, which the Sea is wont to bring in; and by too great neerneſſe, it be not expoſed to the danger of ſuddaine aſſaults. Secondly, It ought to be in a good aire; as the thing, which of all other, can moſt annoy us; being continually, not onely about us, but taken into us. Thirdly, it ought to be in a place of plenty; without which, there can never accrew any greatneſſe to a City. Fourthly, it ought to be in a place, eaſie for carriage and bringing in of commodities. Fifthly and

laſtly,

lastly, it ought to be in a place of advantage for assaulting its neighbours: and difficult it selfe to be assaulted. Now that *Rome* was scituated according to these rules of *Aristotle*, is related by *Livie*, where he saith: *Non sine causa Dii hominesque hunc urbi condendæ locum legerunt, saluberrimos colles*; here he shewes the goodnesse of the ayre: *Flumen optimum quo ex Mediterraneis locis fruges advehantur.* Here he shewes the facility of carriage, either by Land or Water: *Mare vicinum ad commoditates; nec expositum, nimia propinquitate ad periculà classium exterarum Nationum.* Here he shewes a neerenesse to the sea in respect of profit: and a remotenesse, in respect of danger. *Italiæ Medium ad Incrementum urbis natum unice*: Here he shewes the difficulty for being assaulted, by people farre off, being in the midst of *Italy*; and by people neere hand, by reason of its own strength. We may therefore conclude: that a City built to grow great, cannot possibly have a more excellent scituation, (according to *Aristotle*) then *Rome* had.

Libertatem Lucius Brutus Instituit.

How the City of Rome *came from being governed by Kings, to be a free State; and what the difference is betweene a beginning and a cause.*

The second Discourse.

HAving shewed the causes for which the City of *Rome*, was in her first beginning governed by Kings: I conceave it to be no lesse necessary, to make inquiry how it hapned, that leaving that kind of government, it came under *Brutus*, to be a free State: and seeing, of the causes that may be alledged, (setting them

them aſide that are ſupernaturall) ſome are Philoſophicall, and ſome Politicall; theſe conſiſting in the things done; thoſe in the order of number, and influences of the Heavens; I ſay firſt, ſpeaking as a Politician; There are many of opinion, that this alteration of government in *Rome*, was cauſed by the raviſhing of *Lucretia*, by *Sextus Tarquinius*: which opinion *Ariſtotle* ſeemes not much to decline; while ſpeaking of the cauſes, by which Monarchies and States come to be changed, he omits not to name for one, the luſt and laſciviouſneſſe of the Prince: which (as he ſhewes by many examples) have been the cauſe of change in all kinds of Commonwealths and Monarchies. Others may ſay, that this change of government in *Rome*, proceeded from this, that *Tarquinius* had taken away all authority from the Senators; and had by deviſes procured the utter aboliſhing of the Senate; which alſo was the cauſe, that the Monarchy of *Rome*, paſſed afterwards from the houſe of the *Cæſars*, into that of *Galba*. The cauſe likewiſe of the change in *Syracuſa*, from a Monarchy to a popular State; when *Hieronymus* not following the ſteps of his grandfather *Hieron*; deveſted the Senate of all authority; and was therefore by conſpiratours moſt miſerably ſlaine. For as the ſtomacke, which is the ſeat of naturall heat; as long as it hath in it any little nouriſhment, leaves the body in peace and quiet; but if it be altogether without, it then drawes nouriſhment from the head, and thereby oftentimes deſtroyes the body: ſo if the Senate have but ſome little authority left it, it then reſts ſatisfied and contented; but if it be wholly deprived of all authority, it then turnes head upon their head, and fals upon the Prince; and oftentimes becomes the ruine of the City. And even this is one reaſon, that *Octavius Auguſtus*, after the death of *Cæſar*, was able to continue in his Empire; becauſe he left to the Senate, part of

that

that authority which *Cæſar* had before aboliſhed; at leaſt had plotted to aboliſh.

By the examples hitherto brought, I conceave it may be gathered, that theſe were the true Politicall cauſes, why the City of *Rome*, changed its regall government, to a free State; but becauſe to ſay but this, would be to confound beginnings with cauſes; it is neceſſary to expatiate a little; that ſo returning backe, I may leave no man uncapable of this truth.

We muſt therfore know, that between a beginning and a cauſe, there is great difference; not ſpeaking of them either Philoſophically, or Theologically; although in each of them, it might eaſily be ſhewed. In Theologie; becauſe the Father is the beginning of the Sonne; and the Father and the Sonne, the beginning of the Holy Ghoſt; yet neither the Father is cauſe of the Sonne, nor the Father and Sonne cauſe of the Holy Ghoſt, as *Thomas Aquinas* doth learnedly demonſtrate. In Philoſophy; ſeeing *Ariſtotle* in his Phyſicks; and in his books of Generation and Corruption, ſhews manifeſt difference, between beginnings and cauſes. But becauſe *Ariſtotle* in diſtinguiſhing thẽ, takes thẽ not alwaies in the ſenſe that we take them; and oftentimes alſo confounds them; as in his Metaphyſicks; where he ſhewes that a cauſe and a beginning, are as *Ens* and *Unum*; which are convertible one with the other; and in another place affirmes, that all cauſes are beginnings: and in Divinity likewiſe the Greeke Fathers mingle oftentimes in the Perſons of the Trinity, the cauſes with the beginnings: as Saint *Gregory Nazianzen* and others: we therefore in this place, will forbeare to ſpeak of them, either Philoſophically, or Theologically; but will frame our Diſcourſe, by way of actions; ſhewing into how great errors thoſe men have runne, who confound cauſes with beginnings; a thing which *Tacitus* is not guilty of, who in his

his History saying; *Struebat jam fortuna in diversa parte terrarum initia causas Imperii*; shewes plainly he knew that a cause and a beginning were not both one thing.

We may therefore take causes to be those that are in the understanding; beginnings, those by whose meanes, that which is in the understanding is put in execution. And so a cause comes to be, the first in the intention; and the last in execution; a beginning, the last in the intention; and the first, in execution.

This, *Polybius* well understood where he saith, *Causæ omnibus in rebus primæ sunt; Principia verò ultima causarum: equidem ita existimo, Principia dici Primas omnium actiones in rebus quæ judicatæ ac deliberatæ sunt; causas verò quæ judicium deliberationemque præcedant.* And thereupon excellently well he saith, That the cause of the second warre of the Carthaginians with the Romans, was the indignation of *Amilcar Hannibals* father: who, though he were not overcome by Land of his enemies the Romans, yet the Carthaginian Forces being put to the worse by them, he thought it his best course to make peace, and to lay downe Armes for the present, reserving in his mind a perpetuall indignation, which encreased afterward by their threatning of warre, at such time as the Carthaginians distracted with other discords, and thereby not able to withstand them, lost *Sardinia*. Whereupon, *Amilcar* incensed with a new indignation, had an intention to make warre upon them, many yeeres before *Hannibal* passed into *Italy*. These were the causes of the warre: but the beginnings of it were afterward the siege of *Saguntum*: and *Hannibals* passing over the River *Hiber*. So you see, the beginnings were not at the same time; but were long before proceded by the causes.

To returne now to our purpose, concerning the alteration of States; it is seldome seen, that the cause and the beginning happen both at one time. The

cause

cauſe that moved *Cæſar*, to change the State in *Rome*; was an impatience of equality; which being borne and bred with him, was haſtened in him, by the threatning of his enemies, preſſing him to give over his Conſulſhip, and to give an account of what he had done; a thing of great difficulty and danger in Commonwealths, as was ſeen in the caſe of *Scipio*, of *Furius Camillus*, and others. But the beginning was his paſſing over the river *Rubicon*. So likewiſe the change which the Iſraelites made in the time of *Samuel*, from Judges to Kings; had a beginning diverſe from the cauſe; there being in their hearts ſometime before a deſire of Kings, through an impatience of liberty, (as writers hold) which afterward tooke beginning from the injuſtice of the ſons of *Samuel*.

The cauſe then that *Rome* came to be a free State, was *Romulus*, and the Citizens growing to perfection. *Romulus*, becauſe he being ſole King, made ſuch lawes and ordinances in the State, that ſhewed he had more regard to prepare the Romans for liberty, then to eſtabliſh the Monarchy to his ſucceſſors: ſeeing he reſerved to himſelfe no other authority but to aſſemble the Senat; nor other charge but to command the Army in time of warre. It may be ſaid then, that either *Romulus* ſhewed but ſmall ſigne of wiſdome, to make ordinances contrary to himſelfe; whereof being afterward aware, he meant with a greater error, to take from the Senat that authority, which being now eſtabliſhed, was ſoone after, the cauſe of his death. Or we may ſay, and better, that *Romulus* as having no children, had no deſire to leave *Rome* under a Regall government; and the City having none in it, but imperfit men, he had no power to leave it a free State; untill by being governed firſt by one alone, they ſhould learne to be able of themſelves to hold that, which to come to know, they needed firſt, to be guided

by

by a King. Juſt as ſwimming maſters uſe to doe; who beare a hand over them they teach, untill ſuch time as they grow able to governe themſelves; and then they leave them at their owne liberty. This made *Tyberius* (as *Dion* reports) praiſe *Auguſtus* ſo much: though not without flattery: ſaying, he had imitated thoſe Phyſitians, who barring their Patient, the ordering of his own body; they firſt reſtore the Body to health, before they allow him the ordering of it. Inſomuch, that after the death of *Romulus*, the people not yet grown to perfection, there was not one man that once ſpake of liberty; but all agreed to deſire a King. *Regem tamen omnes volebant* (ſaith *Livy*) *libertatis dulcedine nondum experta.* It was not thus at the time of the *Tarquins*; for the people being then growne to perfection, there was in the City good ſtore of Common wealths men; fitter to governe, then to be governed. And ſo came up this government moſt agreeable to nature; which is (as the Philoſopher ſaith) that he be commander of others who is wiſer then others. And therefore *Numa Pompilius* needed no guard to ſafeguard his life; ſeeing governments that are naturall, are a guard to themſelves. From hence it was, that our Lord God, the firſt time he gave a King, (as the holy Scripture ſaith) *Non erat ſimilis ei in Iſrael*; meaning to ſhew, that he is not worthy to be ruler over others, who is not wiſer then others. There being then in thoſe times, ſuch excellent men in the City of *Rome*, as ought rather to give then to take lawes from the Tarquines; they had in them, an ardent deſire, to obtaine that liberty in poſſeſſion, which they had now prevented with merit. And therefore it appeares, that *Junius Brutus*, even from his youth, had this intention: for going with the ſonnes of *Tarquin* to the Oracle, to aske which of them ſhould be Lord of *Rome*, and the Oracle anſwering; he that firſt ſhould kiſſe his mother,

he preſently kiſſed the Earth; and yet he knew not then, that *Tarquin* ſhould raviſh his wife *Lucretia*. Now if this injury onely had beene the motive to *Brutus*, certainly then, as the injury came from a particular perſon; ſo the revenge ſhould rather have been taken upon that particular perſon, then upon the power Regall; and yet we ſee the contrary happened: for *Brutus* in the oath which he cauſed his confederates to take, made this one part, not to ſuffer any to reigne; not onely not the Tarquines, but not any other perſon whatſoever. *Nec illos nec alium quemquam regnare Romæ paſſurum*. A manifeſt argument, that he had more deſire, to abrogate the regall Power, then to vindicate the adultery. So much more, as the conſpirators addreſſed themſelves againſt the dignity rather then againſt the life of the offender. The cauſe then of this alteration in the ſtate of *Rome*, was the Citizens ſpirits being grown to ſuch perfection, that they could no longer tolerate Kings: and this no ſooner then they were arrived at ſuch perfection. In ſigne whereof, I conſider amongſt ſo many Kings as *Rome* had; how onely *Tully Oſtillus*, the predeceſſor of *Tarquinius ſuperbus*, had the intention to make it a free ſtate, which certainly had taken effect, if his death had not prevented it. *Ac tam moderatum Imperium, tamen quia Unius eſſet, deponere eum in animo habuiſſe, ni ſcelus liberandæ patriæ conſilia agitanti interemiſſet*. Which becauſe we cannot aſcribe to the onely goodneſſe of *Tullus*; ſeeing *Numa Pompilius*, a better man perhaps then he, never had any ſuch thought: we muſt needs ſay, that *Numa* ſeeing the Citizens unfit for a republicke, ſet them in a way to that perfection, to which arrived under *Tullus*. It ſhould be an eaſie matter for ſuch Citizens to conſerve that liberty, which under a good Prince they had received. And here experience ſhewes that, which *Ariſtotle* ſpeaking naturally, knew well in matters politicke;

ticke; for assigning the cause, why Power regall changeth oftentimes to a free State, he alledgeth no other reason, but the passing from imperfection to perfection: saying thus; *Sed cum postea contingeret, ut plures pari virtute reperirentur, non amplius toleraruut Regem; sed commune quiddam quærentes, respublicas constituere.*

Moreover, that the ordinances of *Romulus* had not been sufficient, if with it there had not concurred a perfection in the Citizens; will be easily conceived, if we consider the case of *Moses* who was blamed by *Jethro* for ruling himselfe alone: I doe not believe it was, for that he did not judge well; or for that, he tooke too great paines: but rather, for that he shewed not to be more intentive to strengthen his owne power, then to prepare for others the goodway, of which this was the chiefe and first foundation; *Ut non aliter ratio constet quam si uni reddatur.* And therefore, he appointed them a Senate, which by their authority, might serve to set the people in a way to know their owne good; shewing them the way, with which being once acquainted, he might leave them afterward to walk in it of themselves: in such sort, that *Moses* no lesse then *Romulus* directed the Israelites the way to liberty; but they, never attaining to know the way, as never comming (I speake not in matters of Religion) to that perfection, to which the Romans attained: as these could not endure Kings; so those had no will to live in liberty; for although they met with the same cause, extrinsecall; yet they had not the same cause, intrinsecall; which *Moses* well knew, when perceiving his death to approach, he made his prayer to God, that he would provide them a leader, to the end, that as sheep not knowing the way, if it be not shewed them by a shepheard, they might be by him directed. *Provideat Dominus Deus spirituum, omnis carnis, homi-*

nem qui sit super multitudinem hanc; ut possit exire & introire ante eos, vel introducere, ne sint sicut oves sine pastore. And he that will more plainly see their imperfection, let him consider, that in the long absence of *Moyses*, they never demanded any other leader; there being none amongst them fit to governe them; but onely desired, that *Aaron* would make some Gods, *Fac nobis Deos qui nos præcedant.* Whereupon for all the many beginnings the Israelites had, from which they might have taken occasion, to erect a Commonwealth; yet they never did it: because as causes be not sufficient, if with them there concurre not beginnings; so beginnings are of no force, if they come not accompanied with causes; and causes availe not neither, if they be not good. The death of *Cæsar* was a beginning from which a Common wealth might have been erected; but because it was grounded upon a cause that was not politicall, proceeding rather from the hatred and spleene against the Prince, then upon any mature judgement, or judicious counsaile; it was not therefore fit, to bring them to a be free State. So when the Senatours killed *Romulus*; they had by that a beginning of liberty: but it happning upon the same occasion, as that of Cæsar, they hardly had so much braine to agree among themselves to choose a King. So as when there concurre not causes, beginnings oftentimes are left unpursued: that I cannot but say, if *Lucretia* had been ravished by *Romulus*; yet *Rome* for all that had never gotten liberty. It behooves therefore to take great heed, when there be occasions first, not to give the least cause of a beginning: and therefore the Israelites, being moved to demand a King, upon a very great occasion, namely their unfitnesse to suffer liberty; they tooke for a beginning a most weake cause, namely the old age of *Samuel*; and yet for all he could doe, in shewing them the burthens of tyranny; telling

them as a Prophet, that instead of a King, they should have a tyrant; he could never perswade them to leave demanding a King. And therefore *David*, after his great sinne, knowing he had given the people great cause to rebell, avoyded all occasions, from which they might take never so weake a beginning; and for this cause forbare to punish *Joab*, though provoked to it by just indignation; and left the revenge of it, to his successor. Whereupon we may beleeve, that *Tarquinius Superbus*, and his sonne shewed little discretion, seeing so many worthy men desirous of liberty; that they would give them occasion of beginning it: The one by taking away all authority from the Senat; and other, and that more hainously, by ravishing *Lucretia*: considering that the insolency of the sonnes, makes alwaies the Prince himselfe odious, as *Guicciardine* relates of *John Bentivoglio*. And hereof we have a like example in the holy Scripture, of *Hemor Hevæus* Prince of the Sichemites; who lost his Kingdome, thorough the ravishment his sonne *Sichem* committed upon *Dyna* the daughter of *Jacob* and *Lea*: whereof the holy text in *Genesis* saith; *Egressa est autem Dyna filia Leæ ut videret mulieres regionis illius; quam cum vidisset Sichem filius Hemor Hevæi, Principis terræ illius, adamavit eam, & rapuit, & dormivit cum illa; vi opprimens virginem*: and in the end of the Chapter, *Arreptis duo filii Jacob Simeon & Levi, patres Dynæ gladiis; Ingressi sunt urbem confidenter: Interfectisque omnibus masculis Emor & Sichem pariter necaverunt; & depopulati sunt urbem in ultionem stupri*. Thus the cause which gave the Romans occasion of a beginning, if we consider it of the sonnes part, may be conceived to be this; that he was the first, that had ancestours in such height of greatnesse; a thing that commonly puffes up men, and makes them proud; as *Galba* said speaking of *Nero*, *Simulacrum Nero, quem longa Cæsarum series tuentem*; and therefore

the first that arrive to any height of greatnesse; they alwaies endeavor to shunne contempt; but their successours, while they give themselves to pleasures, in that very time, they make themselves contemptible; and give occasion to others to oppresse them. Which *Aristotle* expressely teacheth us, where he saith, *Plerique eorum qui Dominationes adepti sunt, eas usque ad extremum conservaverunt; sed qui ab illis susceperunt, confestim ut ita dixerim, perierunt omnes; in voluptatibus enim viventes efficiuntur facile contemnendi; ac multas perhibent occasiones opprimendi sui.* This was the very cause of altering the Principality of the *Acheans* (as *Polybius* relates) for that Principality having had beginning in the vertues of *Tisamenes*, the sonne of *Oreste*; It had ending in the vices of the successours of *Ligius*, *Postea vero molestè ferre Regnum cœperunt, quia filii ligii non jam legitimi, sed per Tyrannidem Provinciam gubernarent.*

And this is so true, as both *Aristotle* affirmes, and is confirmed by experience; that the first purchasers of a power, doe for the most part maintaine it; and that in their successours it commonly vanisheth; that I cannot choose but make a little digression, to shew the reasons of it. The first is, because they who acquire any thing with labour, account and love it as an issue of their owne: and therefore use as much diligence in keeping it, as they tooke paines in getting it; from whence it is, as *Plato* intimates, that those men are commonly the greatest lovers of riches, who by their owne industry have been the getters: and therefore our Lord God in *Esay*, promising infinite contentments and exaltations to his people, in giving the reason of this so great happinesse; he saith, *Dominabuntur nui qui fecit te.* A second reason, and perhaps a better is, because they who first acquire an estate, must needs doe it by way of some eminency; either of subtilty, or wit, or force, or such like; wherein excelling others,

they shew themselves in that kind, to be more vertuous then others, as *Aristotle* in the first of his Politicks saith; that to overcome, is not without vertue; and seeing Empires are easily kept by those arts, by which they are acquired, *Nam Imperium facile iis artibus retinetur*, (saith *Salust*) *quibus à principio partum est*; it will be an easie matter, for him that hath acquired it, seeing he must necessarily acquire it by way of vertue, by the same way to maintaine it. Whereas his successors very seldome succeed him in vertue, and easily loose that, for the getting whereof, they have taken no paines. A third reason is, because he who riseth first to a power, contents himselfe with every little authority; as *Aristotle* saith, *Contigit autem hoc maxime, post mutationes rerum publicarum: Non enim stat in mutantur; sed contenti sunt ab initio homines, parva concessione patentia*: Whereupon it ought not to seem strange, but rather it is ascribed to the Prince, for a great favour, that which oftentimes he grants for his owne security; and all that, wherein one hath more power then others, yet arrogates no more to himselfe then others; is received of subjects, as so much given them. Where the successours commonly have more pride, and lesse vertue, then their predecessours: and think not themselves Princes, if they raise not their owne authority by depressing of others; as *Hieronymus* did in *Syracusa*; and as *Jeroboam* when he said, *Grossior est minimus digitus meus, dorso patris mei*. And this is so much more distastfull to subjects, to see themselves more restrained by him, that hath lesse worthinesse; that it seemes to invite them to conspiracies; as to the one, and the other of those before mentioned, it happened. A fourth and last reason is, because those men who come newly to a power, are commonly suspitious of loosing it againe; and therefore doubting their owne children, they are contented to see them plun-

ged

ged in vices; and estranged from the love of the subjects; whereupon, they comming afterward to the Principality, cannot choose but run a hazard.

But to returne from whence I digressed; the cause why *Tarquinius* used such cruelty to the Senate, which made them so much desire liberty; was in my opinion, because *Ancus Martius* was preferred before him; and therupon conceiving great indignation against the Senators & people; & coming afterward to the government; he meant to be revenged upon thē with bridling them a little. And such men should never be made Emperours, as from whom there can be nothing expected, but effects of cruelty. An instruction which *Cornelius Tacitus* gives us; while discoursing of the causes, why the Romans speaking of a successor to *Augustus* by reason of his approaching death, would not have *Agrippa Posthumus*, mentions this as the chiefe, *Trucem Agrippam & Ignominia accensum*. For *Tiberius* being preferd before him in the lifetime of *Augustus*; and having suffered banishment in the Iland of *Pianosa*; he was full of spleene and indignation; which no doubt he would have shewed, if he had ever come to be Emperour. For this very cause also *Otho* misliked the election which Galba made, and was doubtfull of *Piso*; *Ingenio trucem, & longo exilio efferatum.*

The Beginning then of the change of government in *Rome*, to speake as a Politician, was the lasciviousnesse of *Lucius Tarquin*; and the pride of his father: but the causes were, the ordinances of *Romulus*, and the perfection of the Cittizens.

But to speake of the causes as a Philosopher; we may assigne two; answerable to that which *Aristotle* relates to have been the opinion of *Plato*; one from the influence of the Heavens; the other from numbers. As for the first of these; by reason of the uncertainty of the yeeres, and perhaps of the Art, I take not

upon

upon me, with any probability to discourse; and therefore passing to the other, which is numbers: *Plato* saith, that the number of seven, hath great operation in the changes of Commonwealths, which may first be observed in the Commonwealth of our body; wherein from seven to seven there is a continuall change; and there want not examples hereof in all kinds of government; as we may see in *Esay*, in *Jeremy*, in *Daniel*, in Saint *Matthew*, in the Sabbatisme, in the Monarchy of *Cain*, & in so many other places; that we must needs beleeve this number to beare a great sway in changes generally, as by others before me hath been observed; yet considering it as to my purpose, it hath not perhaps by any been observed but now by my selfe, that to the foresaid causes of the change of government in *Rome*, this of the number of seven may also be added, seeing after seven Kings, (as every one knowes) it came to be a free state; yet I meane not that numbers can enforce, but onely incline, as instruments of that Almighty God, who *Omnia posuit in numero, pondere & Mensura.*

A Parallell between the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus *against* Cæsar, *and that of* Lucius Brutus *against* Tarquin: *whereby we may see why the one brought in liberty; the other, tyranny.*

The third Discourse.

HAving shewed *Rome* at last came to be a free state, by meanes of the conspiracy of *Lucius Brutus* against the Tarquines; I conceive it necessary to examine, why the conspiracy of *Marcus Brutus* against *Cæsar*, having been moved with the same intention, yet wrought not the same effect; and no better

way

way to come to know it, then by comparing them together.

Many things are wont to concurre in favour of an action; whereof ſome are antecedents, and give it as it were birth; other are concomitant, and give it nourriſhment; others againe are ſubſequent, and procure it ſtrength.

The action of *Brutus* in killing *Tarquin*, was aided by the three foreſaid things, to make *Rome* a free ſtate; Firſt the ordinances of *Romulus*, which tended rather to bring in liberty, then to preſerve a Monarchy: then the aptneſſe of the Cittizens, who now grown fit of themſelves to governe, could no longer endure to be governed by others; and laſtly the inſolency and proud tyranny of *Tarquin*, ſo extreamely diſtaſtfull to all the Citizens. Thus *Romulus* ſet them in a way; the perfection of the Cittizens made them fit; and the inſolency of the *Tarquines* made them deſirous. Now if we looke upon the action of *Marcus Brutus* in killing *Cæſar*; we ſhall finde there were all the three cauſes too; but becauſe they were contrary, they therefore brought forth a contrary effect. The firſt was the domination of *Cinna*, of *Sylla*, of *Pompey* and of *Marcus Craſſus*: who ſet the City in a way, and made it plyant to tolerate Monarchy. The ſecond was the imperfection of the Citizens, which was growne ſo great, that where *Rome* had ſometimes been a City much honoured for vertue; it was now become through evill cuſtome, moſt abhominable. Thirdly, there concurred the great clemency and goodneſſe of *Cæſar*, with which he had gotten and tied unto him the hearts of the people; ſo as, inſtead of the ordinances of *Romulus*, to ſet them in a way of liberty, there præceded here the waies of *Marius* and others, to lead them into ſervitude. Inſtead of perfection of the Citizens, which made them fit to live a free people; there con-

concurred here imperfection, which made them good for nothing but to live in bondage; and where in the one there concurred the cruelty and Pride of the Tarquines, to make them deſire liberty; in the other, there concurred the affability and clemency of *Ceſar*, to make them content with ſervitude.

Now againe if we come to ſpeake of the cauſes concomitant, there were three things concurred in ayd of the conſpiracy againſt the Tarquins. Firſt, the raviſhing of *Lucretia*; ſufficient of it ſelfe, as a publique injury, to cauſe a publique inſurrection. And therefore *Virginius* ſpeaking againſt *Appius Claudius*, who would have raviſhed his daughter, ſaid to the people, with a purpoſe to ſet them in commotion; *Illis enim quoque filias, ſorores, conjuges eſſe; ſed quo impunitior ſit, eo effrenatiorem fore, aliena calamitate documentum datum illis cavendæ ſimilis injuriæ.* Secondly, the juſt indignation of *Lucius Brutus* againſt *Tarquinius*. Thirdly, his acquainting the people with his intention: letting them know the cauſes that moved him; and ſo, they having a part in the conſpiracy, could not chooſe but approve it; and having a part in the danger, not chooſe but maintaine it. Thus the adultery committed with *Lucretia*, gave a color to the conſpiracy: the juſt indignation of *Lucius Brutus*, ſet a gloſſe upon the Authour; the communicating it to the people, made them a party in the cauſe, and facilitated the action. Now in the fact of *Marcus Brutus* againſt *Ceſar*, there concurred the many favours and graces which the Prince had alwaies ſhewed to all; the many benefits which *Marcus Brutus* had received, the murder committed in the Senate, without the peoples knowledge; and where the raviſhing of *Lucretia*, gave a colour to the baniſhing of the Tarquins; the favours of *Ceſar* diſcovered the ill intention of the conſpirators; and where in the one, the offence done to *Lucius Brutus*, ſet a gloſſe of

praiſe upon the authour: in the other, the benefits beſtowed by *Cæſar*, ſet a blot of ignominy upon *Marcus Brutus*, and made him hatefull to all the people: and where the Commons being made partakers of the conſpiracy againſt the Tarquins, conceived it was done for the publicke good; here the Commons knowing nothing of the matter, conceaved it was done for private profit. Laſtly, if we looke to the things ſubſequent; we ſhall alſo in them finde great contrariety. For after the death of the Tarquins, firſt, there followed an eaſing the people of taxations; and a maintaining them in plenty, to the end they might taſt the benefit of liberty; ſecondly, they put to death thoſe Noblemen, that had been adherents to the Tarquines; to the end they might be made ſure for making innovation. Thirdly, they extinguiſhed the whole race of the Tarquins, to the end they might be out of feare, of the States ever comming to any of them againe. And thus they ſecured themſelves from the people, from the Nobility, and from the blood Royall. Now after the death of *Cæſar*, all things were cleane contrary: Firſt, where in that caſe, the benefit of liberty was made appeare to the people: Here *Antonius* with a moſt eloquent Oration, reading *Cæſars* Will, wherein he had given a great Donative to the people; made them ſenſible, how much more it would be for their profit to have a Prince. Secondly, where in that caſe, the partakers were all put to death; here, they were all left living. Thirdly, where in that caſe, there were Armies levied againſt the line of the Tarquines; to the end, they might never be able to recover the government: here, Armies were levied in ayd of *Auguſtus*, to the end, he might more eaſily make himſelfe Prince. Let no man therefore marvell, if where the intention was equall, yet the ſucceſſe was not equall; by reaſon of the difference, and inequa-

lity

lity of the accidents. I have omitted in this diſcourſe ſome other differences, that were between theſe two conſpiracies; meaning to ſpeake of them in another place.

Pompeii Craſsique Potentia cito in Cæſarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Auguſtum ceſſere.

That the power of a few cannot conſiſt in any number better then in three.

The fourth Diſcourſe.

THe Common-wealth of *Rome*, leaving the government of one, and paſſing by the number of two, where it ſtayed a while under *Marius* and *Sylla*; ſetled at laſt in the number of three: the firſt time under *Cæſar*, *Craſſus*, and *Pompey*; the ſecond time, under *Anthony*, *Lepidus* and *Auguſtus*. Which how much better it was, then to have ſtayed in two; every one may know, that will but conſider, either Philoſophically, or Theologically, or Politically, what great force there is in the number of three, for the conſervation and union of things. Indeed *Ariſtotle* had no better way to ſhew the neceſſity of the *Materia Prima*, then this; ſeeing there being a forme and a privation which are two; it was never poſſible they ſhould be united together, but in a third: in which, and by which they might be conjoyned. Alſo the ſchoole of *Theophraſtus*, contented not it ſelfe, to deliver for Principles, Radicall moyſture, and Naturall heate; knowing, that two alone are deſtructive; but he added a third; that is, ſalt and cold, and dry; to the end, that with cold he might aſſociate Radicall moyſture; and

with the dry, Naturall heate; and conſequently make a perfect union of the three, that is Salt, Sulphur, and Mercury. It is therefore no marvell, if Divines alſo make a Trinity in the Deity, not only a Father and a Sonne, but alſo a Holy Ghoſt: who (as many of them ſay) unites the Father with the Sonne; and it is very convenient, that from that Eſſence which is one, there ſhould come three, a child of unity. Againe, if we examine it Politically why three ſhould be conſervative; we ſhall finde it manifeſt of it ſelfe; becauſe if one of the three ſhould aſpire to be ſole Prince; preſently the other two would joyne and oppoſe, and utterly fruſtrate his deſigne. And if two of the three ſhould grow at variance, the third would either by interpoſing reconcile them; or ſtanding neuter, as onely a looker on, they would grow friends of themſelves; for feare leaſt the other ſhould reape the benefit of their victory. And therefore *Ariſtotle* found fault with *Plato* for making a Commonwealth to conſiſt of only Prince and People, and conſequently of only two formes: ſaying it had been much better, to have made it to conſiſt of three; which yet to many ſeems a Paradox; becauſe as multiplying of good, makes a more good; ſo multiplying of evill, makes alwaies a more evill. And why then would he rather have three corruptions then two? for no other cauſe as I conceave, but that he would plainly ſhew he knew the number of three to be conſervative; and the number of two, deſtructive; there being nothing that more ruines Cities, then to be divided into two without a third; as *Ariſtotle* in many places ſhews: and praiſing that City for the beſt, which is full of middling ſorts of men; for no other cauſe, but becauſe there are in it the three; that is, rich, poore, and of a middling ranke; and ſhewes that where theſe are not, it is impoſſible a City ſhould continue. To come then to a Monarchy, it was of neceſſity,

ceſſity, that the number of three ſhould be deſtroyed; and to deſtroy three, It was of neceſſity, either by encreaſing it to bring it to foure; or by abating it, to bring it to two; juſt as the apoſtate *Lucifer*, would have done to divide and deſtroy the heavenly Monarchy; when leaving the circumference founded upon the divine Center, he framed another higher Circle founded upon the center of himſelfe, bringing the one to two; which becauſe it could not continue, he was therefore caſt into Hell: where ſeeking againe to deſtroy the Divine Monarchy, by bringing it to two; he perſwaded *Eve* to eat the forbidden fruit. We may ſay then, that as long as the number of three ſtood firme in *Craſſus*, *Cæſar*, and *Pompey*, So long the government came not to be a Monarchy; but as ſoon as *Craſſus* died, and that the number came from three to two, there preſently grew diſſention between *Cæſar* and *Pompey*, till *Cæſar* at laſt made himſelfe ſole Emperour. Likewiſe in the *Triumvirate* of *Auguſtus*, none of them was ſo hardy as once to ſtirre: but *Lepidus* being gone out of the three, there fell diſcord between *Mark Anthony* and *Auguſtus*; who by the death of the other, remained ſole Emperour. It is therefore no marvell that the Jewes, ſeeing the government of Judges was to come to two, under the ſonnes of *Samuel*, demanded a King; conſidering that two and foure which proceeds from the ſame root, is no leſſe a child of the divell; then three and one which is the root of it, is the child of God. And therefore God bleſſed not the ſecond day; and in the creation, the Holy Ghoſt by the mouth of *Moſes*, makes mention of three things; the Heaven, the Earth, and the waters. Which perhaps moved *Plato* in his *Timæus*, to make three Elements, three and one being union; two and foure, diſ-union.

Cuncta Diſcordiis civilibus feſſa, nomine Principis ſubimperium accepit.

Of what kind of Diſcord the Authour intends to ſpeake.

The fifth Diſcourſe.

BEing by occaſion of this paſſage, of neceſſity to ſpeake of diſcords; and oftentimes to commend them, though with ſome diſtinction: I cannot omit to explaine my meaning; which is, that where I affirme, diſcords fit to be fomented; I mean alwaies amongſt the enemies of the Chriſtian faith; amongſt whom diſcords are of ſuch benefit, that the Prophet *Abacuck* in expreſſe termes ſaith: *Fluvios ſcindes terræ*; which S. *Hierome* expounding ſaith, *Reges terræ adverſum populum tuum dimicantes dividis & diſperges.* For in holy Scripture, by Rivers oftentimes are meant Kings: becauſe as rivers watering the fields in fit time and place, make them fruitfull; or otherwaies with unſeaſonable overflowing, deſtroy them: ſo Kings with the ſweetneſſe of juſtice, increaſe; or otherwiſe, with unmeaſurable cruelty, overthrow the Kingdome. The Prophet therefore deſires, that the Princes of the Earth may be divided, meaning ſuch Princes, as make a God of earthly things; to the end, that by ſuch diviſion, they may more eaſily be overthrown: there being nothing more hurtfull, not only to the good, but even to the wicked themſelves, then the concord of the wicked. As S. *Auſtin* declares it, where he ſaith, *Sicut multum nocet diſcordia inter bonos; ita valde dolendum eſt, quando mali pariſice vivunt; quando vero diſcordant, tunc mundus aliqualiter tranquillatur: Nam ſicut concordia malorum contraria eſt concordiæ bonorum;*

rum; ita optandum eſt, quod boni pacem habeant, & mali diſcordes ſint: nam per diſcordiam, mali aliquando optimi efficiuntur; cognoſcentes quid ſint, & quid erunt. From theſe words it may be clearely gathered, that it is as great a good to put diſcord between the wicked, as to preſerve union between the good: and therefore *Abraham* in his Sacrifice, divided the Goat and the Ram, but the Turtle-dove and the Pigeon he divided not: of which Saint *Auſtin* ſpeaking ſaith; that by this, the Holy Ghoſt would intimate, that carnall men ſhould be divided between themſelves: but good and ſpirituall men ſhould be kept in unity: of whom the Prophet *Eſay* ſpeaking, after he had ſaid, *Et fluent ad eum omnes gentes* he addes, *Non exercebuntur ultra ad prælium:* as if he would ſay, that between the good, there ſhall be alwaies peace. And therefore the Dove returning into the Arke, brought in her mouth an Olive branch; to ſhew, that the peace between good men ought to be perpetuall: as the leaves of the Olive which are never dry; or as the Oyle which gets by time, not leſſe perfection, but more purity. Let peace therefore be kept amongſt the good, and let diſcord be raiſed amongſt the wicked; imitating the diſcretion of Phyſitians, who divide and cut off corrupt members: but preſerve and keep united, the ſound. Whereupon our Lord God in S. *Matthew*, hath left written: *Non veni mittere pacem, ſed gladium*: which place S. *Chryſoſtome* expounding, ſaith: *Quia videlicet præcipua ſingulariſque Pax tunc præſtatur; quando quod tabo vel ſanie corruptum eſt abſcinditur, atque projicitur, quando factioſa & improba pars repellitur aut omnino deſtruitur: ſic certe cœlis terra conjungi poteſt. Nam & medicus hoc modo reliquum corpus conſervat facile; ſi quod reduci ad ſanitatem non poteſt, ecciderit atque abjecerit, & militiæ Dux ad ſolvendam militum conſpirationem, alterum in alterum concitat.* So did God in the Tower of *Babel*: So did S. *Paul* in the conſpiracy

spiracy plotted against him; and this may suffice for declaration of my meaning.

Now as to our purpose; seeing discords may be divided into internall, & externall: Internall, between Citizens of the same City: External, between one City & another: because it is a subject no lesse large then difficult; I will divide it into foure discourses: In the first, I wil handle whether an external war with the enemies of the Christian faith, be the best meanes to hinder internall discords amongst Christians. In the second, in what manner, and at what time discords should be raised with the enemies of our faith, for our most advantage. The third shall shew, what discords they are, that serve to uphold the formes of states. In the last I will shew, that by reason of our imperfection, there is necessary a certain discord, which may be called a Concord.

Whether an externall warre with the enemies of the faith, be the best meanes to hinder internall discords among Christians.

The sixth Discourse.

ARistotle in his Politicks seemes to thinke, that feare may be a great means to uphold Commonwealths; where he saith, *Conservantur autem Respublicæ non solum ex eo, quia procul sunt a periculis, sed etiam interdum, quia propinquæ sunt; homines enim formidantes, vigilantius intendunt ad reipublicæ custodiam: Itaque oportet eos, qui rempublicam salvam esse volunt, formidines quasdam inducere neque dissolvant, quasi nocturnam quandam custodiam reipublicæ observationem.* Whereupon, many are perswaded, that a forraine warre is the onely meanes to maintaine peace at home. And *Sallust* having an eye to this, saith, *Metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat.*

tinebat. And the Romanes as long as they had *Carthage* for an oppolite, were free all that while from civill war; and therefore *Scipio Nasica*, accounted the wiſeſt man of his time, and as ſuch choſen by the City, to have the keeping of the Mother of the Gods in his houſe, as the Oracle had commanded; gave counſell that by no meanes *Carthage* ſhould be deſtroyed. *Timens inſitum animis* (ſaith S. *Auſtin*) *hoſtem ſecuritatem: & tanquam pupillis civibus tutorem neceſſarium videns eſſe Terrorem:* and in a manner with the ſame words hath *Livy* intimated the ſame conceit, *Diſciplina erat cuſtos inſitutitatis, qua inter validiores optime Timor continet.* And therefore the Athenians (as *Plato* relates) never attained to greater perfection, then when the Perſians aſſailed *Greece.* But yet this Rule, as many other in the Politicks, though it be ſometimes good; yet is not to be truſted alwaies and in generall: for a Politician in this caſe muſt doe as a Phyſician, apply to one complexion one medicine, and to another, a divers; and oftentimes to the ſame Patient, in diverſity of diſeaſes, diverſity of medicines: and more then this, to the ſame Patient in the ſame diſeaſe, apply diverſe medicines according to diverſity of times. And therefore *Vindicianus* the Phyſitian (as S. *Auſtin* relates) having given a medicine to a ſicke friend of his, at that time it healed him; but after ſome yeers the ſame man falling again into the ſame diſeaſe, and uſing, without farther counſell of his Phyſician, the former medicine, it did him no good: whereat marvelling and asking *Vindicianus* the cauſe, he anſwered, *Quod non intellexerat videlicet illi ætati jam non hoc ſe fuiſſe factorum*, and the reaſon is, becauſe we muſt not ſo much conſider, that the perſon which uſeth the medicines is the ſame, as that the time is diverſe; and if the diverſity of time be of ſo great moment, of what moment is the diverſity of individuals? We may therefore conclude with *Ariſtotle* in

many

many places of his Ethicks; that in things belonging to particulars, there cannot be given any Rule univerſall.

I will therefore diſtinguiſh men, and conſequently Cities; ſeeing Cities are nothing elſe, but a communion of men aſſembled together to live well, as the Philoſopher defines them: afterward, I will divide the times: and laſtly, the formes of ſtates.

Of men, ſome are quiet, ſome turbulent, ſome addicted to Merchandiſe, ſome to ſtudy: ſo of Cities, whether by any power of the Ayre, or of the influence of the ſtarres, ſome one is full of ſharpe wits, fit for merchandizing; others of ſtout ſpirits, fit for Armes: ſome have ordinances which lead them in a way of peace; others, of warre: ſometimes they are both by nature and art of ſo ſtrong a ſcituation, that in regard of their difficulty to be aſſaulted, they are altogether careleſſe of Military profeſſion.

In this laſt caſe, it will be an eaſie matter to maintain peace at home, to which they are either called by nature, or ayded by art; and eſpecially if the inhabitants ſhall give themſelves to ſuch exerciſes, which keepe men from diſſentions. But if the Citizens be of ſtout natures and imperfect, (I meane not in eſſence; for I well know by divinity, that every creature, in its eſſence is perfect,) it will then be neceſſary there ſhould be feare: and this S. *Auſtin* meant when he ſaid, *Infirmis animis boſtem ſecuritatem*: and there is good reaſon for it; for if they feare to be overcome of an Enemy, they will ſtrive to overcome their own will; and take for a maſter, the feare of vertue. And therefore our Lord God, when he gave *Joſhua* the Land of Promiſe, as he had promiſed to *Abraham*, *Iſaac*, and *Jacob*: yet he deſtroyed not all enemies, but left a part of the Land in the power of the Philiſtines: and others, mentioned in the Booke of *Joſhua*; and this he did, as knowing

knowing that the Imperfection of that people, whom the Holy Ghost by the mouth of *Moyses*, cals *Gens duræ cervicis*; could not better be upheld and kept, then by the feare of enemies. And this the Holy Ghost expresseth likewise in the booke of *Judges*; where speaking of those Nations which remained in the Land of Promise, he saith, *Hæ sunt Gentes, quas dereliquit Dominus ut erudiret in eis Israelem.* It is therefore no marvell, that our Lord God, knowing the weakness of *Adam*, as soon as he saw him fall into the imperfection of sin; to the end he should not commit the like errour againe, presently put him in the midst of discords and enmities: when he said to the serpent, *Inimicitias ponam inter te & mulierem, & semen tuum & semen illius*: and for this cause it is, that he hath left to the Catholique Church so great adversaries, as himselfe expresseth in S. *Matthew*; In signe whereof, he would not suffer the servants to pull up the Tares, but would have them to be let to grow with the Corne; least plucking up the one, they should withall root out the other. Now for those Cities, where the Citizens are given to merchandise, they by all meanes ought to shun warre, as being things of very different nature, to stand in the shadow writing Bils of account; and to endure heat and cold, fighting in the field; as S. *Thomas* teacheth us where he saith, *Est etiam Negotiationis usus contrarius quamplurimum exercitio Militari; Negotiatores enim dum umbram colunt, a laboribus vacant; & dum fruuntur deliciis, molliscunt animo; & corpora veldebentur debilia ad labores Militares inepta.*

But if Cities be so formed with Lawes, that they have better meanes to make resistance in warre, then to conserve themselves in Peace; in this case, it will be necessary to have warre with forraine Nations, to maintaine peace in their own Nation; otherwise it will runne a manifest hazzard to be ruined, as it hap-

pened

pened to the Lacedemonians, of whom *Aristotle* saith, *Ad partem enim virtutis tota ordinatio illarum legum contendit, scilicet Bellicam; hæc autem utilis ad victoriam consequendam; Itaque salvi erant bellum gerentes; peribant vero, rerum potiti; quoniam nec otium agere, nec quicquam aliud exercere sciebant præstabilius, quam rem Militarem.* And therefore the City of *Rome* which was formed by Lawes and Ordinances, to enlarge it selfe, and grow greater by warre; no sooner laid down Armes with Enemies, but it tooke them up with friends; that having none at last with whom to contend, it contended with it selfe; and became overthrown by its own forces. And therefore *Livy* saith, *Nulla magna civitas din quiescere potest; si foris hostem non habet, domi invenit, ut prævalida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, sed suis ipsa viribus onerantur.* But if they have Lawes and Ordinances to live in peace, their best course is to hold them to peace.

The second division we brought before, was of times; which may be divided into two: One, wherein warre hath been but of late: the other, wherein peace hath been long: if peace hath been long, why should we take any other course, and not continue peace still? but if our case be the former, it will then be necessary to maintaine at least some face of warre; because as all habits whether of body or mind, are hard to be left; so spirits once grown fierce with warre, when they want meanes to exercise their fiercenesse upon enemies with honour, will hardly be kept from using it upon friends though with shame. Thus it fell out (that I may keep me to *Tacitus*) amongst the Suevians and the Cherusci, people of Germany; who after the departure of the Romans, being secure from forrain enemies, they then, out of the custome of waging warre, and desire of glory, turned their Armes upon their friends at home: and therefore *Tacitus* saith, *Sed*

Suevi

Suevi prætendebantur auxilium adversus Cheruscos orantes; nam discessu Romanorum, ac vacui externo motu, gentis adsuetudine, & tunc æmulatione Gloriæ, arma in se verterant. So the Romans most stout and warlike from the time of *Scipio Nasica* untill the birth of our Saviour, being in a manner quiet abroad, were in continuall warre at home; and the peace which they came to at last was under a Prince; whereof *Tacitus* saith, *Post hæc Pax quidem, sed cruenta:* because it was under *Augustus*, who finding the City tyred with discords, made himselfe sole Lord: wherenpon S. *Austin* speaking of those times saith, *Eaque libido dominandi quæ inter alia vitia generis humani immoderatior inerat Populo Romano postquam in paucis potentioribus vicit, obtritos fatigatosque cæteros etiam jugo servitutis oppressit.* And this of may be rendered many causes: the first is, because in Cities used long to warre, the people, at least great part having no other occupation, give themselves to be souldiers; and if they faile of that imployment, they must necessarily either sterve for want of victuals, or else stirre up discords and seditions; that so under one side or other, they may get a living. *Et ex civili prælio* (saith *Tacitus*) *Spem majorum præmiorum.* Not being possible, that souldiers accustomed to gaine by warre, should be content with peace, as *Dion* excellently observed in *Cæsar*; and therefore *Livy* saith, *Mercenarii milites pretia militiæ casura in Pace, ægrè ferebam.* Whereupon *Salomon*, seeing that the greater part of his people having in *Davids* time been accustomed to continuall warre, and had not any other trade of living, would of necessity be forced to die for hunger, he therefore, though now in peace, would not disband them, but kept them still in Armes; as it is written in the Booke of the *Kings*; knowing there is nothing, that sooner makes men Rebell, then to have their Trade taken from them, by which they gaine their living: and there-

therefore when S. *Paul* ſpake of deſtroying the Temple of *Diana* in *Epheſus*; thoſe Silver-ſmithes who lived by making ſuch Images, preſently roſe up in Armes, and were ready to have killed him. So alſo it was, when S. *Paul* healed the woman poſſeſſed; becauſe *Magnum quæſtum faciebat Domino ſuo:* from hence it is, that it will alwaies be impoſſible to breake the Uſcocchi, from uſing pyracy; ſeeing they have no other trade, by which to live. The ſecond cauſe may be taken from the Nobility; who will eaſily be moved to raiſe diſcords in time of peace; by reaſon of a habit, which as it is produced by many Acts iterated, ſo it neceſſarily produceth iterated acts, and alſo by reaſon of that deſire of greatneſſe, which alwaies accompanies the Nobility; and againe, by reaſon of the skorn it takes at equality, and much more at ſervitude: which is ſo much harder to be endured, as ſuperiours, in peace are harder to be dealt with. *Revocante Nobilitate* (ſaith *Tacitus*) *cur in pace durius ſervitium?*

Having now divided Cities and Times; It remaines, that we divide the formes of States: which as to our purpoſe are of three ſorts; Monarchy, Optimacy, and Popular. The Common-wealth of the Optimates, either hath under it many Cities and Kingdomes, as *Rome* and *Carthage* had; and at this day, *Venice* hath; or they have but ſome few Cities, as the Athenians, the Spartans and others: or laſtly, they have but only one City; as *Piſa* in times paſt: and *Lucca*, and many free Cities at this preſent. The firſt forme of Common-wealth, which is that which hath Kingdomes under it; either it uſeth to wage warre with its own Armes, as the Romans; or with forraine Armes, as the Carthaginians: if it uſe and be able to wage warre with its own Forces, then either we ſpeake of warre farre off, as of the Romans with the Carthaginians; or of warre in their own ſtate, as of the Romans with the Thuſcans.

cans. If the case be of warre farre off, waged with their own Forces, this will be the Treacle of civill discords. First, because those who are likely to move them, may under colour of honours, be sent to the warres abroad, and spirits that are warlike, are willing enough of themselves to goe where there is fighting, though without any such colour. Thus it was with the Romans, (as *Livy* relates) who sending forth the hottest spirits of their youth to the warres abroad, they in the meane time remained quiet in *Rome. Consules educta ex urbe Juventute, tranquilliorem cæteram turbam fecerunt.* And even by this way, not onely all feare of civill discord will be taken away; which onely proceeds from unquiet spirits; but also all suspition of any rebellion in the subject Cities: as well because they will be weakned both in men and money, by levying Auxiliary souldiers: as also because they will be kept in aw by an Army in the field. But it must be here observed, that they make not then too dangerous a warre, where their whole Forces must be imployed, for then the subject people will be apt to rebell; as the Thuscanes, who seeing the Romans busied in a warre with their whole Forces, they then fell to rebell?

ar Antidote

Now if we speake of a warre neere home, either it is some slight warre, or else some warre of moment. If but a slight warre, it ought to be nourished with all endeavour; as the Romans did with the Genouese, making use of that warre, as of a Military schoole; but if it be a warre of moment, and neere the State, it ought to be avoyded by all meanes possible. The reason is, because the Cities that are subject to a Common-wealth, doe all with an ill will beare their yoak: in confirmation whereof, *Tacitus* saith, *Neque Provinciæ illum rerum statum abnuebant.* As long as *Hannibal* made his warre farre off from *Rome*, although he obtained many victories, yet not so much as any one Castle, (as

Polybius relates) rebelled against *Rome*: but when he got his victory at *Trasimene*, and by consequence not farre from *Rome*, all at once rebelled: and yet for all the overthrows they had had in *Sicily*, in the firme Land, and at Sea, they never made the least signe of revolt. The like happened to the Venetians, after the overthrow they received at *Geradada*. It is therefore no marvell, that *Agathocles* being besieged in *Syracusa*, and not able to endure the siege; when by reason of his tyranny every one rebelled against him: No marvell I say, that not able to endure the warre in his own state, he removed it to the Carthaginians in Affricke; as knowing, that Cities subject to Commonwealths, doe with an evill will endure their yoke: and his enterprise tooke effect as he desired. These Commonwealths therefore, by all means possible ought to shun a warre neere home.

But where the custome is to wage warre with forraine Armes; there all kind of warre, whether neere home, or farre off, is to be shunned. Because mercenary Armes are insatiable, licentious, and for the most part, either they never finish a warre; or once finished, they cannot be gotten away againe, without destroying and making spoile in the Countrey. Or else with mutinies put the Cities in danger. It was a good invention, which *Gliscо* Generall of the Carthaginian Army in *Affrick* used; after the warre was ended with the Romans; for knowing the ill condition of a mercenary Army, he thought to send the souldiers home to *Carthage*, by little and little: in such sort, that the first might be gotten home to their own houses, before the others should recover the City; a judicious conceit, but which seldom takes effect: because oftentimes the souldiers perceive it, and will not be divided; as it happened with the Switzers in times past; and sometime, though they be divided, yet it hath no good

issue: as it happened to the Carthagenians, whose Cities all at once rebelled; and *Carthage* it selfe was not farre from loosing. And in truth, they then perceived, how dangerous a thing it is, to wage warre with mercenary forces; wherenpon for this cause, when *Scipio* afterward came into *Africk*; they knowing themselves to be no matches for the Romans, to be able to wage warre at their owne home, *Suam plebem imbellem in urbe* (saith *Livy*) *Imbellem in agris esse, mercede parari auxilia.* These Commonwealths therefore ought rather to keep themselves from discord, by imploying their Cittizens in merchandising, in governments and Offices, and by not suffering the quiet spirits to grow turbulent, nor the turbulent to stay in Cities, where the people ought to be kept without Armes: Imitating herein, the Carthagenians rather then the Romans.

Now if we come to speake of those Common wealths, that have but few, or but one City under them; in this case they ought by all possible meanes to seek to preserve peace, as the Switzers, the Luccheſi; and such others do, being very obnoxious for such, to become a prey to the more potent, as it hath alwaies happened to the Athenians, to the Lacedemonians, and the Genouesi. From hence it is, that the King of *France*, to preserve the Commonwealth of the Swizzers, hath alwaies procured to quench that fire, which some have endeavoured to kindle for their ruine. And if any object, that the Commonwealth of *Rome*, when it was yet but little, not only maintained it selfe, but grew greater by the means of warre; I answer, that in that time the States in *Italy* were not great, as now they are; and from hence may be drawn a reason, why the Athenians, and the Lacedemonians were never able to get further then their first bounds, without endangering their state; and *Rome* was able to make

it ſelfe Lord of a great part of the World; and it is, becauſe the one were environed with two mighty adverſaries; the other, with many, but weake ones.

Laſtly, to give a generall rule; all thoſe Commonwealths whoſe ordinances tend rather to conſervation then augmentation; ought to uſe any other means to keep themſelves from diſcords at home, rather then warre.

It remaines to ſpeak of a Kingdome, which is either ſetled and naturall; or elſe dangerous and new: if we ſpeake of that which is naturall, I account that to live in peace as well abroad as at home, is both neceſſary and eaſie, eſpecially in our times, wherein Cities and Kingdomes are without the leaſt blemiſh of tyranny, all governed by Princes juſt and pious: and this the rather ought to be done, becauſe in peace, the wits of men are cultivated; their manners refined, good Arts flouriſh, merchandiſing is leſſe dangerous, and plenty of all things eaſily maintained. And therefore in *Eſay* it is ſaid, *Conflabunt gladios ſuos in vomeres*; which means nothing elſe, but that peace cauſeth the earth to be manured, and riches eaſily to be encreaſed. Whereupon the Ancients feyned, that the God of riches was nurſed by peace.

Now to Kingdomes that are new, and not well ſetled, every thing is dangerous, whether it be of peace or warre; but warre, perhaps leſſe; as bringing with it but one danger: which is, that the Army being in the hand of a Generall, the Empire ſeemes to be in his power. As *Tiberius* doubted, that *Germanicus potius vellet accipere quam expectare Imperium.* But then it brings with it many benefits, not only in favour of the Prince, but of the ſubjects alſo. On the Princes behalfe, becauſe he by ſending forth to the warres, the moſt potent and ſtout ſpirits, may himſelfe in the meane time remaine ſecure at home. And therefore King

Ferdinand

Ferdinand kept alwaies ſome little warre abroad, to the end the Nobility ſhould not mutiny in *Spaine*. And *Henry* the ſecond had counſell given him to keep the French buſied in ſome warre, to the end they might not mutiny in France. And this rule ought alwaies to be obſerved, where the people have not loſt their ſtoutneſſe of courage. On the Subjects behalfe, becauſe while ſuch ſtout ſpirits live in peace, they are apt to ſeeke, as having no other meanes, their owne ſecurity, by the death of the Citizens. And this *Tacitus* meanes, where in the firſt of his Hiſtories he ſaith, *Sub Tyberio & Caio & Claudio tantum pauci adverſa pertimuere.* Againe, it is well that cruell men, ſuch as tyrants uſe to be, to the end they may leave the Citizens in peace, ſhould have warre with ſtrangers abroad, upon whom to wreke their cruelty. From whence it comes, that this race of men is more cruell in their age, then in their youth: and therefore oftentimes in the holy Scripture are likened to Lyons, which, as *Ariſtotle* relates, in their old age enter into Cities and make ſpoile of people: and this proceeds (ſaith he) becauſe thorough weakneſſe of body, and defect of teeth, not being able in the fields to follow the chaſe after beaſts, they enter into Cities, and prey upon men: ſo tyrants, when weakened with age, they can no longer quench their thirſt of blood upon enemies in warre, they then for exerciſe of their cruelty fall upon their friends in peace. So did *Herod* the great, and many others, of whom Hiſtories are full.

But to returne to our purpoſe: peace after warre is much more dangerous, becauſe leiſure gives time to thinke, thinking takes notice of ſubjection, and ſtoutneſſe gotten in warre, breeds a deſire to free themſelves by any bad way whatſoever. In regard of this, *Salomon* comming to be in Peace, after a long warre with his father had, made many warlike expeditions, as

appeares in the Booke of Kings: and to this it seemes *David* exhorts, where in the Epithalamium he made; he saith, *Accingere gladio tuo super femur tuum potentissime.* Wherein it is to be noted, that *Femur* oftentimes is taken for pleasures: as though he would say, Couple Armes with pleasures; stand not slumbering in idlenesse; so many writers interpret it: and perhaps in regard of this, *Augustus* would never be without some little warre in *Germany*; rather for these reasons, *quam cupidine proferendi Imperium vel istud ob præmium.* And *Tyberius* upon the same ground, was well pleased that troubles should rise in the Easterne parts; *Cæterum*, saith *Tacitus*, *Tyberio haud ingratum accidit; turbari res orientis, ut ea specie Germanicum suetis legionibus abstraheret; novæque Provinciis impositum, dolo simul & casibus objecturet.*

Lastly, a Popular state ought alwaies to procure peace; for if there be warre, either the people goe forth to fight; and then the Nobles in the mean time, will have meanes to change the state; or else the Noble men goe, and then having an Army in their hand, they are able to make alterations at their pleasure. Whereupon *Isocrates* in his oration of peace saith, that a popular state is strengthned by peace, and by warre, ruined.

But having shewed in this my discourse, that to many Common-wealths it is not good to have warre: to the end I may not dissent from that place in *Aristotle* alledged in the beginning, I now say, that *Aristotle* commends not feare as a thing fit alwaies, but sometimes; and doth not specifie what kind of feare it is he meanes. For understanding whereof, we must know, that Common-wealths oftentimes are endangered by too much security: as the City of *Rome* ranne headlong into hazzard, for want of fearing. Which useth to happen from two occasions: one from the inveterate-

neſſe of the danger: the other, from the greatneſſe and power of them that are offended. *Rome* at the time when it was freed from the tyranny of *Tarquinius* was not great; and being neere to danger, it ſtood in feare: being grown ſuſpicious, partly for the fathers name called *Superbus*; and partly for the ſonnes houſe built higher then ordinary (weak cauſes God knows.) But when the City was growne into greatneſſe, and forgot the danger by reaſon of inveterateneſſe, it then left fearing, and afforded ſuch beginnings, that gave *Cæſar* advantage to bring it in ſubjection. So the Florentines extinguiſhed the name of liberty in *Piſa*; and uſed great diligence at the beginning to prevent rebellion; as ſtanding in feare, as well for the freſhneſſe of the offence, as for the finalneſſe of their Forces: but after ſome yeeres, *Florence* being grown greater, and the offence through time forgotten, they began to leave fearing; and as not fearing rebelled under *Charles the eighth*, which was in a manner the ruine of *Florence*. Seeing then when Cities are without feare, they live without fore-ſight; it is profitable for Common-wealths (as *Ariſtotle* in that text ſaith) that ſome ſuch accident ſhould happen, as may teach them the danger of ſecurity: and therefore the Rachienſi (as *Polybius* relates) while they lived inconſiderately, ſuſpecting nothing; they were upon the point of loſing their City to the Slavonians, but having repelled them, it was afterward a great good unto them, as that which made them ſtand in feare; *Ut per negligentiam in periculo fuerant & urbem & Patrios Lares amittendi; per ſtudium ejus mali perpeſſi, in poſterum prudentiam ſuæ rebus conſulendum.* And in truth, if we conſider the accident which of late yeares happened in *Rome*; the prudence with which thoſe Senatours managed that diſorder, and the good ordinances made for preventing the like hereafter: we cannot but ſay with *Ariſtotle*,

state, that the accident proved to the City of *Venice*, of great benefit. Lastly, I conclude, that they who will not be in warre actually; at least let them make a shew to be in it potentially; *Ostendite modo bellum & pacem habebitis; videant vos paratos ad vim, jus ipsi remittent*: and therefore *Augustus* was never without an Army, upon the frontiers of enemy Nations; and *Salomon* also did the like.

Thus it stands sufficiently proved, when externall discords, or to say better, forraine warres are profitable; that is, speaking of men and Cities, if they be turbulent and imperfect, and have laws tending to warre; to such, they are profitable, or rather necessary. But if their lawes be tending to peace; or if the people be mild and gentle, and by reason of their strong scituation, accustomed to peace, or merchandising: in this case, there is no inconvenience, but they may live quietly and without warre. Then as concerning times, we have shewed, that in times when warre hath been lately, it will doe well; but not so, when there hath been long peace. Then as concerning states we have proved that Common-wealths that are potent, and able to wage warre with their own Forces, shall doe well to maintaine a warre farre off, but not neere home. But if they be not able to wage warre without forraine Forces, they shall then do well to embroyle themselves with no warre at all, either neere or farre off. And as for Commonwealths, that are but petty ones and of small power; it is best for them, to looke to their own safety. Then for Kingdomes that are well setled, we have liked well of peace: for them that are dangerous, of warre. Lastly, that a popular state take care how to live.

What

What is the fitteſt time to proceed in the diſcords with enemies of the faith.

The ſeventh Diſcourſe.

THis ſentence of *Tacitus* ſtanding good, *Cunctis diſcordiis civilibus feſſa, nomine Principis ſub Imperium accepit:* many grow to beleeve, that becauſe diſcords made the way eaſie for *Auguſtus* to make himſelfe Emperour of *Rome*, therefore every one may eaſily make advantage of the diſſentions of others. But becauſe they neither conſider the diverſity of perſons, nor diſtinguiſh the times, nor are acquainted with the cauſes; they therefore oftentimes deceive themſelves, determining theſe things abſolutely and in groſſe; which are not to be admitted but with diſtinction. To find out therefore the truth in this matter, indeed weighty and worthy of conſideration, I ſay, that diſcords may be either internall between Citizens, or externall between Cities of one Province: if between Citizens, then ſometimes they are between Nobles and Nobles, oftentimes between Nobles and Plebeians, and many times between Plebeians and Plebeians. If they be between Cities, it happens that ſometimes they be equall, ſometimes unequall; likewiſe he that aſpires to be a Lord, either is a ſtranger, or Citizen: if a ſtranger, either he is ſtronger then the others, or weaker; and either he hath intelligence, or hath none: if a Citizen, either he is chiefe of a faction, or not.

Theſe heads I ſhall endeavour to examine; beginning with the ſtranger; who by civill diſcords aſpires to make himſelfe Lord; underſtanding by civill diſcords, not thoſe only which are between Citizens of the ſame City, but between divers Cities of the ſame Pro-

Province, as *Plato* underſtands them, where he ſaith, that if Græcians contended with Græcians, it was a ſedition, and not a warre; ſhewing plainly, that ſuch a one ought to be called a civill diſcord.

I ſay then, (to returne to my purpoſe) that ſuch ſtranger, either hath intelligence with one part of the Citizens, or he hath not; if he have intelligence, then is the time: ſo did *Germanicus*, when he aſſaulted the *Catti*, a people in *Germany*; *Nam ſpes inceſſerat diſſidere hoſtem in Segeſtem, & Arminium*: whereupon, having *Segeſtes* on his ſide, it was an eaſie matter to proſper in his enterpriſe; and of ſuch caſes Hiſtories are full.

But if this ſtranger have no intelligence, either it is in the beginning of the diſcords; or when they are inveterate: and thereby one or other of the ſides, waſted and ſpent; if it be the beginning, it will do no hurt, but good: ſo it happened to the Thuſcans, and the Veientanes; ſo to the Athenians, while *Agis* approached their walls; ſo to the Sabines, and the Preneſtines againſt the Romans. Of whom *Livy* ſaith, *Nam in ſpe ventum erat, diſcordia inteſtina Rem Romanam diſſolvi poſſe.* But in truth it was but ill adviſed of them; and in ſuch a manner, as while they ſought the death of the ſick Roman ſtate; they applied a medicine that reſtored it to health. Whereupon *Livy* inferres, *Sed externus Timor maximum concordiæ vinculum, quamvis infeſtos ſuſpectoſque jungebat inter ſe animos.* And therefore *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *Cogit enim in unum communis metus; etiam eos qui prius erant inimiciſſimi.* And this will the rather happen, if they be enemies naturally; either through long warres between them; or elſe through diverſity of Ayre; which conſequently produceth diverſity of temperatures: from whence ariſeth diverſity of cuſtomes, and theſe would rather die a thouſand deaths, then come to be in ſubjection to their enemies. Whereupon it was ſeen in the beginning of *Charles* the

fifth;

fifth; that while the Kingdome of *Spaine* rose up in Armes, and strongly mutinied against their own King; *France* seeing it, and having recovered *Navarre*, brought their Army upon *Spaine*, and presently they came to concord. The best way therefore will be, to take another course, (I mean alwaies against infidels) which is, to let them wast themselves; imitating the worme which gnawes in wood in such sort, that afterwards it is easily broken; so discords should be fomented in enemies countries, that afterward more easily they may be overcome; but yet staying time, that the wood be first consumed, that so at one blow it may be broken. In regard whereof, *David* saith, *Quasi tenerrimus ligni vermiculus qui octingentos interfecit, impetu uno:* in as much, as having by little and little, and by secret waies weakned his enemies, he afterwards easily as wormeaten wood broke them at one blow. Whereupon I conceive, that the Romans are therefore by the Holy Ghost, called a Worme in *Jonas*; where he saith, *Et paravit Deus Vermem, ascensu diluculi in Crastinum; & percussit hederam, & exaruit:* this place being meant, (as *Robert Abbot* with many other writers interprets it) of the destruction of *Jerusalem*, by the Romans under the Empire of *Vespasian*, who having prepared a siege against *Hierusalem*, and understanding there were discords risen amongst them, he delayed the enterprise, *Obsidionem Hierusalem distulit, ratus ejusmodi civilibus discordiis facilius Judæos consumptos deleri, quam armis Romanorum:* and after a while, assaulting the City, he destroyed it. I observe moreover in that Chapter of *Jonas*, that the furine came not first upon the Prophets head; but the worm that dried up the gourd; so also we must dry up our adversaries with discords, and then set upon them with our Armies. This *Coriolanus* meant, when he appointed his souldiers to spoile the fields of the Plebeians; but to leave the

the fields of the Senatours untouched; which he did not do for any hatred to the people, but out of a further reach, by this means to foment their discords. The importance of this, the ancient Romans knew well; who after the first warre in *Sicily*, seeing the Carthagenians, I may say their naturall enemies, in a great streight, through the revolt of the Cities of *Africke*, and the rebellion of their own Army, yet never for this made warre upon them; which would rather have brought concord to their enemies, then victory to themselves: but letting them tire and weary themselves with their own discords, they then set upon them so wearied, and without shedding of blood, made themselves Lords of all *Sardinia* with encrease of Tribute.

But in case they would not stay so long, till the enemy might tire out himselfe: they should then do wel to bring with them in their Army, some person of the blood; and that hath pretension in the state; but yet so, as to do it without forcing. When *Charles* the eighth had intention to make warre upon *Bajaset* the great Turke, because he knew how vain a thing it were to beleeve that a Kingdome, in Religion, in customes and in language different, should receive him; he therefore tooke with him the brother of *Bajaset*: and the like did *Situlces* King of the Thracians; and *Osman* Basha by the commandement of *Amurath*, going to destroy the King of the Tartars, took with him *Islan* brother of that King; and it succeeded well; whereupon (as *Argentone* relates) *Lewis* the eleventh stood in feare of the league, only because they brought his brother along with them. But if the discords be inveterate, and the Citizens through them grown weak, it is then alwaies time to assaile them; and there can be no doubt of victory. Thus *Greece* was easily overcome by any stranger that tooke this opportunity.

And

And thus much concerning diſcords, of Citizens between themſelves; or of Cities that are under one Lord; in which it is ſufficiently ſhewed, how a ſtranger ought to carry himſelfe: Now we will ſhew, what courſe he ought to take, with other Provinces or Cities that are in diſcord between themſelves. Theſe Cities then are either of equall force, or of unequall; if of equall, then ought he to foment both ſides: and thereby they comming at laſt to be unequall, he ſhall then take part with the weaker ſide; but yet ſo, as not to weaken himſelfe: as *Cræſus* in *Juſtin* teacheth us, who ayding the Babylonians againſt *Cyrus*, he ſo much weakned his own Army, that after the taking of *Babylon*, he alſo himſelfe was eaſily overcome. And therefore he ſaith, *Ibi fortuna prioris prælii* (that is of *Babylon*) *percuſſam jam Cræſi exercitum nullo negotio fudit.* The matter therefore muſt be ſo carried, that if the contrary ſide happen to be Conquerour, yet you may be able to maintaine the warre your ſelfe: if conquered, it will then be eaſie for you to make your ſelfe Lord both of the one and the other. For it is not fit when a man may have need of his money and his Forces in defence of himſelfe, that he ſhould raſhly waſt them in the ſervice of another. Such was the counſell (as *Thucidides* relates) that *Nicias* gave the Athenians, while he diſſwaded them from the warre in *Sicily*; there being no diſcretion, to uncloath ones ſelfe, to cloath another. Which is ſo true, that it is written by the Holy Ghoſt in *Ezechiel*, while ſpeaking of the foure beaſts, he ſaith, *Sub firmamento autem pennæ eorum rectæ alterius ad alterum*: and this as S. *Gregory* interprets it, intends to expreſſe the ayd that is due from a man to his neighbour. It follows after, *Unumquodque duabus alis velabat corpus ſuum*; to ſhew, that for ayding of others, it is not fit to diſmantle our ſelves.

To return to our purpoſe, in that we ſpake of be-

forces: that is, what way is to be held in ayding the weaker ſide: a better example cannot be given then that of *Phillip* King of *Macedon*, who ſeeing the Cities of *Greece* at variance between themſelves, he fomented the weaker ſide: and after he had wearied the one and the other, he brought them both under his Dominion. *Philippus Rex Macedonum* (ſaith *Juſtin*) *libertati omnium inſidiatus, dum contentiones civitatum alit, auxilium inferioribus ferendo, victos pariter victoreſque ſubita Regiam ſervitutem coegit.* According to this advice, *Ferdinand* King of *Spaine* fomented ſo well the diſcord between *Francis* King of *France* and him of *Aragon*; that weakning the one, and oppreſſing the other, he made himſelfe Lord of the Kingdom of *Naples*; without waſting of either ſouldiers or money; a Kingdom gotten before by the King of *France* with ſo much blood. This alſo many Writers attribute to the Venetians, who calling *Lewis* the twelfth into *Italy*, hoped by this means to make themſelves Lords of many Cities in *Lombardy* and *Romagna*; with this conceit, *Lewis il Moro*, called in *Charles* the eighth King of *France*; but this man endangered himſelfe unhappily; and the other were not far from abſolute ruine. Upon occaſion whereof, I cannot omit to ſhew their errour, who make doubt, that a third man ſhould enjoy the benefit of their victory, and what remedy there is for it. Secondly, how it happened that *Ludovico Sforza* by raiſing diſcord between the King of *France*, and them of *Aragon*, loſt his ſtate; when *Philip* by raiſing diſcord between the Græcians, and alſo *Ferdinand* King of *Spaine*, got ſo much by it. Concerning the firſt, there can no better counſell be given, to two, who ſtriving together, have a third looking on, to ſet upon the winner, then to perſwade them to peace; or elſe juridically to heare their differences: but becauſe, this ſeldome or never hath place amongſt Princes; and

warre

warre oftentimes for many occaſions either cannot or will not be avoyded: therefore I cannot better deliver my opinion, then by ſhewing the example of *Metius*, who being upon the point of ſtriking battell with *Tullus Hoſtilius*, and knowing that which ſide ſoever was victor, muſt needs (not having to fight with ſheep) exceedingly weaken it ſelfe with loſſe of ſouldiers; whereby the Thuſcans who were equall in Forces to the one and the other, and by this loſſe of men ſhould remain the ſtronger, might take occaſion to draw the victory of the conquering ſide to themſelves; he invited *Tullus Hoſtilius* to a parlee: and with theſe reaſons perſwaded him to put the fortune of the victory upon a few, that not only the Victor might be out of danger, but might alſo have it in his power, to oppreſſe the Thuſcanes; which propoſition *Tullus* accepted; and though there be many that blame him for it, yet I thinke, they meane it in ſome other caſe; becauſe it is not likely, that a warlike ſpirit as *Tullus* was, if he had not certainly known the manifeſt danger of falling to be a prey to the other, would ever have conſented to ſuch a duell; which in the caſe of another, is never without blame, being a thing unworthy of a valorous Captaine, to lay the fortune of many upon a few; but as this caſe was, I find no other errour in *Tullus Hoſtilius*, but that he would hazzard the whole Army upon three men; but if the condition had been, to fight with one ſquadron of Foot, and another of Horſe, I could not then but have commended it: and the reaſon is, becauſe by ſuch a fight it would plainly have appeared, which of them in a ſet battell would have had the victory, there concurring in it, the skill of the Captaine, and part of all parts of the Army; which have the ſame proportion with one another, as the whole hath with the whole; according to the vulgar rule, *Eadem eſt ratio totius ad totum, quæ eſt partis ad*

partem. But in the case of *Tullus*, one of the Armies might be inferiour to the other, in Horse and Foot and Captaine; and yet have three braver men in any of these kinds in it, then the other.

Concerning the second Point, *Ludovico Sforza* did well, for securing himselfe in the State of *Milan*, to move the King of *France*; but he did not well afterward, to move him against the *Aragonesi*; for he ought (at least if he could; and if he could not, he should not then have medled in it at all) to have made use of the King, as an ayd in peace, but not as a Captaine in warre: and so was the counsell which *Phaneas* the *Etolian* gave; that they should call in *Antiochus* and make use of him as an Umpire, but not as a Captaine: *Phaneas* (saith *Livy*) *Reconciliatore pacis, & disceptatore de iis quæ in controversia cum populo Romano essent, uendum potius Antiocho censebat quam duce belli.* And therefore *Ludovico Sforza* had not done ill to call in the King of *France*, as for his purpose to make himselfe free Lord of *Milan*, if it had been in his power to make him returne againe: but seeing the case required to make use of him in warre, now it was his ruine: because to seeke to rise by the discords of others, is not a work for an inferiour, but either for an equall, or a greater. Whereupon to *Philip* King of *Macedon*, and to *Ferdinand* King of *Spaine*, it proved well; but to *Lodovick Sforza*, it brought utter ruine; and to the Venetians exceeding danger; although he with indiscretion set forward his own destruction; these with judgement, freed themselves from the danger. And therefore in the foresaid case, he that is inferiour in Forces ought to seeke alwaies rather to extinguish, then to kindle fire. *Amurath* the great Turke was minded to make warre upon the King of *Polonia*; betwixt whom lay the state of *Petrasco* Prince of *Pogdania*; and he, as a wise man, knowing the damage he might sustaine, either

ther by having his Countrey waſted with the Great Turkes Army; or after the warre ended, by wholly looſing it, as lying in the mouth of the Polack; he ſo treated with them, that he made them friends. But many Cities in *Italy*, not obſerving this rule, whilſt they fomented diſcords between *Pyrrhus* and the Romans; remained, after the warre ended, a prey to the Romans. So the French, when *Hanniball* came into *Italy*, perceived though too late, they had expoſed their Countrey as a Prey to his Army. So the Etolians calling in *Antiochus* to make warre upon the Romans; were themſelves the firſt a prey to the Romans, as it had been foretold them. But although we have ſhewed by the example of *Cræſus*, that it is not good in diſcords, ſo to ayd one ſide; as to weaken ones ſelfe: yet is not this rule to be obſerved, where one is ſo much too ſtrong, that the other without great ayd is not able to withſtand: becauſe in this caſe to abandon a friend, would be a ſtrengthning of the enemy; as the Corfuans in *Thucydides* excellently ſhewed, in the Oration they made to the Athenians, whereupon the Rhegini fearing the Army of *Pyrrhus* King of the Epirots; the Romans came with great Forces to their ayd; but the end was, they became Lords over them. Which they of *Corfu*, not obſerving in the diſcords of *Durazzo*, and denying them ayd, were cauſe that they yeelded themſelves to the Corinthians, and conſequently encreaſed the Forces of their enemies. But *Germanicus* carried himſelfe with great judgement in ayding *Segeſtes*; knowing, if *Segeſtes* were overthrown, his faction would joyne it ſelf with *Arminius*; and conſequently the Forces of his enemy be encreaſed. This the *Campans* declared, demanding ayd of *Rome*; *Si defenditis, veſtri; ſi deſeritis, Samnitum erimus. Capuam ergo & Campaniam omnem veſtris, an Samnitum viribus accedere malitis, deliberate.* So as this is a leſſon which men ſhould

learne, to give preſent aſſiſtance to their friends that need it; otherwiſe they cannot avoyd being a prey to others: and this is delivered by S. *Matthew* in a Parable; where they not comming that were invited to the marriage, others were called that ſtood in the ſtreets.

It is therefore to be obſerved, when we make other mens caſe our owne, that our power be more then theirs: becauſe elſe, either they will be hindred from getting victory; or getting victory be kept from being maſters of the victory; it is not therefore for Princes or Cities that are weake, to make warre; which are to call in one more powerfull then themſelves to their ayd: for by this, they doe but procure a ſtronger enemy: The *Campani* oppreſſed by the *Samnites*, put themſelves into the hands of the Romans, and ſo encreaſed their Forces: and for this cauſe perhaps it is, that *Lucca* continues a Commonwealth.

Having ſhewed, that we ought with all our Forces, to ayd the weaker ſide; when of it ſelfe it is not able to ſubſiſt: it is to be obſerved, that in doing it, we make not ſhew of ſuch preparation, as may make our friends ſuſpitious of us: which *Phillip* King of *Spaine* not obſerving; whilſt under pretence of ayding the King of *Scots* againſt the Queen of *England*; he prepared ſo great a Fleet, that the *Scots* might eaſily perceive, that Fleet was not meant for reſiſting of *England*; but for making himſelfe Lord of *Scotland*. Into this errour alſo the Athenians ranne; who under colour of ayding the *Catanenſi* againſt the *Syracuſans*, meant to make themſelves Lords of *Sicily*, and therefore came with ſo great an Army (as *Juſtin* ſaith) *Ut iis terrori eſſent in quorum auxilia mittebantur*: whereupon they failed of their purpoſe, by reaſon it was eaſie for the *Lacedemonians*, to put a ſuſpition of this into the *Sicilians* heads. And therefore *Vitiges* being within *Ravenna*,

venna, beſieged by *Beliſarius*; and hearing by the Embaſſadours of the King of *Auſtraſia*, that he offered to ayd him with fifty thouſand French; aſtoniſhed at ſo great a ſuccour, put himſelfe into the hands of *Juſtinian*. Therefore weake Cities ought not to go in queſt after warre; becauſe they are like, either to be overcome of their enemies, or to be in ſervitude to their friends; ſeeing they who call to their ayd a greater power then their owne, may be ſaid to leane upon the point of a Speare, or upon a broken Reed; upon which, he that leanes, is like to find rather death then ayd. And therefore our Lord God, ſpeaking in *Eſay* to his people, who had called the Ægyptians to their ayd, *Ecce confidis ſuper baculum arundineum, confractum iſtum, ſuper Ægyptum: cui ſi innixus fuerit homo, intrabit in manum ejus; & perforabit eam; ſic Pharao Rex Ægypti omnibus qui confidunt in eo.* Which *Aratus* Head of the *Achæans* knowing, refuſed to receive the ayd of *Antigonus*. *Verebatur enim ſi forte Rex victoria potitus, Cleomene ac Lacedæmoniis ſuperatis ad extremum aliquid novi contra Rempublicam Achæorum tentare.* And if theſe Cities find a neceſſity to make warre for their owne defence, or otherwiſe, and that not able of themſelves, it behoves them to call in, others to their ayd: they ſhall then doe well, to call in more then one; ſo the Piſans did againſt the Florentines, who ayded by the Venetians, by *Lodovico Sforza*, by the *Genoueſi*, and by the *Seneſi*, went a long time dallying, and kept them all off from getting to be Lords over them.

I cannot omit to advertiſe, when one gives ayd to another, and the caſe ſtands ſo, that their Forces being joyned, they are able to reſiſt, or elſe not: that in this caſe, he ought to come with all his Forces; that if one reſiſt not, the other may: and in this was the errour of the *Campani*, in ayding the *Sedicini*, who therefore were both of them ruined. *Campani magis nomen ad præſidium ſociorum*

ſociorum quam vires cum attuliſſent: fluentes luxu obdura-tis uſu armorum in Sidicino pulſi agro, in ſe deinde molem omnem belli verterunt: and if the Romans had not ayded them, they had been in manifeſt hazzard of deſtruction. And therefore I cannot commend the courſe which the Athenians tooke in a battell of the *Corfuani* with the Corinthians; in which having brought a ſquadron of Galleys in ayd of the Corfuans, they gave order, not to come into the fight, untill they ſhould ſee them routed; there is no doubt, but that if the Athenians had come in to fight in the beginning of the battell, the Corfuans had got the victory: but ſtaying, as their commiſſion was, and not giving ayd to their friends in time; they added reputation to their enemies, and leſſened their own Forces; ſo as either they ſhould not have offered their ayd at all; or they ſhould have given it in the beginning.

Let us now come to a Citizen that aſpires to make himſelfe Lord of his own Countrey, being held by infidels; in which, if the diſcord be between the Nobles and the Plebeians, it is a hard matter to compaſſe: yet in this caſe, it is better he ſhould make himſelfe head of the people; who have both more will and power then the Nobles, as being a greater number; and though they be of inferiour ranke to the great ones: yet it is with them as with Buls; who ſuffer themſelves to be maſtered, becauſe they know not their owne ſtrength. Which *Manlius* well knowing, ſpeaking to the people ſaid, *Quouſq; tandem ignorabitis vires veſtras?* It happens alſo for want of judgement, and ſcarcity of money; but all theſe things are helpt by making ſome great man Head, that is wiſe and rich; the people being like ſheep where one leaps, the other follows. And this *Moyſes* knew, when being told by God, of his own death, he prayed him to provide his people a Leader, that they might not be as ſheepe without

without a shepheard, *Ne sint sicut oves sine ductore*; the people therefore are more able; and the more able, if they have a Head.

It remaines to shew, that the people are more willing; and more easily perswaded to raise a Plebeian to the Principality, then one of the Nobility. First, by reason of the hope, which every one naturally hath of new things, specially the common people; therefore *Sallust* saith, *Sed omnino cuncta plebs novarum rerum studio, Catilinae incepta probabat.* Secondly, because the people envies not the inequality of Honours; but the inequality of Riches; and this is the reason why it was never seen, at least very seldome, that one Noble man helps to raise another Noble man to the Principality: and this *Aristotle* knew when he said, *Nam multitudo quidem graviter fert inequalitatem patrimoniorum; praestantes viri honorum aequalitatem.* Whence it is no marvell, if after the death of *Romulus*; the Nobles found no way to make a King: and if it had not been for the people, it had scarce been ever done. And *Livy* speaking of this saith, *Et esse igitur aliquod caput placebat, & nemo alteri concedere in animum inducebat.* It is therefore best, the discord being between the Plebeians and the Nobles; (I meane alwaies as I said before, as farre as may be done with a good conscience) to make himselfe Head of the people; which yet is not without great danger, and very fallacious, as I shall shew in another discourse upon those words, *Et ad tuendam Plebem, Tribunitia jura contentum.* If the discord be between Nobles and Nobles; then he that would make himselfe Prince, either is head of one part, or not; if not, he ought then to procure the concord of them that are Heads; because their discord will be a cause, he can have but one side in his ayd; and that but weakely neither where, if they be made friends, by this meanes, they will both of them remaine, as it were obliged to him;

and

and perhaps will doe it the more, becauſe they cannot but thinke it a great matter, for one man to hinder the proceeding of their enemies, who will therefore afterwards without any other regard, runne headlong to ayd him, not caring what he be. This my opinion will be ſufficiently proved by the example of *Cæſar*; who ſeeing *Pompey* and *Craſſus* at variance, wrought ſo with them, that he made them friends; as knowing, that to his purpoſe, for making himſelfe Prince, this diſcord of theirs would be a great impediment. But if he be head of a Faction, then is the time to make himſelfe Lord ſecurely; becauſe having halfe the Nobility of his ſide, if he can withall get the favour of the people, he will undoubtedly be able to get the Empire. And ſo is this place of *Tacitus* of which we ſpeak, to be underſtood; that *Auguſtus* in the diſſentions of the Pompeians and the Cæſareans, of whom he was Head, made himſelfe protectour of the people: that there were diſſentions between them, is ſeen by that he ſaith, *Cuncta diſcordiis civilibus feſſa; neque Cæſareanis partibus niſi Cæſar Dux reliquus:* and that he had made the people his friend; is knowne by thoſe words, *Et ad tuendam Plebem, Tribunitio jure contentum.*

The ſumme of all I have ſaid, is this: If a ſtranger in a civill diſcord, ſeeke to make himſelfe Lord: (I meane by civill, that which is between Cities and Perſons that are under the ſame Dominion) if he have intelligence with them; either it is in the beginning, and then he ſhall not ſtirre, but rather be a meanes of concord; eſpecially betweene thoſe that are naturally enemies; betweene whom it behoves him to foment diſcords: to the end, that being weakned, his way may be eaſie; or elſe aſſaulting them with Armes, be ſure to have in his Army one of the blood, but yet without power; although in another diſcourſe I ſhall ſhew that this is a weakneſſe: or elſe it is, when diſcords

are

are inveterate; and consequently the Citizens wasted: & then every thing is like well enough to succeed. We have also shewed, that a stranger who seekes to get the Dominion of Cities, which are at warre under divers Lords; ought to foment the discords, if they be of equall power, so farre as that they may come to be unequall, and then to take part with the weaker; yet no further, then only that they may be able to resist their enemies; alwaies being carefull, that the ayd be not so great, as to weaken him that gives it; unlesse, when without excessive ayd, they cannot prosecute the warre; and that there be danger, least they fall into their enemies hands; for then it behooves to make it his owne cause: but all in such sort, that he give no cause of suspition to his friends. I have said also, that it is no small skill, to foment discords, and that no man ought to make use of a great power, for his interest in war but only in peace; when he is not of force sufficient to be able to send it away againe. And as for those, that lie between greater Princes that are at variance; let them, as *Laurence de Medici* did, use meanes to make them friends. Weake Cities, in my opinion, should never intricate themselves in any warre; and where there are two, that stand in feare of a third; if they will follow my counsell, they shall never lead forth all their Forces. Now if he be a Citizen, who in the discords of the City, seekes to make himselfe Lord of it; let him know it will be hard to compasse, when the discord is between the Nobility and the people; but in this case, the best way is, if he can, to make himselfe Head of the Commons. If againe the discord be between the people amongst themselves, it is then almost impossible: but easie, when it is between Nobles and Nobles; especially if he be Head of a faction; and if not, then to stand neutrall.

What Diſcords conſerve States, and what corrupt them.

The eighth Diſcourſe:

THus then we ſee, that of thoſe three diſtinctions, there is one proper for conſerving the Prince; that is, the diſcord betweene the Nobility and the Commons; as ſufficiently hath been ſhewed.

Now the ſtate of the Optimates (to returne to our purpoſe) is eaſily preſerved, ſo long as there growes no diſcord between Nobles and Nobles: becauſe, as we have ſaid before, the diſſentions of the Nobility reſt upon two Heads; whereof the one ſoone prevailing over the other, brings it within his power to make himſelfe ſole Lord; ſo much the rather, becauſe in a ſtate of Optimates there is alwaies diſcord betweene the Nobility and the Commons; and ſo much, that the people ill brooking the Senat, will rather be willing to have a King. We muſt therefore know, that in a State of Optimates, as the diſſenſion betweene Nobles and Nobles, is very hurtfull; ſo that betweene the Nobility and the people is very profitable, and greatly fortifies and upholds it, ſo long as there concutre not with it, diſcord betweene the Nobles. The reaſon is, becauſe the people being at variance with the Nobles, it will be a cauſe, that they ſtanding united, will not incurre the danger before ſpoken of. Thus we ſee, the Romans after the expulſion of the Tarquins, continued eaſily in their government; becauſe in that time there was perpetuall diſcord betweene the Nobility and the People. In which diſcords when the people came to be oppreſſed, the Nobles fell into Factions, and then the City in a few yeeres came to be a Monarchy.

Of

Of concordant diſcord; and how it ought to be mannaged, for the good of Cities.

The ninth Diſcourſe.

THere is nothing more profitable for the concord and good government of a City, then a diſcord between the parts: a City being a body compoſed of many parts, as our body is of the foure Elements. And as in this, if it be well Organized; in ſuch ſort, that all the foure Elements be in a due proportion, there will then need no diſcord to maintaine it, there being none that ſeekes its own deſtruction: and therefore it ſweetly enjoyes a quiet reſt: ſo in a City, there will be no unquietneſſe, if all the parts be equall; I meane not equall, ſimply; for it were not fit, that all in a City ſhould be equall in dignity and riches; being neceſſary, ſome ſhould be rich and ſome poore: but equall in ſuch manner as it is in the body, whoſe good conſiſts in this, that all the members be equall: for there are two kinds of good, (as ſaith S. *Thomas*) one, the good of the whole; and the other, of the parts: and likewiſe two natures; one univerſall, the other particular: the good of the whole conſiſts in the entirity, and in the diſtinction of the parts: and therefore it is better for a man, to have a Head, Feet, Hands, and the other members, then that all ſhould be Head: but the good of the part, ſhould be more good and perfect, if it could attaine to the degree and perfection of the ſuperiour part; and therefore the Foot ſhould be more Noble, if it were a Head; but the body ſhould not be more perfect, if it wanted a Foot: ſo in a City it is fit, there ſhould be Plebeians; and the equality that is required, ought to be Geometricall

and not Arithmeticall; and where this is, a City ſhall not need diſſenſion, to make it be well governed; but becauſe as *Galen* in his Method, ſpeaking of bodies that are in health, *ſimpliciter*, and abſolutely, ſaith, This ſymmetry of humours conſiſting *In Puncto* is very hardly found; and found impoſſible to be kept: as alſo *Hippocrates* ſpeaketh of thoſe bodies, that are in the height of healthfulneſſe, *Neque enim in melius verti, neque diu ſiſtere valent; reliquum eſt ut in deterius dilabantur*: ſo alſo a City, is either never found in ſuch a ſymmetry of parts; or if at any time found, never long continues. And therefore *Tacitus* ſpeaking of ſuch a compoſition ſaith, *Laudari facilius quam evenire: vel ſi evenit, haud diuturna eſſe poteſt.*

It is of neceſſity, that in the body, there be predominant either cold or heat; or dry or moyſt: if cold be predominant, there is heat to oppoſe it; if dry, the moyſt: ſo in a Commonwealth, all things muſt be reduced to equality; for not onely they which overtop others, but they alſo that are in miſery, are dangerous: in like manner, as it happens in buildings, which come to decay, as well by ſtones that ſtand too farre out; as by thoſe, that ſtand too farre in: and therefore the Maſon alwaies meaſures the walls and fits the ſtones; not by cutting them away, but by ſetting them in the right place: and thus our Lord God would have it be done in his holy Church; and therefore when *Ezechiel* ſaw it in the top of a mountaine, he ſtayed not long, but there came a man of mettall like braſſe. *Et Funiculus lineus in manu ejus*: the *Septuagints* read it, *Funiculus cimariorum in manu ejus*: where S. *Gregory* interprets it, after my meaning; and *Ariſtotle* alſo knowing this, gives counſell, when one part in a City is oppreſſed, and another oppreſſeth; that then the Magiſtrates ſhould relieve the part oppreſſed, and reduce them to equality.

There

There are three things that may beare ſway in a City; either the power Regall, or that of the Nobles, or the Authority of the People: if the Regall Power be predominant, then the people who are many, muſt oppoſe it; becauſe one and many are contraries: and and perhaps for this it is that *Plato* ſaith, that a Commonwealth ſhould be framed of two ingredients; a people, and a King; becauſe the people alone being many, may be a bridle to the King; and the King alone to the people. If the Nobility be predominant, then the people, as being directly contrary to the Nobility, muſt be oppoſed againſt it: whereupon, as we ſaid before, as long as the City of *Rome* uſed this oppoſition, it could never be deſtroyed by the Nobility: In this regard, *Sulpitius* called a ſquadron of the youth, the Senatours *Treacle*, as oppoſed againſt them.

If the people be predominant, then the Nobility muſt be ſet againſt them; and as when cold is predominant in a body, if another cold ſhould be ſet to ſtrive with it, it would inſtantly, *Ipſo facto*, deſtroy the body: So when the people is predominant, if the people ſhould be ſet againſt them; or when the Nobility is predominant, the Nobility ſhould oppoſe it; the Commonwealth preſently would goe to wracke; as it fell out in *Rome*. But not onely, when the like is oppoſed againſt the like, both a body and a Commonwealth may be ruined; but as well alſo, if a contrary be oppoſed, and not in a due manner: and therefore *Galen* ſaith, that contraries may be of three ſorts: that is, Greater, leſſer, and equall. It is a greater contrary, when to a diſtemper hot in two degrees, a remedy is applied cold in three degrees: a leſſer contrary is, when to a diſtemper hot in two degrees, a remedy is applied cold in one degree; the equall is, when to equall heat, equall cold is oppoſed; which being ſo, ſaith *Galen*, the cure of a diſtemper muſt not be by a

greater contrary; because this not onely takes away the distemper, but introduceth the contrary: as if to a distemper, hot as two, a remedy be applied, cold as three: this indeed will take away the heate, but then in place of it, bring in a distemper cold in one degree. Neither also is a cure to be made with a lesser contrary, because this would not reach to take away the distemper: but the cure must be made by an equal, which cannot introduce a contrary, but onely reduce the distemper to a due proportion. And thus is it to be done in Cities: for if the people grown two degrees above their ranke, should have the Nobility opposed in three degrees: this would not onely take away the predominancy of the people, but would bring the Nobility one degree out of just proportion: and the contrary will happen, if it should be lesse: and therefore in the Common-wealth of *Rome*, as long as the people were able to counterpeale the power of the Nobles; although it were in discord, yet it continued and kept it selfe free: but after the death of *Tiberius* and *Caius Gracchus*, when this contrary became unable to withstand the Nobility, the Commonwealth presently was endangered; as well for the inability of the peoples opposition, as for that it gave occasion to raise discord amongst the Nobles. That the contrary in this case was not fit and able, *Salust* sheweth where he saith, *Caterum Nobilitas factione magis pollebat; plebis vis soluta atque in multitudinem dispersa, minus poterat.* Besides the Nobles themselves opposed not well, in opposing *Sylla* to *Crassus*; and worse, in opposing *Augustus* to *Anthonie*: because as the opposition the people made was too weake; so the opposition of the Nobility was too strong; and was therefore the ruine of the Commonwealth. That contrary therefore which with discord shall be opposed to him, that exceeds proportion, ought to be such, as to have no greater power, nor

other

other end, but only to reduce the other to his due place; but yet with waies befitting a Christian: for I like not that course of *Tarquinius Superbus*, which he intimated by cutting off the heads of the Poppies (an invention used by many, and related also by *Aristotle*) For in the commonwealth of the body, what worse evill, then the gout in the feet or hands? yet to heale it, I never saw the foot or the hand cut off; but purgations applied to bring them to their naturall temper. Being in all evils better to oppose the beginning, then be forced to cut off the part, by letting it runne to a Gangrene or Convulsion. For as this oftentimes brings death to the whole body; so in a Commonwealth, the dismembring of a Citizen that is growne out of order, is occasion oftentimes of the ruine of the State; as it fell out in *Cæsar*.

I am to advertise, that I intend not to put division between men and men, but between men and the actions of men; for as the first is extreamly ill, so the second is as good. And therefore the Prophet saith, *Nonne qui oderunt te Domine oderam; & super inimicos tuos tabescebam*; and of this kind of hate, Christ spake when he said, *Non veni mittere pacem, sed gladium in terra.* Whereupon it being an evill action, for one to exceed his degree and thereby seeke to oppresse the City; it ought to be hated, and to seeke to bring him to proportion; but that done, the hate then must be laid aside; and therefore all the holy Fathers agree, that to know what hatred is good, and what bad, there is no better way then this, to looke if the action ceasing for which they hate, they also cease to hate; otherwise it appeares, they hated the person, and not the action. Secondly, it must be observed, when I shew, that for Cities to be well governed, it is necessary there should be discord: I meane not that kind of discord which is destructive, a discord in the whole; but that which is

a discord in a part; and in the whole, a concord: in like manner, as the Heavens turning with one motion from East to West; and with another from West to East, they are discordant in the parts; but in conservation of the whole concordant. So not without a great mystery of nature, that is of God; the Planets by whose influence he governs earthly things, are by their Maker so placed in the heavenly Orbes; that one contrary stands neighbour to another: to the end, that with an harmonious discord, they may have a concordant influence, for the good of the Universe. From hence it is, that *Jupiter* is next to *Saturne*; because *Saturne* being old and dry, an unfortunate Planet, it was necessary he should be allayed with the goodnesse of *Jupiter*, who with heat and moysture, in an admirable manner opposeth him. So unfortunate *Mars* is tempered with fortunate *Venus*, (to speake in the termes of Astrologers) who allaies the malignity of *Mars*, in such manner, as we see oftentimes, the choler of a man, to be mitigated with the sweetnesse of a woman. In like sort (to descend lower) if the Elements were not discordant; there would arise no alteration, and consequently no generation: so if the parts in Musicke were not discordant, there would be no harmony. The parts therefore are discordant; the Heavens, discordant; the Planets, discordant; and all for conservation of the Universe. Whereupon, and it is the doctrine of *Aristotle*; as from the contrariety and discord of the Elements, ariseth the peace of the Universe: so from the opposition in the parts of a City, (I speake in the sense I said before) there ariseth the conservation of the whole. Which perhaps *Plato* meant, when by the mouth of *Socrates* he said, that the profit of a City consists not in concord.

Sed

Sed veteris Reipublicæ Prosperа vel Adversa claris Scriptoribus memorata sunt: temporibusque Augusti non defuere decora ingenia; donec gliscente adulatione deterrerentur. Tiberii Caiique res, Claudii ac Neronis, florentibus ipsis ob metum falsæ: postquam occiderant, recentibus odiis compositæ sunt.

How hard and dangerous a matter it is to write Histories: when the easiest time is to finde writers; and which of them deserve most credit.

The tenth Discourse.

THe words of *Tacitus* above-cited, give me occasion of two discourses; one, concerning the writing of Histories: the other, concerning flattery. Concerning the first, I intend to shew the difficulty it brings with it, what danger Historians undergo; of whom it is easiest to write, and in what time. As for the difficulty, it may grow either in regard of him that reads, and is not interessed; or from him that reads, being interessed; or lastly from the times, in which one writes. Beginning then with the generall, that is, of him who reads, and is not interessed; there is no doubt, but the Historian with such a one, will finde some difficulty, to be thought a true writer. Seeing he must necessarily relate actions; either worthy of praise, or worthy of blame; if of blame, it is attributed to malice; if of praise, it is received with envy; because as *Thucydides* saith in the person of *Pericles*, in the oration he made to the people of *Athens*, at the funerall pompe of those, that were slaine in warre; The praises of the dead if they be heard by friends, never seeme enough; if by strangers, so long as they goe no further then possibility, they are received with patience,

ence; but if they paſſe that bound, they are then as fabulous, either ſcoffed at, or elſe envied. This caſe, *Salluſt* tranſlated out of *Thucydides*, where he ſaith, *Arduum videtur Res geſtas ſcribere; primo quia facta dictis exæquanda ſunt; Deinde quod plerique quæ delicta reprehenderis, malevolentia & invidia dicta putant; ubi de magna virtute atque gloria bonorum memores, quæ ſibi quiſque facile factu putet, æquo animo accipit; ſupra, veluti ficta pro falſis ducit.* It is therefore true, that between theſe two extreames, that writer ſhall alwaies be more beleeved, and be held in better account, who in blaming ſhall diſcover the vices and defects of others; then they who in praiſing, ſhall make their virtues too reſplendent; becauſe a reader, takes blame, in it ſelfe for a praiſe; if at leaſt he have not himſelfe thoſe vices for which one is blamed; and praiſe he takes for blame; if he find not thoſe vertues, for which the Hiſtorian extols him. Beſides, to blame being alwaies with danger; and to praiſe, rather with benefit; he who blameth, will be alwaies taken for a man free and ſincere; and he that praiſeth for a flatterer. To this perhaps *Tacitus* had an eye, when he ſaid, *Obtrectatio & livor promis auribus accipiuntur; quippe Adulationi ſæcdum crimen ſervitutis; malignitati falſa ſpecies libertatis ineſt.*

The ſecond difficulty is cauſed by perſons intereſſed; which are either Princes, or Common-wealths: if Princes, either they are vertuous, or vitious: if vitious, let the Hiſtory be written either of his life, or of any others that is like his, it will be taken, as if by relating the faults of others openly, his own faults ſecretly be caſt in his face. This by *Tacitus* is learnedly expreſſed, where he ſaith, *Reperies qui ob ſimilitudinem morum, aliena malefacta ſibi objectari putant.* So likewiſe if the vertues of ſome other Prince; or of his owne anceſtours ſhall be praiſed; he will take it, as an upbraiding to him his owne vices, and thereupon be moved

to

to indignation and envy; and for default of vertue in himselfe, will with an ill will heare the praises of another. *Etiam gloria* (saith *Tacitus*) *ac virtus infensos habet; ut animus ea propinquo diversa arguens.* Which our Lord God meaning to shew by the mouth of *Ezechiel* saith, *Fili hominis, ostende domui Israel Templum, ut confundantur ab iniquitatibus suis, & metiantur fabricam, & erubescant ab omnibus quæ fecerunt.* And S. *Gregory* expounding this place, saith that the Temple of God is then shewed in confusion, when the actions of a just man are shewed to a wicked; and our Lord God, to shew that wicked men cannot abide to heare the life of good men spoken of, saith, *Ut ostendat Templum*, he saith not, *Ut videant Templum*, meaning to shew, as S. *Gregory* expounds it, *Sponte sua considerare nolentibus, rectorum opera narrare*; These therefore with an evill will, heare the praises of others; which *Tacitus* knowing, forbore to write the life of *Agricola*, a good man, in the time of wicked Emperours, but stayed till *Trajans* time, as having seen manifest examples, of many writers, that lost their owne lives, without any benefit to those of whom they writ, by being themselves slaine, and their bookes burnt, while under wicked Princes, they would publish their Histories of such persons: and therefore he saith, *Legimus cum Arulenum Rusticum, Paetus Thraseæ, Herennium Senecionem, Priscum Helvidium laudati essent, Capitale fuisse, neque in ipsos modo Auctores, sed in libros quoque sævitum.*

But greater danger an Historian incurres, if under a wicked Prince, he dare write his history, because, either concealing his vices, he shewes himselfe a manifest flatterer, and no wise Historian, who without truth, (as *Polybius* saith) is as unprofitable, as a man without eyes; or else writing the truth, he shal in so doing, make his owne grave.

But say, he writes under a good Prince, either he must

muſt relate the actions of the Prince himſelfe, or of his houſe; if of himſelfe living, the Hiſtorian can never avoyd ſuſpition: and it is not enough to ſay, that under ſuch praiſe-worthy Princes, there will be no need, to part from truth, becauſe there are few men that doe not conceive their owne actions to be greater then they are, or at leaſt that deſire not, others ſhould thinke them ſo: whereupon, when they find, that an Hiſtorian relates them not, in ſuch a height as they conceive, or deſire that others ſhould; no doubt, they will thinke he blames them, as not ſufficiently praiſing them.

Now if under a vertuous Prince, they write the Hiſtory of his family, there growes another difficulty of great moment; which is, that a great part of the Cities and Provinces having beene ſometime Commonwealths, & from Commonwealths become Kingdomes; ſeldome without ſhedding the blood of the Citizens, and oftentimes of the Princes: the relating theſe things under a Prince, now Lord of the City, whether he be good or bad, is dangerous: firſt, on the part of the Citizens, who reading the death of their anceſtours; or their greatneſſe in the time when it was a Commonwealth: by the one, they are ſtirred up to hate, by the other to deſire: and taking into their conſideration, that greatneſſe in which they were, and thoſe injuries which they ſuffered; becauſe they cannot revenge theſe, nor regaine thoſe, but by the death of the Prince, they are oftentimes drawne to make cruell conſpiracies. Secondly, on the part of the Prince, who in reading ſuch Hiſtories, ſeeing continually before his eyes, thoſe Citizens, whoſe fathers either killed or at leaſt conſpired againſt his anceſtours; ſeeing he cannot beleeve they ſhould love him; he will hardly be induced to love them, knowing well, that things which are tolerated, by force, when occaſion

caſion happens to remove that force, will never be tolerated.

To this may be added another difficulty, on the part of the Citizens: who love not to heare the diſgraces of their anceſtours related in Hiſtories; and are thereby moved to indignation: this *Tacitus* meant, where he ſaith, *At multorum qui Tiberio regnante, poenam vel infamiam ſubiere, Poſteri manent.* And oftentimes *Tacitus* himſelfe forbeares to ſpeake of ſuch; as he did of thoſe who ſuffered diſgraces under *Nero*, of whom he ſaith, *Quos fato perfunctos, ne nominatim tradam, Maioribus eorum tribuendum puto.*

Againe to relate the warres, which theſe Princes or their Anceſtours had with others; how dangerous it is, *Creſcentius Cordus* may be an example; who for praiſing *Brutus* and *Caſſius*, was forced miſerably to end his life, as the ſaid *Tacitus* relates. It is true, this uſeth not to happen, but under wicked Princes, as *Tiberius* was. For *Auguſtus*, as the ſaid *Tacitus* relates; made rather a jeſt, then tooke indignation at any ſuch things: and thus much concerning a Prince.

Now in writing Hiſtories under a Commonwealth; there appeare againe a thouſand difficulties: Firſt, if he make relation of their beginnings, he ſhall make himſelfe odious to all in generall, and to every one in particular. To all in generall, becauſe all things having but weake beginnings, men like rather to heare the Hiſtory of the Common-wealth, in its virility, then in the weakneſſe of its infancy. To particulars, becauſe hearing relation made of the beginnings of their Houſes, which commonly are but meane, they cannot read ſuch Hiſtories with any patience; at leaſt, not with liking: and therefore in ſome Cities, ſuch writings have not been admitted. This conceit *Titus Livius* expreſſeth to the life; where he ſaith, *Et legentium plerosque* (ſpeaking of himſelfe, who writ the beginning of

of Rome) haud dubito, quin primæ Origines proximaque Originibus, minus præbitura voluptatis ſint, feſtinantibus ad hæc nova, quibus jampridem prævalentis populi vires ſeipſas conficiunt.

Moreover, if they write of warres; not onely they incurre the ſame danger we ſpake of before, under a Prince; in too much praiſing thoſe, with whom the warre hath been held: but beſides, in this kind, it is eaſier to offend in a Commonwealth, which conſiſts of many; then in a Kingdome, which conſiſteth but of one. Whereupon, it ſeemes to be more eaſie to write the truth of one alone, then of many; but withall more dangerous, becauſe the hatred of private Citizens may be ſhunned; but the hatred which comes from the publik perſon of the Prince, and reacheth to life and goods, are impoſſible to be ſhunned.

It is therefore dangerous to write under a Prince, whether he be good or bad; and whether the Hiſtory be of the Princes own actions, or of his anceſtours; and whether in forraine warre, or in warre at home. And it is dangerous likewiſe to write under Commonwealths; not onely to write of their beginnings, but in other times alſo.

It remaines to ſhew, whether it be more eaſie, to find Hiſtorians under a Kingdome, or under a Common-wealth.

The Prince may be a tyrant, and living; the Common-wealth may be corrupt, and continue: and while it continues, hardly will any Citizen, out of love of his Countrey, be drawne to diſcloſe thoſe things, which ought to be kept ſecret; and as little whilſt a Tyrant lives, will any man regiſter his diſorders for feare: Whereupon not without cauſe, the moſt wiſe *Salomon* in his Proverbs ſaith, *Nomen impiorum putreſcet*, not *Putreſcit*; becauſe in the time preſent, his ſtinch is not ſmelt; or to ſay better, none will be ſo bold, as to diſ-

cover

cover it; and if in the one, or the other, an Hiſtorian be found ſo hardy, as to write, he will certainly flatter. And therefore *Tacitus* ſaith, *Tiberii Caiique ac Neronis res florentibus ipſis ob metum falſæ.*

Alſo Hiſtorians take no care of thoſe that come after, but conſider onely their owne intereſt: and knowing how much trouble they endure, that in ſuch times can but live, when they hold their peace; they are out of heart for writing of Hiſtories, and though they ſhould have a will to doe it, yet they could have no meanes, as not being informed of publike affaires, which being done onely by the Prince, and out of his Element, he neither underſtands them, nor meddles in them, nor regards them: all which, *Tacitus* tooke into conſideration, when he ſaid, *Poſtquam bellatum apud Actium, atq; omnem poteſtatem ad unum conferri pacis interfuit; magna illa ingenia ceſſere; ſimul veritas pluribus modis fracta; primum inſcitia reipublicæ ut alienæ; mox libidine aſſentandi, aut rurſus Odio adverſus Dominantes; ita neutris cura poſteritatis, inter infenſos & obnoxios.*

But if this tyrant Prince be dead, and the tyranny altered: alſo if a corrupt Commonwealth ſhall be aboliſhed, and in place of it, ſhall come a Prince; in this caſe, there will not want Hiſtorians, but yet not without ſome doubt of truth. On the part of the Commonwealth now aboliſhed, by reaſon of flattering the new Prince; on the part of the Prince now dead, by reaſon of the hatred that is borne to a tyrant: and to this *Tacitus* had an eye, when he ſaid, *Poſtquam occiderunt, recentibus odiis compoſitæ ſunt*: ſaying in another place, that Hiſtorians who write of tyrants, write many things through hatred, which are not true.

If laſtly we ſpeake of writing Hiſtories under a well-governed Common-wealth, or under a Prince that is a Monarch; in this caſe, it will be eaſie to find writers good ſtore: and therefore *Tacitus* ſaith, *Sed veteris*

Reipublicæ proſpera vel adverſa, claris Scriptoribus memorata ſunt; where we muſt obſerve, he ſaith, *veteris*: to ſignifie that he meanes the Common-wealth, in thoſe firſt times, when it was not corrupt. And as to the purpoſe, concerning a good Prince, he addes, *Temporibus Auguſti non defuere decora ingenia*. Where alſo we ſee, he ſpeakes of the firſt yeeres of *Auguſtus*, which were indeed his beſt: and therefore our *Tacitus* writ onely the latter time of *Auguſtus*, which was his worſt, and conſequently more hard to find Writers that had written truly. So alſo did *Acchias*, who writing the Hiſtory of *Salomon*, omitted the beginning of his raign, as being the beſt; and began at his declining. According then to *Tacitus*, there will be writers good ſtore, both under a Commonwealth, that is well governed; and under a Prince, that is well diſpoſed: but in my opinion, more under the good Prince.

Firſt, becauſe of the greater profit; for a Prince will take more notice of a Writer that relates particular actions; then a Commonwealth will doe, for relating univerſall: and here is to be noted, a difference betweene the Records of a Prince, and of a Common-wealth. The Records of a Common-wealth, *Intenſive* (give me leave to uſe this word) being in my opinion leſſe then of a Prince: the reaſon is, becauſe as it is in the Proverbe, He that ſerves the publike, ſerves no body: for the benefit being received of none as proper, is little regarded, and therefore little recompenſed of the publike; whereupon we ſee *Joſeph* received a greater recompence for the benefit he did to *Pharao*, then ever we read given by any Common-wealth. But *Extenſive*, I hold it more profitable to ſerve under a Common-wealth; becauſe the memory of a benefit done to a Prince, as being a particular perſon, dies with him: but the memory of a benefit done to a City, continues as long as the City continues; and

not onely towards him that did it, but to his poſterity alſo: whereof we have a cleare example in the foreſaid *Joſeph*; who *Intenſively* was rewarded by King *Pharao*, beyond meaſure, being more King then *Pharao* himſelfe. But *Extenſively*, it proved more hurt then benefit, his ſucceſſours being put to ſlavery by him, whoſe grandfather with all his people, *Joſeph* had preſerved before from famine. This reaſon by me alledged, is written by the Holy Ghoſt in *Exodus*, where he ſaith, *Surrexit in terra Rex novus, ſuper Ægyptum, qui ignorabat Joſeph, & ait ad populum ſuum; Ecce populus Iſrael multus & fortior nobis eſt; Venite, ſapienter opprimamus eum.* And therefore, (as I ſhall ſhew in another place) men more eſteeming a preſent profit, then a future, will be moved rather to write of a Prince, then of a Commonwealth.

Secondly, by reaſon of leſſe danger, becauſe an Hiſtorian in praiſing a Prince, hath nothing elſe to think of; and being indeed a good Prince, he may praiſe him truely; and therefore *Tacitus* diſcourſing of ſuch Princes, breakes out into theſe words, *Rara temporum felicitate, ubi ſentire que velis, & que ſentias dicere licet.* But in a Common-wealth (as I ſaid before) it is impoſſible to write ſo, but that amongſt ſo many, ſome or other will be blamed; and oftentimes the Hate that growes from one, proves more hurtfull, then the love of all the reſt proves beneficiall; becauſe theſe hold themſelves not much obliged, as counting it but their due; the other conceave an irreconcileable hate, as counting it a wrong.

Thirdly, Hiſtorians will more willingly write the deedes of a Prince, then of a City; becauſe men take more pleaſure to praiſe ſuch as are above their owne ranke; envy, as every one knowes, being properly amongſt equals: and therefore in Common-wealths, every one lookes rather to be praiſed himſelfe, then to

praiſe others: whereupon *Salluſt*, not without cauſe lamenting the ſcarcity of Writers that *Rome* had, ſaith, *At populo Romano nunquam ea copia fuit*, (that is of Writers,) *quia prudentiſſimus Negotioſus maxime erat; Ingenium nemo ſine corpore exercebat; Optimus quiſque facere quam dicere, ſua ab aliis benefacta laudari, quam ipſe aliorum narrare malebat.* And thus much concerning the perſons under whom, and of whom an Hiſtorian writes.

Now concerning the time, there may be given three kinds of Hiſtorians: ſome, who relate things hapned in their owne time; ſome, things done time paſt; and others, things to be done in time to come. They who relate the Accidents of time paſt, without having had any former relation, are called Prophets: as *Moyſes* writing of the Creation of the World; ſo many who have written of things to come, are called Hiſtorians; as *Eſay*, who hath written as well of our Church; as if he had written of things paſt; *Ita enim Univerſa Chriſti* (ſaith S. *Hierom*) *Eccleſiæque myſteria proſequutus eſt, ut non putes eum de futuro vaticinari, ſed de præterito Hiſtoriam texere.*

But leaving thoſe who write with ſuch Authority, that of their truth there can be no doubt, our diſcourſe ſhall be of the other; and becauſe (as we have ſaid) many write of the times paſt; others, of their owne times: and of theſe, ſome are ſuch as have beene preſent at the things they relate; and others have them onely by relation: there being great difficulty in all the three, it is requiſite, that together with the difficulty, we ſhould alſo examine, which of them is moſt worthy to be credited.

They then who relate things which themſelves have ſeene done, may eaſily be drawne to vary from the truth; as moved with paſſions, ſometimes of hate, ſometimes of envy, and ſometimes againe of love; and therefore *Plutarch* counts it a buſineſſe of great difficulty,

culty: and this perhaps *Livy* meanes, when ſpeaking of ſuch Writers, he ſaith, *Etſi non flectere à vero; ſollicitum tamen efficere poſſunt.* And *Polybius* to give the greater authority to his Hiſtory, labours to ſhew that the ſtory of the firſt warre of the Romans with the Carthagenians, written by *Fabius Pictor* a Roman, and by *Philo* a Carthagenian, was by thoſe Authours, each of them in favour of his owne Country, ſtuffed with lies. And indeed it is not unlike, but they might vary from the truth, and yet out of no corrupt affection; but that each of them writ as he believed, though not as it was; ſeeing things to which men are affected, ſeem alwaies, in the good, greater; and leſſe, in the evill; according to that rule of *Ariſtotle, Intus exiſtens prohibet Extraneum:* and therefore to an eye, looking through a greene Glaſſe, every thing ſeemes greene. So to the palate offended with choler, every thing taſts bitter: and therefore *David* made his prayer to God, to keep him as the Apple of his eye, *Cuſtodi me Domine ut pupillam oculi:* which as it hath in it no colour, and therefore ſees things as they are; ſo he deſired to be without affections, that he might know the truth of things. Whereuppon it appeares, we may conclude, that they who write of their owne times, and have not the vertue of the apple of the eye; may eaſily vary from the truth; not onely by malice, but ſometimes alſo by ignorance; it being impoſſible, that a man ſhould be an eye-witneſſe of all he writes; and ſhould be preſent at all Actions and Counſels in ſuch manner, as not to need the information of others; and even thoſe who are preſent at any action, do ſeldome all of them agree in the relation.

On the other ſide, it appeares there is more credit to be given to an Hiſtorian that writes of his owne time, and of thoſe things at which he hath himſelfe been preſent, then to others; ſeeing they are forced to

ſtand to that which is left them by the ancients, either written in Hiſtory, or preſerved in memory, as *Plutarch* well obſerves. And becauſe it is ſeldome, but there is more then one Writer of the ſame Hiſtory: and for him that will relate them, he muſt neceſſarily make uſe of thoſe, who have formerly given the information: it is an eaſie matter, in ſuch a number of writings, for an Hiſtorian to be confounded; and be able but as a blind man, to give advertiſement of things, whereof he is himſelfe to be advertiſed. Beſides, thoſe firſt writings or memories of which this Hiſtorian makes uſe: they alſo, may have been written, out of affection.

Laſtly, there are not wanting reaſons to prove, that he who writes a Hiſtory of his own time; though he have them but by relation, is the more worthy of credit; becauſe in ſuch, the difficulties that are found in the others, are abated; ſeeing, by not having been preſent, and had no part in the actions they relate; they are alſo voyd of thoſe affections, which make Hiſtorians ſpeake leſſe truth: and by writing of their owne time, they are not tied to ſtand to the bookes of others, who never agree with one another. And therefore the holy fathers, from this difficulty have drawne an Argument to prove the truth of the Goſpell; becauſe four Writers agree in all points. Neither by this example is my opinion abated, but rather ſtrengthned; it being neceſſary, that to make foure men write agreeingly in all things, there muſt be one onely to inſtruct them all, which is the Holy Ghoſt.

But neither is this kind of Hiſtorians without difficulty; rather as I conceive, in greater then any other: as partaking himſelfe alone of all thoſe difficulties, which we in the two firſt obſerved; becauſe although he be not preſent at the things, yet he is preſent at the time; and this hath force to ſtirre affection even in

thoſe that are not neere the time, as every one finds by experience in himſelfe. Secondly, he who gives the information, may be moved by ſome paſſion himſelfe; and then he will the leſſe care for writing a lie, when he hath his intent, and the blame anothers. Thirdly, if he take more then one to give him information; he will fall into the ſame difficulties, as he that writes Hiſtories of the times paſt: ſeeing it is ſeldome ſeene, that two agree in their relation; and oftentimes, one alone is contrary to himſelfe.

And thus there is difficulty we ſee in all manner of times, and of Writers; whether they write of the time paſt, or of their own times; and whether they write by relation from others, or as eye-witneſſes themſelves.

For reſolution, we may conclude, that more credit is to be given to thoſe things, which are related by Hiſtorians that have beene eye-witneſſes of things done in their own time, ſo long as the Writers be honeſt men. Whereupon we give more credit to the Hiſtories of [x] *Argentone*, relating accidents, at which he was himſelfe preſent, then we doe to *Jovius*, who writ by relation from others, when himſelfe perhaps was all the while at his Biſhopricke. Yet I ſay not, that *Jovius* is not worthy of credit, ſeeing it is not my profeſſion to lay blame upon any. This *Argentone* hath made us know this difference, while enterlacing the Hiſtories of *Lewis* the eleventh with thoſe of *England*; he uſeth much cunning to make us beleeve him, as one that was not preſent at the things done: and therefore for the moſt part, names the perſons who gave him information: that from the greatneſſe and credit of his informers, he might winne credit to his owne writings. And this was the very caſe of S. *Luke*, who writing in his Goſpell the life of our Saviour; becauſe he had not himſelfe been preſent, therefore to procure himſelfe credit, at his very beginning he ſaith, he had

[x] *Phil. de Com*

had it by relation from perſons that were preſent. *Sicut tradiderunt nobis, qui ab initio ipſi viderunt, & miniſtri fuerunt ſermonis:* but when he was to write the Acts of the Apoſtles, at which he had been preſent; then without making any Promiſe or Proæme: he begins with ſaying, *Primum quidem ſermonem feci de omnibus, O Theophile:* and this for no other cauſe, but becauſe he knew, how much a Hiſtory hath more credit, when things are written by one that hath ſeen them. It is no marvell then, that S. *John*, for gayning himſelfe credit ſaith, *Ego vidi, & teſtimonium perhibui, quia hic eſt filius Dei.* And therefore it was Gods will, that the Apoſtles ſhould beare witneſſe of him, *Et vos teſtificamini de me, quoniam ab initio mecum eſtis.* And S. *Peter* in the Acts, when he would perſwade the reſurrection of Chriſt to be believed, ſaith, *Qui ſimul edimus & bibimus cum illo.* Whereupon S. *Chryſoſtome*, conſidering why S. *John* names himſelfe, where he ſaith, *Sequebatur autem Petrus, & alius Diſcipulus*, gives the reaſon in theſe words, *Et ſui meminiſſe coactus eſt, ut intelligas ea, cæteris diligentius, quæ in Principis aula facta ſunt enarrare, utpote quia aderat.*

As for the objection made before, it is plainly cleered, if the Writer be an honeſt man. For in a good Hiſtorian, there are two things required; an ability, and a will: and one of theſe parts he that writes of things himſelfe hath ſeen, hath certaine in him more then others; which is, that he is more able to write the truth, then any other; and as for the will to doe it, it cannot be wanting in him, if he be honeſt: and if he be not honeſt, then no doubt another that writes of times paſt may be worthy of more credit then he.

Donec

Donec gliſcente Adulatione deterrerentur.

From whence flattery proceeds: how many kinds there are of it, and which of them is hurtfull to a City.

The eleventh Diſcourſe.

CConcerning flattery, there have been diſcourſes morally written, by infinite writers; and in ſuch manner, that they have given cauſe rather to admire them, then left any place to adde any thing unto them. I therefore, as I uſe to do, will handle it as a Politician, briefly, and yet perhaps in ſuch a way, as hath not beene done by any. Shewing firſt, that Princes themſelves are the cauſe of flatterers. Secondly, how many kinds of flatterers there are. Thirdly, in what the eſſence of flattery conſiſts. And laſtly, which of them are hurtfull to Cities.

Concerning the firſt, it is in common experience, that flatterers are the ruine of Princes; and yet it is eaſie to ſhew that Princes are themſelves the forgers of this their ruine; becauſe if they were furniſhed with vertue and goodneſſe; flatterers could find no matter in them to worke upon: and ſo, either there would be no flattery at all, or at leaſt not hurtfull. And therefore thoſe wiſe virgins who ſtood waiting for the Bridegroome by night, having Oyle for themſelves; which in the Scripture, is often taken for praiſe, *Oleum effuſum nomen tuum*: as *Lyranus* interprets it, they needed not procure from others the Oyle of flattery. *Et Oleum peccatoris non impinguet caput meum:* ſo as Princes themſelves being the cauſe of flattery, and not the Subjects; all the fault of it, ought to be laid upon them.

them. Whereupon it is no marvell, that in the Acts, while *Herod* making an oration to the people, was flattered of them, calling his voyce the voyce of a God; ſuddenly an Angell ſtroke him, and he was eaten up of wormes. *Statuto autem die, Herodes indutus veſtitu Regio & ſedens ſuper Tribunal, concionabatur ad Illos: populus autem clamabat, vox Dei: ſtatim autem illum percuſſit Angelus Domini;* what fault was it in *Herod*, that the people applauded him, calling his voyce, the voyce of God? and yet he was ſtroken, and not the People. We may ſay then, that our Lord God by this example would ſhew, that Princes themſelves are more cauſe of the peoples flattery, then the ſubjects are; which, as a Penne, writes ſuch things, as he that moves it drawes; of which, it is but the inſtrument, and no efficient cauſe.

Before I come to the other two heads; that is, how many kinds of flattery there are; and which of them be hurtfull to a City: I am forced to premiſe a little doctrine, of which I ſhall have uſe, in the explication of the one and the other.

We muſt therefore know, that flattery is a morall action: one of its contraries being friendſhip, which is a morall vertue; and becauſe contraries, (as witneſſeth the Philoſopher) are all under the ſame *genus*; as white and blacke under colour; therefore flattery alſo muſt be under the *genus* of morall actions: of which there are many ſo bad, that nothing can make them good, as adultery, and ſuch like. This opinion was held by the maſter of the ſentences; by the authority of S. *Auſtin*, where he ſaith, *Bonum eſt continentia, malum eſt luxuria, inter utrumque indifferens, ambulare; capitis naribuſque purgamenta projicere, ſputis rheumata jacere, hoc nec bonum, nec malum eſt; ſive enim feceris, ſive non feceris, nec juſtitiam habebis, nec injuſtitiam.* Thirdly, an action may in his owne nature be good; yet ſo as by meanes, it

may

may become bad: as to fast, to pray, to sacrifice, and the like. *Qui enim de rapina Deo sacrificium offerunt* (saith S. *Austin*) *idem facit, ac si filium in conspectu patris occidat.* Lastly, an action may be given, which of its owne nature is bad; and yet by some other cause, may become good. Murther is a wicked thing, yet *Elias* in killing the false Prophets did a good worke, and shewed himselfe zealous of the honour of God.

Those actions then which are subject to alteration, may receive it from three things: first, from the object; a carnall act performed with a wife, is good; but if with another mans wife, is wicked. Secondly, from the circumstance: the Sacrifice which *Saul* made, because it wanted the due circumstances, was not accepted of God. Thirdly, it may receive this alteration from the end; that is, from the intention: but because the end may comprehend under it, both the object and the circumstances; therefore we must know, that it may be considered three waies: First, as it is an object, that terminates the act; and then it is called an intrinsecall end. Secondly, as it happens to some act, as a circumstance. Thirdly, as it is in nature of a cause, and then it is called, *Cujus gratia*: when therefore we say, that an action may receive goodnesse or badnesse, from the end; we meane it the third way.

The action in which flattery consists, is such as may receive alteration, from the intention, or from the object; or from the circumstances. What action of its owne nature more adulatory, then to feigne ones selfe crook-backt, with one that is crook-backt; as *Plato's* schollers did? or to stammer with one that is stammering, as *Aristotles* did; or to feigne himselfe wry-neckt, with one that is so, as the Courtiers of *Alexander* the great did? or to feigne ones selfe poore blind, with one that is poore blind, as the flatterers of *Dionysius* did? It is indeed the greatest kind of flattery (as *Plutarch* ac-

counts

counts it) that can be; and yet theſe and the like actions, Saint *Paul* did, as he writes himſelfe; with the Jewes, he feigned himſelfe a Jew; with thoſe that are weake, to be weake: and in ſhort, with all, he feigned himſelfe all. *Et factus ſum Judæis tanquam Judæus; ut Judæos lucrare iis qui ſub lege ſunt, quaſi ſub lege eſſem; cum ipſe non eſſem ſub lege; ut eos qui ſub lege erant lucrifacerem; iis qui ſine lege erant, tanquam ſine lege eſſem; cum ſine lege Dei non eſſem; ſed in lege eſſem Chriſti, ut lucrifacerem eos qui ſine lege erant: factus ſum infirmus infirmis; ut infirmos lucrifacerem: omnibus omnis factus ſum, ut omnes facerem ſalvos.* See here, that act, which of its owne nature, was moſt adulatory, being uſed by S. *Paul*, became vertuous and beneficiall; and the reaſon of this can proceed from nothing, but from the intention; becauſe as thoſe other were moved, with their proper intereſt; So S. *Paul* was moved with the zeale of God. *Ut Judæos lucrarer, ut eos qui ſub lege erant lucrifacerem, ut omnes facerem ſalvos.* For there cannot a better way be found, to reduce men to the right way, then to counterfeit to be ſuch as they are: And even ſo, doe many Phyſitians uſe to doe; who oftentimes having a patient troubled with a melancholicke humour in the braine; in ſuch ſort, as that they thinke themſelves to be earthen Pots: they alſo feine themſelves to be ſuch, to the end, that they taking meat, their patient alſo by their example may take meat, and not die with hunger, out of a conceit that earthen pots could not eate. And in this manner oftentimes they heale their patients; and feigning themſelves to be fooles, have cured them of folly. Thus alſo did S. *Paul*, who circumciſed *Timothy*, with a purpoſe to take away circumciſion; whereof Saint *Chryſoſtome* ſpeaking, ſaith, *Vide opus, circumcidit, ut circumciſionem tolleret.* Not without cauſe therefore did *Marcus Tullius* blame *Cato*, that would not

flatter

flatter the people with counterfeiting their faſhions, thereby to get the Conſulſhip; and have freed his Country from the imminent tyranny of *Julius Cæſar*. And the rather, it being a thing commended of God himſelfe, *Cum perverſo perverteris*: that is, with wicked men, one muſt feigne himſelfe wicked, to reduce them to goodneſſe.

This Act, which in S. *Paul* received alteration from the end, may alſo in the contrary receive alteration from the circumſtance; and was uſed therefore by S. *Peter*, who when he went to *Antiochia*, was hindred by S. *Paul* himſelfe, *Et in faciem reſtiti quia reprehenſibilis erat*: although the Act of S. *Peter* was the ſame, and done with the ſame intention that S. *Pauls* was; yet by reaſon of one circumſtance, which was, that by his example, the Gentiles were drawne to Judaiſe, he deſerved reprehenſion.

To come then to the ſecond head, which is, how many kinds of flattery there are: I ſay firſt, there may be an Act of its owne nature exceeding good, and yet be apt to become a flattering act: as, to praiſe a man for ſomething he hath done, to the end he may with more boldneſſe reprove him afterward, is a good act: and therefore S. *Paul* knowing that the *Corinthians*, for the love they bore to certaine perſons, were fallen into ſchiſme, at firſt, he praiſeth them, where he ſaith, *Gratias ago Deo meo, ſemper pro vobis in gratia Dei, quæ data eſt vobis in Chriſto Jeſu; quia in omnibus divites facti eſtis in illo, in omni verbo & in omni ſcientia, ſicut teſtimonium Chriſti confirmatum eſt in vobis, ita ut nihil deſit vobis impulſus gratiæ*: certainly a greater praiſe then this, he could not poſſibly give; but he addes afterward, *Obſecro vos fratres per nomen Domini noſtri Jeſu Chriſti ut id ipſum dicatis omnes, & non ſint in vobis ſchiſmata*; ſee here, after his praiſing them, how ſharply he reprehends them. The contrary happens when one praiſing

a man, ſpeakes the truth, but with an ill intention; for it is then true flattery: and ſuch, a Prince ſhould never endure to heare. And therefore S. *Paul*, paſſing with many others by a place, where ſtood a maid poſſeſſed with a devill; and hearing himſelfe praiſed by that devill for a ſervant of God, he made him hold his peace, driving him out of the mayds body. *Factum eſt autem euntibus nobis ad orationem, puellam quandam habentem ſpiritum Pythonem obviare nobis, quæ quæſtum magnum præſtabat Dominis ſuis; Divinando, hæc ſubſecuta Paulum & nos, clamabat dicens: iſti homines ſervi Dei excelſi ſunt, qui annuntiant vobis viam ſalutis: hoc autem faciebat multis diebus: dolens autem Paulus, & converſus ſpiritui, dixit; præcipio tibi in nomine Jeſu Chriſti, exire ab ea, & exiit eadem hora.* There is no doubt, but the devill in praiſing Saint *Paul* and his companions ſaid the truth; but becauſe he did it not with a good intent, but to the end, that another time he might tell a lie, and be believed; therefore S. *Paul* made him goe forth of the maids body. And ſo ought it to be done to thoſe, who ſometimes ſpeake the truth; but to the end, that another time they may more ſecurely flatter. That ſuch kind of praiſing is flattery, may eaſily be proved. For either it muſt proceed from friendſhip, or from mildneſſe, or elſe from flattery. But it proceeds not from friendſhip, becauſe a friend never praiſeth out of intereſt; nor it proceeds not from mildneſſe, becauſe he by *Ariſtotle* is defined to be mild, who exceeds in his praiſes to give contentment; and differenceth him by this from a flatterer, who praiſeth for his owne intereſt. So as we truely and upon good ground take this to be flattery; the rather being defined by S. *Chryſoſtome*, *Adulatio eſt quando quoſdam colit quiſpiam, non propter quæ colere oportet, ſed ad captandum terrena*; where this word *Colit* ſtands in place of the *Genus*; as being common both to a friend, and to him that is mild: and

theſe

theſe words *Ad captandum terrena*, ſtand in place of the difference; in which the eſſence of flattery conſiſts.

Secondly, there may be an action, which of its own nature, is neither good nor bad, but from divers cauſes may receive a diverſe forme. And it is where vertue is indeed and truly in a Prince, but is increaſed and made greater in the praiſing it. The liberality that was in *Tiberius* being celebrated by the Senatours more then was cauſe; not to the end, he ſhould encreaſe it for the publike good; but to the end, to make him privately the more their friend, was flattery, which could not be ſo called, if it had been done for the publike good. And therefore when *Metellus* was extolled for the great valour and proweſſe he had ſhewed in managing the warre; becauſe it was done to the end, he ſhould continue, and hold on his courſe, as he did, was no flattery, but a good act, and ſo recorded by Hiſtorians.

Thirdly, there may be an act, of its owne nature bad and flattering, yet capable to become good from the intention: and it is when a Prince is praiſed for thoſe vertues and conditions which are not in him, but which ſhould be in him, ſo long as he is not guilty of the contrary vices.

Fourthly and laſtly, there may be an act, I will not ſay, eſſentially flattering; but which ſeldome and very hardly can change its nature; and it is, when a Prince is praiſed for a vertue, being ſtayned with the contrary vice; as to call one mercifull, that is cruell.

It remaines to ſhew, which of theſe kinds is hurtfull to a Prince, and conſequently to the ſubjects. Concerning the firſt, ſeeing flattery conſiſts of two things; an action, and an intention: as being an action, it is tranſient; as being an intention, it is imminent; as being an action it is good; as an intention bad: laſtly, as an action it is founded in the merit of the Prince, in

which it paſſeth away; as an intention, it is founded in the ill quality of the actor, in whom it remaines; ſo as it cannot be hurtfull to the Prince but by accident; when it is done, as to make an introduction, but hurtfull to him that uſeth it: who thereby ſhewes himſelfe a wicked man, and an intereſſed flatterer. For there is this difference betweene morall acts and works artificiall; as *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that workes of art paſſe away in the matter; and remaine not in the workman; but acts of vertue remaining in our ſelves, require a goodneſſe in the actor; which is of ſmal importance in works artificiall. But although in this, there appeare no great hurt, yet it will be alwaies good to imitate S. *Paul*, in diſcarding ſuch perſons: or rather to imitate our Lord Chriſt, who being flattered of the devill, (as *Theophilact* interprets it) when in Saint *Luke*, he ſaid, *Scio te qui ſis, ſanctus ille Dei*: he inſtantly rebuked him, *Et increpavit illum dicens; obmutesce & exi ab eo.*

The ſecond way that may either hurt, or profit a Prince, is taken from the object; for this praiſe is about an object, either good or bad: I meane, he whoſe vertues are extolled, is either vertuous and juſt as *Metellus* was, or vitious and wicked as *Tiberius* was. In the firſt caſe, it doth well, and was therefore very profitable to the Commonwealth: but in the ſecond caſe, I like it not; in regard whereof, S. *Gregory* ſaith, *Injuſtus audita laude ſua pollutur, juſtus purgatur: poviet enim ſi talis non oſtenditur, qualis ab hominibus putatur.*

The third way is a little more difficult; yet as it is eaſie to be knowne, and hard to be done; ſo it can do but ſmall hurt, to a City or a Prince. For if he ſhall beleeve there is ſuch an opinion had of him; he will endeavour ſo to carry himſelfe, that his actions may anſwer that opinion; if not to attaine to that for which he is praiſed, at leaſt to hide the contrary. And

for this perhaps *Varro* (as S. *Auſtin* relates) ſaid, that it is profitable for a City, to flatter Princes, with making them beleeve, they are Sonnes of the Gods; becauſe finding ſuch an opinion had of them, either they will beleeve themſelves to be ſuch indeed; or at leaſt believing themſelves to be accounted ſuch, they will endeavour to do nothing that may be unworthy of Sons of the Gods. Nevertheleſſe, (to returne to our purpoſe) this way alſo receives goodneſſe frō the object; ſeeing, if we deale with bad Princes, it is no good courſe, to make them thinke, thoſe vertues to be in them, whereof they have not any ſparke; becauſe, either they will beleeve that they are ſuch; and then will never endeavour to be ſuch; or at leaſt, finding there is ſuch an opinion had of them, they will content themſelves with having the name. But on the other ſide, if we have to doe with a good Prince, it cannot be but very profitable; ſeeing although he ſhould not beleeve himſelfe to be ſuch, nor had in ſuch account; yet finding ſuch vertue to be univerſally praiſed, he would for meriting the praiſe, apply himſelfe to it: and much more, if he beleeve ſuch an opinion to be had of him, for fearing of going leſſe. Therefore S. *Auſtin* ſaith, *Gratias agimus tibi uberes, quod nos laudas tanquam tales ſimus: magnopere enim hortaris ut tales eſſe cupiamus.* With this intention he conceives in another Epiſtle, that *Cicero* praiſed *Cæſar* for clemency, *Talem eſſe oſtendebat Principem qualem illum fallaciter predicabat.* So as from this kind of flattery, there will grow no hurt, but rather good: and the more, if the flatterer meaning to praiſe a Prince for ſomething that is not in him, he praiſe him not for ſome vice; for this would rather provoke him to anger, to heare thoſe vices attributed to him of which he is not guilty: and which are ſo much better known, as they are leſſe like.

The laſt way alſo may be either good or bad. The

Senate of *Rome* underſtanding that *Macrinus* the moſt cruell man in the World, was choſen Emperour, preſently determined to give him the name of *Pius*; which was not done without great judgment and myſtery: & it did ſome good (though he accepted not the name) to mitigate in ſome part his cruelty. But contrariwiſe, when *Nero* afterward having killed his mother, and an infinite number of Senatours, found himſelfe applauded, and the name of a valiant man given him; it drowned him altogether in a flood of vices. *Seque in omnes libidines effudit*: and a little after, *Poſtquam cuncta ſcelerum pro egregiis accipi videt, exturbat Octaviam*, and ſo following. From theſe two contrary, at leaſt unlike effects; I am moved to ſearch out the reaſon, why the one of them, ſhould be profitable rather then hurtfull; and the other be the ruine of ſo many Citizens? To which I ſay, that this Act may receive alteration, either from the circumſtance, or from the object. From the circumſtance, ſeeing this praiſe may either be given for a vertue, farre different and contrary to a vice with which the Prince is tainted: or it may be given for a vertue, which is neere to that vice. If in the firſt caſe, we call one that is cruell, mercifull; as it is eaſie to be knowne, ſo it will doe more good then hurt; becauſe this is rather a modeſt admoniſhing the Prince, then an impudent praiſing of his vices; but in the ſecond caſe, to call one that is cruell, and a murtherer of his Senatours and Citizens, by the name of a valiant man, and a freer of his Countrey; as it is a flattery hard to be knowne, ſo it is both to Prince and City moſt pernicious. Of the firſt ſort, was the caſe of *Macrinus*; of the ſecond, that of *Nero*. As concerning the object, he whom we praiſe for a vertue, either is ſtained before, being Prince, with the contrary vice, as *Nero* was: or elſe he comes but newly to be Prince, as *Macrinus* did; if he were ſtayned before, it can doe no good, although

though the praise be for a vertue most remote from the vice; but if he come but newly to be Prince, it may then doe some good.

I will not omit (though this be not the proper place for it) to advertise, that a flatterer is a person, of whom a Prince ought to stand in feare; seeing two sorts of men may be his ruine: either, they that are too free; who using their freenesse in dispraising their Lord, must needs give him cause to be afraid; or else they, that are too wary, who concealing their thoughts, are apt to make conspiracies; and the flatterer being of this sort, a concealour of his thoughts, gives the Prince just cause to feare him. And therefore *Tiberius* an understanding man, neither liked those that flattered too much, nor those that spake too freely; *unde Augusta & lubrica Oratio*, (saith *Tacitus*) *sub Principe qui libertatem metuebat, adulationem oderat.* And in another place, speaking of flattery, he saith, *Quæ, moribus corruptis perinde anceps si nulla, & ubi Nimia est.*

Postquam Bruto & Cassio cæsis, nulla jam publica arma Pompeius apud Siciliam oppressus, exutoque Lepido, interfecto Antonio, ne Julianis quidem partibus nisi Cæsar Dux reliquus; posito triumviri nomine, consulem se ferens & ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio Jure contentum, ubi Militem donis, Populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.

What things holpe Augustus to the Empire, and what meanes he used to maintaine it.

The twelfth Discourse.

COrnelius *Tacitus* not onely in these words, but also in a good part of the first Book, entreating of *Augustus*, labours to shew what meanes he used to attaine the

the Empire; and what to uphold him, having attained it. And my meaning is to follow his courſe, and punctually to examine all things: dividing my Diſcourſe into two parts: the firſt, to ſhew the waies which *Auguſtus* uſed to attaine the Empire; the ſecond, the waies by which he maintained it.

The ordinary waies, as experience and men teach us, to come to a Principality, are either by fortune, or by vertue, or by wickedneſſe, or by craft, or by election, or laſtly by ſucceſſion.

Auguſtus then came to the Empire by fortune; which holpe him three waies: the firſt, that when *Brutus* and *Caſſius* who were his enemies were dead; and that *Lepidus* and *Antonius* his partners in greatneſſe were extinguiſht; he only remained of the Cæſarian faction: and therfore *Tacitus* ſpeaking in what manner fortune ayded him, ſaith, *Poſtquam Bruto & Caſſio cæſis; nulla jam publica arma, Pompeius apud ſiciliam oppreſſus; exuto Lepido, Interfecto Antonio, ne Julianis quidem partibus niſi Cæſar Dux reliquus:* and ſo following.

This onely ayd of fortune, is the ableſt way to raiſe one to a Principality: and therefore *Pericles*, (as *Plutarch* in his life relates) by this onely meanes became Prince of *Athens*, *Poſtquam Ariſtides vita deceſſit, Themiſtocles exulatum abiit, Cimonem bella, plerique citra Græciam detimere, tbi demum Pericles populo ſe dedit.*

But this alone did not ſerve *Auguſtus*, but fortune in another manner gave him aſſiſtance: for the ſtouteſt Citizens, being part baniſhed, and part ſlaine in battailes, it was an eaſie matter to attaine the Empire without any let. This ſecond ayd of fortune, *Tacitus* expreſſeth, where he ſaith, *Inſurgere paulatim, munia Senatus, Magiſtratum legumque in ſe trahere; nullo adverſante, cum ferociſſimi per aciem, aut proſcriptione cecidiſſent.*

Not leſſe apt then the firſt, is this ayd, to make a change in States; ſeeing the people of *Tarantum*, onely

becauſe

because the greater part of the Nobility were dead in warre, was easily able to change the state: whereupon *Aristotle* saith, *Contingit vero quandoquidem id*, (the change of the State) *per fortunam, veluti apud Tarentinos; cum superati prælio a Lampigensibus Nobilitatis magnam partem amississent.*

But fortune not content with this neither gave *Augustus* another ayd also, to make himselfe Emperour: which was, that he found the Common-wealth wearied with discords, and the Provinces oppressed by Magistrates; which *Tacitus* describing saith, *Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa, nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit*: and of the Provinces he addes, *Neque Provinciæ illum rerum statum abnuebant, suspecto Senatus populique Imperio*, and that which followeth.

This way was the onely cause that brought *Viscont* to be Lord of *Milan*; and *Bentivoli* to be Lord of *Bologna*.

Yet fortune by all these waies had not power her selfe alone, to bring *Augustus* to the Empire; though (as we have shewed) each of them of it selfe were apt to doe it: but secondarily there concurred with them his own valour, which he shewed in so many battels: and lastly, in that Naval fight; by meanes whereof he came to be Emperour. And although this alone had beene sufficient to bring him to the Empire, as was seen in *Vitellius*, who by getting the victory onely in one battaile against *Otho*, made himselfe Lord of *Rome*; yet *Augustus*, besides fortune and his owne vertue, brought himselfe forward by desert, as having enlarged the Roman Empire, *Mari Oceano, haud antehac ullis longinquis septum Imperium*: by this way have many come to be Princes, as *Saturnius*, and others. And *Aristotle* himselfe approves it, where he saith, *Præterea ob beneficia accepta Reges creavere.* Which Saint *Thomas* expounding, saith, *Vel quia pugnavit contra inimicos*

pro

pro illis, vel invenit artem aliquam iis neceſſariam.

But beſides fortune, vertue, and merit, *Auguſtus* brought himſelfe forward by wickedneſſe and perfidiouſneſſe alſo, which ayded him two waies: Firſt, by making uſe of thoſe armes to oppreſſe his Countrey, which he had received to defend it, *Arma quæ in Antonium ceperat contra Rempublicam verſa*: and indeed, there cannot be a greater wickedneſſe, then when benefits are turned againſt him of whom they are received; and therefore our Lord God meaning by the mouth of *Eſay*, to ſhew the ungratefulneſſe & wickedneſſe of the Hebrew people, ſaith, *Filios enutrivi, & exaltavi, ipſi autem ſpreverunt me*, Where the Chaldee paraphraſe ſaith, *Tuliſti de auro meo, atque de Argento meo, quæ dedi tibi, & feciſti tibi Imagines Maſculinas*. This way was alſo followed by *Hiero* the Syracuſan, who imployed that Army to oppoſe the Common-wealth, which he had received to defend it.

But neither did this wickedneſſe of *Auguſtus* ſerve his turne, but he ſtrengthened it by committing ſo many murthers, as *Tacitus* deſcribes where he ſaith, *Pietatem erga parentem & tempora Reipublicæ obtentui ſumpta.* And againe, *Caſſii & Brutorum exitus paternis inimicitiis datos: deceptos poſt Antoninm Tarentino Brundiſinoque fœdere: & nuptiis ſororis illeptum, ſubdole affinitatis pœnas mortis exolviſſe.* But not onely this wickedneſſe, with ſo many other cauſes ſpoken of before, concurred; though this alone were enough to bring a man to a Kingdome; as it did *Agathocles* the Sicilian, and *Cleomenes* the Spartan and many others; a way unworthy to be imitated not onely of Chriſtians, but even of Barbarians: But beſides all theſe, that which ayded *Auguſtus* was craft and policy: for being called in by his owne Citizens, and they divided into Commons and Nobility; The Commons by reaſon of oppreſſion by the great ones: the Nobles by reaſon of common diſſenſion, deſired rather to

have

have a King and be ſafe, then to have liberty, and be in danger: So as *Auguſtus, Ad tuendam plebem*, tooke upon him the dignity of a tribune; and to be ayded by the Nobility, advanced them in honours and riches, who *Novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & præſentia, quam vetera & periculoſa mallent.* For ſafety is ſo ſweet a thing, that the people liked better of ſervitude with ſafety, than of liberty with danger. And therefore the Iſraelites finding that the Canaanites were a valiant Nation, were ready rather to turne backe into *Ægypt* and be ſlaves; then to ſtay in *Canaan* and be in danger. As it happened alſo in *Exodus*, when they ſaw *Pharao* comming, *Nunquid non erant Sepulchra in Ægypto, quando ſedebamus ſuper ollas carnium?* And therefore the Romans having driven out the Kings, doubted leſt the the people, if the Tarquins ſhould make warre upon *Rome*, would not to reſolve, rather to receive the tyrant againe, and live in peace; then continue in liberty, and be ſtill in danger. *Nec hoſtes modo timebant* (ſaith *Livy*) *ſed ſuos met ipſos cives, ne Romana plebs, metu perculſa, receptis in urbem regibus, vel cum ſervitute pacem acciperet.* And here is to be noted, that men will alwaies be more moved with private intereſt, then with publike profit; and that every one had rather be a ſlave and rich, then to be free and poore. Whereof I will bring one example out of *Dio*: *Cæſar* having before him the Army of *Scipio*, cauſed Letters to be carried into the enemies Tents, wherein he friendly promiſed the Souldiers honours and riches, and to the Countreymen, to ſave their goods untouched; and by this meanes, he drew them all to come to his ſide: on the cõtrary, *Scipio* alſo being forced to uſe the ſame device of ſending Letters into *Cæſars* Camp, perſwaded them to be of his ſide, in defence and for the good of the Commonwealth; putting them in mind, of the great benefit of liberty: for all which perſwaſions, there was

not

no a man that would offer to go from *Cæſar*; whereby we may plainly ſee, that ordinarily men preferre profit before honeſty. And where it may be objected, that people infinite times make inſurrections onely for their liberty: it is eaſily anſwered, if we conſider that under that name of liberty, they alwaies thinke, or are made beleeve, there is great profit to be had: and therefore they deſire liberty, not as an end, but as a means to another end.

But to returne to our purpoſe; beſides ſo many cauſes alleged, concurring in favour of *Auguſtus*; this of election alſo is to be added: that he was choſen by the Senate, by the people, and by the Souldiers; by which meanes infinite others have obtained the Roman Empire: and ſo it happened amongſt the Græcians, ſo the Pope, ſo the Kings of *Polan*, ſo the Emperour in our times, by this meanes onely of being elected, attaine their Principalities.

Laſtly, it may be alſo ſaid, that he came to be Emperour by ſucceſſion, as being the next of kin to *Cæſar*, to whom by right of ſucceſſion, beſides his being made his heire by his Will, the Empire belonged.

We may then ſay, that *Auguſtus* came to be Emperour, neither by fortune, nor by wickedneſſe, nor by policy, nor by merit, nor by election, nor by ſucceſſion, but by all of them together; ſeeing each of theſe, (as I have before ſhewed) being apt of it ſelfe to raiſe a man to the Empire, certainely all of them concurring in *Auguſtus* could not chooſe but effect it.

And thus much for his attaining the Empire; now for holding it, thus gotten: we ſay, that an Empire may be held, either from the Nobility, or from the people, or from the Souldiers; and that either by love or by force. With the people it is held by procuring of plenty, and that the poore be not wronged by the rich; there being nothing that makes a Prince more

beloved of the people, than to keep them safe from the insolencie of great men. And therefore the Holy Ghost meaning to shew the cause, why all Nations should serve that King, saith, *Omnes Gentes servient ei, quia liberavit pauperem à potente*: and a little after, *Et honorabile Nomen eorum coram illo.* S. *Hierome* reads it, *Et pretiosus erit sanguis eorum coram illo*, That is, they shall hold the honour of the King in great account, and shall not leave unpunished whosoever shall imbrue their hands in his blood; as was seene in the conspiracy against *Cæsar*. This therefore *Augustus* knowing, tooke upon him the power of a Tribune, *Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure contentum*: and suffered them not to be in want, knowing that safety without plenty is little esteemed: and therefore he saith, *Populum annona.*

Now for Noble men, they are of two sorts; stout, and timerous. In the stout, there is no trusting, being men that extreamely skorne a servile condition; and consequently extreamly hate a tyrant. And therefore it was necessary, *Augustus* should send such into banishment or to the warres; and they once dead, he then remained secure and without feare of any new hatred. To the timerous and quiet are to be given honours; for a Gentleman hath no other end, but honour: and of these, the Prince ought to make use in peace; and as for warre he need not feare them: therefore *Tacitus* saith, *Cæteri Nobilium quanto quis servitio promptior opibus & honoribus extolluntur: ac Novis ex rebus auctis, tuta & præsentia quam vetera & periculosa mallem.* Where it is to be observed, that by *cæteri* he meanes, those onely that were not stout: there following, without any words between, *Cum ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptione cecidissent.*

Augustus then did well, to advance many of the Noble men, above the others; & especially those, that

shewed themselves most ready to do him service. First, to the end, that such example might draw others to the like servitude, thereby to gaine the like honour. Secondly, to the end that seeing honours attained to under a Prince, which could never have beene attained in a Common-wealth, they might the better be contented with such a State; and therefore *Aristotle* amongst the meanes for conserving a Kingdome, forgets not to speake of this, where he saith, *Atque eos viros quæ aliqua in re honorabiliter se gesserint honorare; ita ut non existiment unquam se magis honorari in civitate degentibus potuisse.* Thirdly, *Augustus* did well, to advance many great ones above others, because as where equality is, a Kingdome there is hardly raised, and liberty easily maintained: so where there is inequality, a Kingdome there is easily preserved: and therefore a Prince is to be commended, that removeth many from equality; to the end there may be seen a certaine proportion, and not one to be unequall, and all the rest equall. The reason of this, in my opinion, is, because when onely one is seen unequall, all the rest will have a desire to reduce him to equality, and by some means or other to rid him away; but when there are many unequals, the inferiours not only will never be moved to conspire against the Prince, because they should never by this meanes come to equality: but also they will not suffer any other to doe it, resting satisfied in this, that as themselves have many unequals, their superiours, so those have the Prince unequall, and their superiour: and in this at least they shall be equall, that they are all of them inferiour to one.

But because obedience is hardly found, especially in new states, if there be not force concurring; whereupon the Throne of *Salomon*, which by Writers is taken for obedience, was compassed about with twelve Lyons, seeing they who desire to be obeyed, ought

together with generoſity, have force alſo to make them be obeyed; and therefore the holy Ghoſt in the mouth of *Salomon* ſaith, *Sicut Turris David, collum tuum; quæ ædificata eſt cum propugnaculis; mille clypei pendent ex ea; omnis armatura fortium.* This Towre hath ſo many defences, becauſe it is put for a figure of obedience; meaning to ſhew, that they who deſire to preſerve obedience, have need of all ſorts of Armes to defend it: for theſe cauſes, *Auguſtus* knowing this, and having an Army in his hand, able to make him be obeyed by force, if need ſhould be, he made the Souldiers ſure to him, by donatives of which they are moſt greedy: whereupon it may be ſaid, that *Auguſtus* maintained his Empire, neither by the Nobility, nor by the people, nor by the ſouldiers; neither by love, nor yet by force, but by all of them together.

Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio Iure contentum, ubi Militem donis, Populum annona, cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit.

How Princes may get the peoples love: how a private man ought to make uſe of the peoples favour; and what part it hath in beſtowing the Empire.

The thirteenth Diſcourſe.

AS ſafety is not enough to give the people ſatisfaction, if it be not accompanied with plenty: and therefore the Iſraelites, though they lived ſafe under their leader *Moyſes*, yet when plenty failed, they deſired againe the ſervitude of *Pharao*: ſo neither doth plenty give ſatisfaction, if it be not accompanied with peace, as was plainly ſeene in that people; for when thoſe men returned whom *Joſhua* had ſent into

the Land of Promiſe, to make known the fruitfulneſſe of the Countrey, yet when they heard there were in it great ſtore of Gyants, onely for this, they liked better to ſtay in the Wilderneſſe in peace, then to goe to a Land flowing with Milke and Honey with warre: the deſire of living quietly prevailing more with them, than the enjoying of plenty.

Three things then are required in a people, to make them abſolutely happy: ſafety from being oppreſſed by thoſe at home; peace with thoſe abroad; and plenty. Whereupon our Lord God meaning to ſhew the happineſſe in which his people ſhould live, expreſſeth theſe three things by the mouth of his Prophet *Eſay*, where he ſaith, *Sedebit populus meus in plenitudine pacis*, here is peace: *In Tabernaculis fiduciæ*, here is ſafety: *In requie opulenti*, here is plenty. Such a like happineſſe *Tacitus* ſhewes that *Rome* had; or to ſay better, the people of *Rome* under the Dominion of *Auguſtus*; where he ſaith, *Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure contentum*: ſee here, by making himſelfe protectour of the people, he made them ſafe from oppreſſours at home: *Ubi populum Annona*, ſee here, plenty: *Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit*, ſee here the ſafety from forraine enemies, which is peace; for by the word *Otium* in this place (as I ſhall ſhew in another diſcourſe) he meanes nothing elſe but peace.

But becauſe many gather from this place, ſeeing *Auguſtus* obtained and maintained his Empire by the love of the people; that therefore this is the true way, for all others to riſe from a private man to be a Prince; and the rather becauſe a place in *Ariſtotle* confirmed by many examples ſeemes to concurre in this opinion, where he ſaith, *Et profecto antiquorum Tyrannorum plurimi ex popularibus hominibus facti ſunt*; I ſhall be forced in diſcourſing of this matter, to proceed with diſtinction, as finding many places directly contrary to this;

and

and particularly in the foreſaid *Tacitus*, who in another place ſhewes, that the peoples favour is rather a ruine than a fortune to great men; where in the third of his Annals he ſaith, *Breves & Infauſtos Romani populi amores.*

I ſay then, that he who is in the peoples favour, either he hath a mind to make himſelfe Prince, or he hath not: if he have no ſuch mind, he ſhall doe better to avoyd thoſe demonſtrations with ſafety, which without any benefit makes him runne into danger; ſeeing a good intention is not ſufficient, where it is equally dangerous, to have ſuch imputation, whether wrongfully or juſtly, as *Tacitus* well ſaith, *Si objiciantur etiam inſontibus, periculoſa:* becauſe Princes, as ſoone as they ſee the peoples favour enclining to another, preſently have him in ſuſpition; and therefore *David* began to be hated of *Saul*, as ſoone as he knew the people loved him: whereupon in the booke of the Kings, the holy Spirit ſaith, *Poſuitque eum Saul, ſupra viros belli, & acceptus erat in oculis Univerſi populi, maximeq; in conſpectu famulorum Saul:* and a little after, *Non rectis ergo oculis, Saul reſpiciebat David, a die illa & deinceps.*

Likewiſe when the myſticall *David*, Chriſt, was ſeene to the Jewes, to enter triumphantly into *Hieruſalem* on Palme-ſunday, with great applauſe of the people, they preſently began to conſpire againſt him: The like hapned to *Germanicus*, whoſe caſe was much like that of *Ariſtobulus*; both of them being gracious with the people, young men of goodly preſence, both; both of them next to the Crowne; under moſt cruell tyrants, *Herod* the great, and *Tiberius Nero*; both of them for the ſame cauſes put to death by fraud: one bewailed counterfetly of *Herod*; the other, feignedly of *Nero*; by whom in truth they came to their deaths. Of theſe then, it may be ſaid, *Breves & infauſtos populi amores.*

But if he that is in the peoples favour, have an intention to make himſelfe Prince, we muſt then diſtinguiſh: for either the peoples favour towards him growes out of a diſcontentment towards the Prince; or it comes out of anger ariſing from ſome ſuddaine accident: if in the firſt caſe, he that will make uſe of their favour, if he be able to hide it, which is a difficult thing, ſhall doe well to wait for ſome good occaſion: ſeeing he may aſſure himſelfe, that as diſcontentment encreaſeth by little and little, and is nouriſhed in minds once diſcontented; ſo it is hard, or rather impoſſible, it ſhould vaniſh on a ſudden: and therefore if he ſtay for a good beginning, where there hath preceded a good occaſion, as I have ſhewed in another diſcourſe, there can be no doubt of having good ſucceſſe. Princes therefore muſt take heed, they give the people no ſuch occaſions; which are ſo much more dangerous, as they are leſſe violent: becauſe in ſuch caſes, men are not moved with every light wind; but wayting for a fit opportunity, they then ſhew their minds when they ſee they have power to doe it, with the ruine of the Prince. And there needs no other proofe of this, than the examples of the *Aragoneſi*, and of *Ludovico Moro*. But if the people be moved to ayd him, out of choler, this, as it is leſſe dangerous for the Prince; ſo to him that would make uſe of it, it is more difficult: Firſt, becauſe when the beginnings are not preceded by fit occaſions, as hath been ſhewed in the like caſes, it ſeldome takes any good effect: And therefore when the people would have riſen againſt *Tiberius*, onely out of choler, becauſe he had taken from them that ſmall authority they had; this inſurrection not being preceded by mature judgement, there was none would take upon him to be Head; and ſo the enterpriſe came to nothing. Secondly, becauſe the occaſion which is founded upon choler, will ſoone

ceaſe, and is never able to continue; and as it growes coole, makes men repent them of what they had done. And you cannot ſay, that having provoked the Prince with choler, there is now a neceſſity to follow that Head for feare; with whom, partaking in fault, they partake alſo in fortune; for this is directly the overthrow of the buſineſſe, becauſe having provoked the Princes mind with their inſurrection, and knowing they may pleaſe him againe with killing their Head, they will eaſily be drawne to murder him. Nevertheleſſe, he that will make uſe of the peoples favour, for riſing to any honour, which he thinks is his due, let him give them no time to thinke of the matter, but once perſwaded, let him ſuddenly venture. *Don Antonio* of *Portugall*, finding he had the peoples favour, inſtantly without delaying any time, made uſe of it, and it took effect. So *Bardanus* called in by the Parthians, that would drive out *Gotarze*, went about it with all ſuddenneſſe; and having gotten poſſeſſion, knowing the inconſtancy of that people, he ſuddenly fortified all the principall places of the Countrey. It is therefore no marvell, that *Caius Caſſius* gave counſell to ſeize upon the Kingdome ſuddenly, knowing the Parthians to be fickle and inconſtant; and this ſuddenneſſe ought the rather to be uſed, becauſe for the moſt part, a people in inſurrections is drawn to do things, which though good, yet are repugnant to their *Genius*: and therefore if time be given them, they ſoone perceive their errour, and thereupon repent, and put preſently their repentance in execution. The Souldiers of *Neroes* guard, were with great cunning perſwaded to give their conſent to his death; but when they had time given them to perceive their errour, they ſuddenly turned to take revenge, and it tooke effect. *Miles Urbanus longo Cæſarum Sacramento imbutus, & ad deſtituendum Neronem arte magis & impulſu, quam ſuo ingenio traductus:*

ductus: and that which followeth. Another example we have in the ſecond of *Tacitus* his Annals; where ſpeaking of *Vonone*, whom *Tiberius* at their deſire had ſent to the Parthians, he ſaith, that at firſt they received him with great applauſe, *Et accepere barbari Lætantes prout ferme ad nova imperia*; but thoſe people thinking afterward of the matter, though he were a King of good conditions, and profitable for them, yet, becauſe he came from the Emperour of *Rome*, and conſequently contrary to the *Genius* of that Nation, they firſt repented them, and afterward expelled him. *Mox ſubiit pudor degeneraviſſe Parthos petitum alio ex orbe Regem*; and that which followeth. This then may paſſe for a generall rule, alwaies when either through eloquence, or threatning, or reward, or any other cunning, a man is induced to doe a thing againſt his *genius*, ſeeing it depends upon his will, it is like to laſt no longer then he hath time to thinke upon it: and therefore the beſt courſe in ſuch caſes, is ſo to mannage the buſineſſe, that having once perſwaded him, it be not left in his power to repent, as *Bardanus* did, by fortifying himſelfe preſently. So *Jehu* who in the life of *Joram*, was accepted King by Gods appointment, ſeeing the good inclination of the people towards him, and knowing that if he gave them time he ſhould never perſwade them to ſet upon their naturall Lord, he went inſtantly to find out *Joram*, and ſlew him. This reaſon is taken into conſideration by *Abulenſis*, where he ſaith, *Quia totus vigor Jehu erat in hoc, quod populus concorditer adjuvare illum volebat: ſi tamen differret opus ad aliquantulum tempus, forte animi virorum tepeſcerent, & nollent inſurgere contra Dominum ſuum antiquum.* But the contrary of this being done by *Julius Campitolinus*, and *Spurius Æmilius* in *Livy*, both the one and the other were forſaken of the people, and they runne themſelves into no ſmall danger. For the people indeed are never

never able to continue long in dissentions, having trades which they must necessarily follow to get their living; which *Aristotle* considering, is of the mind, that there cannot be a better kind of people in a City, then that which consists of Husbandmen; because being forced to attend their occupation, they are not able to stay long in seditions. He therefore that will make use of the people, for the purpose aforesaid, let him dispatch it, and doe it so speedily, that they may have no time given to repent them.

I cannot omit here to examine the reason, why the people oftentimes doe good actions upon the sudden, and such as upon mature deliberation they would not doe; and forbearing for brevities sake, certaine reasons which every one of himselfe may easily conceive, I only say, that this proceeds from the weakness of their understanding; It being their custome, either to doe nothing that is good, or else to doe it upon the sudden; because as *Aristotle* saith, All weake things come soon to their accomplishment and height; seeing nature, which is moved by the intelligences, and by God, bestowes little time upon the growth of base things, as is seen in Pompions, and other Herbs of smal moment. Another reason may be taken from the said *Aristotle*, who speaking of the Ancients who made the first principles contraries, saith, *Quasi a utritate ipsa coacti*; whereas S. *Thomas* learnedly shewes, that as a stone of its owne nature descends downward, and fire ascends upward; so the understanding naturally follows the better apparence: and therefore weake understandings, if they doe at any time any good thing, they must do it naturally, and consequently upon the sudden; for if they have time to thinke upon it, then the counsell which they give, or the action which they doe, will be no longer naturall but Artificiall; and therefore weake understandings are not perfected by

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deliberation; but rather confounded, and by this meanes would oftentimes goe astray. This then is the Philosophicall and Reall reason, why many having done something that is good, doe afterward by thinking upon it, and deliberating, spoyle and overthrow it.

For resolution therefore, and to make the forealleged passages to agree, I say, that the people are not the whole cause of raising one to a Royalty, but only concurre as a cause in part; neither yet the people together with the Nobility, sufficient to make an alteration, where there are Souldiers; and therefore not without cause *Tacitus* saith, *Brevem & infaustos populi Romani amores*: because the City of *Rome* was never without Prætorian souldiers. Of this there is a plaine example, in the whole siege of *Nola*, in *Livy*, and to speake of our owne times, in *Verona*, where the people having a mind to rise in favour of the Venetians, yet because the souldiers of the King of *France* and of the Emperour were within it, they were not able to doe any thing of moment. We may therefore conclude, that the people alone can never be an absolute meanes to raise a man to a Principality, if it be not upon a suddaine, and that there be no Souldiers in the place; for against them there is no good to be done, although they should have the Nobility to assist them: but the people together with the souldiers, may easily raise one to the Empire, and when *Tacitus* saith, *Brevem & infaustos populi Romani amores*, he means it of the people alone; but in this present place, he speakes of the people and souldiers together; which plainly appeares, because having said, *Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio jure contentum*, he addes, *Ubi militem donis*: shewing he well knew, that together with the people, the souldiers must concurre. And *Aristotle* differs not from *Tacitus*, nor yet from my opinion, but

rather

rather confirmes both the one and the other: seeing, where he gives a reason, how it happened, that in ancient times the favourites of the people came to be Lords, he saith, that the same man who was powerfull with the people, was also Leader of the Army; and so, had both people and souldiers of his side. And addes withall, that whosoever of late time hath attempted any thing, relying only upon the people, hath never brought his purpose to any good passe: A manifest argument, that the people concurre as a cause in part, if the souldiers joyne with them: *Vetustis quidem temporibus* (saith he) *quando idem erat potens in populo ac Bello, Dux, Popularis Respublica in Tyrannidem mutabatur, & profecto antiquorum Tyrannorum plurimi ex popularibus hominibus facti sunt: causa autem cur tunc fierent, non autem nunc, illa est, quod qui tunc in populo maxime poterat, ex iis erat qui bello præficiebatur.*

Ubi Militem donis.

How the Donatives which are given to souldiers are profitable to raise a man, and to maintine him in the Empire: and when it is that Military discipline is corrupted by them.

The fourteenth Discourse.

THere are two things chiefly that move men to follow the warres; Acquiring of honour, and encrease of riches; and both these are in Donatives; for Donatives, as to the thing it selfe, is an encrease of wealth; and comming from the Princes hand, as a testimony of the souldiers valour, they are an encrease of Honour. It is therefore no marvell that *Augustus* not only at his entrance into the Empire, but even from his childhood, used with Donatives to winne the souldiers

diers love, seeing they are able to corrupt the wisest and best men; as our Lord God in *Exodus* hath left written, *Nec accipies munera quæ etiam excæcant prudentes & subvertunt verba justorum.* Whereupon not without cause, S. *John* in the *Apocalyps*, cals them by the name of Witchcraft, where speaking of *Rome* under the figure of *Babylon* he saith, *Quia mercatores tui erant Principes terræ, quia in veneficiis tuis erraverunt omnes Gentes.* Where S. *John* intends to shew, according to the opinion of some, that *Rome* by meanes of guifts, as it were with sorcery, had drawne the greatest part of the world, to the adoration of Idols. *Tiberius* therefore knowing what power there is in them, when *Junius Gallus* had moved in the Senat, that Gifts and Honours should be bestowed upon the souldiers of his Guard, he sharply reproved him (saith *Tacitus*) *veluti coram rogitans, quid illi cum militibus esset, quos neque ditu Imperatoris, neque Præmia nisi ab Imperatore accipere par esset.*

Yet the introduction of Donatives was to the Commonwealth of *Rome* of exceeding great damage. First, they have been, (as I shall shew in fit place) in great part the cause, why the City of *Rome*, freed once from tyranny by *Lucius Brutus*, was never afterward able, being oppressed by the House of the *Cæsars*, to recover its liberty; the Donatives having put the election into the souldiers hands, and they, not to lose so great a gaine, would alwaies rather have an Emperour for their private profit, than a Commonwealth for the publike benefit. Secondly, because having an Army in their hand, on which the election and safety of the Emperours depended, as men greedy of money, they were moved to stand for him who offered most, in such sort, that at last they came to set it, at who gives more: and because as *Aristotle* in his Politicks well observes, when Honours are bestowed in a City, in regard of riches, it is an easie matter for every Plebeian to become

come Honourable; and therefore no marvell that *Elius Pertinax* an Hostlers sonne, came to be chosen Emperour.

It is therefore a cleere case, that these Donatives were the ruine of the City of *Rome*; from whence also may be inferred, that they were hurtfull to the Prince, whose profit depended upon the welfare of the City. But because the contrary happens where tyrants governe, I shall be forced to examine, whether the introduction of Donatives were for the Emperours benefit, or no. Many approve the affirmative part, as moved not onely by the said place of *Tacitus*, where he sheweth, they were to *Augustus* a speciall helpe; but by the example also of *Cæsar*, who by this meanes, both obtained and maintained the Empire. And it availes not to say, that he was there slaine, because seeing one mans indignation was enough to make a Prince be murthered; the difference that may be taken from the ones well, and the others ill governing, for conserving the Empire, ought not to be taken from a violent death, but rather that death being revenged, and the antient successours replaced in their states: I see not, how there can be a greater signe, of proceeding with judgement for his owne security, being able even after his death, with his only name, to procure his revenge, and to settle the Empire in his owne family; a hard matter oftentimes for the best Princes to obtaine, who yet have the favour of God, to die a naturall death. This example therefore, (to omit many others, of which Histories are full) is an evident proofe, that Donatives to the Souldiers, were profitable to the Roman Emperours, not only to attaine the Empire, but also to maintaine them in it. Nevertheless, for the Negative part, there want not examples to the contrary, not only of *Otho*, but of infinite other Emperors, who by giving excessive Donatives, lost the Empire.

For resolution, we must proceed with distinction; either he that comes to the Empire, is the first that brought in Donatives, as *Cæsar* the Dictatour, and *Octavius Augustus* were; and then not onely they help to attaine, but also to maintain the Empire: and therefore *Tacitus* intimates it as a praise to *Augustus*, where he saith, *Obi Militem Donis*; or else he is not the first, but finds it a custome brought in before, and then as it may be a good meanes to attaine the Empire; so it is a certaine ruine for maintaining it. The reason of this difference is, because the souldiers not being accustomed to receive Donatives; the first time it is given the, they acknowledge it as a gift of the Princes bounty, and account themselves obliged for it; and more than so, not knowing whither they should receive the like from others, they endeavour to uphold him in the Empire, hoping hereafter to have those things by merit, which the Prince at this time hath given them of courtesie. But if they have been accustomed to have Donatives, and it hath been a use amongst them, then, where in the first, they acknowledged them the only bounty of the Prince, and received them as gifts of grace; now accounting them as debt, they take them as rewards of due, which if it be denyed them, it then causeth an implacable hatred against the Prince, and at last, his ruine; and if it be granted them, yet this encreaseth not the souldiers love, who count not themselves beholding to the Prince for them, but as fellows accustomed to have money without paines, they spend it frolickly, and that spent, they expect new Donatives; which if a Prince may satisfie a while, yet he cannot hold out to doe so long, but that at last he must be faine to deny them; and when this happens they presently fall to choose a new Emperour of whom they may receive it; and this hath been in *Rome*, the ruine and death of many, as every one may read

and

and ſee. We may therefore conclude, that Donatives to the ſouldiers are very profitable to all for attaining the Empire, but that the introduction of Donatives for them that were not the firſt, is very pernitious for maintaining them in it. And *Galba* having already attained the Empire, and knowing this, openly made it knowne, that he meant to give no more Donatives to the ſouldiers, as reſolved to take away ſo great an abuſe, *Acceſſit Galbæ vox, pro Republica, honeſta, ipſi anceps; legi a ſe Militem, non emi*, but it had an unhappy iſſue: Firſt, becauſe (as I have ſhewed in another Diſcourſe) the Souldiers were againſt their *genius* induced to abandon *Nero*; and therefore it had been fit, with the ſame cunning to have held them in, and not have ſuffered them to be conſcious of their errour, *Miles Urbanus longo Cæſarum Sacramento imbutus, & ad deſtituendum Neronem, arte magis & impulſu, quam ſuo ingenio traductus, poſtquam neque dari Donativum ſub nomine Galbæ*, and that which followes. Secondly, having gotten no reputation amongſt the ſouldiers, and by reaſon of his age, being apt to be contemned, he ſhould rather with liberality have gotten their love, than through covetouſneſſe have procured their hate. *Non enim ad hanc formam* (ſaith *Tacitus*, to not giving donatives to Souldiers) *Cætera erant; invalidum ſenem*; and that which followes. Thirdly, if he would not give donatives himſelfe; yet at leaſt, he ſhould have taken order, that no other in his prejudice, ſhould have given them; which becauſe he did not doe, he therefore with his avarice was by *Otho's* liberality eaſily oppreſſed. *Quoties Galba apud Othonem epularetur, cohorti excubias agenti, viritim centenos nummos divideret, quâ veluti publicam largitionem Otho ſecurioribus apud ſingulos præmiis, intendebat, adeo animoſus corruptor ut Cocceio Proculo ſpeculatori de parte finium cum vicino ambigenti, univerſum vicini agrum ſua pecunia emptum, dono*

dederit per secordiam Praefecti. Fourthly, to take away a custome so inveterate, he should have contented himselfe in the beginning, with one by moderating it, especially, seeing he might have obtained his purpose, with any small donative, *Constat potuisse conciliari animos* (saith *Tacitus*) *quamlibet avaras parci senis liberalitate; novum antiquus vigor, & nimia severitas, cui jam pares non sumus.* By which words we may plainly see, that *Tacitus* blames not his severity, but the excessiveness of it: whereupon *Vespasian* who knew as much as *Galba* knew, tooke a better course, and had his intent. For moderating only the donatives of the souldiers, he left them not altogether without hope of having some; & by this means, he preserved himselfe in the Empire, and yet corrupted not the souldiers: *Ne Vespasianus quidem plus civili bello obtulit, quam alii in pace, egregie firmus adversus militarem largitionem, aeque exercitus melior.*

If any should now enquire, whether donatives to the souldiers corrupt Military Discipline, or no? I would briefly answer, That rewards uphold it, but that donatives corrupt it: and the reason is, because donatives being such as are given without cause, the souldier may alwaies by the same right demand them; and whilest he stands waiting for this ayd from the Prince, he becomes idle and good for nothing. But rewards given for some notable service, cannot but for such service be demanded, and that souldiers should endeavour to do such services, is a matter of great profit to Military discipline. And therefore *Cæsar*, with Rewards, made his Souldiers more valorous, and *Otho*, with donatives corrupted them.

Populum

Populum Annona.

How much it imports a Prince for getting the peoples love, to maintaine plenty, by what meanes ſcarcity happens, and how it may be helpt, and how a Prince may make good uſe of it.

The fifteenth Diſcourſe.

ABove all things for winning the peoples love, a Prince muſt take care there may be plenty; in regard whereof, *Cæſar* ordained two Ædiles, whoſe imployment was onely to this purpoſe. Alſo *Auguſtus* knowing of how great importance this is, (as *Taeitus* relates) amongſt other ſecrets of his government, had alwaies a great jealouſie of *Ægypt*, from whence all the Corne for maintenance of plenty in *Rome*, came; and indeed both the one and the other underſtood it rightly, becauſe, as the want thereof is apt to cauſe inſurrections amongſt the people, as was often ſeen amongſt the Iſraelites againſt *Moyſes*, who if God had not mightily protected him, had oftentimes for this onely been in manifeſt danger: ſo on the contrary, the onely plenty of things is enough of it ſelfe to raiſe a man to the Empire; As was ſeen at *Rome*, when the City was ſo oppreſt with a dearth, that the Citizens choſe rather to die in the water of *Tiber*, than to ſtay upon the Land, and be ſtarved with hunger. And he that will ſee an example of this, may conſider how our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, having fed a multitude that followed him in the Wilderneſſe, he had preſently the acclamations to be a King, or a Prophet; *Illi ergo homines* (ſaith S. *John*) *cum vidiſſent quod Jeſus fecerat ſignum*, (that is of the bread and fiſh he gave them) *dicebant quia hic eſt vere Propheta qui venturus eſt in mundum*;

dum, Jesus ergo cum cognovisset, quia venturi essent ut raperent eum, & facerent eum Regem, fugit interim in montem; but they another time, desiring to eate, asked him bread, *Domine semper da nobis panem hunc*; and he at that time denying to give them temporall bread, the multitude, which before when he gave them meat, had called him a Prophet, and would have had him for their King, now they call him a Carpenters sonne, for no other cause, but because he denied them corporall bread, when he meant to set them at Gods owne Table: *Murmurabant ergo Judæi die illo, quia dixisset ego sum panis vivus, qui de Cælo descendi, & dicebant nonne hic est filius Joseph cujus nos novimus patrem & matrem?* For there is no such happinesse to the people, as to have wherewith to fill their bellies. Whereupon as S. *Chrysostome* observes, in making mention of the miracles and stupendious Acts of *Moyses*, they omitted all other, though farre more marvellous, and mentioned onely that of Manna, *Patres nostri manducaverunt Manna in deserto.*

A Prince therefore must of necessity, either maintaine plenty, or else leave his Principality, and specially one that comes newly to the Empire, as *Augustus* did. And therefore *Esay*, Prophesying of one whom the Israelites should require to accept the Kingdome, shewes that if they knew him not able to maintaine plenty, they should not accept him, *In domo mea non est panis nolite constituere me Regem super vos*. Being assured, he could never hold his Principality with dearth, as it hapned to *Prometheus* King of the *Scythians*, who not being able to maintaine his people in plenty, by reason the Land was overflowed with the River *Aquila*, he was cast into Prison: and because *Hercules* turned that River into the Sea, and made the Country fruitfull, the fable came up, that an Eagle devoured the liver of *Prometheus*, and that *Hercules* freed him.

Having

Having shewed, that *Augustus* in the beginning of his raigne, wonne the people to him by procuring of plenty, it will be necessary to shew, how dearths happen, and by what means they may be helpt, and how farre the Prince is faulty in them.

A dearth may happen first, from the barrennesse of the soile, as it happened to the Israelites in the Wildernesse.

Secondly, It may happen, for want of Husbandmen to till the ground, which if it were tilled, would be very sufficient and have to spare, as in times past, it happened in *Mesopotamia*, and in our time would often happen in the Sea coasts of *Siena*, if the care of the Serenissimo the great Duke did not supply the want of Husbandmen.

Thirdly, it may happen through abundance of people, and smalnesse of Territory, as in ancient time it would have happened at *Rome*, and would in our time at *Florence*, if the one had not then had the Countries of *Ægypt* and *Sicilie* for a Granary, and the other had not now a gracious and provident Prince for a purveyour.

Fourthly, it may happen through the sterility of the season, and of the yeere, as particularly this yeere 1621.

Fifthly, many times there are Husbandmen and land enough to till, but is not tilled, either by reason of warre, or for some other cause, as it happened at *Rome* not long after the banishment of the Tarquins; the people (as *Livy* relates) by reason of dissentions with the Senate, refusing to till their grounds, in such sort that they wanted not much of dying for hunger.

Lastly, it happens oftentimes, either by reason of a siege, as in *Hierusalem*, where mothers did eate their owne children; or through incursions of enemies, as in *Athens* all the time of the civill warre.

And

And although in none of these cases, any just blame can be laid upon the Prince, yet it is his part to use all meanes, with money, diligence and power, to make resistance against fortune, nature, and all accidents whatsoever.

In the first case, I shall not need to trouble my selfe to shew, how a dearth may be helpt in desart places; seeing he might well be accounted a man without braine, that would build a City, in a Countrey altogether barren: and though it were so with the Israelites, yet their Tabernacles were for passage and not for habitation.

If it should happen in the second case, that is for want of men, where there is Land sufficient; here the Prince must induce men to marry, and draw in strangers to dwell in the Countrey; the first will take effect, if the course of *Lycurgus* be observed, who seeking to make the City of *Sparta* populous, allowed great exemptions to them that begot children, or else if disburthening them of taxes, (as the Duke of *Parma* at this day doth in his State of *Castro*) he shall give occasion, that gathering wealth, they may endeavour to have children to whom to leave it; and by this course, he shal be able to draw strangers also to come and live there. For men run willingly even with danger of their lives, where they see there is certaine & present profit to be had, never having a thought of a future and uncertaine death. Wherof we have example in the State of *Milan*, where in some places the ayre is so unwholsome, that few of the inhabitants ever come to be forty yeeres old; yet in these places, men growing rich, although they see this example daily before their eyes, yet they choose rather to dwell there, than in other places of wholsome ayre. Another course also may be taken, for this inconvenience, by drawing thither a forraigne Nation, as *Antiochus* did, who causing two thousand

thousand families of Jewes to come and dwell in the Countries of *Mesopotamia* and *Babylon*, (as *Josephus* relates) assigned them Land to till, and places where to build, and then exempting them for ten yeeres from tribute, he lastly gave order, they should have so much Corne given them, as might serve them to live, till their own should be reaped.

And lastly, those who dwell in such ayre, and in such Countries, should indeed, have no other burthens laid upon them, but only the burthen of bringing up their children; *Paupertas satis stipendii penditore* (saith *Livy*) *si liberos educent.* But nothing prevailes so much to make a place populous, as the Princes living there: and so *Tullus Hostilius* did; and we have experience of it at *Petigliano*, where whilst the *Orsini* that were Lords of it, kept their residence, it was infinitely fuller of people than it is at this day, under the *Serenissimo* the great Duke of *Thuscany*, though governed by him, with admirable justice and clemency; of so great importance is the presence of their naturall Lord, that many times men had rather have a tyrant, that should live amongst them, than a good Prince, that should be farre off.

Another way is nowadaies used by Princes for peopling such places, and it is, by confining some petty delinquents thither; because, if they live, they encrease the number of the inhabitants; and if they die, the Prince receives no losse by it. This invention whether good or bad, is yet most ancient; and we have an example of it in *Tacitus* himselfe, *Actum de sacris Aegyptiis Iudaicisque pellendis, factumque Patrum consultum, ut quatuor millia libertini generis, quis Idonea aetas, in insulam Sardiniam vehercutur, coercendis illic latrociniis, & si ob gravitatem coeli interissent vile damnum.*

If the defect grow in the third case, that is, from inal-

ness

nes of Territory, where the people are many, the remedy here uſed, hath been to ſend forth Colonies; ſo *Pericles* did, to help a dearth that was at *Athens*. In this caſe *Plutarch* in the life of *Numa*, gives a counſell, which is, that in ſuch a City, care muſt be taken that Trades be in account, and that idle perſons be puniſhed; but the beſt courſe of all will be, that the Prince ſpare no coſt to fetch Corne, where it may be beſt had; ſo a thouſand times did *Tiberius*, and ſo *Nero*, who not regarding the great charge he had been at by Sea, nor the great loſſe he had in *Tyber*, with infinite expenſes, provided that the price of Corne might not be rayſed. This courſe was notably followed, by the *Sereniſſimo Coſmo*, ſecond great Duke of *Thuſcany*, who by the way of *Livorno*, and other places, procured at his infinite charges, a perfect plenty; and ſometimes out of his owne purſe, hath kept of Almes ſix thouſand perſons. I forbeare to ſay, that many yeeres together, he ſpent of his owne, to keepe down the price of Corne, above a hundred thouſand Crownes: An act that exceeds any act whatſoever of the Ancients, ſeeing that which moved them, was their owne intereſt, and matter of ſtate; but that which moved him, was only the office of a Prince, and the zeale of a Chriſtian.

In the fourth caſe, proviſion will be made from other Countries, by ſuch waies as have been ſhewed.

In the other two caſes, where dearth may happen by reaſon of warres, cauſed by ſieges, and by incurſion of enemies, the Commonwealths of the Swizzers, have found out an excellent way, who in places under ground, have in ſtore for many yeeres, all things belonging to victuals, and alſo to Trades; which courſe, with great prudence, the Commonwealth of *Lucca* hath taken to imitate.

But above all, the Prince muſt take heed, that he be not himſelfe a cauſe of the dearth, by making merchandiſe,

chandiſe, and by engroſſing; nor yet by ſuffering others to doe it, for then the fault will be laid upon the Prince, and the Subjects will have juſt cauſe to complaine. Likewiſe, that when the people are in want, he continue not feaſting, and feed upon dainties, as ſhewing to take little care of his Subjects miſery; a thing moſt pernitious to Princes, who ſhould alwaies take ſuch part as the people doe, thereby to encourage them the more contentedly to beare their labours. This in the old Teſtament our Lord God teacheth us; who when the Iſraelites were in the Wilderneſſe, and like Shepheards dwelt in Tabernacles, he alſo would dwell in Tabernacles himſelfe; afterward when changing their courſe, they entred into warre under their Judges and Kings, and their Army uſed Tents, he alſo would then dwell in Tents too; and when *David* deſired to build him a Temple, he would not ſuffer him, untill ſuch time, as there being peace under *Salomon*, every one might dwell in his own houſe, and then he was contented to have a houſe alſo built for him. All this is expreſſed in the Booke of Kings, where he ſaith, *Neque enim habitavi in domo ex die illa qua eduxi filios Iſrael de terra Ægypti, uſque in diem hanc, ſed ambulabam in Tabernaculo & in Tentorio per cuncta loca, quæ tranſivi cum omnibus filiis Iſrael.* But becauſe this courſe was not imitated by *Auguſtus*, who when the people died in the ſtreets for hunger, himſelfe made a ſumptuous banquet, where (as *Suetonius* relates) the gueſts ſate in form of Gods and Goddeſſes, and he in ſhape of *Apollo*, the people infinitely diſtaſted it, and was moved to great indignation. *Auxit cænæ rumorem, ſumma tunc in civitate penuria, ac fames, acclamatumque poſtridie eſt, frumentum omne Deos comediſſe.*

But if he ſhall be no occaſion of the dearth, and much leſſe ſhew himſelfe to rejoyce at it, he may then convert it to his owne profit, either by getting of money

money, or encreaſing his authority, or otherwiſe by winning the love of his people. *Pharao* King of *Ægypt*, by meanes of a dearth and *Joſephs* counſell became Lord of all *Ægypt*, *Emit igitur Joſeph omnem terram Ægypti, vendentibus ſingulis poſſeſſiones ſuas, præ magnitudine famis, ſubjecitque eam Pharaoni, & cunctos populos ſuos, a noviſſimis terminis Ægypti, uſque ad extremos fines ejus*; which purchaſe was not diſtaſtfull to the people, for the cauſe aforeſaid; but rather they accounted themſelves obliged to the King for it, ſaying, *Salus noſtra in manu tua eſt, reſpiciat tantum nos Dominus noſter, & læti ſerviemus Regi.* Whereupon I conclude, that when a great famine was in *Rome*, and the Senatours had fetched Corne from *Sicilie*, then had been a fit time to take the authority from the people, which they had uſurped. This, *Coriolanus* in *Livy* well knew, whoſe conceit yet was not approved of others; not becauſe it was not ſufficient being uſed with leſſe violence, to take away that authority, but becauſe it was not ſufficient to maintaine it, ſeeing the Senatours having a purpoſe to augment the Common-wealth, and conſequently to make uſe of the peoples Armes, they might conceive, that thoſe Magiſtrates who had left their authority in time of dearth, would afterward, the dearth ceaſing, reſume it againe by force.

A dearth then thus managed, will be a means to get the Prince, both authority and riches, and the love alſo of his Subjects. As we ſee in *Herod* the great, who being a Prince the moſt hated of his people that ever any was; yet onely by relieving them with Corne, in a time of dearth, he made himſelfe beloved, obliged, and freed from a thouſand dangers.

Cunctos

Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit,

What kind of ease it is that Tacitus speaks of, and how it may be reconciled with some places in other Authours.

The sixteenth Discourse.

IN these words *Cornelius Tacitus* shews us, that *Augustus* by meanes of procuring ease, got himselfe the love of all men. And because, he as a new Prince, ought rather to have sought how to maintaine himselfe in his Empire; then how with his own danger to procure delights to his Subjects; it seemes, he might for this be reproved, there being a precept of *Aristotle* in his Politicks, where teaching the true way that a Prince ought to take, for maintaining him in his State, he perswades this specially, not to keep the people in ease, and gives us for example the Kings of *Ægypt*, who to the end their people should not stand idle, caused so many Pyramides, and Mausoleums to be built, as *Pisistratus* the tyrant built the Olympus, and *Polycrates* a thousand Fabricks about *Samos*, *Hæc enim omnia* (saith *Aristotle*) *fuerunt instituta ad otium & quietem populorum tollendam, ut illi quotidianis molestiis occupati, vacare non possent ad consilia contra tyrannos ineunda.* And there is reason for it, as is said in *Ecclesiasticus*, *Cibaria & Virga & Onus Asino, Panis & Disciplina & opus servo, operatur in disciplina & quærit libertatem, jugum illorum curvat collum, & servum inclinam operationes assiduæ servo malevolo tortura, & compedes, mitte illum in operationem ne vacet; multam enim malitiam docuit otiositas.* And so much more might *Augustus* be blamed for it, seeing (as we have shewed before) he maintained the people in plenty; and now if to plenty be added ease, it cannot

chooſe but be the ruine of any City whatſoever. *Hæc fuit iniquitas Sodomæ*, (ſaith *Ezechiel*) *Abundantia panis & otii.*

And againe, becauſe this eaſe aſſigned by *Tacitus* came preſently after a warre, his fault may be the more, there being a paſſage of *Ariſtotle* in his Politicks, where he ſaith, That the Lacedemonians paſſing from warre to eaſe, incurred great danger.

Thirdly, there is a place in *Livy* alſo, that croſſeth this of *Tacitus*, where he ſaith, that *Tarquinius Priſcus*, after his fight with the Latines returning to *Rome* in peace, kept the people in continuall and laborious exerciſes; of which *Livy* ſaith, *Majore inde animo Patres opera inchoata quanquanta mole geſſerat bella, ut non quietior populus domi eſſet, quam militiæ fuiſſet.*

To reconcile then theſe foure Texts, it muſt be ſhewed, that neither of them is repugnant to another, but that all of them agree together. Firſt, I diſtinguiſh of eaſe, which, as to our purpoſe, is of two kinds; eaſe, which is a deſiſting from any action at all; and eaſe, which is contrary to warre; becauſe warre being a violent action, thoſe ſouldiers which are in peace, although they have other exerciſes, yet are ſaid to be at eaſe; ſeeing deſiſting from warre, they deſiſt from that violent action, which is proper to them. In this ſenſe *Ariſtotle* once tooke eaſe, where ſpeaking of the Lacedæmonians, he ſaith, *Splendorem enim veluti ferrum, per pacem amittunt; cauſa hujus eſt legis poſitor, qui non ita inſtituit, ut in otio ſtare poſſint.*

By meanes of this diſtinction, this place of *Tacitus* is reconciled with the firſt place out of *Ariſtotle*; ſeeing *Tacitus* by eaſe here, meanes not an eaſe contrary to all action; for *Auguſtus* both with ſports and playes, and buildings, held the people in continuall worke, inſomuch that he could boaſt, he had made *Rome* a City of Marble, which he found but of Bricke; but he meant

it of that ease which is contrary to warre. And this is plainely seene, because having said before, *Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa*, he presently comes in with this very word, *Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit*. Thus *Aristotle* agrees with him exceeding well, in that Text, where he likes the people should be held in action but not in warre: and indeed in such actions, as debase men, and are worse then ease. So dealt *Pharao* with the Israelites, putting them to make Bricke, and other most base workes. Whereupon it is said in *Exodus*, *Præposuit itaque eis Magistros operum, ut affligerent eos operibus*; and a little after, *Oderant filios Israel Ægyptii, & affligebant eos, & invidentes eis, atque ad amaritudinem perducebant vitam eorum, operibus duris luti & lateris, omnique famulatu.*

But to this resolution, that place of *Livy* before cited is most contrary, where speaking of *Tarquinius Priscus*, he shews, that returning from the wars, he held the people in hard and cruell labours. For answer whereunto we must distinguish, that the Princes are either in termes of getting more, or else but of keeping that they have already gotten; if to get more, then it is necessary to hold the people in hard labours, to the end they may not lose courage, and be imbassed in their spirits. And therefore no marvell that *Tarquinius Priscus* teacheth us to hold the people in hard labours, seeing the Romans at that time had no other end, but to enlarge their Empire. But if the Prince have no ayme at augmentation by new acquests and stands not so much in feare of externall enemies, as of friends at home, he then ought to let the people enjoy a negotious ease, of buildings, and playes, and such like things. And this made *Augustus* take this course, because he aymed not at all, at any amplifying of his Empire, as from many places in *Tacitus* may be gathered, and particularly from that place where in

the first of his Annals he saith, *Bellum ea tempestate nullum, nisi adversus Germanos, abolendæ potius injuriæ, ob amissum cum Prisco Varo exercitum, quam cupidine proferendi Imperii.* And in another place where he saith, *Consilium coercendi intra terminos Imperium*, whereby we see, he was minded rather to restraine, then to enlarge the Empire.

Lastly, it remaines to reconcile that other place of *Aristotle* in the second of his Politicks, where by the example of the Lacedemonians, he shewes, that after warre, to be left to live at ease, is a dangerous thing.

For Resolution whereof, I say, that the passing from warre to ease, is then dangerous, when men returne from a short warre, and in which they have had the better; because they that get victories, by reason of the pride which victory brings with it, are apt in Cities, to raise commotions. So it fell out amongst the Lacedemonians, and so a thousand times it hath been like to fall out amongst the Romans, whereof, in the whole first decad of *Livy* we may see examples. But when men come from a warre bloody and long; then they love and are glad of peace. Whereupon in our case the Romans comming from an infinity of civill warres, in which to winne was no better than to lose; and being now weary, as is gathered by the words, *Cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa*, they became not onely desirous, but apt also to tollerate ease.

It is now sufficiently proved, that *Tacitus*, or to say better, *Augustus* is no way discordant either from the precepts of *Aristotle*, or from the examples of *Livy*, but that with great judgment, he undeavoured to win every one with ease.

Lastly, it is necessary to reconcile *Tacitus* with himselfe, who in this place praiseth ease, and yet afterward examining the causes of the tumults in *Germany*, he saith, *Habebantur per otium*; as though ease were the

cauſe of thoſe rebellions. To which I briefly ſay, there is great difference betweene the eaſe that is in a City, and the eaſe that is of ſouldiers in warre; becauſe the end of a City, is to live in peace, whereof the eaſe ſpoken of before is a companion; but the chiefe end of ſouldiers at the warres, is to fight, to which eaſe is contrary and an enemy: and ſo the ſouldier with eaſe, and the Citizen by warre, are deprived of their ends, and conſequently in ſhort time runne into danger.

Neque Provinciæ illum rerum ſtatum abnuebant, ſuſpecto Senatus Populique Imperio ob certamina Potentium, & avaritiam Magiſtratuum: invalido legum auxilio, quæ vi, ambitu, poſtremo pecunia turbabantur.

That Cities ſubject to another City, better like the government of a King, than of a Commonwealth, and that every City would gladly have their Lord to live amongſt them.

The ſeventeenth Diſcourſe.

Cornelius Tacitus in theſe words makes us know, that the Provinces ſubject to the people of *Rome*, liked better the government of a King, than of a Commonwealth, as it happens generally to all Cities that are ſubject to another: So *Guicciardine* relates of *Cremona*, that it liked better to be under the King of *France*, than to be governed by the Common-wealth of *Venice*. And hereof we have a manifeſt example in *Piſa*, which being ſold by *Gabriel Maria Viſconte*, to the Common-wealth of *Florence*, there was ſcarce one Citizen that would tarry in it. But more than in any other, we may ſee the truth of this, in the Lycians, who having tried what it was to live under a King, and un-

der a Common-wealth, they called the servitude of that, in comparison of this, liberty. *Neque miserabilis legatio Lyciorum, qui crudelitatem Rhodiorum quibus ab Lucio Cornelio attributi erant, querebantur fuisse sub ditione Antiochi, eam Regiam servitutem, collatam cum præsenti statu, præclaram libertatem visam: Non publico tantum se privum imperio, sed singulos injussum pati servitium.*

Of these points we will speake, first in particular of *Rome*, then in generall give the reasons; Lastly, we will shew, that every City would we glad to be under a particular Prince, and one that should dwell amongst them.

Concerning the first, all those changes of State, which come from a worse, must needs be welcome; from whence it is, that after the expulsion of the Tarquins, liberty was so pleasing, *Et ut latior esset* (saith *Livy*) *proximi Regis superbia fecit.* That in our case, the Commonwealth was corrupted even to the worst degree, is sufficiently expressed by *Tacitus* in the foresaid words. First, by reason of the discord of the great ones; one of which factions there was a necessity to follow, and that overcome, all then remained at the discretion of the other. Secondly, by occasion of the Magistrates, who sought rather to satisfie their avarice with money, than to take care for the executing of justice. Thirdly, because the laws had now no more place, as being easily corrupted by force and mony. Just cause therefore had the Provinces, to be glad of the government of *Augustus*.

But because this liking of a subject City, to be rather under a Prince than under a Commonwealth, (as we have said before) is a common liking of all Provinces and Cities that are under another, It will be necessary to search out the reason, why it is so. And for a first reason, a certaine politician brings this, because Commonwealths are more durable than Kingdomes;

and

and being more durable, there is lesse hope to shake off their servitude, and are therefore the more hated. Secondly, because Common-wealths having no other care, but to make themselves greater, and others lesse; they endeavour only to weaken the subject Cities, and to strengthen their own body; a thing which Princes care not to doe: and for this, he brings the example of the Samnites, who as long as they were of themselves, maintained warre with the Romans a hundred yeeres; a manifest signe, they were then a strong people; but afterwards falling in subjection to *Rome*, they became most weake, and of no force.

But because the first of these reasons is false, and the second follows no lesse in Kingdomes than in Common-wealths, (with leave of so great a man) I have conceived perhaps a better reason, and it is, because the Provinces and Cities having been at warre, and by reason of the warre, grown to hate one another, and that hatred in processe of time become naturall, as it was between the Romans and the Carthaginians, between the Pisanes and the Florentines, and others; it happens, that being overcome, they are held in subjection by their naturall enemies; which subjection is so much the more distastfull, as being between persons that are equall: and from hence it is, that so gladly men seek to shake off the yoak. So many times did *Pisa*, so *Spaine* with the Romans, who doubting the like of *Greece*, as knowing by their continuall rebellions, that they il brooked their subjection to the Common-wealth of *Rome*, they destroyed many Cities, and at last *Corinth*.

But if it happen that this Common-wealth fall into the hand of a Prince, there is no doubt but the ostles Cities and Provinces will be glad: a principall reason is, because where these served, and those ruled before with inequality, now under a Prince, they both serve equally;

equally; and comming to be commanded, by persons much their superiours, the Dominion is so much lesse hated, as the person is greater that commands; and therefore we see, that *Pisa* which under a Commonwealth was alwaies in rebellion, now that it is under a Prince, hath lived, and doth live, and is like to live, in most quiet peace; it is true indeed, there concurres the graciousnesse of the Prince that sweetens all things. Another manifest example we have in the Roman Histories; and it is, that *Spaine*, as long as the City of *Rome* was a Commonwealth, was continually in rebellion; nor could ever be quieted, till the said City came into the hand of a Prince under *Augustus*. I omit the example of the Philistines, who never left warring with the Israelites, from the first day (I may say) they entered into the Land of Promise, untill they were setled in a Regall government under *David*.

To come to the third head: not onely Cities and Provinces cannot abide to be under the rule of a Commonwealth; but neither doe they like to be under a Prince that is a stranger, and that dwels not amongst them; which Prince may either be of different customes and language, as the King of *Spaine* to *Naples* and *Milan*; or of the same customes and language, but of divers Provinces, as the King of *France* to *Burgundy* and *Britaine*; or else of the same Province, the same tongue, and the same customes, as many Princes of *Italy*, to many Cities.

In the first case, they are not well brooked, but tolerated with an ill will: First, by reason of the difference of customes, which is able to make a Prince odious, though he be not a stranger: whereupon *Tacitus* speaking of *Venone* given to the Parthians to be their King, shewes, that because he was of different customes from the Parthians, though of better than

theirs,

theirs, he was with ignominy expelled the Kingdome. *Accendebat dedignantes & ipſe diverſus à Majorum inſtitutis, raro venatu, ſegni equorum cura, quoties per urbem incederet, lecticæ ſtamine, faſtuſque erga patrias epulas, irridebantur & Græci Comites, ac viliſſima utenſilium avulso elauſa, ſed prompti aditus, obvia comitas, ignotæ Parthis virtutes, nova vitia, & quia ipſe majoribus aliena perinde odium prævis atque honeſtis.* For the very ſame reaſon, the Gothes tooke it ill, that *Amalaſiunta* cauſed *Atalaricus* to be brought up in the Roman cuſtomes, although they were better than their own. And therefore *Iſabel* Queene of *Spaine*, by her laſt Will, left *Ferdinand* her Husband to be Governour of *Caſtile*, for ſo long time, untill *Philip* who was to ſucceed, being a ſtranger, might learne the cuſtomes of the Spaniards. And for this cauſe, the Jewes at the comming of the *Meſſias*, were troubled together with *Herod*, and liked better to be in ſubjection to one of their owne cuſtomes, though a ſtranger as *Herod* was, than to the Meſſias that was of different, though better cuſtomes; although they knew by the words of *Moyſes*, *Prophetam ſuſcitabit Dominus de medio fratrum tuorum*, that he ſhould be their owne Countreyman, of which S. *Chryſoſtome* gives the reaſon, *Fuerunt iſti turbati, quia injuſti non poſſunt gaudere de adventu juſti.*

Secondly, becauſe difference of Language is a moſt odious thing; and this out of his ſingular providence God foreſeeing, and meaning to hinder *Nembroth* enterpriſe, to make himſelfe a Monarch, he confounded the Tongues, and thereby eaſily gave a ſtop to their proceeding. On the contrary, when our Lord meant that his Apoſtles ſhould make ſome fruit of their labours, he would not have them preach in a ſtrange Tongue, and therefore gave to every one of them, all Tongues, that ſo more eaſily they might draw men to receive the Faith. And the Romans knowing, what

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advantage there is in this, compelled all their subjects, when they spake in the Senate, to speak in the Roman tongue. And *Rabsaces*, knowing of how great importance, the likenesse of Language is, to win the love of the people, to the end the Israelites might the willinger receive the government of *Senacherib*, though *Sobna* the Jew, out of a contrary end, prayed him to speak in the Syriack tongue, *Loquere lingua Syriaca ad servos tuos*; yet he an understanding man (as is written in *Esay*) *Clamavit Lingua Judaica*; whereupon *Esay*, in another place, shewing the hate and feare, which the City of *Hierusalem* had of the King of the Assyrians; amongst other causes, names their differing in language, *Populum impudentem non videbis, populum alti sermonis, ita ut non possis intelligere disertitudinem linguæ ejus.*

Thirdly, when to difference of customes and language, there is added remotenesse, it will adde no doubt a great degree of distastfulnesse. First, because they will be more obnoxious to the dangers of warre. And therefore the Tribe of *Dan*, seeing *Lais* to be farre off from *Sydon*, which had then the government, attempted to bring it in subjection, and it tooke effect. And that this was the cause that moved them, may be gathered from words in the Booke of *Judges*; *Euntes igitur quinque viri venerunt Lais, viderunt que populum habitantem in ea absque ullo timore, juxta consuetudinem Sydoniorum securum & quietum, nullo eis penitus resistente, magnarumque opum & procul a Sydone, atque a cunctis hominibus seperatum.* And that by this meanes, they easily made themselves Masters of it, is written also a little after, where he saith, *Sexcenti autem viri tulerunt sacerdotem, & quæ supra diximus, venerunt que ad Lais ad populum quiescentem & securum, & percusserunt eos in ore gladii, urbemque incendio tradiderunt; nullo penitus ferente præsidium, Eo quod procul habitarent a Sydone.* So it happened to the Saguntines, who being

farre

farre remote from the Romans their confederats, were destroyed before they could be ayded. And therefore the Armenians standing in doubt of this, put themselves into the hands of *Mithridates*, and revolted from the Romans. So the people of *Syria* desired to live under the government of the Parthians, as being neere unto them, and neighbouring upon them. Secondly, because people that are farre off, must of necessity be governed by a Deputy, who by reason of the Princes remotenesse must have great authority given him, and consequently may at his pleasure, contrary to the Princes meaning, play the tyrant over them. For all those things that have motion from another, and a motion of their own besides, how much they are lesse neere to the first mover, so much they are more able to move their owne way. From hence it is, that the Moone, being of all the Planets the farthest off from the *Primum mobile*, is moved faster in her own motion, and slower in the diurnall motion, than any of the other. The contrary whereof is seen in *Saturne*, which being neere to the *Primum mobile*, hath the slowest motion, and makes the least resistance.

Yet in the second and third case, they will more easily be tolerated; although as well in this as in that, there is a generall rule that seems to crosse it; which is, that every City would gladly have a Prince that should be resident amongst them, and also be a native of their City. That one of the same Nation and City is most acceptable, is plainly seen, because the people for the most part waves justice, and regards not so much the generall good, to choose the worthiest; as their private benefit, to choose the neerest. And therfore the Prophet *Esay* saith, *Apprehendet enim vir fratrem suum Domesticum patris sui, & dicet; vestimentum tibi est, Princeps noster esto.* Where S. *Thomas* observes well, that every one seeks to make him King, that is neerest, and

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not him that is best. Indeed this respect of neerneſſe is of ſpeciall force; as we may ſee in *David*, who being choſen King, was followed only by the Tribe of *Juda*, *Sola autem domus Juda ſequebatur David.* So *Abimelech* was more willingly received of the Sichemites, then *Jorubaal* the ſonnes of *Jeroboam*, when he ſaid unto them, *Simul conſiderate quod Os veſtrum & Caro veſtra ſum*, They were all preſently moved to ſay to him, *Frater noſter es.* The *Milaneſi* expoſed themſelves to a thouſand dangers, out of a deſire they had, to be governed rather by one of the *Sforzi*, then by the King of *Spaine* or *France*. And the Faentines choſe rather a baſtard of *Manfredi*, then to be under the Church. So the Armenians (as is ſaid before) ſubjected themſelves to *Mithridates*, and revolted from the Romans. Finally, we have a notable example of this, in the life of *Aratus*, to whom it was imputed as a great fault, that he would rather call to his ayd, *Philip* King of *Macedon*, then put his Cities into the hands of *Cleomenes* a Spartan. *Quod ſi omnino* (ſaith *Plutarch*) *Cleomenes injuſtus fuerit, atque Tyrannicus, tamen Heraclidarum genere, patria Spartanus fuiſſe, & quidem iis qui rationem aliquam Græciæ Nobilitatis haberent, Spartanorum obſcuriſſimum potius, quam primum inter Macedonas Ducem deligendum fuiſſe.* Whereupon our Lord God, meaning to give the man Regall power over the woman, to the end it might be tolerated with more contentment, made her of a ribbe of *Adam.* And to conclude, in *Deuteronomy*, he commanded his people, they ſhould not chooſe a ſtranger to be their King.

But becauſe this my opinion is full of difficulty, ſeeing oftentimes a City deſires to be governed rather by a ſtranger then by one of their owne Citizens, it will be neceſſary to uſe diſtinction; either it is the firſt time a Kingdome is erected, or elſe they have been uſed to Regall power before: if it be the firſt time, they will

then

then rather chooſe to ſerve a ſtranger, then one of their own Citizens: Firſt, becauſe knowing the Citizens beginning they are apt to ſcorne him. So it fell out with the Iſraelites, the firſt time they had a King, for being moſt deſirous to ſee who it ſhould be, when they ſaw it was *Saul*, they ſcorned him. *Num ſalvare nos poterit iſte? & deſpexerunt eum.* Secondly, it happens often by reaſon of factions that are in the City; for ſuch deſire rather to be governed by a ſtranger, as a man indifferent, then by a Cittizen that is an enemy. Seeing ſuch a one comming to the government, would certainly fill the City with blood and ſlaughter. Whereupon *Livy* ſaith, *Cum pars quæ domeſtico certamine inferior ſit, externo potius ſe applicet quam civi cedat.* A third reaſon is drawne from envy; for an envious man endeavours alwaies to obſcure the worthineſſe of his Countreymen, as lying more in envies way then a ſtranger, whereof S. *Hierome* ſaith, *Propemodum naturale eſt ſemper, cives civibus invidere; invidia autem eſt, triſtitia de aliena excellentia, ut eſt proprii boni diminutiva. Bonum autem abſentium non diminuit noſtra, quia non confert eis, Ideo non invidemus, bona autem præſentium conferunt bonis noſtris, & comparatione excellentiæ eorum, oſtenditur parvum eſſe bonum noſtrum, & hoc eſt illud Diminui.* And of this we have the example of our Lord Chriſt, who being perſecuted by his Countreymen, was invited by *Abagarus* a forraine Prince, that would have made him in part King with him in his City. A third reaſon may be this, that Countreymen know a man from his infancy, when there is yet no vertue in him, and thereupon conſider him but as ſuch a one ſtill; where ſtrangers that come not to know a man but in his perfection, cannot, nor know not how to conſider him other then as ſuch. So the ſaid S. *Hierome* ſaith, *Quia cives non conſiderant, præſentia viri opera, ſed fragilis recordantur Infantiæ.* It is therefore no marvell, that the

Florentines chose rather, to be governed by a French man, then by one of their owne Citizens. Our Lord God, knowing how difficult a thing it is, to choose at the first time, ones own Countreyman to be Prince; In the old law, to the end the Israelites having a desire to have a King, and not yeelding one to another, might not subject themselves to a stranger, he made a law, they should choose none to be their King, but only an Israelite, *Non poterit alterius generis hominem in Regem facere, quod non sit frater tuus*; But because he knew, it would be a hard matter for them to agree upon the choyce at the first time, he therefore made that election himselfe, *Eum constitues quem Dominus Deus tuus elegerit de medio fratrum tuorum.* And when lastly he came to choose him, to the end he might be lesse envied, he tooke a course, that causeth least envy, and that was by Lot. But if the people have been accustomed before to a Regall subjection, in this case they will rather like to be governed by one of their own Countrey then a stranger; and so much the more, if some of his family have beene Governour before; there being then no place for either envy, feare, or for equality. It is therefore no marvell, that *Caesar* was but ill beloved, and was slaine, and that *Augustus* lived quietly, and had the love of all men, seeing *Caesar* raised his House from equality; and *Augustus* found it in superiority, in which the Dictatour had left it: whereupon when I consider how it happened, that our Lord God would at the first time make a King by election, and afterward would have it to goe by succession in *David*; I cannot conceive a better reason than this, that he knew after the first time, the election of a King would be without difficulty.

In this particular, let every one be of what opinion he please; but for this other point, I doe not thinke it will be denied me, that all Cities and Provinces like better

better to be governed by a particular Prince, that dwels amongſt them, then by any other how great ſoever he be. For this cauſe it was, that the Spaniards were not well pleaſed when *Charles* the fifth was made Emperour; and were ready to riſe, becauſe they feared he would leave dwelling in *Spaine*, and make his reſidence in *Germany*. This deſire was the cauſe, that the Perſians, to have a King in their owne Province, ſet up *Cyrus* againſt *Aſtyages*, who reſided in *Media*; and out of this deſire the Brittaines covenanted with the King of *France*, that his eldeſt ſonne comming to the Crown, his ſecond ſonne ſhould be Duke of *Brittaine*; whereof there can be no other reaſon, but the deſire to have a particular Prince, that ſhould dwell amongſt them, as being indeed of ſpeciall benefit to the people. Firſt, becauſe living amongſt them, he ſpends thoſe Revenues in the Country which he drawes from the Countrey. Secondly, becauſe of the greater care the Prince hath of them; and becauſe of the peoples neerneſſe to their Lords eare, to whom they can preſent their ſuites in their own perſons; without waſting themſelves in journeys, and lying at Innes. Laſtly, becauſe if the Prince being Lord of many Provinces, reſide in one of them; the other muſt be faine to be governed by Deputies of that Province. The Emperours of *Rome* reſiding in *Italy*, governed all the Provinces by Italians, a thing moſt diſtaſtfull to all the people; becauſe to one that is not grieved to be ſubject to a Prince that is a ſtranger, yet it grieves him to be governed by men of a Province that is a ſtranger: as many people that are content to be ſubject to the King of *Bohemia*, yet refuſe to be ſubject to the Kingdome of *Bohemia*. And the King of *France*, after many times loſing *Genoua* by this meanes, at laſt he reſolved to govern it by *Gentleſi*. So in *Milan* he made *Trivultio* Governour, wherein though he erred, yet the errour

was in the Individuall, and not in the Species; as putting the government into his hand, that was Head of a Faction. But if the Prince be resident in the Province, though he be a stranger, yet with better liking he will be tolerated; because such commonly not only govern the places where they reside, but all other places subject to them, by Citizens of that Country where they reside. The King of *Spaine*, residing in *Spaine*, governes all his subject Kingdomes by Spaniards, a thing which not onely winnes love to the Prince, but profit also to the Province. To this may be added, that those people shall alwaies receive more favours, who are neere to the Fountaine from whence those favours come, then they shall doe that are further off; seeing, (as S. *Thomas* learnedly observes) how much a thing is neerer to its beginning, so much it partakes more of the effects of that beginning. And for this cause *Dionysius Areopagita* saith, that the Angels as being neerer to God than men are, do therefore partake more of the divine goodnesse then men do.

I cannot omit to advertise, that all the difficulties before spoken of, are easily allayed, after the first heats are once passed, as oft as there is found a prudence and graciousnesse in the Prince, which is indeed of marvellous great moment, as was seen in the Romans, who though they hated strangers, and were resolved to have no stranger be their King; yet when *Numa* (a stranger) was propounded to them; in regard of his eminent vertue, they accepted of him. Whereof *Livy* saith, *Romani veteres peregrinum Regem asper-nabantur*, and a little after, *Audito nomine Numæ, patres Romani, quanquam inclinari opes ad Sabinos, Rege inde sumpto, videbantur, tamen neque se quisquam, nec factionis suæ ullum, nec denique Patrum aut civium quenquam præferre, illi vero unâ ad unum omnes Numæ Pompilio Regnum deferendum decernunt.* Whereupon it is no marvell, if

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at this day many Provinces and Cities, whereof some have a Prince that lives farre off; and some, a Prince that is a stranger, of customes and language different; yet they all live in great contentment, only thorough the just government of him that rules them. I desire therfore that this discourse of mine may be received as of the times past, my purpose being to search out the reasons of things have formerly happened; and not expressely or tacitely to taxe any Prince, Commonwealth or City, nor so much as any particular person: For above all things, I abhorre slandering, and specially of those to whom as superiours I owe Reverence.

Cæterum Augustus subsidia dominationi Claudium Marcellum sororis filium admodum adolescentem: Pontificatu & curuli Ædilitate Marcum Agrippam ignobilem loco, bonum Militia, & victoriæ socium geminatis consulatibus extulit, mox defuncto Marcello generum sumpsit, Tiberium Neronem & Claudium Drusum privignos Imperatoriis nominibus ornat.

What meanes Princes may use with safety to set them in a way, that are to succeed them in the government.

The eighteenth Discourse.

IT is plainly seen, that *Augustus* to the end the Senatours nor any other, should ever hope to reduce *Rome* to its ancient forme of government, held this for a speciall Maxime of State, to advance his neerest kinred; and to set some one of them in the way for managing the Empire; that so making him privy to all affaires, making him known to the souldiers, making him beloved of the people, and lastly, making him

favoured of the Senatours: both, he after his death that might have his way made to come to the Empire; and on the contrary no hope might be left for any to attempt any thing againſt the life of the Prince, being propped up with ſo many Pillars. And therefore, *Ut pluribus munimentis inſiſteret*, he rayſed *Marcellus*, he advanced *Marcus Agrippa*; and after them, *Tiberius Nero*, *Claudius Druſus*, *Caius* and *Lucius* ſonnes of *Agrippa*; and laſtly, would have *Tiberius* to adopt *Germanicus* and *Druſus* to be his ſucceſſours. And accordingly, *Tiberius* advanced to the Conſulſhip, and other honours, *Germanicus* and *Druſus*, and after them *Caius Cæſar*. Whereupon by the example of ſuch great men, this courſe perhaps may be thought worthy of imitation, as well for ſecuring ones ſelfe from danger, as alſo for leſſening in part the burthen of thoſe great labours, which ſo great a dignity brings with it: ſo much the more as we have in *Cornelius Tacitus*, a manifeſt example of *Sejanus*, who by no other meanes was ſtopped in his courſe, but onely by the number of ſucceſſours *Tiberius* had ordained; and this ſtopping, as in conſpiracies it uſeth, was cauſe at laſt, that the Prince diſcovered all his practices. But becauſe of the other ſide, the deſire of rule blinds the minds of the moſt inward and domeſticke friends; It ſeemes to be no ſafe courſe for a Prince, whilſt he lives himſelfe, to give any great authority to ſucceſſours. For *Invidia Regni* (as *Livy* ſaith) *etiam inter Domeſticos infida omnia atque infeſta facit*. *Antaxerxes* cauſed his ſonne to be elected King, but this ſerved not his ſonnes turne, who thereupon would have killed his father. So *Abſolon* meant to do, and when with ſafety he might have expected the Kingdome, after the death of his old father *David*, he would rather with wickednesſe prevent it, and run headlong into ruine. *Quod multos etiam honeſtos peſſumdedit*, (ſaith *Tacitus* upon another occaſion) *qui ſpretis quæ*

tarda cum securitate præcaueant, vel cum exitio properent. And therefore *Selim* being assumed into part of the Empire, by his father *Bajazet*, could not stay to expect it with peace, but sought by the death of his father, to make himselfe sole Lord. And the like intention had *Mustapha* towards *Sultan Solyman*, and thereby lost his life. Finally, this advancing of his successours, had but ill lucke with *Augustus*; for *Tiberius* (as is commonly conceived) caused him to be poysoned: and with *Tiberius* it proved not much better, who also towards the end of his life, had the kindnesse of *Caius Caesar*, to helpe him to his death. For resolution, it may be said, that where a State is quiet, accustomed to passe by succession, in children legitimate; there it is in no wise fit, to take them into part of the Empire, there being no cause, with ones owne danger, to take away hopes where there are none, or to seeke for props where no part threatens ruine. But on the other side, when the State is in danger, not accustomed to live under a Prince, and is apt to rebellions; in such case, it may doe well, to call him that is to succeed, to be a cōsort in the Empire. To this purpose it seems the example tends, which *Tacitus* relates of *Augustus*: he caused *Tiberius* to be called *Filius*, to shew he was his successor; *Collega Imperii*, to enter him in managing affaires; *Consors Tribunitiæ Potestatis*, to make him gracious with the people; *Omnique per exercitus ostentatur*, to make him beloved, and knowne to the souldiers.

Nevertheless having considered a little better of this matter, I have altered my opinion, concerning the last: and as to the example of *Augustus*, though it proved well for his successour, to bring him to the Empire, yet it proved but ill for his owne person: for by this meanes, he became as it were a servant to *Tiberius*, who finally caused him by his owne wife to be poysoned.

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I therefore conceived, the better course would be, to advance the managing of the Empire; not one alone, but many; because, by this meanes, not onely he shall make himselfe secure from those of the City; but from those also of his own Family. This lesson I learn from *Aristotle* in his Politicks, where he saith, *Communis vero custodia omnis Dominationis unius est, neminem unum pro ceteris magnum facere, sed plures, nam se invicem custodium*: being an excellent remedy against the insatiablenesse of men, to afford them some one, upon whom they may vent their ambition, without turning it against the Prince. For this cause perhaps, the ancients invented the name of fortune; to the end, that men falling into any great disaster, should not turne their anger against God, but lay the fault upon the false Deity of fortune. And in truth there is none hath more need to make use of this invention then Princes; because naturally, men seeking to rise above their degree; when they have another like to themselves, they may turne their practises against him, and not attempt any thing against the Prince, as they would doe, if they had not some upon whom to work, and vent their ambition. This good fortune happened to *Tiberius*, for when *Sejanus* would rise above his degree, first he had *Drusus* against whom to turne him; and afterward the sonnes of *Germanicus*, in oppressing of whom, he lost so much time, that all his practises came to be discovered. To this opinion of mine, the course of *Augustus* was not contrary, but it seemes he followed it as long as he was able; seeing *Tacitus* relates, that he advanced not *Marcellus* alone, but together with him *Marcus Agrippa*; and when *Marcellus* died, he left not *Agrippa* alone, but joyned with him *Tiberius Nero*, and *Claudius Drusus*; and when *Drusus* died, he yet left not *Tiberius* alone, but brought forward *Caius* and *Lucius*: and although when both these

died,

died, he left *Tiberius* alone; yet it cannot be ſaid, he did well in doing ſo: and therefore *Tacitus* maketh an excuſe for him, that he did it by reaſon of age, *Nam ſenem Auguſtum adeo devinxerat, ut nepotem ſui cum Agrippæ Poſthumum in inſulam Planaſiam projiceret:* in which if he had done well, *Tacitus* had not needed to make his excuſe: and even *Auguſtus* himſelfe perceived at laſt his errour, as he that alwaies held it for a maxime of State, not to have onely one, but many upon whom to leane, *Ut pluribus munimentis inſiſteret:* whereupon at laſt, the poore old man opening his eyes, and ſeeking to provide for it in a time, when he had done better to diſſemble it, having overſlipt his time ſo long, he made ſhew to call *Agrippa Poſthumus* home, *Et inde ſpem fore* (ſaith *Tacitus*) *ut penatibus avi redderetur.* And the making that ſhew, was a haſtener of his death. Alſo *Philip* after he had put *Demetrius* to death, he perceived his errour to let *Perſeus* ſtay alone; whereupon he meant to bring in his familiar friend *Antigonus*, for a counterpoiſe, giving out, he ſhould ſucceed him in the Kingdome, but was prevented by death. Therefore *Tiberius* alſo conſidering this, advanced not *Germanicus* alone, but *Druſus* with him, *Seque tutiorem rebatur, utroque filio legiones obtinente:* knowing well, it would be impoſſible they ſhould ever joyne together in any attempt againſt him. *Quia arduum & difficile eſt, eodem loci concordiam & potentiam eſſe:* whereupon he was ſecure he ſhould alwaies have them of his ſide. And when *Germanicus* died, he left not *Druſus* alone, but brought in *Sejanus*, whereof *Druſus* infinite times complained, *Crebro quærens Incolumi filio adjutore Imperii, alium vocari.* And when *Druſus* was dead, and *Sejanus* left alone, *Tiberius* was then in no ſmall danger; which he perceiving, had determined to bring in *Nero* ſonne of *Germanicus*; but afterward being ſecured of the fall of *Sejanus*, he put him to death; and then *Caius Cæſar* remained

remained alone. Whereupon *Tiberius* finding himſelfe in the ſame ſtraight, in which *Auguſtus* was when *Tiberius* was left alone; although he knew the danger, and that it was no ſafety for him, that all favour ſhould be caſt upon one; yet being old, and ill-beloved of all, having thoroughly conſidered, what courſe he might beſt take to ſecure himſelfe from *Caius Cæſar*; he could finde none, as I conceive, but ſuch as would rather be a courſe to haſten his death; and therefore in that caſe he ſhewed himſelfe much wiſer then *Auguſtus*: and although *Cornelius Tacitus* attribute it to another matter, where he ſaith, *Conſilium cui impar erat fato permiſit*: which was to make choice of another ſucceſſour; yet I, without taxing his opinion, would thinke that he forbore this new election, leſt comming to the eares of *Caius Cæſar*, it might put him upon ſome practiſe to procure his death, as he himſelfe had done before to *Auguſtus*; and the rather as knowing himſelfe to be exceeding weake, *Reputante Tiberio publicum ſibi odium, extremam ætatem, magiſque famæ quam vi ſtare res ſuas.*

But becauſe *Auguſtus* and *Tiberius* knew well, how much it imported, to have more ſucceſſours then one: yet each of them was brought at laſt to have but one, and could not helpe it: it will be fit to thinke upon ſome way, how a Prince that is brought to ſuch a ſtraight, may both enter ſuch a ſucceſſour in affaires of State, and yet ſecure himſelfe from domeſtick dangers. As for the entering him, and ſetting him in a way; it will be eaſily done, by putting him into thoſe ſteps, which himſelfe paſſed to attaine the Empire: and by this way, the Houſe of *Auſtria* at this day maintaines it ſelfe in the Empire. An inſtruction of *Auguſtus*, and afterward followed by *Tiberius*, who comming to the Empire by meanes of the Tribuneſhip, they alſo uſed to make their ſucceſſours Tribunes. *Id ſummi faſtigii vocabulum*

cabulum Auguſtus reperit, ne Regis aut dictatoris nomen adſumeret, ac tamen appellatione aliqua cætera imperia præmineret: Marcum deinde Agrippam ſocium ejus poteſtatis, quo defuncto Tiberium Neronem delegit, ne ſucceſſor in incerto foret: ſic cohiberi pravas aliorum ſpes rebatur, ſimul modeſtiæ Neronis & ſuæ magnitudini fiebat, quo tunc exemplo Tiberius Druſum ſummæ rei admoveret. The difficulty then conſiſts onely in ſecuring himſelfe againſt his ſucceſſour, being too potent; and the beſt way, that I can learne out of Hiſtories is this; not to ſuffer him together with the dignity, to get the love and affection of the Subjects. This *Auguſtus* put in execution, untill he was blinded by his wives intreaties. For when he demanded the Tribuneſhip for *Tiberius*, under colour of excuſing him, he laid open all his ill conditions, thereby to make him odious. *Etenim Auguſtus paucis ante annis, cum Tiberio Tribunitiam poteſtatem a Patribus rurſus poſtularet, quanquam honora oratione quædam de habitu cultuque & inſtitutis ejus jecerat, quæ velut excuſando exprobraret.* To what end ſhould *Auguſtus* demand honours for *Tiberius*, and himſelfe diſhonour him? but onely to this, that as by meanes of the dignity which could not be denyed him, he meant to ſettle in him the ſucceſſion, ſo by meanes of making knowne his vices, he meant to make him odious; and thereby ſecure himſelfe, that he might never be able through the peoples favour, to contrive any plot againſt him. *Tiberius* alſo made uſe of this courſe, and therefore cauſed *Druſus* to be preſent alwaies at the ſports of the Gladiatours; to the end, that by ſhewing himſelfe delighted with the ſight of blood, he might be knowne to be of a cruell and bloody diſpoſition, and conſequently be of all men hated. Whereupon *Tacitus* diſcourſing upon the reaſons, why *Tiberius* himſelfe would not be preſent at them; amongſt other, he mentions this, where he ſaith, *Non crediderim ad oſtentandam ſævitiam moven-*

movendaſque offenſiones conceſſam filio materiem, quamquam id quoque diſſimuleſt. Another time, when *Tiberius* ſaw *Germanicus* and *Druſus* conteſting with the Senate, he wonderfully joyed at it; as well becauſe their contention was about diſparaging a Law, as becauſe of the hate they incurred by it, *Lætabatur Tiberius, cum inter filios ejus & leges Senatus diſceptaret.*

Having commended the courſe, for a Prince to deſigne more then one ſucceſſour, by whom to be ſupported, there muſt care be taken to hold the ballance even betweene them, otherwiſe he ſhall expoſe himſelfe to manifeſt danger; in regard whereof, *Auguſtus* never brought *Tiberius* openly forward untill ſuch time as he was left alone, *Druſoque pridem extincto, Nero ſolus ex privignis erat, illuc cuncta vergere*, and that which followeth. So *Tiberius* as long as *Germanicus* lived, uſed them with great equality: but after *Germanicus* death, he then diſcovered his love to *Druſus*. *Tiberius Druſum ſummæ rei admovet; incolumi Germanico, integrum inter Duos Iudicium.*

But becauſe it is a moſt difficult thing, to obſerve this equality, and to carry an even hand, as that which was in Chriſt accounted a matter of admiration, that he ſo carried himſelfe toward his Apoſtles, that they could never know which of them he favoured moſt, every one thinking himſelfe to be the man, whereupon they often contended which of them ſhould be the greateſt; it is fit to conſider, to which ſide the Prince ought rather to incline.

For reſolution whereof, I conceive, that a Prince (as indeed he can doe no leſſe) ſhall doe well to favour the weaker party, for by meanes of his favour he ſhall make him ſtronger then the other; and yet ſhall not need to doubt him, as being of himſelfe the weaker. So did *Tiberius*, who if ever he ſhewed any ſparke of partiality, it was to *Druſus*.

Nam

Nam senem Augustum devinxerat adeo, ut nepotem unicum Agrippam Posthumum in Insulam Planasiam projiceret. *And a little after,* Nulla in præsens formidine, dum Augustus ætate validus, seque & Domum & pacem sustentavit: postquam provecta jam senectus, ægro & corpore fatigabatur.

That old men are apt to be carried away by women, and of what age a Prince should be.

The nineteenth Discourse.

THe old age of *Augustus* (as we may conjecture by these two Texts, which for more conveniency I have joyned together) brought forth in the City of *Rome*, many evill effects: First, by suffering himselfe to be ruled by his wife *Livia*, who with no small subtilty perswaded him to discard *Agrippa Posthumus*, and to leave *Tiberius Nero* his successour in the Empire. Secondly, because thorough old age, he was no longer able to governe the City, his family, or himselfe.

By occasion then of the first, we will examine, whether it be true, that old men are apt and easie to be led away by women; and finding it to be so, we will shew the reason: and by occasion of the second, it will be fit to examine, at what age a Prince is fittest to governe.

Concerning the first, there will need no great labour to shew by examples and by reason, that the wives of old men may obtaine of them whatsoever they desire. *Adonia* the sonne of *David* had made himselfe King in his fathers life; and by reason of age, as being the eldest, it was his due; as *Salomon* himselfe confessed, whilst denying a favour, which his mother

in behalfe of *Adonia* requeſted of him, he ſaid, *Ipſe enim eſt frater meus major me*; yet how eaſily did *Berſabee* perſwade her old husband *David* to put by *Adoniah*, and to make her ſonne *Salomon* his ſucceſſour? whereof the holy Scripture in the Booke of *Kings* ſaith, *Ingreſſa eſt itaque Berſabee ad regem in cubiculo, Rex autem ſenuerat nimis.* And ſeeing the holy Scriptures have never a word that hath not ſome myſtery in it, we may well gather by theſe words *Rex autem ſenuerat nimis*, were written to intimate, that the ſuite of *Berſabee* was much facilitated by the old age of *David*. Another example in the booke of *Kings* we have of *Salomon*, who in his old age was ſo led away by his Concubines, that moſt perfidiouſly leaving the true worſhip of God, he ſet up Images, built Altars and Temples unto Idols, whereof the holy Spirit in the ſaid Booke gives the reaſon ſaying, that *Salomon* being now growne old, was eaſily drawne away by women, *Cumque jam eſſet ſenex, depravatum eſt cor ejus per mulieres, ut ſequeretur Deos alienos.*

The effect then is manifeſt: it remaines that we ſhew the cauſe why this ſhould happen in old men, and not in yong. And firſt, it may be attibuted to length of time: for as a ſtone, though never ſo hard, is mollified and broken by often falling of water, ſo the long ſuits of women accompanied with their dalliances and allurements, are able to penetrate the hardeſt heart: and therefore *Job* ſaith, *Lapides excavant aquæ, & alluvione paulatim terra conſumitur*; whereof Saint *Gregory* makes the like interpretation, as I doe here of the example of *Salomon*, *Videamus qualiter lapides excavat aqua: & alluvione paulatim terra conſumitur. Salomon quippe immoderato uſu, atque aſſiduitate mulierum ad hoc perductus eſt, ut qui prius Templum Deo conſtrueret aſſiduitate libidinis etiam perfidiæ ſubſtratus, Idolis conſtrueret Templa non timuit. Sicque factum eſt, ut ab aſſiduæ carnis petulantia,*

petulantia, usque ad mentis perfidiam perveniret. Quid it aque aliud quam aquæ excavarunt lapidem? & alluvione paulatim terra consumpta est; quis furrepente paulatim infusione peccati, terra cordis illius ad consumptionem defluxit.

A second cause is, because in old age by reason of weakneſſe, the vertue of reſiſting feminine allurements failes, which in youth by reaſon of vigour are eaſily reſiſted. This cauſe *Cajetan* meanes, when ſpeaking of *Salomon* he ſaith, *Quamvis mulieres junctæ fuerint Salomoni Juveni, non tamen diverterunt a Juventute ad cultum Deorum, ſed in Senectute paulatim emollitus eſt animus ejus, creſcente amore, & deficiente virtute.*

A third cauſe I would alledge my ſelfe, and it is, That all love is founded upon ſome intereſt, either good or bad: and ſeeing that of women can never be founded upon vertue, by reaſon of the incapacity of that ſex; it happens oftentimes to be founded either upon beauty or upon profit: For in women commonly there are two deſires; or to ſay better, two affections: one of rule, the other of luſt; and when theſe faile, then alſo their love ceaſeth. From hence it is, that ſeeing an old man, can never beleeve (unleſſe age hath taken away his braines) that women can love him for beauty; it follows neceſſarily, he muſt beleeve they love him for profit; of which if there be no hope, neither can he hope, they will ever love him. And therefore when he knows he cannot ſatisfie their affection one way, by reaſon of the weakneſſe of his age, he muſt of neceſſity ſeeke to ſatisfie it the other way, and conſequently agree to all their deſires. And therefore no marvell if *Tacitus* ſay, that *Auguſtus* grown old, was led away by women.

Concerning the ſecond point, before we come to examine which is the beſt age in a Prince, for governing his people, we muſt take notice, that in men there are foure ages: old age, childhood, youth, and conſiſtence,

istence, or middle age. Thus *Hippocrates* distinguisheth them, which for the present shall passe, without questioning the truth of the distinction. Secondly, it must be noted, that I speake not of Princes that are by succession, for they have their officers and Deputies, by whom they may alwaies governe well; but I speake of Princes that are by election, and particularly in Kingdoms that stand in danger, into which, many by reason of age have fallen.

In this case, it is not well, that a Prince should be in his childhood, whereupon our Lord God, by the mouth of the Prophet *Esay*, threatning the destruction of *Hierusalem*, after saying, *Ecce enim Dominator Dominus exercituum, auferet a Hierusalem, & a Iuda, validum & fortem, & virum bellatorem, omne robur panis & omne robur aquæ, Iudicem & Prophetam, Ariolum & senem*: he saith, *& dabo pueros Principes eorum*, by whose government, how great disorders were to grow, is shewed in the processe of that Chapter, and therefore *Salomon* in *Ecclesiasticus* cries out, *Ve tibi terra, cujus Rex est puer.*

The reason of this is, because in a Governour, there are foure things required: the first is knowledge and prudence, whereupon *Salomon* considering himselfe to be but a child, prayed not to God for Riches or Honour, nor yet for long life, but for Wisdome to be able to judge rightly, saying, *Ego autem sum puer parvulus, & ignorans egressum & introitum meum. Et servus tuus est in medio populi quem elegisti, populi infiniti qui numerari & supputari non potest, præ multitudine. Dabis ergo servo tuo docile, ut populum tuum judicare possit, & discernere inter bonum & malum.* Whereupon S. *Gregory* makes a good observation; that in holy Scripture, Princes and Prophets are called *Videntes*, Seers, as those that have need of Prudence and Knowledge, that being to lead the blind, they be not blind themselves; for then will

Cities goe to wracke, and easily be destroyed; as *Esay* saith, *Omnes bestiæ agri venite ad devorandum, Universæ bestiæ saltus, & speculatores ejus cæci omnes.*

The second thing required in a Prince is fortitude, to be able to bridle the people, and to beare the weight of the Scepter. And therefore *Salomon* in *Ecclesiasticus* saith, *Noli quærere fieri Judex, nisi valeas virtute irrumpere iniquitates, ne forte extimescas faciem Potentis, & ponas scandalum in æquitate tua.* And *Job* speaking of the burthen that lies upon Princes shoulders, saith, *Sub quo curvantur qui portant orbem*, which S. *Gregory* upon that other place of *Job*, *Ecce Gigantes gemunt sub aquis*, expounds saying, *Gemere sub aquis* meanes nothing else, but to be oppressed with the weight of Subjects, taking waters for people, as the Angel in the *Apocalyps* delivers, *Aquæ multæ, populi multi*: Whereupon not without great mystery our Lord God, meaning to make *Peter* Prince of the people, he called him first to walke upon the water.

Thirdly, Princes ought more to regard the common good of their subjects, then their owne private profit; that they may not be like those, of whom the Prophet ~~Sophony~~ speaketh, *Judices ejus lupi vespere, non relinquebant in Mane*: but like to the Apostle *Paul*, who saith, *Non quæro quæ vestra sunt, sed vos.* *Zephania*

Fourthly, there is required Experience, *Qui non est tentatus quid scit?* saith *Salomon* in *Ecclesiasticus*, *Et qui non est expertus parva recognoscit.* And therefore the Ancients have a fable, that *Phaeton* having taken upon him to guide the Horses of the Sunne, was throwne downe headlong. In asmuch then, as a child through defect of age, can neither have knowledge, nor experience; and thorough weakneſſe of body, can neither be strong nor constant: and finally, thorough time spent in pleasures, will more regard his owne interest, then the people; there can be no doubt of his unfit-

neſſe to govern others, who without doubt is not well able to governe himſelfe.

The other age contrary to this, is old age; in which as a thing moſt odious, men commonly are ſubject to contempt: *Ipſa ætas Galbæ* (ſaith *Tacitus*) *& Irriſui & faſtidio erat.* And a little after, *Precarium ſibi Imperium, & brevi tranſiturum.* But beſides their being contemned, oftentimes they governe ill, becauſe (as *Ariſtotle* writes in his Politicks) *Habet etiam intellectus ſuam ſenectutem*, that the underſtanding alſo hath its old age; ſeeing by weakneſſe of naturall heate, and want of radicall moyſture, they generate naughty blood, from which conſequently ariſe naughty ſpirits, which paſſing to the Heart, and from the Heart diſtributed to the ſenſes, makes them they can but ill performe their office. And therefore in old men, we ſee the ſenſes are alwaies weakned, as the Philoſopher ſaith, *Omnis noſtra intellectio ortum habet à ſenſu*; the underſtanding making uſe of the ſenſes to underſtand by: inſomuch, that they being grown old, it may reaſonably be ſaid, the underſtanding is growne old: whereupon *Livy* meaning to ſhew, that *Camillus* though growne old, was yet able to governe, ſaith, He had all his ſenſes perfect, *Sed vegetum ingenium in vivido pectore vigebat virebatque integris ſenſibus.*

A Prince therefore ſhould not be old, as well becauſe ſuch are apt to be contemned; as becauſe, becomming a child againe, he will governe ill: whereupon not without cauſe, *Tacitus* ſpeaking of *Auguſtus*, ſaith, *Poſtquam provecta jam ſenectus, ægro & corpore fatigabatur*; and that which followeth. And *Galba* knowing this, and meaning to helpe theſe inconveniences of old age, he adopted *Piſo*, ſaying, *Et auditis adoptionis deſinam videri ſenex, quod mihi unum objicitur.* And our Lord God meaning to furniſh his Captaine *Moyſes*, with all the parts required in a Prince; to the

end

end, that through old age, he might not be contemned, nor through want of underſtanding come to governe ill; ſuffered not his ſenſes, nor yet his fleſh to grow old with yeeres, but preſerved them in a flouriſhing ſtate, *Non caligaverunt oculi ejus*, ſaith the Scripture, and this opinion all Writers follow.

It remaines, to ſhew, which is the fitter age, of youth, or the conſiſtent age: for Reſolution whereof, I ſay briefly, that if a Prince be to attend the warres, it is then better he ſhould be yong; as well for the labours of the body, as for the vigour of blood, which growne cold in old men, were never able to performe thoſe things, which are required in a warriour. Whereupon we ſee, that many great Captaines, who in their youth have done admirable acts; in their old age, have loſt many advantages, through weakneſſe of ſpirit; as it happened to *Metellus*, in the warre againſt *Sertorius* in *Spaine*, (as *Plutarch* relates.) And therefore *Moyſes* ſhewed great judgement, who amongſt the Elders he had choſen, having two yong men, *Eldad* and *Medad*, he cauſed them to ſtay in the Army; ſhewing thereby, that in matters of warre they ſhould be yong men. And our Lord God meaning to ayd the Maccabees in a battaile againſt their enemies appeared in the forme of a yong man upon a white Horſe.

But if we ſpeake of Princes, that are to judge the people in peace; in this caſe, the age that inclines to old age, is certainly fitteſt; in ſigne whereof our Lord God who in the Canticles, as being a Bridegroome appeared in forme of a yong man, *Comæ ejus ſicut elatæ palmorum, nigræ quaſi Corvus*, when afterwards he appeares as a King and Judge of *Daniel*, and in the *Apocalyps*, he comes deſcribed with gray haires, *Caput autem ejus & Capilli erant candidi, tanquam lana alba, & tanquam Nix*; and this is for as much, as for the moſt part is wont to happen.

But

But because the contrary of this is often seene, that some man in his youth governes much better then in his age; I cannot omit in this place to advertise, that *canities* or whitenesse by age, consists not so much in haires or in yeers, as in the whitenesse of the thoughts: whereupon, in the *Canticles*, the Bridegroome saith to the Bride, *Vulnerasti cor meum, in uno oculorum tuorum, & in uno crine colli tui*, and S. *Luke*, *Sed & capilli vestri numerati sunt*; and S. *Gregory* upon *Job*, expounding that place of *Deuteronomy*, *Levitæ tenentur radere pilos carnis suæ*; expounds it, *id est, cogitationes superfluas.*

He then shall be accounted old, and to have gray haires, that is full of white thoughts; whereupon *Salomon* saith, *Senectus venerabilis est, non diuturna, neque annorum numero computata, cani autem sunt sensus hominis & ætas Senectutis, vita Immaculata.* When our Lord God would have *Moyses* to choose persons that should assist him in judging the people, he said not, Choose out seventy old men; but, seventy whom thou knoweest to be old; where it plainely appeares, that he speakes not of the old age of the body, for that every one is able to know; but of the old age of the mind, and so S. *Gregory* expounds it in those words, *Congrega mihi septuaginta viros Israel quos tu nosti quòd Senes populi sunt.* While he saith, *In quibus senioribus, quid aliud, quam senectus cordis requiritur, cum tales jubentur eligi; quod senes esse sciuntur? si enim senectus in eis corporis quæreretur, a tantis sciri poterant, a quantis videri; dum vero dicitur, quos tu nosti, quod senes populi sint, profectò liquet, quia senectus mentis, non corporis eligenda mandatur.* For an old man that is gray by reason of yeeres may be a child in regard of conditions; and therefore *Esay* saith, *Puer centum annorum moriatur*; whereupon it followes not, to say, a Prince is yong, therefore he will governe ill; a Prince is old, therefore he will governe well; because it oftentimes happens, that the same man, is in youth;

old;

old; and in age, young; as *Salomon* who in his youth governed divinely well, both himselfe and his state, but afterwards in his old age, he overthrowes himselfe, and consequently his subjects. So *Nero* in the beginning of his youth, governed with so great prudence, that he is rather to be imitated, then that he can be surpassed: but in processe of time, he so perfidiously carried himselfe, that passing neither his schoolmasters, nor his mother, nor finally himselfe, he cast himselfe, and (as much as he could) the state into absolute ruine.

It will not then be from our purpose, to search out the reason, how it happens that many in their youth governe well, and in their old age, become cruell; and throw themselves headlong into vices. First then, I say, it happens by reason of age, which (as we have shewed before) of its owne nature, causeth contempt; and the Prince doubting this, and thinking to remedy it with cruelty, plungeth himselfe in it, to shew there is valour in him: so did *Tiberius* who in his youth endeavoured by all meanes to hide his acts of cruelty; but in his old age, changing opinion, he was never well, but when he was talking of them; and when he could say something to make it appeare, that he was cruell; for no other cause, but that he thought this the onely way to keep him from contempt. Wherupon, if the Senatours had known this reason, they would never have marvelled to heare him recite his acts, & the death of his nephew *Drusus*: and although *Tacitus* ascribe this to his great confidence, where he saith, *Penetrabat pavor, & admiratio callidim olim & tegendis sceleribus obscurum, eo confidentiæ venisse, ut tanquam dimotis parietibus, ostenderet nepotem sub verberibus Centurionis, inter servorum ictus extrema vitæ alimenta frustra orantem*; yet I hold, he did it rather in the sense aforesaid, and I conceive that *Tacitus* in substance understood as much himselfe.

Secondly,

Secondly, this is wont to happen, becauſe in the beginning men are not ſecure in their ſtates, and therefore ſeeke by good meanes to make themſelves ſecure; but once ſecured, they then yeeld themſelves wholy to be governed by ſenſe: and therefore *David* when he had vanquiſht his enemies, and made himſelfe ſecure in his Kingdome, he then committed the adultery with *Berſabee*, and the ſlaughter of *Urias*, whereof S. *Bernard* ſpeaking ſaith, *Sapiens David, ſapiens Salomon fuit, ſed blandientibus nimis ſecundis rebus, alter ex parte, alter ex toto deſipuit.*

Thirdly, becauſe a Prince in old age, hath either gotten him a good name or a bad: if a good, then conceiving that whatſoever he doth, can never take away the good name already gotten, he eaſily runneth into vices; if bad, then deſpairing in ſo ſhort a time, as being now old, to remove that bad name, he thinkes it all one what he doth; and thereupon contemning fame, would be content the World might end with himſelfe. So did *Herod* the great, who gave order that as ſoone as himſelfe ſhould be dead, a great number of Noblemen, that were then priſoners ſhould be ſlaine. And *Nero* was contented it ſhould be thought, that he grieved for nothing ſo much, as that he had not the whole World in his hand, incloſed in a glaſſe, that he might caſt it to the ground whenſoever he ſhould die. But if a Prince be yong, although he have gotten the name of a cruell man, yet hoping in time he may redeeme it and get a better, he will not eaſily plunge himſelfe in vices.

Fourthly, this is wont to happen, when Princes are but of little judgment; becauſe as when of themſelves they are prudent, they alwaies governe better in the third age; ſo when of themſelves they want diſcretion, they governe better in their youth, then afterward; ſeeing in that age, it is no diſgrace to ſuffer themſelves

to

to be guided by men of ability; as was seene in *Nero*, who in his youth was contented to be advised, and to follow the counsell of *Seneca*, *Burrhus* and *Corbulo*, but comming to a riper age, either they take a liberty no longer to regard the advice of good Counsellours, or else they count it a shame to be a Prince upon props: or lastly they are instigated by others, thorough hate they beare to the greatnesse of those able Counsellours. All these things concurred in *Nero*: for first he rejected the reverence of his schoolmasters, *seque in omnes libidines effudit*: and then there wanted not instigatours, who told him it was a shame, *Certe finitam Neronis pueritiam, & robur juventæ adesse, exueret Magistrum, satis amplis Doctoribus instructus Majoribus suis.* So as, having no braine himselfe, nor hearkning to them that had, he came in a short time to utter ruine. So the Emperour *Constantinus Sesius*, was contented at first to be ruled by his mother *Irenea*, but growing elder, he cast her off, and came to be starke naught. And Rabbi *Salomon* saith, that as long as *Nathan* the Prophet, who was *Salomons* schoolmaster lived, *Salomon* tooke no strange woman to be his wife: and this opinion is followed by *Abulensis*.

Domi Res tranquillæ: eadem Magistratuum vocabula.

That to maintain and suffer Magistrates to continue, although without authority, is a matter of great moment.

The twentieth Discourse.

I Have alwaies heard it resolved, that when a City changeth from being a Common-wealth, to be a Kingdome, it should doe well, to leave if not the same authority,

authority, yet at least the same Magistrates. And the same I have found written in all Politician Authours; and for authority, they alledge this place of *Tacitus*, *Eadem Magistratuum vocabula*: where he shewes, that *Augustus* changed all things in *Rome*, but onely the name of Magistrates: and they give this reason, that seeing it is onely a bare name, much in shew, and little in substance, the Prince can lose nothing of his owne Right by it; and yet by this meanes he shall be sure to get the love of his people, who are fedde with such vanity.

This opinion, held, written and observed of every one, containes in it two things: one, that as to the Prince, the leaving of Magistrates is of great profit: the other, that as to the subject it is a meere vanity, and serves onely to puffe up the people.

Although this opinion be generall and entred in such sort into mens conceits, that there seemes to be no contending against it; yet it may be lawfull for me to deliver what I thinke of it; seeing I seeke not to be believed, by any other strength, then by that of reason. I say then, I could never come to know, that this leaving the name of Magistrates, is any weakneſſe, but have alwaies accounted it a matter of great moment; for proofe whereof, we must know, that as all other kinds of state, so a Commonwealth also consists of two things; that is, of matter, and of forme. In a Monarchy, the forme is the Prince; and the City is the matter. In a Commonwealth, the forme is the Magistrate that rules; and the thing that is ruled is the matter. From hence it is, that when these two things doe not meet and joyne together, a City cannot be said to be free: whereupon, if it should be without any Prince, and should withall be without any Magistrates, it could not be called a Commonwealth. The Armenians after the death of *Ariobarzanes*, being unwilling to

serve

serve his successours, remained without any Lord; but having no forme of a Commonwealth, they were never the more free. Whereof *Tacitus* speaking, shewes he knew that well, which I said before, where he saith, *Ariobarzane morte fortuita absumpto, stirpem ejus haud toleravere, tentatoque fœmineo imperio, cui nomen Erato, eaque brevi pulsa, incerti solutique & magis sine Domino quam in libertate, profugum Vononem in Regnum accipiunt.* If then the Prince taking away the matter, which is the City, shall leave the forme, which are the Magistrates, he shall give not onely a vaine contentment, as those men say, but also a great hope to recover liberty: of which they should be out of hope if the Prince, together with the authority, should also take away the Magistrates; seeing although they should be without a Prince, yet they should be nere the neerer for being in liberty, but rather would never be quiet, untill they had a King againe, as it fell out with the Armenians: and if they should agree to have a Commonwealth, it would never be durable; as was seene in *Florence* after a driving out of *Petrus de Medici*: and therefore the Romans had great fortune to find a forme made to their hands; for the Kings being expulsed, they had then nothing else to do, but onely in their stead, to make two Consuls. This thing both *Romulus* and *Torquinius*, *Cæsar* and *Nero* knew to be of great moment, who endeavoured all they could to extinguish the Senate. And indeed, those Provinces that have been without Magistrates, have never been able to come to liberty, as was seen in the Assyrians, and is at this day seen in the Persians, and in the Turks, and others. For it is an easie matter for an image of waxe, if it be broken, to be renued againe, so long as the forme by which it was framed remaines entire; seeing with one onely action, the new forme will be taken away, and the old will be introduced: but if together

with the Image, the mould also should be taken away; it would then be very hard to reframe it to the old forme; as requiring two actions, one to breake the forme that is of new, and the other, to renew the form that was before.

Moreover, this onely apparence of Magistrates, besides that it facilitates the recovery of liberty, causeth also a desire of liberty, which if it doe no other hurt, at least it puts them in mind of a Commonwealth, a thing to Princes most pernitious: and lastly, it gives occasion to the principall men to assemble together without suspition, and therefore, if I be not deceived, *Julius Agricola* told *Tacitus* oftentimes, that the taking away these apparences of liberty, had been very usefull for hindring the rebellions of the Irish. *Sæpe ex eo audivi, legionibus & modicis auxiliis debellari obtinerique Hiberniam posse. Idque etiam adversus Britanniam profuturum, si Romana ubique arma, & velut è conspectu libertas tolleretur.*

This in my opinion it is sufficiently proved, that to leave the names of Magistrates, although without authority, is not a puffing up, or a vanity that blinds the people; but indeed a matter of great moment, for regayning of liberty. Yet I blame not Princes that take this course, and especially those that are at this day, who having no doubt of their people, ought to allow them, not onely the names of Magistrates, but also Magistrates with some authority: and as little doe I like, that a man comming new to a Kingdome, should take this course; only I put them in mind, that all they who have gone about to extinguish Magistrates, have either been slaine or banished, except onely *Cleomenes*.

Tiberium

Tiberium Neronem maturum annis, ſpectatum bello, ſed veterè atque inſita Claudiæ Familiæ ſuperbia, multaque indicia ſævitiæ, quanquam premantur erumpere: Hunc & prima ab infantia eductum in domo Regnatrice, congeſtos Juveni Conſulatus, Triumphos ne iis quidem annis, quibus Rhodi ſpecie ſeceſſus ærulem egerit, aliquid quam Iram & ſimulationem & ſecretas libidines meditatum.

That Tiberius was part good, and part bad. How it happened that he fell not into dangers as Nero did. Whether it be good to be brought up in the Princes Houſe: and finally, how their ſecret vices may be knowne.

The one and twentieth Diſcourſe.

TAcitus diſcourſing of the ſucceſſours of *Auguſtus*, whilſt he laies open the vertues and vices of *Tiberius* ſhewes us alſo, the capacity and incapacity that was in him for ſucceſſion in the Empire: his capacity was firſt, by reaſon of his ripeneſſe in age, being ſuch as in our former diſcourſe we required in a Prince, then his ability in Military affaires; and the long experience he had, being brought up in *Auguſtus* his Houſe, and imployed continually in State buſineſſes; and ſeeing Princes ought to be able both to governe the people in peace, and to rule them in warre, I know not any man could be fitter for the Empire then *Tiberius*.

On the other ſide, *Tiberius* was proud, cruell, and laſcivious; and ſeeing a Prince ought to governe with mildneſſe, to have care of the ſubjects lives; and above all, rather to defend their honour, then oppreſſe it: there is no doubt, but *Tiberius* was more uncapable of ſuch a dignity then any other; becauſe as being proud,

he could never be pleasing in his government: and as being cruell, he was readier to destroy his subjects then to preserve them: and lastly, as being lascivious, he was likelier to dishonour his Citizens, then to do them honour; and thus, as there were in him all those vertues that make a Prince admirable; so there were in him all those vices that make a state miserable. And because for the most part, the good is overborne and suppressed by the bad; we may justly say, that *Tiberius* was altogether uncapable of the Empire, his experience being obscured by his pride; his valour in warre, by his cruelty in Peace; and lastly his ripenesse in yeers, by his greennesse in lustfulnesse.

Tiberius yet together with his many vices, had also some vertues, and therefore was not wholly good, but part good; nor wholly wicked, but part wicked: and this is the cause why he continued peaceably in his Empire, which *Nero* did not, because *Nero* had many vices, and never a vertue; *Tiberius* though he had many vices, yet withall he had some vertues; and a vice can never hold out long, if it be not founded upon some vertue. A lascivious man, if he have not some temperance, will never live ten daies to an end: a Thiefe, if he use not some meane in his robbing, but will be stealing day and night, secretly and openly, he will quickly make his own Gallowes. Therefore Saint *Chrysostome* saith, *Talis est natura mali, ut non consistat nisi virtuti cuipiam admisceatur. Nam mala non habent naturam, ut ex se possint subsistere; nisi paululum aliquid a virtutibus ceperint.* And *Aristotle* having an eye to this, where teaching the way how to maintaine a tyranny, saith, that a tyrant ought at least to be part good, and part bad; *Insuper moribus talis esse, ut recte se habeat ad virtutem, vel semibonus quidem sit, & non malus, sed semimalus.* This was one of the causes why *Nero* being cruel, ruined himselfe, and *Tiberius* being cruell, kept himselfe

ſelfe ſafe; becauſe *Nero* was a cruell beaſt, and *Tiberius* a cruell man. He killed men, out of greedineſſe of the blood of others; and this onely for ſecurity of himſelfe: the one uſed his cruelty fooliſhly, and the other politickly; or rather we may ſay, wiſely; *Eſt enim quædam Prudentia falſa* (ſaith S. *Thomas*) *vel per ſimilitudinem dicta, cum enim Prudens ſit, qui bene diſponit ea quæ ſunt agenda propter aliquem bonum finem, ille qui propter malum finem aliqua diſponit congruentia illi fini, habet falſam prudentiam, in quantum illud quod accepit pro fine, non eſt vere bonum, ſed ſecundum ſimilitudinem ſic dicitur aliquis bonus latro*; and that which followes.

But having ſaid, that in *Tiberius* there was vertue as well as vice; but that *Nero* was all vice: for which ſome man with no ſmall colour of truth may reprehend me, ſeeing in all Hiſtories we find, that *Nero* was perhaps more vertuous then any other of the Cæſarean family: I therefore thinke it neceſſary to advertiſe, that all vertues are not vertues in a Prince; but rather many a one, no better then a vice. Poeſie, Muſicke, Paynting, and all thoſe Sciences and Arts which depend upon ſharpneſſe of wit, a Prince having need to procure himſelfe a ſoundneſſe of judgement, and not a ſubtilty of braine, for contemplating of thoſe things which conſiſt onely in Idæa; therefore in theſe and ſuch like, a Prince ought to content himſelfe with a mediocrity of knowledge; not for his owne practice, but onely to enable him to taſte the pleaſure from them that doe practiſe them. *Sunt enim quædam e liberalibus ſcientiis*, (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) *quas uſque ad aliquid diſcere honeſtum ſit, penitus vero ſeſe illis tradere, atque uſque ad extremum perſequi velle, valde noxium eſt.* *Philip* King of *Macedon*, hearing his ſonne *Alexander* play excellent well on an inſtrument, reproved him, ſaying, It is a ſhame for a Prince to play ſo well; it is onely fit for him, to be able to take delight, when he heares

them doe it, that make it their profession. And seeing this delight cannot be taken without being intelligent of the Art, therefore this censure of *Philip* seems not much different from my opinion; that a Prince, if it be possible, should know all Arts and Sciences, but not practise them. *Nero* composed verses, and finding it a profession not fit for a Prince, he gave it over, *Sed colibet vires* (saith *Martial* speaking of him) *ingeniumque pudor*. Seeing then *Nero* was vertuous and excellent in these kinds of Arts and Sciences, in which it is not for a Prince to be too conversant; we may justly say, that he was vitious in vertues; a thing which easily happens to those that are too greedy of getting knowledge. Whereupon *Tacitus* commended *Agricola*, that he could bridle this greedinesse, *Retinuitque quod est difficillimum, ex sapientia modum*. For this desire to know more then is fit, is neither Politically, nor Morally, nor Theologically good, *Quemadmodum omnium rerum* (saith *Seneca*) *sic literarum etiam intemperantia laboramus*. And S. *Paul*, *Noli sapere plusquam sapere oportet, sed sapere ad sobrietatem*. That which *Tacitus* cals, To hold a meane in studies, *Seneca* cals, to be temperate; and S. *Paul*, to be sober.

It comes into my mind, now that we are in this digression, to give another reason, why *Tiberius* maintained himselfe in the Empire, and *Nero* perished in it: and it is, that *Nero* scorned fame, and *Tiberius* much esteemed it. And if a Divine should object, that the contemning of fame in this world, is a necessary vertue in all good men; I would answer, as it is true, that to contemne worldly fame, is one of the best things a Christian can doe; so it is one of the worst things a Heathen or a wicked man can doe; because there will be no vice or villany, which he will not dare to doe, if he regard not fame; as was seene in *Nero*, who not regarding fame, left no wickednesse unattempted.

But to returne to our purpoſe and principall intent, which is, to ſhew the meaning of that place in *Tacitus*, upon which we have undertaken to diſcourſe; I ſay, that many from that text, make it a rule, that one who hath been brought up in the Princes houſe, ſhould not be made Prince, becauſe of *Tacitus* his ſaying, *Hunc ex primum ab infantia educatum in domo Regnatrice*: and their reaſon is, becauſe in ſuch places he learnes to be proud and inſolent.

Firſt, I doe not thinke, that *Tacitus* miſlikes a ſucceſſour ſhould be brought up in the Princes Houſe, neither that he makes it a cauſe of pride abſolutely; becauſe not onely it is commendable, but in a manner neceſſary, that Princes ſhould be brought in their Houſes to whom they are to ſucceed; ſeeing, that though a Prince be of the ſame ſtate, and of the ſame blood Royall which ought to ſucceed in the Crowne; yet if he ſhould be brought up any where but in his owne houſe, it would be cauſe enough to make him odious to all his ſubjects. And therefore *Tacitus* ſaith of *Vonone*, that although he were of the blood Royall of the Parthians, yet becauſe he had beene brought up in *Rome*, his ſubjects would not endure him, *Quamvis Gentis Arſacidarum ut externum aſpernabantur*.

They therefore deceive themſelves, who favouring either brothers or ſons of the great Turk, have a hope to ſettle them in the *Ottomane* Empire: for though they be of the blood Royall, yet they will alwaies be accounted ſtrangers, and thereupon rejected. Whereof continually we have heard and ſeene examples, no other good having ever come of it, but that it hath ſhewed the Chriſtian piety of thoſe Princes, who in zeale to God, have given ſhelter to ſuch perſons.

Secondly, he being commonly of an intolerable carriage, who from a ſervant comes to be a maſter, as well

well becauſe he paſſeth from one extreme to another; as becauſe, to be a ſervant abaſeth the ſpirit; as was ſeen in *Tigranes*, of whom *Tacitus* ſaith, that he therefore loſt his Kingdome, *Cum advenit Tigranes a Nerone ad capeſſendum Imperium dilectus, Cappadocum ex Nobilitate, Regis Archelai nepos, ſed quod diu obſes apud urbem fuerat uſque ad ſervilem patientiam dimiſſus, neque conſenſu acceptus.* And therefore our Lord God, would not that his Captaine and Leader of the Iſraelites, *Moyſes*, ſhould be as others were, a ſervant to *Pharao*, but would have him bred and brought up in the Kings houſe; and for this it was, that the Parthians expelled *Vonone, Si mancipium Cæſaris, tot per annos ſervitutem perpeſſum, Parthis Imperitet.*

Thirdly, becauſe being in ſome part raiſed above equality, as they are, who live in Princes houſes, they are with leſſe envy of the ſubjects, taken to be their Prince. Whereupon *Servius*, although (as ſome thinke) he was the ſonne of a bondwoman; yet becauſe he had been brought up in the Princes houſe, he was accepted for King. The Lacedemonians alſo, when they wanted a King, they tooke *Laconicus*, onely becauſe he had been brought up in the Kings houſe.

Fourthly, becauſe in ſuch places, there is no doubt but they may better learne how to governe, and be ſet in a way of managing affaires: and therefore *Dion* in the life of *Adrian*, would have a ſpeciall regard to be had of this, in chooſing a Prince: and our Lord God, meaning to fit *David*, for being a King, made him in *Sauls* life time, to goe to live in the Kings Pallace; to the end, he might learne the cuſtomes of a King, and be made to know the degree, before he tooke it; where if ſuddenly upon *Sauls* ſinne, he had been made King, he ſhould have come unknown to all the people.

It is not therefore to be found fault withall, that he

he who is to rule others, ſhould be brought up in his houſe that rules; neither in my opinion had *Tacitus* any ſuch meaning; or to ſay better, he whoſe words *Tacitus* reports.

For they doe not ſimply and abſolutely finde fault with *Tiberius* his education in *Auguſtus* his houſe, neither yet, that he had ſo great dignities and honours conferd upon him; for theſe did rather prepare him to governe well, then to make him proud; but the faule they find is this, that in his youth, and whilſt he lived in the Princes houſe, he was raiſed to ſo many and to ſuch a number of Offices. The fault therefore was not, that he was brought up in the Princes houſe, but that he had ſo many offices and honours beſtowed upon him; and this neither not ſo much, as the unſeaſonablenes of them. And therefore *Tacitus* ſaith not ſimply, *Congeſtos conſulatus & honores*, but *Congeſtos Juveni conſulatus*. Which is very manifeſt, for ſeeing *Tiberius* had alſo in his mature age, great offices and honours, *Tacitus* muſt needs be underſtood to ſpeake of thoſe which he received in his youth, apt to make men grow proud, as in another place he excellently ſhewes, in the perſon of *Tiberius*; for the ſonnes of *Germanicus* being much honoured by the Pontifex, who in his prayers to their Gods, made mention of them together with *Tiberius*, he forbad him ſaying; that yong men grow proud by receiving honours before their time. *Movit ne quis in poſterum mobiles adoleſcentium animos, præmaturis honoribus ad ſuperbiam extolleret.* And thus much concerning his pride.

Secondly, *Tacitus* taxeth *Tiberius* with cruelty, which though he endevoured all he could to hide, yet he could not keepe it from appearing. From whence we may know, there cannot be a worſe nature, nor a worſe Prince, then he who having in him the vice of cruelty, ſtrives for ſome ends to hide it, ſeeing having

once

once gotten his intent, with heaping upon himselfe much hatred, he after makes his greedinesse of blood appears the more, by flushing it out all at once, (at lest if he doe not as *Cleomenes* did) and where if he had not hidde his vice, every one might have knowne, upon what to worke; and consequently few should have needed to feare. Now that he hides it, and men cannot penetrate into the Princes mind, it gives occasiō for all in generall to feare. The Senatours therefore of *Rome*, seeing *Otho* dissemble his vices, were much displeased at it: *Otho interim* (saith *Tacitus*) *contra spem omnium, non deliciis, neque desidia corpescere, dilatæ voluptates, dissimulata luxuria, & cuncta ad decorem Imperii composita; eoque plus formidinis afferebant, falsæ virtutes, & vitia reditura.* Yet it is to be understood of those who dissemble, but for a certaine time, as *Otho* would have done, and as *Nero* did; but if we aske, which is the better Prince, of him that being cruell desires to use his cruelty courtly, or he, that is openly cruell, I hold directly, that this is the worse; for, using his cruelty openly, either he knowes not his vice, or he cares not what men say of him: if he regard not what men say of him, there cannot a worse thing be; if he know not his vice, he comes to be a cruell foole; where he that hides it, shews that both he knowes his vice, and also desires a good report: whereupon it followes he cannot so often put his cruelty in execution; for then he should be a more foole then the other, to thinke that an act often repeated, should never be perceived; and if any one object that this must needs be the worse, as joyning to the vice of cruelty, the vice of craft: I answer, that this mans government will be so much better, as it is lesse distastfull, to be governed by one that is crafty, then by one that is a foole: whereupon the Senatours of *Rome* never feared *Tiberius* so much, as when they saw him give over his dissembling: and

there-

therefore *Tacitus* in another place saith, *Perstabat pravo, & adnitenti alibi malo, & tegendis sceleribus obscurum, eo confidentiæ venisse, ut tanquam dimotis parietibus ostenderet nepotem, sub verberibus Centurionis inter servorum ictus, extrema vitæ alimenta frustra orantem.* But it is so hard a matter to hide a vice that is naturall, and to hide it so, as that no signe of it may appeare, that almost all they, who have had a purpose to dissemble, in short time have been discovered. So it happened to *Philip*, so to the Emperour *Domitian*, so to *Sylla*, to *Tiberius* and to *Nero*; and finally, to *Theodotus* King of the *Ostrogothes*: being a thing impossible, though there be a habit gotten of dissembling, to cover a vice that is naturall. In regard whereof, *Plutarch* saith of *Philip*, *Insita a natura vitia adscititium habitum vicerunt, paulatim foris superbiberunt, & ingenium Regis deterere.* Whereupon our Lord God in S. *Matthew*, meaning to teach us to know such kind of men, saith, we must observe well their deeds, *Attendite a falsis Prophetis qui veniunt ad vos in vestimentis Ovium*: and to shew us the way how to know them, it followes, *A fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos*, where *Theophylact* adds, *Nam licet ad tempus simulent, successu tamen temporis producuntur.* I will not forbeare to bring another pregnant way, which *Galen* teacheth us, to come to the knowledge of these dissimulations, who saith, that if a vertue be naturall, as (for example) mildnesse, whether the provocations be great or little, yet they will not move a man to choller; but in all occasions, he will shew himselfe constant; but if it be feined, then perhaps in light occasions he may hide it; but in great, it will violently break out and shew it selfe: and therefore *Tacitus* meaning to shew the dissimulation of *Tiberius* useth these words, *Multa indicia sævitiæ, quanquam premantur erumpere*: where this word *Erumpere* shews, that not upon light, but upon great occasions, it discovered it selfe

with

with violence. Thirdly *Tacitus* blames *Tiberius* for luxury; of which head, I intend to ſpeake in the following diſcourſe.

Ne iis quidem annis, quibus Rhodi ſpecie Seceſſus exulem egerit, aliquid quam Iram & ſimulationem, & ſecretas libidines meditatum.

How much it imports a Prince to be chaſt.

The two and twentieth Diſcourſe.

LUxury is a much greater vice, then cruelty; this taking away the life onely of the ſubjects, that the honour: and chaſtity on the contrary, is ſo profitable both to the acquiring, and to the conſerving a Dominion, that every one (though of an ill nature, and a worſe intention) that aſpires to a Principality, will yet take care, if not to be chaſt, yet at leaſt to ſeem ſo, and to hide his vice of luſt untill he have attained and be ſetled in the Empire. Whereupon *Daniel* ſpeaking of Antichriſt, ſaith, *Deum patrum ſuorum non reputabit, & erit in concupiſcentiis fœminarum:* which place is tranſlated in theſe words, *Et concupiſcentiis mulierum non ſubjacebit.* Writers therefore interpret, that Antichriſt knowing of what importance chaſtity is for getting a Kingdome, will counterfeit himſelfe to be ſo, thereby to get himſelfe love, and to bring him forward, and finally to make him Emperour. But after he hath once gotten the Empire, he will then no longer hide his filthy concupiſcence, but making himſelfe a prey to vices, will ſhew himſelfe to be truely their child.

This profit *Tiberius Nero* knew, and therefore ſtrove all he could to hide his luſt; *Et ſecretas libidines meditatum:*

tatum; but when he had once gotten whither he aſpired, and had ſet ſure footing in the Empire, he then ſuffered himſelfe to fall headlong into all kinds of vices. It is not therefore enough, to counterfeit to be ſuch, before a man comes to his greatneſſe, as that wicked one did, and as this impious one will doe; but a Prince muſt truely, both in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end not onely ſhew to be, but be in truth and ſincerely free from luſt: firſt, for zeale to God, and then for his owne good and the States: on his owne behalfe, becauſe there is nothing that more ruines a Prince, then to be abject, baſe, and deſpiſed: Nothing that more upholds him, then Majeſty, Gravity and Reverence; and becauſe Princes that are given to luſt can never have any of theſe reſpects, It is therefore neceſſary they ſhould keep themſelves chaſt. In conſideration of this, *David* after his adultery committed with *Berſabee*, taking notice of his errour, prayed to God and ſaid, *Redde mihi lætitiam ſalutaris tui, & ſpiritu Principali confirma me.* As though he ſhould ſay, O Lord God, I forgot that I was a King and a Prince, through the concupiſcence of the fleſh, into which moſt miſerably I am fallen; I humbly pray thee, that from henceforward, thou wouldſt confirme in me the ſpirit of chaſtity, that ſo I may returne to be a King & a Prince: and this is ſo true, that by the figure *Antonomaſia*, chaſtity is called Gravity, and Majeſty; and therefore S. *Paul* writing to *Titus* ſaith, *In omnibus teipſum præbe exemplum bonorum operum, In doctrinâ, in integritate, in gravitate.* S. *Hierome* in his Comment upon that place, inſtead of *gravitate*, reads *caſtitate*; for the ſame word, which in Greeke ſignifies Gravity and Majeſty, ſignifies alſo Chaſtity: and therefore, as Gravity and Majeſty are neceſſary for a Prince, without which he ſhould not be a Prince; ſo Chaſtity alſo is no leſſe neceſſary: and as it is impoſſible that Majeſty and luſt

ſhould be in company together, *Non bene conveniunt, nec in una ſede morantur, Majeſtas & Amor*; ſo it is impoſſible that Majeſty and chaſtity ſhould not be together, which onely of it ſelfe is able to make Princes be reverend. Which S. *Paul* in the foreſaid Epiſtle ſhewes where he ſaith, *Ut qui ex adverſo eſt Revereatur, nihil habens malum dicere nobis.* Seeing chaſtity is reverenced even of her enemies.

On the part of the Subjects, there is no doubt but the chaſtity of the Prince, is of great conſequence for their good: Firſt, in regard of his example, ſeeing Cities, and conſequently the Citizens, alter as they ſee the Prince alter: and therefore when *Dionyſius* the Tyrant, ſent for *Plato* to teach him Geometry, all the City and Pallace was preſently full of duſt, every one ſeeking with all diligence to be a Geometrician. And Saint *John* in the *Apocalyps*, meaning to expreſſe the changes, which are made in Cities, through the change that is in Princes, deſcribes one and the ſame horſe, to be ſometime red, ſometimes white, and ſometimes blacke, which happened by the diverſity of their riders, according to whom it changed colour. By the horſe, (as the greater part of Writers ſay) is ſignified the Empire of *Rome*; and by thoſe that rode upon it, the Emperours; according to whoſe vices the Empire changed, and in nothing more then through chaſtity; ſeeing the Prince may by violence violate the honour of his Subjects, if he be not chaſt. In which regard S. *Paul* ſaith, *Obſecro orationes fieri, pro Regibus, & pro omnibus qui in ſublimitate ſunt conſtituti, ut tranquillam vitam agamus in omni pietate & caſtitate.* Where he plainly ſhewes, that the chaſtity of the Subjects depends upon the chaſtity of the Prince, while he ſaith, let us Pray for Kings, to the end we may live chaſtly.

Chaſtity therefore is profitable for the Subjects,

and necessary for him that will rise to honour, in signe perhaps whereof, S. *John* in the *Apocalyps*, makes the Virgins appeare on the top of the Mount: as though he would say, that chast persons can easiliest rise to great degrees, who in the Scripture oftentimes are figured by Mountaines. Let Princes therefore be farre from lust, and as (according to the opinion of *Hugo* the Cardinall) they have the Name of God in common to them with Virgins: so also let them have chastity in common to them with Virgins, but yet in such a manner as Princes are able to have it; for so they shall the better discharge their Office, to the honour and glory of God; which is the thing above all they ought to have before their eyes.

Accedere Matrem muliebri Impotentia, serviendum Fœminæ.

How and when the government of women is odious.

The three and twentieth Discourse.

FOr declaration of this place of *Tacitus*, where he seems to make it an odious thing to be governed by women: we will first shew, in what things it is, that womens Dominion over men is odious; and then, what Authority Princes should allow women in the government.

To begin with the first: I say, that women may beare rule three waies; the first, themselves alone directly. Secondly, themselves alone indirectly. Thirdly, themselves together with their sonnes, husbands, or other men.

The first way of bearing rule; that is, directly and properly consists in the acts of jurisdiction, as in judg-

ing; to which there being required great knowledge, great prudence, and inflexibility: it is not poſſible, that women, by reaſon of the weakneſſe of their underſtanding, can in any degree be fit: and therefore in the law, there is a prohibition againſt that Sex. And indeed there is no example found to the contrary, but only that of *Debora*, who in the old Teſtament is numbred among the Judges; and judged the people of *Iſrael*, with ſo great prudence, that ſhe hath left of her ſelfe an eternall memory. But yet this caſe can be no barre to our aſſertion; ſeeing it may eaſily be anſwered, that *Debora* gave not judgement of her owne braine, but gave anſwers to queſtions in manner of a Propheteſſe, ſaying onely that which was revealed to her by God.

The ſecond way of bearing rule, leſſe proper and indirect, is nothing elſe, but to have a power to cõmand; which by accident alſo may happen to women, who being daughters of Princes, may ſucceed their fathers in the State. Although the power of commanding may ſeem proper to the man, and no way common with women; yet ſeeing the poſſeſſing of riches, is equally common to the man, and to the woman; and that it oftentimes happens that the juriſdiction followes the riches, and the thing poſſeſſed; it may alſo happen, that as the woeman is partaker of the riches, ſo ſhe may be alſo of the juriſdiction to them annexed.

A third way, is to command in company with men; and themſelves, not have the command alone; as many times, Wives with their Husbands, Mothers with their Sonnes, and Grandmothers with their Nephews; which oftentimes may be, and oftentimes is, but whether well or ill, ſhall be ſhewed hereafter.

It is therefore cleare, that a woman cannot beare rule directly and properly; that is, in that kind of ruling which is called judging: but yet may in that which

is ſaid to be commanding; and eſpecially in the third way, with ſonnes and other men.

As to the ſecond point, whether the Dominion of women be odious, or no; we may diſtinguiſh it thus: either we ſpeake of women alone, and by themſelves: or elſe of women accompanied with men. If we take it the firſt way, there is nothing more odious; nothing more abhorred of men; then to be commanded by a woman; as being a thing repugnant to reaſon; contrary to Gods commandement, and moſt contrary to the law of nature. Our Lord God ſaid to the woman; *Sub viri poteſtate eris.* *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that naturally the more perfect beares rule over the more imperfect; and the better over the worſe: whereupon the woman (as *Ariſtotle* in a thouſand places witneſſeth) being more imperfect then the man, and being by *Pythagoras* placed in the number of evils, and man of good; it would certainely be a monſter in nature, that the perfect ſhould be ſervant to the imperfect, the good to the evill; and eſpecially that ſex being (I ſay not alwaies, but for the moſt part) voyd of prudence and of valour; full of pride; and fuller of luſt; and conſequently moſt unfit to governe: of whom *Tacitus* ſaith; *Non ſolum imparem laboribus ſexum, ſed ſi licentia adſit, ſævum, ambitioſum, poteſtatis avidum.* The government therefore of women, when they rule alone, not onely is odious, but is alſo moſt miſerably adminiſtred: neither can the example of *Debora* (whereof I ſpake before) be juſtly objected; but rather I may my ſelfe make uſe of that example, in confirmation of my own aſſertion; for if ſhe governed well, it was becauſe ſhe was a Propheteſſe; and if her government were not odious; it was becauſe a man commanded: for our Lord God, being willing the Iſraelites ſhould be ruled by a woman; and knowing that by reaſon of their naturall imbecillities, they are not fit to rule, he infu-

sed into *Debora* a Propheticall spirit, and meaning she should be received without distast, knowing how distastfull a thing it is to men to be governed by women, he appointed her *Barak* for a companion in the government; to the end, that commanding by his assistance, it might not be thought, as of her self alone, the command of a woman.

I will here forbeare to speake of infinite Kingdoms and States, that by the government of women have been utterly overthrowne, of which all ancient and moderne Histories are full; as well, for that it is a thing so well knowne, as for that it is not much to our purpose. For when *Tacitus* saith, *Serviendum fœminæ*, he meanes not, that a woman should command alone, either as Judge or as Princesse; but he meanes the third way, together with men, seeing he speakes of *Livia*, who having been the cause of *Tiberius* his comming to the Crowne: it might be doubted, whether she also were not to governe, as well as he. That which we are to examine is this, what authority ought to be given in such cases, by men to women; and whether their government in this sort be odious or no? For answer whereto, we must proceed with distinguishing, either we speake of States not well setled, where the men are stout and warlike; or else of States, that live quietly and in peace, and are governed by a Prince secure. If we be in the first case, I am absolutely of opinion, that the Dominion of women is most odious; and therefore *Semiramis*, as knowing this, durst not venture to take upon her the Empire, openly; *Hæc* (saith *Justin*) *nec infanti puero ausa tradere Imperium, nec ipsa Imperium palam tractare, tot ac tantis gentibus vir patienter sui viro, nedum fœmina parituris.* And the reason of this is nothing else, but that those Subjects being stout and warlike, would never have consented to be governed by her, if they had knowne her at first to

be a woman. Which we may well thinke, ſeeing with theſe very ſubjects, it was enough for *Sardanapalus* that he had but the likeneſſe of a woman, to make him deſpiſed, and afterward be ſlaine. *Indignatus tali fœmina* (ſaith *Juſtin* of him in the perſon of *Artabanus*) *tantum virorum ſubjectum, tractantique lanam ferrum & arma portantes parere.* And this is the caſe, which *Tacitus* meanes when he ſaith *Serviendum fœmine*; ſhewing, it would be odious in a warlike people, as the Romans were, and dangerous in a new Prince as *Tiberius* was, to governe in company of a woman.

Now if we aske, what authority ſhould be given to women in ſuch caſes, I ſay, they ſhould not be ſuffered to entermeddle in matters of judgement, nor of the ſtate, themſelves alone; not ſo much for their incapacity, as for the contempt they are apt to fall into, though they ſhould governe never ſo well. And therefore the Roman Emperour *Alexander*, a man moſt juſt, and furniſht with all the qualites of a good Prince; yet becauſe he ſuffered his mother to meddle in matters of State, though ſhe did it with great prudence and juſtice, he fell in ſhort time into contempt, and finally of the Souldiers was miſerably ſlaine. In truth a ſingular example to ſhew, that warlike minds can never endure the government of women, and that their honour is the Princes diſparagement; which *Tiberius* (a wiſe man) knew, and could ſay, *Moderandos fœminarum honores:* and *Tacitus*, no leſſe wiſe then he, gives the reaſon of it ſaying, *Muliebre faſtigium in ſui diminutionem accipiens.*

Yet they muſt not altogether be left without honour, but ſome authority it is fit they ſhould have, eſpecially ſuch as are the cauſe of the Princes comming to the Empire. And therefore the wiſe *Salomon*, who through the good meanes of his mother *Berſabee* with old *David*, was aſſumed to the Royall dignity; not onely

onely honoured her exceedingly, but would have her ſit with him upon his Throne; as is written in the Booke of Kings, *Venit ergo Berſabee ad Regem Salomonem, ut loqueretur ei pro Adonia, & ſurrexit Rex in occurſum ejus, adoravitque eam, & ſedit ſuper Thronum ſuum, poſituſque eſt Thronus matri Regis, quæ ſedit ad dexteram ejus.* But yet I cannot finde, in holy Scripture, that ever ſhe gave judgement, or ſpake in counſell, or gave audience in affaires at any time. The authority and honour therefore that is to be allowed to women, in States that are not ſecure, ought not to be immediately in themſelves, but by aſſiſtance of their husbands. And this counſell *David* gave to *Salomon*, in the Pſalm *Eructavit*, ſpeaking to his Bride, where he ſaith, *Filiæ Tyri in muneribus, vultum tuum deprecabuntur*: Where he ſaith not *te*, but *vultum tuum*, that is, thy husband; meant by the word countenance, as *Theodoret* and S. *Baſil* interpret it. He then that is to be reſorted to, and to be ſued unto, muſt be the man, and not the woman; and the honours that are done to the women, ought to paſſe by the way of their husbands: and therefore it is ſaid in *Eſay*, *Tantummodo invocetur nomen tuum ſuper nos*. This courſe *Tiberius* tooke moſt notably, who when his mother made any ſuite in his name, he preſently granted it; and more then ſo, he many times at the ſuit of *Livia* required thoſe things of the Senat, which without bluſhing he could not have asked; but when it was moved to give her honours immediately without paſſing by the meanes of *Tiberius*, he then preſently oppoſed it, ſaying, *Moderandos fœminarum honores.*

But if we ſpeake of thoſe Princes that live ſecurely in peace, and are well ſetled in their ſtates, as at this day many are in *Italy*; then, either thoſe women that ſhould governe together with the men, are in judgement and underſtanding fit for it, or elſe they are altogether

together unfit: if unfit, it may then be enough for them to looke to matters at home, and Domeſticall affaires; but if fit, I cannot then thinke any thing more juſt, or more convenient, or more profitable to a Prince, then to call ſuch women of his blood, to beare a part of the burthens of government; both becauſe by their experience and prudence they may aſſiſt the Prince as much as any other; and alſo becauſe by reaſon of their owne intereſt, and the ſingular affection they beare to their husbands, their ſonnes or nephewes; there can be none found, that with more ſincerity and faithfulneſſe, and without any by-reſpects, will helpe them to beare ſo great a burthen, as a Kingdome is; and ſo much more, as they are alwaies like to be partakers as well of the dangers, as of the profits of the Prince. A thing which is not found in ſtrangers, and ſuch as are mercenary, whoſe profit oftentimes lookes another way, and is divided from the Princes profit. Whereupon S. *Bernard* upon that place of *Eſay*, *Pater filiis notam faciet veritatem*: ſaith, *Non revelatur ſervo veritas, quia ſervus neſcit quid faciat Dominus ejus, ſed nec Mercenarius rapitur ad contemplandam veritatem, quia propriam quærit utilitatem.* And therefore *Auguſtus* a moſt wiſe Prince, had often conference with *Livia*, *Numa Pompilius* with *Ægeria*, *Cyrus* with *Aſpaſia*, *Tarquinius* with *Tanaquill*, and *Juſtinian* with his wife *Theodoſia*. Princes therefore ought not to deſpiſe the counſels of women of their blood, but to hold them in great account; whereof, in my opinion there is in *Geneſis* a Golden Text: *Sara* having ſpoken to *Abraham* to ſend away *Agar* and *Iſmael*, it ſeemes he was not very willing to give credit to the words of a woman; which God knowing, ſaid unto him, *Omnia quæ dixerit tibi Sara, audi vocem ejus*. Moreover, when our Lord God made the woman, he ſaid, *Faciamus ei Adjutorium ſimile ſibi*: and why then ſhould we ſeeke after

after other helpers, and not take those who are made of purpose for our ayd? According to this my opinion was decided the controversie in *Tacitus*, betweene *Valerius Messalina* and *Cæcina*, where it was concluded, that in governments which stand in danger, it is not fit to bring in women; but very fit, in governments that are peaceable and secure. In which I say more, that a Prince who is yong, cannot doe better, then not onely to be counselled (a thing in part also fit, where States are dangerous) but to suffer himselfe also to be governed by women. *Theodatus* King of the *Ostrogothes*, in the beginning of his Raigne carried himselfe, with great moderation, as long as he agreed with his wife, but when he left to follow her advice, he filled with injustice all his Kingdome. The Emperour *Constantinus Sestus*, never governed well, but when he suffered his mother *Irene* to direct him. And *Salomon* never runne into disorderly courses, as long as his mother *Bersabee* lived; of whom he scorned not to be taught, as himselfe in the Proverbs saith, *Filius fui patris mei, tenellus & Unigenitus coram matre mea, & docebat me atque dicebat, suscipiat verba mea cor tuum, custodi præcepta mea, & vives.* And therefore S. *Chrysostome* upon S. *John* saith, *Nihil potentius muliere bona ad instituendum, & informandum virum, quodcunque voluerit, neque tam leniter amicos, nec magistros patietur, ut conjugem admonentem atque consulentem, habet enim voluptatem quandam admonitio uxoria; eum plurimum amet cui consulit, multos possum afferre viros asperos & immites, per uxorem mites redditos & mansuetos.* Who knowes not, that *Tiberius* never plunged himselfe so much into all kinds of wickednesse, as after his mothers death? And the reason which all men alledge to prove women unfit for government, is of no force; of force I know in generall; but that in particular, women should not be as fit as men, I hold it a great folly to thinke; having

my

my ſelfe, although but yong, not onely found written in Hiſtories, but ſeene in experience, many women able to have governed the whole World: and to theſe the frailty of their ſexe, is ſo farre from being a hinderance, that rather they are worthy of the more praiſe, for overcomming naturall defects, with ſupply of vertue.

Vix dum ingreſſus Illyricum Tiberius, properis matris literis excitur, neque ſatis compertum eſt, ſpirantem adhuc Auguſtum apud urbem Nolam, an exanimem repererit, acribus namque cuſtodiis domum & vias ſepſerat Livia, lætique interdum nuntii vulgabantur, donec proviſis quæ tempus monebat, ſimul exceſſiſſe Auguſtum, & rerum potiri Neronem, eadem fama detulit.

That at one and the ſame time, to make knowne the death of the Prince, and the aſſumption of the ſucceſſour, is a thing very profitable for States that ſtand in danger.

The foure and twentieth Diſcourſe.

THere is nothing makes me more beleeve, that *Tiberius* had given order to his mother to poiſon *Auguſtus*, then his very being far off from *Rome*, at the time of his death; an invention followed by all thoſe, who by ſuch meanes have taken away the life of great perſonages. So did *Piſo*, after he had (as is ſaid) poyſoned *Germanicus*: ſo did *Lodowick Sforza*, who knowing that his Nephew had taken poyſon, and could not long be living, he would not ſtay in *Milan*, but went to *Piacenza* to the King of *France*. The cauſe, as I thinke, why they do ſo, is to the end the World may not ſuſpect they had any hand in their deaths; and although, they cannot but thinke, that men of underſtanding

ſtanding will ſuſpect them the more, yet this is nothing to the Prince, who ſeeks but to avoyd the heat of the people, who without any judgment, are carried through love or hatred, to doe ſuch things, as men of judgement would never doe.

Tiberius was then in *Slavonia*, when his mother ſent him word of *Auguſtus* his ſickneſſe; who (as may be thought) was dead before *Tiberius* came to *Nola*; yet he oftentimes gave forth, he had good hope of his ſpeedy recovery; and this he continued ſo long, till he might be provided of things needfull for accompliſhing his purpoſe; and that done, he at one and the ſame time, with one and the ſame voyce, made known the death of *Auguſtus*, and his owne aſſumption to the Empire.

We have in *Tacitus* another example very like to this, of *Agrippina* the mother of *Nero*, who upon certaine words ſhe heard *Claudius* utter in his Wine, that he meant to give the Empire to *Britannicus*, ſhe poyſoned him; and being dead, ſhe gave out there was good hope of his amendment, untill ſhe had made ready all things needfull for making *Nero* Emperour. The words of *Tacitus* are theſe, *Vocabatur interim Senatus; votaque pro incolumitate Principis Conſules & Sacerdotes nuncupabant, cum jam exanimis veſtibus & fomentis obtegeretur, dum res firmando Neronis Imperio componuntur. Jam Agrippina velut dolore victa, & ſolatia conquirens, tenere amplexu Britannicum, veram Paterni oris effigiem appellare, ac variis artibus demorari, ne cubiculo egrederetur. Antoniam quoque & Octaviam ſorores ejus attinuit, & cunctos aditus cuſtodiis clauſerat, crebroque vulgabat, ire in melius valetudinem Principis, quo miles bona in ſpe ageret, tempuſque proſperum ex monitis Chaldæorum attentaret. Tunc medio diei, tertio ante Idus Octobris, ſaribus Palatii repente deductis, Comitante Burrho Nero egreditur.* I have related theſe words of *Tacitus* at large (as not able at this

this time to diſcourſe upon them:) to the end, that every one may ſee, what devices *Agrippina* uſed at the death of *Claudius* to bring *Nero* to the Empire. The very like courſe to this, was taken by *Servius Tullus*, in company of *Tanaquill* the wife of *Tarquinius Priſcus*, who ſeeing her husband wounded ſo dangerouſly, that he was upon the point to die, ſhe ſhut the Court gates, and gave out that the wound was but light; and that in a few daies they ſhould ſee the Prince abroad; but that in the meane time, he had commanded *Servius Tullus* to take his charge, and to be obeyed as himſelfe in perſon: by this deviee, *Servius* getting poſſeſſion of the Royall authority, was able in few daies ſo to ſetle himſelfe in the Empire, that it was an eaſie matter, at one and the ſame time, to make known, that *Tarquinius* was dead, and that himſelfe was Emperour. Which fact *Livy* relating, ſaith, *Servius cum trabea & fascibus prodit, ac ſede Regia ſedens, alia decernit, de aliis conſulturum ſe eſſe Regem ſimulat, itaque per aliquot dies; cum jam expiraſſet Tarquinius celata morte, per ſpeciem alienæ fingendæ vicis, ſuas opes firmavit, tum demum palam facta, ex complorations in Regia orta, Servius præſidio firmo munitus, primum injuſſu populi, voluntate Patrum Regnavit.* Alſo *Arius Aper*, after he had ſecretly in a litter ſlaine *Numerianus* the ſonne of the Emperour *Carus*, gave out in the Army enquiring where he was, that for an infirmity in his eyes, he kept him out of the wind, intending firſt to accomodate his owne deſignes, and then to publiſh *Numerianus* his death; and if his plot ſucceeded not, that was long of other occaſions. It is therefore no marvell that *Tiberius* following the courſe of *Servius*, was able to attaine his end, as well as *Servius*, eſpecially having many things to help him, which to the other were wanting.

This therefore is an excellent way, ſecure and worthy of imitation, in Kingdomes that are not well

ſetled, and where the people are deſirous of change; for to ſuffer no *Interregnum*, but in one and the ſame time, to make knowne the death of the one, and the aſſumption of the other, is the onely meanes to hinder innovations. The reaſon of this, in my opinion is, becauſe as Waxe is more apt to take a forme, when it is without any, then when it hath a forme before, ſeeing in the firſt caſe there needs but one action, which is to imprint a new forme; where in the ſecond caſe, there need two: firſt to take away the old forme, and then to bring in a new, which certainly is double as difficult: and therefore a certaine Philoſopher, would be doubly payed, when he tooke one to teach, that had been taught before, becauſe he muſt take double paines: firſt, to remove the falſe Images imprinted in the fantaſie; and then to bring in the true: ſo a City (to returne to our purpoſe) being a matter that cannot conſiſt without a forme, it will be more eaſie to bring in it a new forme, if it have none before, then if it have; and therefore if *Tiberius* had made knowne the death of *Auguſtus*, before his owne aſſumption to the Empire, the City had remained without a form, & conſequently with ſmall difficulty, either the Senate or the people, or the ſouldiers might have brought in another: but comming at one and the ſame time, to know both the one and the other, the Empire ſeemed rather to change Prince, then forme. Our Lord God knew the Iſraelites to be a people, *Duræ cervicis*, apt to rebell, and deſirous of innovations; and therefore he called *Moyſes* up to the Mount, to the end they might not know of his death, before they knew *Joſua* the ſonne of *Nun* to be his ſucceſſour. We may therefore conclude, that this courſe of *Tiberius* is not to be blamed, eſpecially taken to a pious end.

Primum

Primum facinus Novi Principatus fuit Poſthumi Agrippæ cædes; quem ignarum Inermemq; quamvis firmatus animo Centurio ægre confecit. Nihil de ea Re *Tiberius* apud Senatum diſſerit: Patris Juſſa diſſimulabat, quibus præſcripſiſſe Tribuno cuſtodiæ adpoſito, ne contaretur Agrippam morte adficere quandoque ipſe ſupremum diem expleviſſet.

That thoſe men who poſſeſſe the ſtate of another, are but in a dangerous condition, as long as any of the former Lords line remaine alive: and what courſe is to be taken to free themſelves from ſuch danger.

The five and twentieth Diſcourſe.

Tiberius apprehended, he could never live ſecurely in the Empire, if he made not away *Agrippa*. For he being of the line of *Auguſtus*, and neerer to the Crowne then himſelfe, a fierce man and of beaſtly conditions, would alwaies bee a refuge to the ſouldiers and people of *Rome*, whenſoever they ſhould fall into diſtaſt of their Prince: and the rather for that he being a violent man, and without judgement, would never have ſtood upon danger, but not fearing death it ſelfe, would have ventured upon any occaſion. And theſe are the men, who though but private men, are to be feared of all: and therefore *Pomponius* ſtood in feare of *Titus Manlius*, *Et quod haud minus timendum erat* (ſaith *Livy*) *ſtolide ferocem viribus ſuis cetneret.*

This courſe of *Tiberius* hath for the moſt part beene followed by all Princes and Commonwealths in the changes of State, when from one line it paſſeth to another, the new alwaies extinguiſhing the old, as though without this courſe, they were never able to

live in peace. So the Romans, as long as the race of the Tarquins continued, were never without warre. And this is one of the causes I alledged, why the conspiracy of *Marcus Brutus* against *Cæsar*, had not so good successe, as the conspiracy of *Lucius Brutus* against the Tarquins; because in this, they destroyed not onely the line of the Tarquins, but all those that were of the name: where in that of *Cæsar*, they onely cut downe the tree, but left the roote behind; from which sprung up *Augustus*, who receiving nourishment and ayd from those very men that had killed his unkle, in a short time he grew to be so great a Tree, that he crushed them to pieces, that went about to cut him downe. For this very cause, in *Ægypt*, in *Cappadocia*, in *Soria*, in *Macedonia*, and in *Bythinia*, they often changed their Kings, because they tooke no care to extinguish the line of the former Lords, but onely to get their places. And therefore *Bardanes* in *Tacitus* is justly blamed, who instead of extinguishing *Gotarze* the former Lord, stood loosing his time, in besieging the City.

But these and a thousand other examples, (which for brevity I omit) it may be held for a maxime of State, that whosoever gets a Kingdome from another, he ought to root out the whole line of him that was Lord before.

But this rule cannot be thus left, without some aspersion of impiety: and therefore, for resolution, I think best to distinguish; because if we speake of a Christian Prince, that hath gotten the state of another, who is enemy of the faith, he may justly doe as best pleaseth him, by any way whatsoever to take them away, that can pretend to the State; yet not so neither, unlesse he find them so obstinate in their sect, that there is no possible meanes to remove them from their errour; and so much our Lord God himselfe, by the mouth of

the Prophet *Samuel*, appointed *Saul* to do to *Amalech*, *Nunc ergo vade & percute Amalech, & devastate omnia ejus, non parcas ei, & non concupiscas ex rebus ipsius aliquid, sed interfice a viro usque ad mulierem, & parvulum atque Lactantem.*

But if we speake of a Christian Prince, that by force gets possession of a State, from one of this same faith, let him never goe about to destroy the line of him that possessed it before; for, besides that it is a thing unworthy of a Christian, it seemes to me, to be rather their invention, who meaning to live wickedly, would be glad to have no bridle, for if a Prince shall carry himselfe lovingly towards his Subjects, using them as children, and not as servants, he need not be afraid of any whomsoever. For this cause, the Senatours of *Rome*, having driven out the Tarquins, had more care to governe the City, as fathers, then to extinguish the line of him that had been Lord, which was indeed incomparably more for their good: as in the second booke of the first Decad of *Livy*, every one may see.

Rather, many times it is better to bestow honours upon them, from whom a state is taken, and to leave them a part, thereby to reteine the rest more securely. So did *Cyrus*, who having taken *Lydia*, and dispossessed *Cræsus*, who was Lord of it before, he left him at least a part of his patrimony, and gave him a City to be his owne. And indeed if he had done otherwise, he might easily have lost all: therefore *Justin* saith, *Cræso & vita, & patrimonii partes & urbis Barce concessa sunt, in qua etsi non Regiam vitam, tamen proximam Majestati Regiæ degeret.* And then shewes the benefit that comes by it, where he saith, *Hæc clementia non minus Victori, quam victo utilis fuit: quippe ex Universa Grecia, cognito quod illatum Cræso bellum esset, auxilia velut ad Commune extinguendum incendium confluebant. Tanta Cræsi erat apud omnes urbes gratia, ut passurus Cyrus gravia bella Græciæ fuerit,*

fuerit, si quid crudelius in Cræsum consuluisset. If the King of *France* had done thus, when *Ferdinand* of *Aragon* would have yeelded up the Kingdome of *Naples* to him, if he would have left him but Lord of *Calabria*, perhaps he had not loſt both the one and the other: and in truth, it had been his beſt way to have done ſo, at leaſt for ſo long time, till he might have made himſelfe ſure and firme in the Kingdome of *Naples*: and then for the other, he might have taken it from him againe at any time. So did *David*, who tooke away halfe of the ſubſtance which *Saul* had given to *Mephiboſheth*; and gave it to his ſervant *Siba*, for a doubt he had, leſt he ſhould deſire his fathers Kingdome. This interpretation *Procopius* made of it, when he ſaid, *Ut ſubſtantiam minuens, animum ipſius dejiceret, ne Regnum affectaret, alias enim illum qui adverſus Dominum ſuum mendacium dixerat, quem punire potius debebat, nequaquam participem cum eo feciſſet.*

Alexander the Great, when he waged warre with Kings farre off from *Macedonia*, he not onely when he had overcome them, never ſought to extinguiſh their line; but which is more ſtrange, to them from whom he had taken a Kingdome, he reſtored the ſame Kingdome againe. A great act of Magnanimity, and which may and ought to be uſed, in the like caſe to that of *Alexander Magnus*; that is, when Countries farre remote from the Seate of the Kingdom, and in cuſtomes, lawes, habit and language very different, are eaſily overcome; and ſo much the rather, when the warre is waged, more for deſire of glory, then for getting of ground; ſeeing it is alwaies better, to ſeeke to hold that by a way of clemency, which by a way of force can never be held.

But in caſe it be feared, leaſt leaving the former Prince, in the Countries taken from him, he ſhould practiſe to make a revolution; he may then have ſtates

given him to governe in other places: So *Cirus* did, who having overcome the Medes, and deprived *Astyages* of his Kingdome, he would not leave him in *Media*, and yet would not deale hardly with him neither, but he made him Governour of *Hyrcania*, and although *Justin* say, it was done, because *Astyages* himselfe had no mind to returne to the Medes; yet to my understanding, it is more likely, that *Cyrus* did it as fearing, least he who had procured his nephews death, to bring himselfe to the Kingdome, being now deprived of it, would never be quiet, when any fit occasion should be offerd to him.

Another way there is, which others have used, and it is, to keepe such about themselves, and to hold them in esteeme of Kings: so *Herod* the great had begun to doe with *Aristobulus*, and with *Hyrcanes*, but the cruelty of his nature made him fall at last, to take the same course that others doe. This counsell therefore, was much better followed by *David*, who leaving *Sauls* patrimony to *Mephibosheth* the sonne of *Jonathan*, he held him alwaies about himselfe in great honour, and all succeeded exceeding well.

And in case all these courses seeme to be difficult; either, thorough the undanted spirit of him that was Lord before, or by reason of the extraordinary affection the people beare him; in this case, the best course is, to send them into banishment for some long time, as the Pope did in *Bologna*.

But to returne to our purpose: *Tiberius* not without cause stood in feare of *Agrippa*, which is plainely to be seen by this, that not onely *Agrippa*, but one onely servant forging and taken upon him his name, was like to have raised no small insurrection in the people and Senatours of *Rome*; and because *Tiberius* could not put this *Agrippa* to death, without incurring an exceeding blot of cruelty, he therefore had re-

course

course, to that remedy so much used by Princes; which was to feigne that *Augustus* had commanded it. So also did the Emperour *Adrian*, who would have it beleeved, that all the murthers he committed were done by his predecessours command; which not onely abates the hatred and name of being cruell, but converts it also into piety, as done for executing the will of the dead. And yet in this there would be no blame, if such murthers were committed out of zeale of justice; out of which zeale, *David* being willing that *Joab* should be punished for two murthers, and *Semei* for the injury he had done him; to take away the hatred, that for this might fall upon *Salomon*, he commanded him at the time of his death to doe it; to the end, that he afterward putting it in execution, might seem rather (as in this indeed he was) a just King, and a pious executour of the will of his deceased father, then a cruell Prince.

But because *Ludovico Moro*, taking to him that state, which belonged not to him, by meanes of his Nephews death, hath much resemblance to *Tiberius*; I am willing to shew it a little more cleerely, by a Parallell. *Augustus* being dead, *Tiberius* succeeded in the Empire, and caused *Agrippa Posthumus* to be put to death, to whom the succession of right belonged. *Ludovico Moro* succeeded in the Dutchy of *Milan*, and caused (as it is beleeved) *John Galeazzo*, the true heire, to whom that Dutchy of right belonged, to be put to death. *Tiberius* doubted, that because *Augustus* was gone to visit *Agrippa*, he would appoint him to be Emperour. *Ludovico Moro* feared, that because *Charles* the eighth was gone to visit *John Galeazzo*, he would make him Duke of *Milan*. *Tiberius* would have it beleeved, that he was elected by the Senate, and not through the wickednesse and plots of his mother *Livia*. *Ludovico Moro* would have it beleeved, that he was made Duke of

Milan

Milan by the people, for the good of the ſtate, and not through his owne villanies. *Tiberius* made a ſhew, as though he were unwilling to take upon him the Empire, *Moro* alſo diſſembled the like. In one onely thing they differed, that to the one it proved ſafety; to the other, ruine; and it is, that where *Tiberius* as ſoone as he came to the Empire, he preſently put *Agrippa* to death; *Ludovico* ſtayed ſo long from putting his nephew to death, that he was forced, for putting it in execution to call in the King of *France*, to his manifeſt and utter ruine.

A Parallell betweene Tiberius and Salomon.

The ſix and twentieth Diſcourſe.

SEeing in theſe Diſcourſes, and particularly in the next before, we have ſpoken of *Tiberius*, and brought alſo many examples of *Salomon*, I have thought it no unfit curioſity, to compare them together. *Tiberius* was borne of *Livia*, who was taken by *Auguſtus* from *Nero*. *Salomon* was borne of *Berſabee*, who was taken by *David* from *Urias*. *Berſabee* was with child, (although by *David*) when he tooke her to wife; *Livia* alſo was with child, when ſhe went to be married to *Auguſtus*. *Auguſtus* had many neere of kinne to whom to leave the Empire, as *Agrippa* for one. *David* had his ſonne *Adoniah*, to whom by right of age, as being the elder, the Kingdome belonged. Finally, *Auguſtus* growne old, at the ſuit of *Livia*, appointed *Tiberius* to be his heire: and *David* growne old, at the perſwaſions of *Berſabee*, ordained *Salomon* to ſucceed him. *Salomon* being come to the Crown, killed *Adoniah*, to whom the right of it belonged: *Tiberius* being come to the Empire, cauſed *Agrippa* to be put to death, who

was

was rightfull heire of the Empire: Both the one and the other governed with great judgement in the beginning; but at last, *Salomon* loosing *Bersabee*, and *Tiberius*, *Livia*; both the one and the other plunged themselves into all kinds of lustfulnesse. Whereupon there rebelled against *Tiberius*, *Sejanus* the deerest servant he had: and against *Salomon*, *Jeroboam* the most inward friend he had. *Tiberius* used to speake darkly: *Salomon* also used the like speaking, as may be seen by his Parables and Proverbs.

Nuntianti Centurioni ut mos Militiæ: factum esse quod imperasset, neque imperasse sese, & rationem facti reddendam apud Senatum, respondit. Quod postquam Sallustius Crispus particeps Secretorum (is ad Tribunum miserat codicillos) comperit; metuens ne reus subderetur, juxta periculoso, ficta seu vera promeret, monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus, &c.

That it is a dangerous thing to obey Princes in services of cruelty and tyranny.

The seven and twentieth Discourse.

S*Allust* had taken order, and provided all due means for putting *Agrippa Posthumus* to death, by the commandement of *Tiberius*; but he desirous to shew he had no hand in the fact, denied to the Centurion who was the executioner of it, that it was done by any command of his; saying, that for what he had done, he must give account, not to him, but to the Senat. Which *Sallust* seeing, and doubting least the mischiefe might fall upon his head; *Veritus* (as *Justin* saith, speaking in the person of *Arpagus* in the like case) *ne illam infantis necati ultionem, quam a patre non potuisset, a ministro exigeret*: he began to counsell *Livia*, *Ne arcana Domus*,

Domus, ne consilia amicorũ, ministeria militum vulgarentur.

The conceit of *Tiberius* was good, that he would have, (as I imagine) the Centurion goe to the Senate to tell them, he had executed the Commandement of *Augustus* about the death of *Agrippa*; but yet that of *Sallust* likes me better: because there is no likelihood it would ever be beleeved, that *Augustus* appointed the death of a Nephew, for security of a son in law: seeing as he could get nothing by it, so he might loose much; because the Prince shewing he cared not to have his death known, there is no doubt but men would talke of it with more boldnesse: from which talke, there oftentimes grow ill affections against the Prince; whereas, if *Tiberius* had passed it (as he did) in silence, it would not have come to many mens eares, & they that would have heard it, would have kept it secret, as knowing how dangerous a thing it is, to discover & talk of that which Princes would have to be concealed. Besides, if he made it be told in the Senate, he did by such feigning more incense the minds of all men; seeing doing it, without telling it, he had used but force, but telling it withall, he used craft; and because it grieves inferiours more, when they are overcome by craft, then when they are oppressed by force: consequently, they would have taken greater indignation for the death of *Agrippa*, if to the force there had been added this craft, to make the Senate beleeve such tales, as one would not looke should be beleeved of Children. And therefore we see the Romane Nobility tooke it ill at *Neroes* hands, that he would goe about to make them beleeve, that the shipwrack of his mother was a thing happened by chance; and that she had sent *Agerinus* to kill him, which were all but foolish devises, to cover his most nefarious fault. Yet I say not, if *Tiberius* had used that cunning before spoken of, that he had been ere the more in danger by it; seeing they who understand

ſtand theſe tricks, are men of braine, who as they have judgement whereby they diſcerne ſuch ſubtilties of the Prince; ſo by the ſame judgement they know how to hide them, by making a ſhew that they beleeve them. And upon ſuch men it is that the people, (the Princes onely feare) caſt their eyes, and beleeve verily all that to be true, which they ſee wiſe men make a ſhew to beleeve: as one that lookes only upon the barke of things, diſcernes not that which is true, from that which is feigned; whereof, we have an example in *Tacitus*, in the fore-alledged caſe of *Nero*, in which, although the chiefe men had taken diſtaſte to be mocked with thoſe fooliſh inventions of *Nero*, yet they all made ſhew to beleeve it when it was told them. *Miro tamen certamine Procerum, decernuntur ſupplicationes, apud omnia Pulvinaria.* *Herod* was much afraid, if he ſhould cauſe Saint *John* to be beheaded, leaſt the people would make ſome inſurrection; whereupon he found this tricke, to bind himſelfe by oath; thereby to make the people beleeve, that it was againſt his will he put him to death, but that he was tied by oath; and it ſucceeded well with him, for the chiefe men, both out of intereſt and out of feare made ſhew to beleeve him; and the people beleeved him indeed: yet in this preſent caſe, when together with ſecuring themſelves from the people, they may alſo avoyd the diſtaſt of the Senate; this opinion of *Salluſt* likes me better.

But be it how it will, this is a cleere caſe, which we may gather from this place, that thoſe Officers who have ſerved their Lords, and been their inſtruments in cruell and tyrannicall executions, have come themſelves at laſt, for the moſt part to a miſerable end. And this happens for divers reaſons.

Firſt, becauſe oftentimes they ſurfeit of them, and knowing their owne villanies, in which many times they

they goe ſo farre, that *Neque peccata, neque Remedia pati poſſunt*, as *Livy* ſaith, they feele themſelves torne in conſcience, which is alwaies gnawing, *Sicut veſtimentum ſic comedet eos vermis, & ſicut lana, ſic devorabit eos tinea*; a miſery which for the moſt part happens to tyrants. And this *Plato* teacheth us, as *Tacitus* ſpeaking of *Tiberius* relates, *Adeo Facinora atque flagitia ſua ipſi quoque in ſupplicium verterent. Neque fruſtra Præſtantiſſimus ſapientiæ* (that is *Plato*) *firmare ſolitus eſt, ſi reciudantur Tyrannorum mentes, poſſe aſpici laniatus & ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ità ſævitia, libidine, malis conſultis animus dilaceratur.* As was ſeene alſo in *Nero*, who after he had killed his mother, was continually affrighted in his mind, as fearing the wagging of every leafe. And *Alphonſus* of *Aragon* had alwaies apparitions before his eyes, where he thought he ſaw thoſe Lords, whom he had put to death. So the King *Theodoricus*, having put *Boetius* and *Symmachus* to death, when the head of a great Fiſh was ſerved to his table, he thought he ſaw the head of *Symmachus* threatning him; wherewith affrighted, he caſt himſelfe upon his bed, and died. So Poets feine, that *Oreſtes* having killed his mother, was tormented by the Furies: whereupon the Ancients, ſeeing theſe tyrants ſtanding alwaies in continuall terrour, *Sonitus terroris ſemper in auribus illius; & cum pax ſit, ille inſidias ſuſpicatur:* have conceived that ſuch men were frighted with the Ghoſts of thoſe whom they had killed. Seeing therefore theſe Princes cannot hinder a thing done, from being done; they deſire at leaſt to have them taken away, who having beene their inſtruments, doe with their preſence refreſh the memory of the villanies they have commited: So *Tacitus* ſaith, ſpeaking of *Anicetus* whom *Nero* imployed to kill his mother. *Levi poſt admiſſum ſcelus gratia, dein graviore odio, quia graviorum facinorum miniſtri, exprobrantes aſpiciuntur.* And there-

sort *Tiberius* used often to rid away those servants, who in such villanies he had imployed: And that his cruelty might not want worke, in their places he supplied still others; which *Tacitus* relates where he saith, *Scelerum ministros ut præcerti ab aliis nolebat, ita oblatis in eandem operam recentibus, veteres & pergraves afflixit.*

Secondly, they oftentimes put to death such servants; specially whom they have imployed in murthering any of the blood Royall: and the reason is, left having now imbrued their hands in Royall blood, they should not sticke to murther them too. So *Perseus* put him to death, who had been his instrument in killing *Demetrius*; so *Otho* all those who had beene his ministers in killing of *Galba*.

Thirdly, this happens sometimes for securing of Princes, that their villanies may not be knowne: for when they have done them, and can finde no other way to hide them, they then lay another upon them; as *David* did, who to cover his adultery, committed a murther; and therefore they put all those to death, who have any hand, or have any knowledge of their faults: so did *Bassianus* the sonne of *Severus*, who having caused his brother *Geta* to be killed, caused also *Letus* that had beene his Counsellour, and all other that were acquainted with it, to be slaine. *Perseus* also standing in feare of the Roman Army, appointed *Niceas* to cast all his Treasure into the Sea; and *Androniides*, to burne the Navy: but afterward, being sensible of his cowardice in shewing such feare, and ashamed of it; to the end it might not be knowne, he caused both of them to be put to death.

Fourthly, it often happens that such servants runne a hazzard, because a Prince having used them, in the executing a thousand cruelties and tyrannies, through which they come to be odious to all the City; he hopes that by putting those servants to death, the

odiousnesse

odiousnesse shall be turned upon them: as whereby the subjects shall be made beleeve, that those cruelties were committed without their consent. So *Valentinus* used to doe, who having imployed *Remirò d'Orco*, with great cruelty to extinguish the factions of *Romagna*; after most tyrannically, he had made himselfe Lord of it, and had obtained his purpose; not without bringing upon himselfe the infinite hatred of all his subjects; at last he cut in pieces that miserable minister of his, to the end, the hatred of his subjects might be turned upon him: and the like did *Tiberius* to *Sejanus*, and of such examples Histories are full. Rather indeed, tyrants ingrosse to themselves such fellowes, to the end, that when the scores of seditions shall be cast up, they may excuse themselves, and make the people wreck their anger upon the servant. *Cæsar Borgia*

Fifthly, such servants runne a hazzard; because the foundation upon which they build their Lords favour is soone ended: the cause of their favour, being onely the hatred that is borne to another, which ceaseth as soone as he is dead; and consequently the affection ceaseth, which was borne for putting the murther in execution: so much *Tacitus* intimates, speaking of *Plancina*, who after the hatred to *Germanicus* was ended, was her selfe in danger, *Ubi odium & Gratia desit, jus valuit.*

But these waies never bring forth any good effect to a Prince: First, because it is false, that they can ever cancell the remembrance of such villanies out of their minds; seeing their owne conscience is too great a witnesse against them. Whereupon, although our Lord God, (as *Theodoret* saith) tooke away the life of that sonne of *David*, which was borne in the adultery with *Bersabee*, that it might not remaine a shame to him, for the sinne he had committed, *Vivus erat futurus argumentum sceleris ac iniquitatis, piè ergo Regis qui erat, &*

Prophetæ, cui angerus Dominus, non sinit eum vivere: yet it served not to remove the gnawing of his conscience: as he saith, *Peccatum mentis coram me est semper.* Secondly, this is no sufficient way to keepe their crimes from being knowne; *Nihil occultum quod non reveletur, neque coopertum, quod non sciatur.* And if it be not knowne at other times, at least it shall not be hidden at the day of judgement. Thirdly, it is no fit way to make the people beleeve, that the cruelties executed by servants, were done without the Princes consent; and although it have sometimes succeeded well, yet this hath not been because the people beleeved it, but (as I said before, upon the place of *Justin*) because when the people cannot wreake their anger upon the Prince, they will for the present upon his ministers, and afterward when time serves, upon the Prince himselfe: as it happened to *Valentinus*. Sometimes also, the people make a shew to beleeve that the villanies committed, were done without the Princes consent; to the end, that to preserve this good opinion of himselfe, he may, after the death of such ministers, give over his cruelty: and lastly, it saves them not from being slaine; for if they be not by them, they are by others, and oftentimes by themselves, as it happened to *Otho*.

This way therefore doth no good at all, and is the worst wicked course that can be imagined, being nothing but a meere multiplying of villanies. It is true, if a Prince should imploy a servant to kill a delinquent, and so both of them should juridically deserve death; in this case, he should commit no errour, in putting also the servant to death; but herein, he should imitate our Lord God, who oftentimes makes use of the wicked to punish the wicked; and they once punished, he then as a loving father, having corrected his child, casts the rod which was the instrument of correction, into the fire; and more then this, he oftentimes

times punisheth those whom he hath used for executing his anger, *Væ Assur; virga furoris mei, & baculus ipse est*, saith the truth in the mouth of *Esay*. So our Lord God made use of the King of the Assyrians, and of his Army, to punish the people of *Israel*, for their sinnes; and that done, he punished also the Assyrians themselves, in such sort that he destroyed them all. There is no doubt but our Lord God did it all with exceeding great justice and providence, punishing justly those Assyrians, who besides their being a most perfidious people, they fell upon the Israelites (as *Theodoret* expounds it) not for any zeale of executing Gods justice, but onely for the hatred they bore to that Nation.

To returne to our purpose, I conclude that *Sallust* had an excellent braine, not to suffer the cause to be brought before the Senate, which if it had beene there agitated, and *Tiberius* not discover himselfe, all the mischiefe would have lighted upon him, and they would have beene revenged upon the servant, when upon the Prince they could not. So it happened to *Piso*, who having beene imployed by *Tiberius* to kill *Germanicus*, and the cause brought before the Senate; *Tiberius* shifted it off from himselfe, and it fell to *Pisoes* lot to suffer for it. Not without cause therefore did *Sallust: Monuit Livian, ne arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgarentur.*

Monuit Liviam ne arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgarentur.

That Princes ought not to reveale the secrets of their State; and how it happens, that oftentimes men are drawne to speake some things which ought to be concealed.

The eighth and twentieth Discourse.

ALl States, whether they be Commonwealths or Kingdomes, have certaine foundations, or as we call them secrets, by which they governe themselves, both for conservation and augmentation. And therefore they endeavour in such sort to conceale them, that they may not be knowne to any but their successours. So did *Augustus*, in giving instructions to *Tiberius*; so did *David*, acquainting *Salomon* with them at the time of his death: so finally did *Charles the fifth*, teaching them to *Philip* the second when he renounced the Empire: for if these secrets by which they governe, should be publiquely knowne, it would be a great advantage against them, for loosing their states. And therefore *Sosybius*, understanding that *Cleomenes* the Spartan, was informed of all the most inward secrets of *Ptolomey*, would not suffer him to goe out of *Ægypt*, for feare (as *Plutarch* relates) he should raise some sharpe warre in that Kingdome, whereupon finally he put him to death. We may see also, that the Romans never were in greater danger to be overthrowne, then when by *Coriolanus*, their owne Citizen, & consequently acquainted with all their secrets, they were assaulted. This præcept was so well observed by the ancient Romane Commonwealth, that though we have

have all the Hiſtories of thoſe times, yet to this day we know not, otherwiſe then by ſome conjecture, by what means it was, that they maintained their government, and augmented it.

Juſtly therefore did *Salluſt* adviſe, *Ne arcana domus vulgarentur*: that is, that thoſe ſecrets of State, upon which the Empire is founded, ſhould not be made knowne to any but to the Prince. And *Salomon* in his Proverbs obſerves as much where he ſaith, *Cœlum ſurſum, terra deorſum, & cor Regis inſcrutabile.*

But becauſe oftentimes men overſhoote themſelves, in diſcovering the ſecrets of their mind, it ſhall be our worke in this Diſcourſe, to ſhew what policies are wont to be uſed to make men reveale their ſecrets; and then, what remedy there is for it, which conſiſts indeed in onely the knowing them, as it is in ſnares, which if they be knowne, are eaſily avoyded.

Secrets then are either diſcovered of ones owne accord, or elſe one is drawn to diſcover them, by ſome other. The firſt caſe may happen by many occaſions: Firſt, out of a certaine vanity, that is commonly in all men, to ſhew they are privy to the ſecrets of Princes; and this is moſt ſeene in women and yong men: and thus the conſpiracy of *Catiline* came to be diſcovered. Secondly, it may happen through drunkenneſſe, which is apt to diſcloſe any ſecret, how great ſoever, as it happens at feaſts. And therefore *Salomon* would not have Kings to drinke Wine, *Noli regibus O Lamuel, noli regibus dare vinum, quia nullum ſecretum eſt, ubi regnat Ebrietas*: there being this nature in Wine, that it makes thoſe things be laid open, which ſhould be hidden: as we ſee in *Noe*, who no ſooner drunke Wine, but he laid open thoſe parts, which he ſhould have hidden. And this is one reaſon why the Ancients painted *Bacchus* naked; thereby to intimate that Wine diſcloſeth ſecrets. Thirdly, it happens oftentimes through

through hatred and indignation, which they, to whom ſecrets are imparted, conceive againſt the Prince: whereupon, they knowing the danger of this, as ſoone as they find they have diſcontented one in whom they had confidence, either they poyſon him, or ſome way or other bring him to his end. So dealt *Ptolomy* (as we ſaid before) with *Cleomenes*, certainely a moſt wicked courſe. Fourthly, ſecrets oftentimes are diſcloſed out of hope of reward; ſo did *Elvidius* the freed man of *Scevinus*, who acquainted *Nero* with a conſpiracy againſt him, onely out of hope to be well rewarded. *Nam cum ſecum ſervilis animus præmia perfidiæ reputavit.* Laſtly, this happens ſometimes through feare of puniſhment. And therefore *Ciſrone* (as *Philip Cominæus* relates) when he ſaw himſelfe carried to die, would then reveale to the Duke of *Burgundy*, the treaſon which the Count of *Campobaſſo* had plotted againſt him. And thus much concerning the revealing of ſecrets of ones owne accord. And though it may ſeem to be in our owne power to hold our peace, (as *Tacitus* ſaith) *Si tam in noſtra poteſtate eſſet, obliviſci, quam tacere*; yet many times a man is allured, and in a manner forced to diſcover his mind; a thing which may many waies be done. Firſt, by Rhetoricke and Eloquence, which moving the affections, and ſtirring up the peccant humour of him whoſe ſecrets we deſire to know; he without perceiving it, is eaſily tranſported, to reveale whatever is in his breaſt. This cunning was uſed by *Sejanus* againſt *Nero*, and againſt *Agrippina* alſo, when *Agrippinæ quoque proximi inliciebantur pravis ſermonibus tumidos ſpiritus perſtimulare.* Whereupon, it is no marvell, that *Latiaris* finding the peccant humour of *Sabinus*, eaſily drew him to tell him at full his diſcontentment. *Igitur Latiaris jacere fortuitos primum ſermones* (feeling him firſt a farre of,) *mox laudare Conſtantiam, quod non ut cæteri floruit is domus amicus, afflictum deſeruiſſet,*

deſerviſſet, ſimul honores de Germanico, Agrippinam miſeram diſſerebat. Another way the foreſaid *Latiaris* uſed, and it was to feine a confidence, with making *Sabinus* beleeve, he was his true friend, and pretending to be of his mind, in thoſe dangerous things which he would not have communicated to another, *itque ſermones tanquam vetita miſcuiſſent, ſpeciem arctæ amicitiæ fecere.* And this is an eaſie way, by entruſting ſome ſecret to a man, whoſe mind we deſire to know, as *Tacitus* plainely expreſſeth, where he ſaith, *Nihil eorum Vitellianos fallebat, crebris ut in Civili transfugis & exploratores cura diverſa ſciſcitandi, ſua non occultabant.* Thirdly, men are oftentimes drawne to diſcover ſecrets, by being asked upon a ſuddaine, becauſe the underſtanding operating naturally, and not having time to operate with art, muſt needs either anſwer that which is the truth, or be ſilent and ſay nothing, or laſtly intangle it ſelfe. Whereupon *Tiberius*, who loved none of his qualities better then his diſſimulation; yet being asked upon the ſuddaine could not hide the diſpleaſure he had taken againſt *Aſinius Gallus*, of whom, *perculſus improviſa interrogatione paulum reticuit.* As likewiſe interrogations often multiplied, confound ſecrets in the mind, and therefore *Tiberius* in the death of *Piſo*, *Crebriſque Interrogationibus exquirit, qualem Piſo diem ſupremum noctemque exegiſſet atque illo pleraque ſapienter, quædam inconſultius reſpondentem.* The ſame way alſo he uſed with *Syllanus*, who *Creberrime Interrogabatur.* Fourthly, oftentimes men of themſelves, and againſt their will diſcover ſecrets, either by their voyce, or by ſome motion not uſuall, or by ſome caſt of their eyes, and other exteriour ſignes, by which the ſecrets of the heart are often diſcovered: *Tiberius* knowing this, to the end he might not make appeare the ſecret contentment he tooke at the death of *Germanicus*, would not ſhew himſelfe

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in publique: *Tiberius atque Auguſta publicè abſtinere, ne ſerius Majeſtate ſua rata, ſi palam lamentarentur, ante omnium oculis vultum eorum ſcrutantibus, falſi intelligerentur*: By this way the conſpiracy of *Sceviuus* came to be knowen, *Simul affluentibus ſolito Convivium initum ſervorum chariſſimi libertate, & alii pecunia donati, atque ipſe mœſtus, & magnæ cogitationis manifeſtus erat, quamvis lætitiam vagis ſermonibus ſimularet.* Fifthly, it is eaſie to draw a ſecret from ones mouth, by asking him, not with doubtfull, but affirmative words; thereby ſeeming to know that, which he deſires to know: ſo dealt our Lord God with *Eve*, who to the end ſhe ſhould not deny her ſinne, omitted as a thing knowne, that which he would have had her to confeſſe, ſaying, *Quare hoc feciſti?* and ſo not enquiring of the fact, he asked of the cauſe: and this he did (ſaith *Abulenſis*) not for any need he had to uſe this way, for knowing the truth, but onely for inſtructing of us.

These then are the waies by which ſecrets oftentimes, are voluntarily and of ones owne accord diſcloſed; either out of vanity, or through drunkenneſſe, or through hatred, or for hope of reward, or for feare of puniſhment; and ſometimes alſo a man is drawne to diſcloſe ſecrets, by Art, that is, by moving the affections, and by finding out the peccant humour, and by entruſting his owne ſecrets, or by asking queſtions upon a ſudden, or by reiterating interrogations, or by meanes of ſome motions and actions of the body; or laſtly, by feigning to know it already.

Princes therefore muſt be well adviſed, to whom they impart theſe ſecrets; that they intruſt them not to ſuch, as may afterward voluntarily diſcover them; and ſervants to whom they are imparted, muſt be very vigilant, that they be not drawne from them by any cunning.

But although ordinarily and for the moſt part,

secrecy be a commendable thing, yet not commendable in all things, seeing to hold ones peace, or to deny in some cases, is not onely unprofitable, but pernicious, as making some act or accident, to be more and with worse circumstances published, which would not be if it were confessed freely. Into this errour fell *Vitellius*, *In hunc modum etiam Vitellius apud milites disserit, prætorianos nuper exauctoratos insectatus, a quibus falsos rumores dispergi, nec ullum civilis belli metum asseverabat, suppresso Vespasiani nomine, & vagis per urbem militibus, qui sermones populi coercerent, id præcipuum alimentum famæ erat.* And in another place, of the same *Vitellius*, he saith, *Fractis apud Cremonam rebus, nuntios cladis occultans, stulta dissimulatione, remedia potius malorum, quam mala differebat. Quippe Consitenti, consultantique superesse spes vires que, cum e contrario, Læta omnia fingeret, falsis ingravescebat. Mirum apud ipsum de bello silentium. Prohibiti per civitatem sermones, eoque plures, ac si liceret vera narraturi, quia verebantur, atrociora vulgaverant.* More wisely did *Galba* carrie himselfe, when, *Ne dissimulata seditio in majus crederetur, ultro asseverat quartam & duodevicesimam legiones, paucis seditionis auctoribus, non ultra verba ac voces errasse, & brevi in officio fore.* But yet, if one would desire to have some accident to be kept secret and concealed, there is no better way, then immediately and by himself to give out false rumours, and to spread reports contrary to the truth, as *Scipio* did, to whom when Ambassadours came from *Syphax*, he fearing least by concealing their message, the army would grow jealous, and suspect something, suddenly called them to counsell, where with a cheerfull countenance he told them that *Sybax* had sent to sollicite him to come into *Africke*: and although the truth was, that he sent rather a threatning message; yet his readinesse and resolution prevailed so farre, that the Army did verily beleeve it to be as he said. And thus

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it ought to be done as often as the diſcovery of a ſecret may be hurtfull, as it was in this caſe; but when concealing may be prejudiciall, as it was with *Vitellius*, a contrary courſe muſt then be taken.

Monuit Liviam ne arcana Domus.

How Princes ſhould make uſe of Counſell.

The nine and twentieth Diſcourſe.

BY occaſion of *Salluſt*, who without being required by any, put forward himſelfe to give *Livia* counſell, either I cannot, or I like not to forbeare the delivering my owne opinion, or that at leaſt, which beſt likes me, concerning the counſelling of Princes. Where, I will firſt ſhew how neceſſary it is for Princes to have counſell. Secondly, the waies that are uſed in it. And laſtly, delivering my owne opinion, I will (as my cuſtome is) endeavour to prove it, with reaſon, and with Authorities. And beginning with the firſt, I ſay, that nothing is to Princes more neceſſary, then to be counſelled; whereupon *David*, though as being a Prophet himſelfe, he had no need of another Prophet, yet our Lord God, gave to him as to a Prophet-King, another Prophet to be his Counſellour. And therefore not without myſtery, it is ſaid in *Eccleſiaſticus*, (as a certaine Writer obſerves) *Surrexit Nathan Propheta in diebus David:* as though by theſe words *In diebus David*, he would intimate, the need that Princes have of Counſellours. Alſo *Moyſes*, though himſelfe moſt wiſe, yet followed the counſell of *Jethro*: and *Salomon* was not without counſellours; and even God himſelfe, when he made man, by ſaying, *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & ſimilitudinem noſtram*, would ſeeme to take counſell;

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no doubt for our inſtruction, that we ſhould doe nothing without counſell. And *David* ſpeaking of our Lord God ſaid, *Glorificatur in conſilio ſanctorum, Magnus & terribilis ſuper omnes qui in circuitu ejus ſunt.* And our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, to ſhew of how great importance counſell is, to counſell himſelfe, as in Saint *John* where he ſaith, *Unde ememus panem?* and in another place, *Quid tibi videtur Simon, Reges terræ a quibus accipiunt Tributum vel cenſum, à filiis ſuis, an ab alienis?* and *Peter* anſwered, *Ab alienis.* Alſo the Apoſtles, though inſtructed by the Holy Ghoſt, yet oftentimes made uſe of counſell; as Saint *Paul*, who went as farre as *Hieruſalem*, to take counſell of Saint *Peter* and Saint *John*. It is then moſt evident, and which none is ſo blind but ſees, that all men have need of counſell, whether they be learned or ignorant; yet with this diſtinction, that the Learned make moſt benefit, and have leaſt need; the ignorant have moſt need, and make leaſt benefit.

But as it is neceſſary for a Prince to have counſell, ſo it is hard for a Writer to ſhew the way he is to hold in being counſelled, as being a thing in ancient time very diverſly uſed, and with great variety obſerved.

The firſt way hath beene to take no counſell at all, but to doe all things of his owne head; ſo did *Charles* the eighth, and many others. And this they doe, as conceiving, that to aske counſell of another, ſhewes want of judgment in ones ſelfe; and that by this means a Prince makes himſelfe inferiour to him that gives him counſell, then which there is nothing to Princes more diſtaſtfull.

Others doubting to commit ſome errour, by doing all things of themſelves, and for the reaſons aforeſaid, not willing to be counſelled by others, have therefore neither taken any counſell of others, nor yet done any thing of their owne head: which quality, Writers

attribute to the Emperour *Maximilian*, who refusing to be counselled by any, used to give out what it was he went about; and then listned to heare, whether it were liked of, or no; and if it were, he then put it in execution; if not, he would then alter it of himselfe. But in truth this was no good way, nor fit to be followed, because while he sought to avoyd disparagement, by shewing himselfe to be lesse judicious then others, he fell into that which disparaged him more, by shewing himselfe to be mutable and inconstant. Which being once knowne, every one could then tell, not onely how to counsell him, but also how to reprehend him, nothing being worse, then to subject ones selfe to the debatings of the common people. And *Emilius* knowing this, while he was passing with his Fleet to *Larissa*, and hearing that this course was much murmured at by his followers, he called the Rhodians to him, and demanded of them, whether the Haven of *Patera*, were of capacity to hold his whole Fleet, and they answering, no; he thereupon tooke occasion to returne, and not to goe thither; and this he did, to the end, that altering his course upon so good a colour, they that had murmured, might not take heart to give him counsell.

Others have used another way quite contrary to the first, and I doubt is at this day more used then is fit; and it is, to give care and heare what every one sayes, and to take any mans counsell, that will give it; which thing (be it spoken with others leave) seemes to me, not onely to be subject to confusion, but also to contempt; because every one will then pretend to counsell the Prince, who hearing continually such diversity of opinions, must needs be confounded in himselfe, and despised of others: whereupon in the Histories of *Tacitus*, when it was debated to send Embassadours to *Vespatian*, *Elvidius Priscus* was of mind, that

that men of great wiſedome and judgement ſhould be ſent, who might helpe the Prince, with good adviſes; but *Marcellus Epirius* was of another mind, as knowing it to be a moſt diſtaſtefull thing, to give a Prince counſell without being required. Whereupon although *Plato* commend *Cyrus* for giving leave to any of his ſubjects to ſpeake his opinion in any thing that was to be done; yet to me it ſeemes a thing dangerous for him that gives it, and more for him that takes it. And therefore *Claudius* hearkning once to counſell in this manner, was confounded, not knowing what he ſhould doe, turning himſelfe ſometimes to one mans counſell, and ſometimes to anothers, *Ipſe modo huc, modo illuc, ut quemque ſuadentium audierat:* and at laſt finding his errour, he called a counſell.

A Prince therefore in my opinion, ought alwaies to have about him him, a Band of experienced men; *In quibus ſit veritas, & qui oderint avaritiam*; by truth is meant wiſdome, which (according to the Philoſopher) is nothing elſe but a knowledge of the truth; and by covetouſneſſe are underſtood all vices; becauſe as the Scripture ſaith, *Avaritia eſt Principium omnium malorum:* if then they have wiſedome, they will be able to give counſell; and if they be free from vice, they will give it. but yet, I hold it not fit, that at their owne pleaſure, without being called by the Prince, they ſhould fall a counſelling; which perhaps *Salluſt* knowing, was the cauſe he durſt not give *Tiberius* counſell, about the death of *Agrippa*, *Sed monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus; conſilia amicorum, miniſteria militum vulgarentur:* an arrogancy not ſufferable in a ſervant, to preſume to give his maſter counſell, without being called. And who knowes but this preſumption in *Salluſt*, might be the cauſe of his fall? ſeeing he was out of the Princes favour before he died, as *Tacitus* relates. *Amaſias* being reproved by the Prophet

anſwered, *Nunquid Conſiliarius regis es?* by which it appeares, that thoſe Kings uſed not to be counſelled but by their Counſellours.

But if it be arrogancy in a ſervant to give counſell not being asked, it as is much indiſcretion in a Prince, not to aske it. This is that I would have Princes to doe, have alwaies about them a Band of choice counſellours, to aske their advice in all his affaires: ſo did *Nerva*, ſo *Salomon* teacheth to doe, when in his Proverbs, he ſaith, *Gloria regum eſt inveſtigare ſermonem*; that is, a Prince ought not to ſtand expecting he ſhould be counſelled, but rather it is fit he ſhould go and ſeek after counſell.

After a Prince hath heard the opinions of his counſellours, it may be doubted whether he ought to deliver his owne opinion; and when, and in what manner he ſhould doe it. As farre as I can judge, I thinke it not fit he ſhould deliver his owne, either firſt or laſt, or in the midſt. For if he doe it firſt, all the reſt will preſently conſent; and if he doe it laſt, every one will come about to his opinion: as it happened to *Henry* the third, who (as Hiſtorians relate) deliberating about the death of the Duke of *Guiſe*, called foure to counſell, of whom when two had ſpoken their opinions, the King had ſcarcely heard them out when he delivered his owne, cleane contrary to theirs: whereupon the two that were to ſpeake after, preſently fell to be of the Kings opinion; and the two that had ſpoken before, retracting their former advice, conſented to that the King had determined; which determination was the ruine afterwards of *France*, and of the King himſelfe. So in *Spaine*, when it was deliberated about making peace betweene *Henry* the fourth King of *France*, and the King of *Spaine*; after *Il Moro* had ſpoken, and the Kings ſonne being preſent replied the contrary, all the reſt came

came preſently to be of his opinion: Whereupon, not without great judgement, *Cneius Piſo* in *Tacitus*, when *Tiberius* would deliver his opinion in a certaine cauſe, ſaid, *Quo loco cenſebis Cæſar, ſi poſt omnes, vereor ne imprudens diſſentiam, ſi primus, habebo quod ſequar.* Therefore *Tiberius* another time commanded *Druſus* that he ſhould be the firſt to deliver his opinion.

The Prince therefore ſhould be ſilent, and finding his Counſellours of different opinions, let them debate the matter betweene themſelves, that he may ſee who gives the beſt reaſons; ſo he ſhall avoyd contempt, by not ſuffering himſelfe to be counſelled, without asking it; and he ſhall not be flattered, if concealing his owne opinion, the truth is made manifeſt, by letting them debate it betweene themſelves: and laſtly, he ſhall ſhew himſelfe more learned and more wiſe then the other, if of himſelfe without any others direction intervening, he ſhall determine the matter. All theſe things (in my opinion) are compriſed in that place of Eccleſiaſticus, *Auditorem ſimul & quærens*; how can he be ſtill, that askes and heares? but onely as I have explained it; to aske counſell in all things, to heare counſels, and in hearing them to be ſilent; and after, of himſelfe to determine as reaſon adviſeth. In this regard the ancient Poets feigned that *Jupiter* tooke counſell to be his wife; meaning to ſhew, that it is needfull for Princes to be counſelled; and after, that his wife being great with child, he ſwallowed her up, and became himſelfe great with child in his head, and at the due time was delivered of *Pallas*, which is wiſdome; to ſhew that counſell would be ruminated in the mind, and that a Prince ought not to ſuffer his counſellours to be delivered themſelves; but ought by ſwallowing them up, to make that to be his owne iſſue which was anothers.

That a Prince ought to determine of himſelfe, and

ought not to determine of himselfe; that is, determine with counsell is the best, of those that are given him, and so not of himselfe; seeing the counsels are other mens: and yet of himselfe, seeing the determination proceeds from his owne judgement; I conceive, it is sufficiently expressed in the booke of the Kings, where *Salomon* saith, *Dabis ergo servo tuo cor docile*; having said before, *Da mihi sapientiam.* For explanation of which passage, we must know, that understanding can have no knowledge of things, but such as either it invents of it selfe, or learnes of others. To the finding them of it selfe, is required a sharpnesse of wit, and being found, a judgement to choose the good, and refuse the bad: and lastly, a memory to retaine that which is imprinted. To the learning them of others, is required a perspicacity, which is all one with docility, & makes the understanding apt to apprehend those things which are taught by others. There is required also judgement, to discerne good things from bad; and lastly, a memory to reteine them. So as the memory is as the matter of the one and the other, the judgement as the Forme of them both, and perspicacity and acuteneſſe are as the differences. *Salomon* desires Wisedome, but not with acuteneſſe to invent things; that is wisedome which consists in the sharpnesse of wit, but he desires wisedome togethen with docibleneſſe; that is, wisdome and perspicacity, which is all one with docibleneſſe: perspicacity, to be able to understand rightly the opinions and reasons of his counsellours; and wisedome, that is judgement, to be able to discerne the good from the bad. *Salomon* therefore shews, that a Prince ought not to care for inventing of his owne head, but to content himselfe with having docibleneſſe, to understand things invented by others; and wisedome to know the truth, and to discerne the

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good from the bad. And therefore he ſaith well, *Da mihi ſapientiam:* and after, *Dabis ergo ſervo tuo cor docile:* Where we muſt obſerve, that though he ſay, The Heart, and not the Underſtanding, yet he meanes the ſame thing; ſeeing thoſe faculties, which *Galen* attributes to the underſtanding, many others attribute to the heart: and in holy Scripture it ſelfe, the heart oftentimes is put for the underſtanding: as in *Eſay* it is ſaid, *Excæca cor populi hujus, & aures ejus aggrava, & oculos ejus claude, ne forte videant oculis ſuis, & auribus ſuis audiant, & corde ſuo intelligant.*

Neve Tiberius vim Principatus reſolveret, cuncta ad Senatum vocando. Eam conditionem eſſe Imperandi, ut non aliter ratio conſtet, quam ſi uni reddatur.

How Princes ought to make uſe of Magiſtrates and Officers.

The thirtieth Diſcourſe.

Alluſt counſels *Tiberius*, to take heed that he remit not ſo many cauſes to the Senatours, as thereby to weaken his owne ſoveraighty, there being nothing ſo proper to a Prince, as to be ſole Commander. A counſell worthy to be well conſidered, by occaſion whereof, it will be fit to diſcourſe: Firſt, how Princes ought to order the remitting of cauſes to the Senate, or to other Officers; and then whether they ſhould take the adminiſtration of all things into their own hands.

It ſeemes a thing impoſſible, that one man alone can

can by himſelfe be able to judge all cauſes, which *Jethro, Moyſes* father in law, conſidering, and ſeeing him to take the reckonings of all the people of *Iſrael*, without aſſiſtance of any; and wondring at it, he ſaid, *Ultra vires tuas eſt negotium; ſolus illud non poteris ſuſtinere.*

For Reſolution then, either we ſpeake of giving Authority to a Senate, or elſe of committing cauſes to other Officers. If we ſpeake of the Senate, either the cauſes are great and weighty, or elſe but of ſmall moment. If they be great, then ought the Prince to reſerve them for himſelfe to determine: if ſlight, and of ſmall value, he may doe well to remit them to the Senate, that ſo he may pleaſe them with a ſhew of liberty, without any prejudice to himſelfe. This *Tiberius* well underſtood; and therefore when the ſubject Provinces made ſuit for the continuance of certaine Franchiſes, he remitted them to the Senate; to the end, that being matters of ſmall moment, the Senate might determine of them as they pleaſed; which *Tacitus* expreſſeth where he ſaith, *Tiberius vim Principatus ſibi firmans imaginem antiquitatis Senatui præbebat.*

Secondly, the affaires that are handled, are either ſuch, as deſerve reward and grace; or elſe ſuch as are odious, and deſerve puniſhment and cenſure. If they be ſuch as deſerve reward, the Prince ought to determine of them himſelfe: but if they be odious and deſerve puniſhment, he ought then to ſhift them off from himſelfe and leave them to the Senate; or if he cannot to the Senate, at leaſt to other Officers. *Honores autem* (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) *ipſemet tribuere debet; pœnas & animadverſiones per alios infligere, per Magiſtratus videlicet & per judicia.* So *Simonides* in *Xenophon* adviſeth *Hiero:* ſo *Mœcenas* in *Dio, Auguſtus*. Our Lord God when he puniſheth, he doth it by the miniſtery

ſtery of others, *Immiſſiones per Angelos malos*: whereof Saint *Chryſoſtome* ſpeaking ſaith, *Igitur quando ſervare oportet, per ſeipſum hoc facit, ita filium miſit in ſalutem generis Humani, & iterum: tunc inquit, dicam Angelis, congregate facientes iniquitatem, & projicite in Caminum, de juſtis vero dicit, non ſic; ſed qui vos ſuſcipit, ſuſcipit me, & iterum, ligate illius manus & pedes, & mittite in tenebras exteriores: vide illic ſervos qui miniſtrant, quando autem beneficiis opus eſt, ſeipſum Benefactorem vocat. Venite Benedicti Patris mei, percipite præparatum vobis regnum, quando loquendum cum Abraham, ipſe adeſt; quando in Sodoma abeundum, ſervos mittit, & iterum: enge ſerve bone & fidelis, ſupra pauca fuiſti fidelis, ſupra multa te conſtituam; & tunc ipſe benedicit; illum autem malum, non ipſe, ſed ſervi ligant.* By this, you may ſee, that a Prince ought to have no hand in puniſhments, but leave all ſuch diſtaſtfull things to Officers.

It was handled in the Senate to take order for reſtraining of luxury, which was now growne exceſſive, and beyond all meaſure; and becauſe there was ſcarce a man in the whole City free from this vice, it was a thing exceeding diſtaſtfull, as *Tacitus* ſhewes, where he ſaith, *Nec ignoro in conviviis & circulis incuſari iſta, & modum poſci, ſed ſi quis legem ſanciat, pœnas indicat, iiſdem illi civitatem verti: ſplendidiſſimo cuique exitium parare, neminem criminis expertum clamitabunt.* *Tiberius* therefore finding of what nature the cauſe was, would not determine it ſelfe, but caſt it upon the Senate, as *Tacitus* in his perſon ſaith, *Si quis ex Magiſtratibus tantam anguſtiam vel ſeveritatem pollicetur, ut ire obviam queat, hunc & laudo, & exonerari laborum meorum partem fateor, ſin accuſare vitia volunt, dein cum gloriam ejus rei adepti ſunt, ſimultates facient, ac mihi relinquunt, Credite P. C. me quoque non eſſe offenſionis avidum:* Which the Senate perceiving,

ceiving they alſo remitted the cauſe to the Ædiles: and ſo it vaniſhed.

In this point, there is no Kingdome better governed, then that of *France*, which leaves all matters to the Parliament, that might any way make the King diſtaſted; and matters of moſt importance, the King himſelfe in his Privy Counſels determines. And thus much for giving Authority, and remitting cauſes to the Senate.

Now if we ſpeake, how a Prince ought to ſerve himſelfe, of his Officers; I ſay generally, that the leſſe he doth by their miniſtery, the better; whom he ſhould uſe as inſtruments to execute, and not as principals to deliberate. For betweene the governing reaſon, and the things that are governed, there may intervene another reaſon, two waies: one, when it ſupplies ſome thing which was wanting in the governing reaſon: for example, If it have not ordered and provided all things, but left ſome to be ordered by the inferiour reaſon, which it takes notwithſtanding by meanes of the ſuperiour reaſon providing: and in this manner, the inferiour reaſon is a meanes, and intervenes as a reaſon to the diſpoſition of the government. Secondly, the inferiour reaſon may be a meane in the government, as a ſervant, and not as reaſon: that is, that the principall reaſon, diſpoſe all things how ſmall and particular ſoever; and then give the execution to the inferiour reaſon, as to a ſervant. In the firſt way our Lord God did not ſerve himſelfe, of the inferiour reaſon; for he provided every thing, great, ſmall, univerſall and particular: but in the ſecond way he ſerves himſelfe in the government of humane reaſon, yet not as humane but as miniſteriall. And this is the doctrine of *Cajetan*: whereupon if it be true that Kings are called Gods, *Ego dixi Dii eſtis, & filii Excelſi omnes*; then ought they

they as farre as they are able, to imitate the Great Maker and Governour of all things: that is, to determine all things they are able to determine; and leave the execution to their Officers. But if a Prince ſhall leave it to his miniſters, to determine, and provide things neceſſary for the ſtate; he ſhall not then make uſe of his miniſters, as miniſters; but rather as of reaſon, which is nothing elſe, but as of King.

Let a Prince therefore leave to his miniſters, ſuch things as are proper for miniſters; and ſuch as for their ſmalneſſe, need not the underſtanding of a Prince; and though he be able to doe ſuch things of himſelfe, yet by all meanes let him leave the care of them to his miniſters; for therefore in the Scripture we ſee all things of ſmall moment were done by Angels: it was an Angell that appeared to *Agar*, they were Angels that deſtroyed the Tower of *Babell*, Angels that burnt *Sodome*, an Angell that ſhewed the way to *Eleazar*: but great things were alwaies done by God himſelfe, as the delivering of the Hebrewes out of Ægypt, the giving the Land of Promiſe, to *Abraham*, *Iſaak*, and *Jacob*: and the reaſon why our Lord God would doe thus, (ſay Writers) was, to the end, leaſt if the Hebrewes had received ſuch great benefits from Angels, they might have thought, that all their good came from them, and conſequently have adored them as Gods. So likewiſe, if a Prince ſhall ſuffer his miniſters to beſtow great things upon the people, they will be ready to take the miniſter for Prince, as from whoſe hand they receive all favours. Our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, going to raiſe *Lazarus*, was able no doubt, of himſelfe to remove the ſtone from the grave, ſeeing he was able to raiſe one that had been foure daies dead; but becauſe it was ſo ſmall a matter, he would not doe it himſelfe, but ſaid to the Jewes, *Tollite vos lapidem*, whereof Saint

Auſtin

Austin saith, *Sed quia ab hominibus fieri poterat, homines facere præcepit: quæ autem Divinæ virtutis erant, sua potentia demonstravit.* So also, a Prince ought to commit such things to servants, which are proper for servants; and doe such things himselfe, as are proper for a Prince.

And yet to this opinion of mine, the counsell of *Jethro* is no way discordant: for though I grant, that a Prince cannot doe all things of himselfe; yet I deny not but he may doe all things of himselfe, that are of importance: for so we may finde did *Moyses*, if the words be well considered, *Constitue ex eis Tribunos & Centuriones & Quinquagenarios, & decanos, qui judicent populum omni tempore; quicquid autem majus fuerit, referant ad te, & ipsi minora tantum Iudicent.* See here, how *Jethro* shews plainly, that a Prince ought to doe all things himselfe, that are of weight; which is so true, that if he doe otherwise, he shall shew himselfe not onely ignorant and irresolute, but by preferring his servants, he shall give them occasion, from getting authority, to get into the Kingdome it selfe, and set him at naught; seeing there is no readier way to make ones selfe King, then by drawing all businesses of the Kingdome into his hand. And therefore *Sejanus* knowing this to be the onely meanes for attaining the Empire to which he aspired, used many devices to worke himselfe into affaires; so much, that at last he got *Tiberius* to goe live in the Countrey; to the end that the Emperour being out of *Rome*, all matters might passe through his hands alone. And indeed *Tiberius* was by this very neere to have lost at once both life and reputation; but that perceiving at last his errour, he would ever after, not onely dispatch businesses himselfe, when he was in health, but even when he lay dying.

The like art and cunning was practised by *Assan Beglerbey*

Beglerby of *Greece*, and prime Favorite of *Amurath* the Great Turke, who perswaded him not to stirre out of the Seraglio, making him believe, there were plots laid to kill him if he came abroad; which *Amurath* sillily believed, and kept himself up close, leaving *Assan* in the meane time to manage all affaires alone, whereby he had a faire field to play the tyrant at his pleasure; and the State had soon been ruined, and with the State the Prince, if *Amurath* at last perceiving his errour, had not gone out of the Seraglio, and provided in time for all things necessary. No man knew this better, then *Lewis* the eleventh, King of *France*, a Prince no lesse judicious then valiant, in peace and warre admirable; who tooke so much pleasure to dispatch affaires of his Kingdome himselfe, that it may be truely said, he died dispatching businesse.

Many opposing this opinion, alledge, that Princes are not Hackney men nor Porters, to kill themselves with labour: but (with reverence I speake it) I yet hold, that either Princes must leave their States, or else must be content to labour for the subjects good. In figure of this it is, that in *Essay* the Regall power is laid upon the shoulders, where he saith, *Dabo clavem domus David super humerum ejus.* Likewise in the old law, besides the twelve precious stones, wherin were written the names of the twelve Tribes, which the high Priest bore in his Rationall upon his breast; there were also in two stones, engraven six names apiece, which by Gods appointment he carried upon his shoulders: by which was intimated, that it is not sufficient to have the subjects in his breast; that is, to love them: but he must also carry them upon his shoulders, that is, endure any labour for their good. And for this onely cause perhaps, a Prince in *Deuteronomy* is likened to an Oxe, that

should not be dainty and given to rest, but apt to labour, and to carry the yoake upon his shoulders.

Two things remaine to be advertised: the one, that when I say, a Prince ought to doe all principall things himselfe, I meane not things of the Law, which consist in the judiciall part, where onely particular things and of private interest are handled; and have nothing to doe with the maine of the state; but I meane it in the deliberative part, where publique matters of the Kingdome are handled, and such businesses, in which consists the foundation of the state: and therefore with good reason is by *Aristotle* preferred for the judiciall part.

Secondly and lastly I advertise, that this my discourse is not meant of Princes that are unfit; for as those Princes that are judicious, cannot doe worse, then to suffer themselves to be ruled by their ministers; so those that are of little judgement cannot doe better then to do all things by faithfull and prudent ministers, as *Nero* in his beginning did under *Burrhus*; *Seneca* and *Corbulo*, men fit to have ruled the whole World; and whom as long as he imployed, his state was so managed, that justly a wise Emperour said; no Prince, how judicious and wise soever, could possibly governe better then *Nero* at his beginning did: but as soone as he left to be ruled by those worthy men, it may as truely be said, No Prince how foolish and wicked soever, could possibly governe worse then *Nero* did.

Nam

Nam Tiberius cuncta per Conſules incipiebat, tanquam vetere Reipublica, & ambiguus Imperandi.

Why Tiberius made a ſhew he would not be Emperour, and that to make Princes diſcovet things they would have concealed, is dangerous.

The one and thirtieth Diſcourſe.

Tiberius after the death of *Auguſtus*, as though he were doubtfull to take upon him the Empire, as a burthen too heavy for his ſhoulders, made a ſhew he would reſtore it to the Commonwealth, *Se in partem onerum vocatum a Divo Auguſto, experiendo didiciſſe, quam arduum, quam ſubjectum fortunæ, Regendi cuncta onus.* But to the Prætorian ſouldiers, he gave watchwords as Emperour, *Signum Prætoriis cohortibus ut imperator dederat.* Laſtly, he made it be ſpread in the Army, that he was already elected Emperour by the Senate. *Dabat & famæ, ut vocatus electuſque potius a Republica videretur, quam per uxorium ambitum, & ſenili adoptione irrepſiſſe.* And becauſe theſe were three waies, all of them (in my opinion) uſed with great myſtery, I will ſearch into them a little narrowly.

Firſt then, *Tiberius* made a ſhew he would reſtore liberty, whereof one reaſon *Tacitus* alledgeth, where he ſaith, *Poſtea cognitum eſt, ad introſpiciendas Procerum voluntates, inductam dubitationem:* as though he would ſay, He was moved to doe thus, thereby to ſee whether the chiefe men either deſired liberty, or otherwiſe diſtaſted his Dominion; to the end, that com-

comming to know every ones mind, he might worke his owne ends, and ſecurity accordingly.

This reaſon, if *Tacitus* bring it as a popular reaſon, may paſſe; but if he bring it as the true intention of the Prince, it is very unlikely, as not at all ſuiting with *Tiberius* ſubtilty: and if it be *Tacitus* his owne invention, it comes farre ſhort of his great wit. For two kinds of Noblemen may be conſidered in the Senate: The one, of men eminent for judgement and valour; the other, of men little experienced, and leſſe witted. If *Tiberius* had any doubt or feare, it could be of none but of thoſe eminent men: for, as for ther eſt, either they will never dare to attempt any thing againſt the Prince; or if they attempt, never ſucceed. And for this it is we ſaid before, that *Auguſtus* had great lucke to finde the City full of ſuch men, *Cum ferociſſimi per acies, aut proſcriptione cecidiſſent*. I ſay then, that if any were moved to lay himſelfe open and diſcover his mind, upon *Cæſars* words, It muſt needs be, they were of thoſe of little judgement; becauſe men, I ſay not of great, but of any meane underſtanding, would never be brought to beleeve, that a man ſo greedy of the Empire, and that by plots and wiles had procured his owne mothers death, and the death of *Auguſtus* himſelfe; would after attaining it with ſo much labour relinquiſh it againe, and reſtore them to liberty. So that, if *Tiberius* by this meanes did diſcover the mind of any Senatour, it muſt needs be of thoſe, of whom as he could juſtly have no feare; ſo it ſhould be abſurd, without any benefit to take revenge. For this cauſe, *Marcus Lepidus* gave counſell in the Senate, that *Lutorius* ſhould not be put to death, *Vita Lutorii in integro eſt, qui neque ſervatus in periculum Reipublicæ, neque interfectus in exemplum ibit. Studia illi ut plena vaecordiæ; ita inania & fluxa ſunt. Nec quidquam grave ac ſerium*

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ex eo metuas, qui ſuorum ipſe flagitiorum proditor; non virorum animis, ſed mulierculorum adrepit.

It is not therefore likely, that *Tiberius* a man ſo wiſe, and of ſo great judgement, would ever be moved upon ſuch ſlight grounds, to cover his intention; we muſt therefore looke out ſome other reaſon, that may be more likely.

There were two things, of which *Tiberius* might be afraid: Firſt, of the Senate, leaſt not brooking his government, they ſhould riſe in Armes againſt him: ſecondly, of *Germanicus*, leaſt having a powerfull Army in his hand, and withall the favour of the people, he ſhould with a little danger, prevent a ſucceſſion that was uncertaine. To meete therefore with both theſe difficulties, he feigned in the Senate and with the people, that he was unwilling to be Emperour; to the end, that if the Senatours ſhould make any demonſtration againſt him; the people might beleeve they were not moved to it for the publik good, but onely for their private hatred; ſeeing to ſeeke to kill a Prince that would reſtore liberty, is a ſigne they love not liberty.

I would therefore conſtrue it, that when *Tacitus* ſaid, *Ut introſpiceret Procerum mentes*; he meant, that *Tiberius*, before he declared himſelfe to accept the Empire, deſired to ſee firſt, whether any in the Senate made any oppoſition, that ſo (as I have ſaid before) by uſing the name of liberty, he might the better prevent ſuch miſchiefe; and the rather, as not having omitted any other eſſentiall things, for ſtrengthning of himſelfe, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

The ſecond reaſon, why *Tiberius* was moved to ſuch feigning, is ſet downe by *Tacitus* in thoſe words, *Cauſa præcipua ex formidine ne Germanicus in cujus manu tot legiones, immenſa ſociorum auxilia, mirus apud populum favor, habere Imperium quam expectare mallet:*

Tacitus

Tacitus then ſaith, that *Tiberius* feigned to be unwilling to accept the Empire, becauſe he doubted *Germanicus* would pretend unto it: in truth, he that ſhould take theſe words in an ordinary ſenſe, muſt needs make it one of the pooreſt reaſons that can be given; for what hath the not accépting the Empire to doe with *Germanicus*? rather inſteaſt of helping him, it would be his greatéſt hurt, ſeeing the irreſolution of *Tiberius* might encourage *Germanicus* to attempt many things which he would not have done, if he had knowne him to be Emperour, and *Tiberius* himſelfe, being aware of this, writ Letters to the Armies, as being Emperour already; *Literas ad exercitus tanquam adepto Principatu miſit.* And if any ſhall ſay, that he ſpake in ſuch termes, becauſe he was aſhamed to call himſelfe by a name, which might eaſily be taken from him, I ſay, that this would have beene a moſt dangerous vanity, becauſe I conceive that *Tiberius* ſeeing the love of the people to *Germanicus* proceeded onely from a hope they had, (as *Tacitus* in another place ſhews) that if he came to the Empire, he would reſtore the government to the Commonwealth: he knew, that by making them the ſame offer, he ſhould both diminiſh the peoples love to *Germanicus*, and alſo abate his owne hatred, which the name of a Prince brings with it; and yet by this not deprive himſelfe of that authority which ſhould ſtrengthen him. From hence it is, that to the ſouldiers he gave the ſigne of being Emperour; as well becauſe, if occaſion were they ſhould defend him; as alſo becauſe he knew they loved a Prince better then a Commonwealth, under which they are deprived of Donatives, and driven out of the City. Whereupon he might doubt that if they ſhould find *Tiberius* unwilling to accept the Empire, and ſo feare the reſtoring of liberty, they ſhould there-

thereupon he moved to chooſe another Emperour. *Aſinius Gallus* finding *Tiberius* at this ward, to make him ſpeake plainely, whether he meant to be Emperour, or no, asked him what part of the Empire it was he deſired; making as though he believed really that he meant not to be ſole Emperour, a thing which brought him to his ruine; ſeeing Princes ſpeake many things which yet they would not have others to take as they are ſpoken. *Cæſar* was by ſome called King; and though he were well pleaſed with it; yet he ſaid, he would not be called King, but *Cæſar*; and yet when the Tribunes upon theſe words of his, prohibited any to call him King, he tooke it in ſo ill part, that from that time forward, he put them out of office. The reaſon of this is, becauſe they who take theſe courſes, it ſeemes would either put the Prince to a neceſſity, of looſing his authority, or elſe to lay open his intentions, which is a thing moſt odious. Whereupon another time, *Tiberius* complaining, he thought himſelfe not ſecure: *Aſinius Gallus* preſſed him to tell of whom it was he ſtood in feare, promiſing they ſhould be all put out of their offices; and he *Eo acrius accepit, recludit quæ premeret.* The ſame *Gallus* at another time, as it were ſeeking how to make the Prince offended with him, gave counſell, that Magiſtrates ſhould be new choſen every five yeeres; and that the Legats of Provinces, who had not yet been Prætors, ſhould by having ſuch legation, be the next admitted to the Prætorſhip, and that the Prince ſhould be tied every yeere to name twelve Candidates: which counſell no doubt did *Altius penetrare, & arcana Imperii tentandi*, ſeeing it reſtrained the Princes authority, and limited it to a certaine time, and to a determinate number; and priviledged the Legats of *Legions* to attaine

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to the Prætorship without other election or dependance upon him, which much distasted *Tiberius*: and therefore, pretending that this counsell of *Gallus*, tended onely to inlarge his owne authority, he refused it. To be short, when Princes are not willing to be understood, it is fit to make shew of not understanding them; it being a dangerous matter, to enter into the search of Princes secrets: *Abditos Principis sensus, & siquid occultius parat exquirere, illicitum, anceps, nec ideo assequare.*

Nusquam

Nuſquam Contabundus niſi cum in ſenatu loquebatur; Cauſa præcipua ex formidine, ne Germanicus in Cujus manu tot legiones, Immenſa ſociorum auxilia; mirus apud populum favor, habere Imperium quam expectare mallet.

What courſe a Prince ſhould take to ſecure himſelfe from Generalls of Armies: and what courſe Generalls ſhould take to ſecure themſelves from te Prince; and from a Common-wealth.

The two and thirtieth diſcourſe.

Tiberius beginning to ſuſpect *Germanicus*, that having the love of the Army, hee would rather take the Empyre, then expect it; We by occaſion of this, will firſt diſcourſe, of the doubt, which a Prince, or a Common-wealth may have, to ſtand ſubject to Generalls of Armies; Secondly, of the danger ſuch Generalls ſtand in, of falling into the ſuſpition of them they ſerve: by which oftentimes is cauſed their death; and how they ſhould carry themſelves to avoid it.

Concerning the firſt; there is no doubt, but a Generall having once gotten Reputation, oftentimes puts the Prince whom he ſerves in danger: which commonly happens; Firſt, becauſe they are not rewarded according to their merit; as it happened to *Ferdinand* King of Spaine; who having never rewarded the great Captaine, might well feare he would take it in ſcorne; and thereupon ſeeke to right himſelfe, by procuring to himſelfe the ſtate. Secondly, It may happen by reaſon of the inſolencies, which victory commonly brings with it; as it happened to the *Thebans*, who having made *Philip* of *Macedon*, their Generall; he, after the victory

gotten, tooke away their liberty. Thirdly, It may happen thorough ſuſpition ; which the Common-wealth or Princes take of them that ſerve them ; which ſuſpition once perceived by the Generall ; he muſt neceſſarily put another in danger, to ſecure himſelfe ; becauſe to ſeeke to juſtifie himſelfe in ſuch ſuſpitions, is for the moſt part, in vaine ; as may be ſeene, under a Prince, in *Corbulo* ; and under a Common-wealth, in *Scipio Africanus*. The very ſame happened to the Romans, who threatning *Cæſar*, about bringing in his account of managing the Army ; and ſhewing a ſuſpition they had of him ; were cauſe, that he tooke this feare of theirs, for a beginning to make himſelfe Lord of *Rome* ; which, when no forraigne Force was able to bring it into ſervitude, was by their owne forces eaſily oppreſſed.

I am perſwaded the danger is ſo manifeſt, which Common-wealths, or Princes incurre by occaſion of Generalls, that every one knowing it ſufficiently of himſelfe, will never looke I ſhould ſtay to prove it, either by Examples or by reaſons ; and eſpecially ſeeing there are few Hiſtories, that are not full of ſuch accidents.

But having ſaid, that this danger proceeds from three occaſions ; It is neceſſary to examine every one of them. Concerning the firſt, which was the ingratitude of the Prince : It will be eaſie to remedy that, by recompenſing him that ſerves ; for by this meanes, hee ſhall have no cauſe, to ſeeke to have all by force ; when he may have a part with love. It is true, a Prince in rewarding ſuch, ſhould not doe it, by giving them Cities or goods ; in the places where they have waged warre ; for either, they are Conquerours of the whole Country ; and then by poſſeſſing goods there, they will take occaſion after the victory, to make themſelves the Lords ; or elſe not conquering the whole Country ; the contrary part will ſtill be growing : and then they, not to looſe the reward given them, will either proceed ſlowly in the warre ; or elſe

elſe turne to that ſide that hath the better. This *Guicciardine* attributes to *Proſpero*, and *Fabritius Colonna*; who having beene rewarded by the King of *France*, with Dukedomes, and Caſtles in the Kingdome of *Naples*; when they ſaw the *Aragoneſian* ſide get the better; they went and tooke pay of *Ferdinand*. Therefore Princes ſhall do well, to reward them in other ſtates, where they have not warred; and where their reputation is not in Fame: and thus I have knowne it many times done in our time. Alſo they ſhall doe well, not to put them into choller; although faulty perhaps in other things; ſo long as it is not in matters eſſentiall, and proper to their places. So did *David* with *Ioab*; bearing with many Inſolencies and murthers committed by him; to the end he ſhould not fall into choller, and make Inſurrection.

Concerning the ſuſpition, which the Prince may ſhew to have of a Generall; and which is wont to bee followed with rebellion; It will be an eaſie matter to remedy that, if the Prince will not fall to ſuſpect for trifles; which is the quality of baſe perſons; as *Iſocrates* intimates in his *Euagoras*; or elſe, if ſuſpecting him, he conceale his ſuſpition, till hee remove him from the Army; So did *Domitian* with *Agricola*: So did *Tiberius* with *Germanicus*, who removing him out of *Germany*, ſent him into *Africk* with *Cneius Piſo*. And this, the Queene *Teuca* (in *Polybius*) not obſerving, was cauſe that *Demetrius* her Generall in *Slavonia*, underſtanding that the Queene was by his Adverſaries incenſt againſt him, and fearing her Indignation; he ſent to *Rome* to deliver into their hands, the Citie, the Army; and all he had under his charge.

The third cauſe alleadged before, was the pride and reputation which victory brings with it: for remedy whereof in particular, and of the reſt in generall: there have beene advertiſements given by many, in divers manners.

The first way is, for a Prince to goe himselfe in person ; and for a Common-wealth to send thither, their Principall Magistrate ; so the *Turke* in times past, hath used to doe ; to goe himselfe in person ; So the Common-wealth of *Rome* used to doe ; sending forth the *Consul or Dictatour*. But in truth, in this way, the Remedy seemes to mee, more dangerous then the evill, because if the Prince goe himselfe in person ; hee must be sure to have alwayes the victory ; for otherwise if hee loose, hee will either bee slaine or taken prisoner : If slaine, as was *Charles* of *Burgundie*, what hinders but the victour may enter upon the State, at least make spoyle of it ? If taken prisoner, as was *Francis* King of *France*, and *Syphax* King of *Numidia* ; I see not, but his State will bee as much in danger ; and therefore of this mans State, it was easie for *Massinissa* to get possession: and for the other, his Reputation, and state and life were all Endangered. We may then conclude, that this way of encountring disorders, is a dangerous way.

A second way is, every yeere to change the Generall, as the Ancient Romans used to doe; and as at this day the Common-wealth of *Venice*, in their Maritime Navy useth to doe. But yet in this way also there may infinite disorders happen : First, if the Army chance to mutinie, which is commonly the Correlative of an Army ; In this case, a man new come, nor beloved, not feared, will be little fit to appease such tumults. Secondly, they that make warre in this manner, are like to doe but little good, because the Souldiers can have no confidence in such a one : and it is the confidence in their Captaine, that for the most part, is the cause of victory. For confirmation whereof, wee may see in *Livie* ; that the same Army, which under other Captaines was alwayes beaten, when it came to be commanded by *Furius Camillus*, had alway victory : and this, by reason of the great confidence, the Souldiers had in him. Thirdly

ly there appeares another danger, not inferiour to any; and it is, that when a Generall knowes he ſhall be changed at the yeares end: either hee will not with any great heat begin that, which he knowes he cannot finiſh; or elſe beginning it, and impatient that another ſhould bee companion of his victory, he will raſhly, and precipitantly hazard both the Army and himſelfe; which hath beene the cauſe, that the *Romans* have loſt whole Armyes: as it happened at *Trebia* againſt *Hannibal*; where *Cornelius* the then *Conſul*, to the end hee might have all the glory himſelfe; unadviſedly ſtroke battaile with *Hannibal*, and was with much danger to the common-wealth, utterly defeated, of whom *Livie* ſaith: *Stimulabat & tempus propinquum Comitiorum ne in novos Conſules differretur, O occaſio in ſe unum vertendæ gloriæ!*

But granting this Captaine ſhould have made a good beginning, and have prepared a faire way for victory, yet certainely when he heares a ſucceſſour is to come, though he precipitate not himſelfe as *Cornelius* did; at leaſt he will doe all he can to hinder, that another ſhall not reape the benefit of his labours, or otherwiſe will not ſtick to make any ſhamefull Peace; as *Marcus Attilius* did, who having beaten the *Carthaginians* by Sea and land; and upon the point of obtaining a Compleate victory; yet when hee heard another Conſull was to come into *Africk*; to the end, the fruit of his labours ſhould not be reaped by him, he preſently fell to a Treatie of peace. So *Scipio*, one time by occaſion of *Tiberius Claudius*, another time, of *Cneius Cornelius*, precipitated the victory with making peace. *Ferunt poſtea* (ſaith *Livie*) *Scipionem dixiſſe, Tiberii Claudii primum Cupiditatem; deinde Cnei Cornelii fuiſſe in mora, quo minus idbellum exitio Carthaginis finiretur.* There bee ſome, that have hindred their ſucceſſours from victory, by overthrowing of purpoſe all that themſelves had well begun; ſuch a one was *Quintus Metellus*; who having

very neere ſubdued *Spaine*, when hee heard that *Pompey* the Conſull, was to come in his place, he disbanded al his Souldiers, gave all his proviſion of victualls to the Elephants, and broke up the Army; So alſo in *Numidia*, hearing that *Marius* was to come his ſucceſſour, he endevour'd all he could to marre the Enterpriſe.

Others againe, although their predeceſſours have done nothing to hinder them; but have endeavoured to leave them the victory, in a manner prepared; yet to the end all ſhould be attributed to themſelves, have refuſed to make uſe of the wayes and courſes their predeceſſours had uſed. Whereupon our Lord Chriſt, when he would doe the Miracle of wine, he rather made uſe of water, a thing already created, then of any new matter; whereof Saint *Chryſoſtome* ſaith, It was a manifeſt argument, that he who made wine of water, was the ſame God, who had made water of nothing. *Nam ſi ipſi Deo contrarius Opifex fuiſſet: non utique alienis uſus eſſet Chriſtus ad propria virtutis demonſtrationem.* And Saint *Ambroſe* ſpeaking of the firſt mitacle, which Chriſt did on the Sabboth, ſaith, *Et bene Sabbatho cœpit, ut ipſum ſe oſtenderet Creatorem, qui Opera Operibus intexeret; & proſequeretur Opus quod ipſe jam cœperat.* And thus when a Generall is changed, the Inſtruments alſo, and all other things are changed with him: and therefore *Cneius Pompeius* being ſent Succeſſor to *Lucullus* in *Aſia*; altered all that *Lucullus* had done, for not only it is the nature of men, that ſucceeding another in any office, they will ſeldome follow their predeceſſours courſes, but in this caſe, there is another reaſon for it alſo; to the end, It may not be thought, that getting the victory, they get it more, by their Predeceſſours carriage then by their owne; and therefore no mervaile, that *Druſus* tooke contrary courſes in *Germany*, to thoſe which *Germanicus* before him had begun. I conclude then; Theſe Generalls to whom a ſucceſſour is ſent, are either

either needy of glory : or elſe they have gotten glory enough : If they be needy, they will then precipitate the Army and themſelves to get it ; as *Cornelius* did with *Hannibal* at *Trebia* : if they have glory enough already, they will then endevour to make a Peace, that they may not hazard their Reputation with a ſucceſſour, as *Corbulo* did, when hee heard of one that was to come in his place. *Corbulo meritæ per tot annos gloriæ, non ultra periculum faceret.* But there are two oppoſitions, may in this place be made, which I cannot omit, & I ought not to ſhun: The firſt is, that the *Romans* changed their Generalls every yeere, and yet they alwayes got the victory, as in the firſt Decad of *Livie* may be ſeene. The ſecond, that the *Venetians*, men of ſo great valour and prudence, that they may ſerve for an example to all the world; have alwayes taken this courſe, and alwayes it hath ſucceeded well.

To theſe reaſons it is no hard matter to give an anſwer. And firſt, for that of the *Romans*, it may be ſaid, that this happened thorough the weakneſſe of their neighbouring Nations, with whom they had war. Secondly, and perhaps better; that although in the *Roman* Army, they ſent yeerely a New Conſull : yet there were many others in the Army, who had beene Generalls themſelves before : a thing which at this day, is not poſſible: ſeeing every one thinks ſcorne to goe a private Souldier: not onely if he have beene a Generall; but if he have been but onely a ſimple Corporall before. Thirdly, the warres they had then, were at the gates of *Rome*; & were ſuch warres, as were finiſhed, I ſay not in one yeere; but oftentimes, in one day. But when they came to have warres farre off, and that laſted long; they then ſuffered their Generalls, to continue many yeeres; and grow old in their places. From hence it was: that at one and the ſame time, having warre with *Hannibal* in *Italy*; and with *Aſdrubal* in *Spaine*, they very often changed their Ge-

Generalls in *Italy*, but *Cneius Pompeius* that was their Generall in *Spaine*, they never ſtird. So as when they had to doe againſt Powerfull Armies, in places far off, they were then forced, to ſend a *Scipio Africanus*, or a *Cæſar*, or ſome ſuch, as knowing how much it importeth the maine of the warre, to have one ſole commander.

As to the Particular of *Venice*, It is no mervaile, that they in their Fleets at Sea, doe every yeere change their Generalls, ſeeing the warre, and the Generalls Office, end both at once, becauſe actions at Sea, are begun and ended all at one time; but when they make warre by land, they change not then their Generalls every yeere, as in Hiſtories may be ſeene. Laſtly, in the Common-wealth of *Venice*, one reaſon there is; and in *Rome* there was; which makes the matter, the leſſe dangerous: and it is, becauſe that Common-wealth hath ſo many in Sea matters ſo expert and excellent, that they might eaſily change their Generall every day without any danger; which I cannot ſay ever happened to any other then to the Common-wealth of *Rome*, and to that of *Venice*; and the reaſon is, becauſe in theſe Common-wealths, men of valour are rewarded.

A third way to ſecure a Prince from his Generalls of Armies, is to ſend Perſons of truſt, & of his own blood; as *Tiberius* did, in ſending *Druſus* and *Germanicus*: but neither doth this courſe like me; Firſt, becauſe Princes have not alwayes, of their blood, that are fit to be Generalls. Secondly, although they have, yet it ſeemes to me ſo much the more dangerous, as the Army is in a mans hand of more Power, and ſpecially one, not far from the Crowne; and for this cauſe, *Ludouicus Sforza*, choſe rather to leave the Caſtle of *Milan*, in the cuſtodie of a ſtranger: who afterward betrayed it, then of his owne brother. And it availes not to ſay, he is a neere

neere kinſeman, ſeeing as I have elſe-where ſaid, *Invidia Regni etiam inter Domeſticos infida omnia facit*: there being few, *qui malint expectare quam accipere Imperium.* And therefore *Iſocrates* in his Oration concerning the Government of a Kingdome, ſaith, that a Prince ſhould beſtow the higheſt Honours upon thoſe of his blood, but the ſolideſt Honours upon thoſe that love him. When *Veſpaſian* was made Emperour; his Son *Domitian* had the honour: but *Mucianus*, the Authority. *Cæſar Domitianus Prætoram cepit, ejus Nomen Epiſtolis Edictisque præponebatur; Vis penes Mucianum:* by all meanes, there was care taken to order it ſo, that hee might not uſurpe the Empire. The like courſe *Otho* took: *Profecto Brixellum Othone, honor Imperii penes Titianum fratrem, Vis ac Poteſtas penes Proculum Præfectum.* If afterward it ſucceeded well with *Tiberius*, It was becauſe, *Vterque filius legiones obtinebat.*

A fourth way is, when a Generall hath gotten Reputation by ſome victory; then preſently to remove him before hee grow too famous, and uſe him in the warres no more. So did *Pharao* by *Moſes*; when imploying him againſt the King of *Æthiopia*, he no ſooner got the victory in a battaile, but he preſently called him backe into *Ægypt.* So did *Anthony* with his Captaine *Ventidius*; after he had overcome *Pacorus.* So did the King of *Spaine* in calling home *Gonſalvus.* But neither doth this courſe like me: for either the victory will make an end of the warre, and then there will be no need of calling him home: and yet the Prince not without danger: ſeeing one victory alone, if it be finall, will be ſufficient to get the Generall a Name, and make him preſume. And if that one victory end not the warre, the Prince then that takes this courſe, will have little will to proceed any further, for the reaſons before alleadged. and if by ill luck, Fortune ſhould chance to turne: he will be forced

forced, with ſhame and danger, to ſend the ſame Generall againe; as the King of *Spaine* would have done, after the defeat at *Ravenna*, for if the *French* had followed the victory, which was hindered by the death of the Generall, the King of *Spaine* had determined to ſend *Gonſalvo* againe into *Italy*.

The laſt remedy which hath beene invented, to prevent this danger, ſpecially in Common-wealths, is to joyne two Generalls together in the Army: So the *Romans* uſed often times to doe, So the *Carthagenians*, So finally the *Athenians*; yet I cannot ſatisfie my ſelfe, that this is a good way; Firſt, becauſe it is commonly the overthrow of the action: as was ſeene by the King of *France*, in the Kingdome of *Naples*, by the Duke of *Vrbine*, and by the Cardinall of *Pavia*, in the Popes Army, by *Marcus Varro*, and by *Paulus Aemilius* amongſt the *Romans*, whereof in all Hiſtories, there are Examples.

Secondly, this way is not ſufficient to take away the danger, we ſpeake of, as was ſeene in *Auguſtus*, who although hee had two companions *Hircius* and *Panſa*, joyned with him, yet could not they hinder him, from getting into his hand, the Army of both the one and the other, having firſt by deviſes, put them both to death; as *Tacitus* intimates, where he ſaith; *Cæſis Hircio & Panſa, (ſive hoſtis illos, ſeu Panſa veneni vulnere effuſum; ſive milites Hircium & machinator doli Cæſar abſtuleranr) utriuſque copias occupaviſſe.*

Thus for a Prince to goe himſelfe in perſon, is dangerous, to change his Generalls every yeere, is not commendable, to ſend one of his owne blood, not ſafe; to remove a Generall after getting a victory, worſt of all; laſtly to make more Generalls at once, then one, of little benefit, and conſequently, how to avoyde this danger, is very difficult. The beſt counſell I could give, ſhould be that which *Auguſtus* gave to *Tiberius*; *Conſilium Coercendi*

ercendi intra terminos Imperium, and in briefe, as much as may be, to avoid warres: and therefore *Tiberius* knowing these difficulties, although he heard of the Rebellion of the *Gryſons*, yet hee made no ſhew of it, becauſe hee had no mind to ſend thither any perſon of reputation: *Diſſimulante Tiberio damnum, ne cui bellum permitteret.* But becauſe it is impoſſible, but that occaſions of warre will ſometimes happen; I ſhould like well, in ſuch caſe, that a Prince being doubtfull of his Generall, ſhould goe himſelfe to be neere the Army; but not to bee in the Army; or if in the Army, yet hee ſhould never expoſe himſelfe to danger, unleſſe the maine of the ſtate depended upon it. This, *Charles* the fifth King of *France* knowing, (for which hewas called *Charles* the wiſe) would be himſelfe in perſon in the Army; but when the battaile was to be fought, he then attyred a ſervant of his, in his owne Armour, and by this meanes, the Army had the benefit of the Princes preſence, without the Princes danger. *Pyrrhus* alſo put his Armour upon another, finding how faine the *Romans* were to kill him. *David*, as long as matters were in manifeſt danger, thought it neceſſary to fight himſelfe in perſon. But if the preſence of the Prince can doe no more good, or elſe, if having loſt a battaile, he have Forces enow to renue his Army, in this caſe, a Prince ſhould not doe well to goe in perſon, and therefore *David*, in the like caſe, ſaying, *Egrediar & ego vobiſcum*, the people anſwered; *Non exibis, ſive enim fugimus, non magnopere ad eos de nobis pertinebit; ſive media pars ceciderit de nobis, non ſatis curabunt, quia Tu unus pro decem millibus computaberis.* *Otho* therefore ſhewed little Judgement, and had ill counſell, when deliberating about a battaile againſt *Vitellius*, he let it bee knowne, that hee meant not to goe himſelfe in perſon; ſeeing when the maine of the buſineſſe is at ſtake, the Prince ought then to goe himſelfe, becauſe, if his Army ſhould be loſt, he were as good be loſt himſelfe, as was

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ſeene in *Otho*; for he ſtaying behind, and not going in perſon in the Army, both abated the courage, and alſo the number of his Souldiers. Their courage, becauſe they lookt for him, *Militibus ut Imperator pugnæ adeſſet poſcentibus*, Their number, becauſe hee retained many companies for his owne Guard, and though *Tacitus*, in that oration which *Otho* made, ſeeme to ſhew, he had forces enow to renue the Army, and that he killed himſelfe onely becauſe hee would not doe the Common-wealth ſo much hurt, yet I cannot beleeve, that a man ſo wicked as *Otho* was, would ever bee ſo Compaſſionate, and take ſuch pitty of the Common-wealth.

A Prince then ought to goe himſelfe in perſon, when either the danger is ſuch, that if the Army bee loſt, the whole ſtate is loſt: or when it is ſuch, that looſing the battaile, the Prince cannot doe better, then to dye: ſeeing there is no doubt, but it is a great encouragement to the Souldiers, to ſee their Prince amongſt them, as it happened in the battaile at *Tarus*, where the onely preſence of the King, was the cauſe, they got the victory, whereupon, it is no meruaile, that the *Iſraelites* going upon a difficult action, and hearing that our Lord God, their chiefe Prince would not goe himſelfe, but would ſend an Angell to be their Generall; *Et mittam præcurſorem tuũ Angelum, ut eiiciam Chananæum, & Amorrhæum, & Bthæum, & Phereſæum, & Iebuſæum, & intres in terram fluentem lacte & melle, Non enim aſcendam tecum*, that the people hearing themſelves thus vilified, made the greateſt demonſtrations of ſorrow that could be, *Audiens autem populus ſermonem hunc, luxit; & nullus ex more indutus eſt cultu ſuo*: ſo as, if the Lord God did not goe himſelfe, the people could have no heart to undertake that Enterpriſe.

But if the ſtate of the Prince, though that Army bee loſt, be able in any ſort to defend it ſelfe, in this caſe the Prince ſhall do well, not to goe himſelfe in perſon; but

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ſhall ſet onely One Generall over the Army, and himſelfe not to be farre off, but ſo, as in occaſion of certaine victory, hee may remoove into the Army; This *Ioab* teacheth us, when he adviſed *David*, to come into the Campe, being now in his power, to take the City of Rabbat, to the end, the glory of the Action might bee *Davids*, and therefore in the ſecond of the Kings, he ſaith: *Miſit Ioab nuntios ad David, dicens, Dimicavi adverſus Rabbath, & capienda eſt Vrbs aquarum. Nunc igitur congrega reliquam partem populi, & obſide Civitatem, & cape eam; ne cum à me vaſtata fuerit Vrbs, Nomini meo aſcribatur Victoria.* Maharbale left by *Hanniball* to Oppugne *Saguntum*, left the Oppugnation in good termes; and then ſtayed for *Hanniballs* comming. *Strataque omnia* (ſaith *Livie*) *recentibus ruinis, adventi Annibali oſtendit.* In this manner, a Prince ſhall fully ſecure himſelfe, from any Generall, whoſe Reputation growing onely from the victories hee hath gotten, the Prince ſhall convert all that Reputation upon himſelfe: and therefore *Ioab* ſaid; *Ne aſcribatur Nomini meo Victoria.*

But if the Prince bee not willing to bee himſelfe in ſuch actions, hee may yet with his onely being neere, prevent all inconveniences, by imploying one Generall ſtill: and himſelfe in no danger; imitating herein *Moſes*, who ſending *Ioſua* againſt the *Amalekites*; would not be himſelfe farre off; *Egreſſus pugna contra Amalech, & ego ſtabo in vertice collis.* This courſe was a great help to *Philip* the ſecond, with the Duke of *Alva*. From hence it is, that as long as the *Romans* had warre neere home, they never doubted any Generall, of their Army, but when they had warre farre off, the Senate no more then the Prince, not being able to follow the Army, they then began to doubt, and a while after, it fell out as they doubted; as it is in daily experience, that Princes, in warre neere home, never make any

doubt of their Generalls. Moreover, if hee be not in the Army, he is ſure to be ſafe : and this I hold to be the moſt principall thing that can be, becauſe it would be much, if a Prince carrying away, (as the Proverb is) the Hide, although he ſhould looſe his whole ſtate, and all his Army, ſhould not be able to finde meanes, to come afreſh upon the enemy ; as was ſeene in *Maſſiniſſa*, in *Iugurtha*, and in *Ludovico Moro*, untill he was taken priſoner : and would to God we might ſee no Examples of it, in our times. Howſoever, whether Princes be in the Army, or be not, they ſhall doe well to looke to their owne ſafety.

It is then cleere that a Prince ſhould have but one Generall, and himſelfe not to be farre off : as we may learne from our Lord God : who not onely is neere, but in Eſſence, in Preſence, and in Power, is in all things : and having made uſe of *Michael* the Archangell, as his Generall in the firſt battaile, as it is written in the *Apocalyps*; *Factum eſt prælium magnũ in Cœlo, Michael & Angeli ejus prœliabantur cum Dracone, & Draco pugnabat & Angeli ejus, & non valuerunt, neque locus inventus eſt eorum amplius in Cœlo* : Hee will make uſe of him alſo in the laſt, as may be gathered from *Daniel* : *In tempore autem illo* (ſpeaking of *Antichriſt*) *Conſurget Michaell Princeps magnus : qui ſtat pro filiis populi ſui, & veniet tempus quale non fuit ab eo, ex quo Gentes eſſe cœperunt uſque ad tempus illud.* And thus much concerning a Prince.

Now Common-wealths in this point have greater difficulties. There is a Politician that counſells, they ſhould ſend of their owne Citizens : and he inſtances in *Venice*, who making their Generalls, *Bartholmew* of *Bergamo*, and *Nicholas Orſino* Count of *Pitigliano*, that were ſtrangers, they loſt at *Vayola* in one battaile, all they had gotten with infinite labours, in eight hundred yeeres ; and another time (ſaith he) they were faine

ſaine to put *Carmignola* (another forreigne Generall) to death. I lay no blame upon this opinion, but yet I commend rather, that common-wealths ſhould imploy ſuch ſtrangers to be their Generalls, with whom, for their owne ſecurity, they may ſend a paire of the wiſeſt Senatours, that they paying the Souldiers, may not ſuffer the Souldiers love to be caſt all upon the Generall, and repreſenting the Senat, not ſuffer any thing to bee done without their conſent. This way is at this day uſed: but is not new, as that which was knowne in the time of the *Carthagenians*, as farre as I can find by *Polybius*: who ſhewes, that *Xantippus* their Captaine, would not ſtrike battaile with the *Romans*, untill he had asked their leave, who were ſent by the *Carthagenian* Senat. *Xantippus acceptâ a Ducibus Carthaginenſium poteſtate, pugnandi copiam hoſtibus facit.* The Example of the *Romans* in oppoſition to this, is of no force; becauſe that was an Age, not greedy of Dominion; but when it came to be ſo, they then too well perceived, how dangerous it was to put an Army into the hand of a Citizen, as was ſeene in *Marius*, in *Sylla*, in *Cæſar* the *Dictatour*: in *Anthony*, in *Auguſtus*; and in a thouſand others. So alſo it would have been in *Pompey*, if he had gotten the victory of *Cæſar*, *Pompeius occultior* (ſaid *Tacitus*) *non melior*. Secondly, it availes not to ſay, that the *Venetians* were forced to put *Carmignola* to death, ſeeing the *Romans* alſo cauſed *Scipio*, when they had baniſht him, to be put to death: and it was their ruine, they could not doe as much to *Cæſar*: being a much harder matter, when a Generall is to bee put to death, to put it in execution, if he be a Citizen, then if he be a ſtranger, becauſe a Citizen hath alwayes a Faction in the Senat, that will defend him: and therefore in *Rome*, there was never any Generall put to death, where a ſtranger as having none to ſtand for him, will eaſily be oppreſſed, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter. Thirdly, the exam-

ple he brings of the defeat the *Venetians* had at *Vayola*, is of noe force, seeing there are none that make warre, that have not sometimes defeats; and who ever had more then the *Romans*? who though their Generalls were alwayes Citizens, yet in three Defeats they had, one at *Trebia*, another at *Cannæ*, and another at *Thrasimene*, they lost all they had, (I may say) but onely the City of *Rome*, which *Hannibal* after his victory, at *Cannæ*, might have taken also, and would not. And if there were nothing else to make me be of this Opinion, yet the Example at this day, of the Common-wealth of *Venice*, a City full of such excellent men, would perswade me to it.

We have now shewed, the best course that Princes or Common-wealths can take, to secure themselves from their Generalls: It remaines to shew, what course Generalls may take to secure themselves, from Common wealths & Princes. And because we have said, that a Prince may doubt them, either because they have not beene rewarded, or by reason of the Glory they have gotten, or thorough suspition, which oftentimes Princes and Common-wealths doe vainely conceive; I say.

The first of these is easily to be avoyded, if the Generall shall shew himselfe to be without interest; and not to care for any thing but the honour, for by this meanes he shal keep the Prince from any jealousie in this behalfe, and shall not precipitate himselfe into danger.

As concerning the second, of Glory, they shall doe well to imitate the *Allmaines*: who (as *Tacitus* relates) used to attribute all the praise of their great atchievements, wholly to their Princes. And this precept a Generall may observe, either by requiring the Prince to come, when he sees a victory is certaine, as *Ioab* did, or if the Prince cannot come, then to cause his name to bee called upon in the Army, and to erect *Trophies* to him; and therefore *Germanicus* knowing this, after hee had subdued many Nations of *Germany*, in the Title he published

liſhed of them, made mention onely of the Prince: and of himſelfe ſaid nothing at all. *Debellatis inter Rhenum Ablimque nationibus, exercitum Tiberii Cæſaris, ea Monumenta Marti & Iovi & Auguſto ſacraviſſe. De ſe nihil addidit, metu invidiæ, an ratus Conſcientiam facti ſatis eſſe*; and indeed there is nothing more pernitious to Generals, then to aſcribe victories to themſelves. This was it, that brought *Saul* to hate *David*, in his victory of the *Philiſtine* Gyant: and it is indeed a great Vanity, where there are manifeſt deeds, to puff them up with words. It was many times ſaid to our Lord Chriſt, *Dæmonium habes*, and he anſwered; *Dæmonium non habeo*; another time, when he had heaſed a blind man, and it was ſaid unto him *Dæmonium habes*, he made no anſwer at all, becauſe the worke he had done, anſwered for him, that hee had not a devill; where therefore there are great workes, It is needleſſe to adde words.

The greateſt difficulty of a Generall, is to keepe himſelfe from being ſuſpected, for this hath bene the undoing of an infinite number of worthy Captaines; amongſt whom, ſpeaking of Princes, was *Corbulo*, One of the greateſt ſouldiers, the *Romans* ever had; and ſpeaking of Common-wealths, *Paullus Vitelli*, a famous Captaine of his time, who onely upon ſuſpition, was by the Common-wealth of *Florence*, beheaded.

A generall then may incurre danger, in two things, in ſuſpition, and in death; To prevent ſuſpition, hee cannot doe better, then to uſe ſeverity in the Army; following the example of *Hanniball* rather then of *Scipio*, and therefore *Corbulo* in his Beginnings, while he uſed Diſcipline, Incurred no danger. To this may be added, that which we ſpake of before, which is, to ſhunne all vaine glory, but becauſe it is ſometimes impoſſible, not to incurre ſuſpition; the beſt inſtruction I can give in this point, is to advertiſe, in which of the two Services, is the greater danger.

I ſay then, that ſtrangers ſhall runne more hazard, by ſerving a Common-wealth, then by ſerving a Prince; and ſubjects ſhall runne more danger, by ſerving a Prince, then by ſerving a Common-wealth; an example whereof, we have given in *Paullus Vitelli*; who being a ſtranger, and ſerving a Common-wealth, loſt his life. This made *Xantippus*, who was generall of the Common-wealth of *Carthage*; aſſoone as he had gotten one glorious victory againſt the *Romans*, to leave the Army, and returne home. The reaſon of this diſtinction, is in my opinion, plaine, becauſe Generalls under a Prince; either they have friends to defend them, or they have not: if they have not, then they lye open to calumnies without any defenſe; if they have, then will the danger bee the greater; becauſe the Princes ſuſpition will be the greater, to ſee them have ſuch friends and adherents in the City; where if the Generall be a ſtranger; there can bee had of him no ſuch ſuſpition. Now, if it bee in a Common-wealth; the ſtranger having few adherents will bee little defended from the blowes of calumnies: where the Citizen having his faction to protect and aſſiſt him; will eaſily avoyd the danger, at leaſt of life. And this is the reaſon *Polybius* brings; why *Xantippus*, after the victory he had gotten, left the Army: where he ſaith, *Nam præclara facinora, & res a quocunque egregiè geſtæ, magnam plerumque invidiam, & graves Calumnias conflare ſolent, quique Cives quidem affinium ac amicorum multitudine freti, facile reſiſtunt: hoſpites vero omnis præſidii expertes, utroq; malo quam celerrime conteruntur.* And where under a Prince, to have Citizens to defend him, is a dangerous thing; the ſuſpition encreaſing with the defenſe; under a Common-wealth, it is a benefit, to have part of thoſe, to take his part, that may deliberate; and therefore in the Common-wealth of *Rome*; when they have not beene able to anſwer the Accuſation; yet they have beene able to ſcape death; in ſuch ſort, that for any miſadventures

in

in battailes, or for any suspition of the people or of the Senate; I never could see any that incurred danger: where under a Prince, there may bee found a thousand examples.

Above all, Generalls must take heed, they take not courses, against the nature of him they serve; for in so doing, they may bee sure, they shall never bee well thought of for what they doe; and besides, with their owne danger, they shall breed a jealousie in them they serve. This had happened to *Alvianus* at *Geradada*; if he had not beene taken Prisoner; because being in the service of a Common-wealth, so advised and wary in all their affaires, hee by giving battaile so precipitantly, shewed he knew not; at least, observed not the nature of them he served. And therefore *Corbulo* (as *Tacitus* relates) venturing upon hazardous attempts, under *Claudius* a timorous Prince; not onely was blamed for it; but was faine, with little honour to himselfe, and much jealousie of the Prince, to leave the Army, and withdraw himselfe: *Corbulo femina rebellionis præbebat; ut læta apud plerosque, ita apud quosdam Sinistra fama. Cur hostem concivet? adversa in Rempublicum casura, cum prospere egisset; formidolosum paci; virum insignem & ignavo Principi prægravem. Ideo Claudius adeo novam in Germanias Vim prohibuit; ut referri præsidia & Rhenum juberet.*

Dabat & Famæ, ut Vocatus Electusque potius a Republica videretur; quam per uxorium ambitum; & senili adoptione irrepsisse.

Of Succession and Election.

The three and thirtieth Discourse.

BY occasion, that *Tiberius* would rather have it bee thought he was chosen Emperour, by the Senat, then by

by *Augustus*; we thinke fit, to examine these points; when Election is good, and when succession; and lastly, which of them is the better.

To begin with the last; because upon this, the other depend; there are many of opinion, that Election is the better; which (they say) may be proved by Examples & by reasons. By examples, because of all the many Emperours that *Rome* had, if any were ever good; they were those, that came in, by Election: and if we looke into the holy Scripture; we shall finde, that the Judges came no sooner to be by succession, but they ended in the sonnes of *Samuell*; and the Regall Dignity assoone as it came to be by succession, presently became a Tyranny, beginning in *Salomon*; and Encreasing in *Roboam*; who were not Elected, as *Saul* and *David* were. Then againe by reason, it may be proved; because Election is in our owne power: where succession is in the power of Fortune, which, though it may sometimes give a good Prince, yet it cannot continue to doe it so long, but that at last (as *Aristotle* observes) It will give a bad, who alone is enough to overthrow all the good, his Predecessours had done. To this may be added, that successours are alwayes full of domineering pride, which makes them beleeve, they are greater then ever their Ancestours were; and having had no part, nor labour in acquiring the Kingdome, they little care for conserving the Kingdome; and lastly, having honour and glory enough, they trouble not themselves for getting of more; where he that comes in by Election, will by the same vertues with which hee hath attained the Empyre, be able also to conserve the Empyre; and seeing hee hath perhaps but little glory by his Ancestours, he will endevour to get glory by himselfe.

On the other side, there want not reasons to prove, that succession is the better: and the first is taken from *Aristotle*, who in his Politicks, speaking against *Plato*

shewes

ſhewes : how different and much greater the love is, that is borne to things which are our owne : whereupon a ſucceſſour having the Kingdome as his owne, and one that is choſen, having it but as lent ; It muſt needs be beleeved, that a ſucceſſour is likely to make the better Governour : Men commonly not having ſo great care, of things which they have but for terme of life ; as of things in which they have inheritance, and may leave them to their Heire. To this may be added : that the conditions of thoſe, who come newly to their greatnes ; (as *Ariſtotle* ſpeaking of the Common-wealth of the *Chalcedons* ſaith) are evermore intolerable, as a Poet ſaith, *Aſperius nihil eſt humili cum ſurgit in altum.* Moreover they who come in by Election, as not having had education in the Princes houſe, can have but meane information of the affaires of ſtate ; where if ſonnes ſucceed, as no New Dignity accrewes unto them, ſo no occaſion of growing proud befalls them ; and being trained up and acquainted with affaires : as they themſelves will be better able to governe ; ſo both People, and Nobility will be willinger to bee governed by them ; the People, as having beene accuſtomed to obey their Fathers ; The Nobility, as being farre removed from Equality : we may adde further ; that ſucceſſion takes away all occaſion of diſcords, which in Election, muſt needs fall out ; and falling out ; It is impoſſible, a perſon of any goodneſſe ſhould be choſen, or if a vertuous perſon happen to be choſen, yet having been conteſted againſt, by ſome part of the Electours, he cannot chuſe but beare them grudges ; and hardly be able to governe as a King ſhould doe.

For reſolution, I ſay ; that Election and ſucceſſion, be it good or bad, may be conſidered either with regard to the Prince, or with regard to the people. If to the Prince ; then the queſtion is, which of them is the more available either for his ſecurity, or for his Reputation.

Beginning then with Reputation, there can bee no doubt, but it is more honour to a Prince to be Elected, then to ſucceed: ſeeing this comes by Fortune, without any merit in the ſucceſſour; the other comes by merit which is wholly in him that is Elected. This *Galba* underſtood; when adopting *Piſo*, he ſaid, *Generari naſcique a Principibus fortuitum, nec ultra æſtimatur, adoptandi Iudicium integrum; & ſi velis eligere, Conſenſu monſtratur.*

As for ſecurity; I hold it ſafer to ſucceed, then to bee choſen, becauſe he that is Elected, is either choſen by the Prince, or by the People, or by the Senat. If by the Prince, he wil want many of thoſe graces, which make a ſucceſſour ſecure: as the merits of his Father: which ſaved *Salamon* from utter ruine, and the being of the blood Royall, which hath beene a cauſe of preſerving many in their ſtates. Beſides this, he will have many things in his diſfavour; as, that hee is but newly riſen up from Equality, and divers other. If wee ſpeake of thoſe that are Elected by the People, I cannot deny but they will have the people of their ſide: but then conſequently, they will have the Nobility againſt them: and ſo of the one ſort, they are like to be hated; and to the other ſort, obliged; and being never able to ſatisfie ſo much, as the obligation requires, in ſhort time there will follow, with a generall hatred, their owne particular ruine. Laſtly, if he be Elected by the Senat; hee is like to have the people his enemy, and be ſure to be himſelfe a ſlave to the Nobility, whereupon, wee may conclude, that Election is the more Honourable; and ſucceſſion the more ſecure.

Concerning the laſt point; which is, whether of the two is the more profitable to Cities; Election or ſucceſſion; I ſay, that if the Prince chooſe him, and be the Electour, either he is a good Prince, or a bad; if a good, he cannot chooſe but make a good choice, and conſequently

quently will bee better for the City, then succession; that being certaine, and this uncertaine, and therefore the Election of *Antoninus*, was better then the succession of *Marcus Aurelius*: and yet *Marcus Aurelius* was no lesse vertuous then *Antoninus*. But if the Prince bee bad; no doubt then, but choosing a successour, he will choose one starke naught, and therefore it was thought that *Augustus* chose *Tiberius*, *Comparatione deterrima sibi gloriam quærens*, as *Dio* and *Tacitus* say; and not onely for getting themselves glory, as in this case, but sometimes they will doe it, out of sympathy of Conditions; in which regard, *Otho* speaking of *Galba*, who had chosen *Piso*, as vitious a man as himselfe, said; *Ne quo saltem in successore Galbæ spes esset; accersit ab exilio, quem tristitia & avaritia sui simillimum judicabat*, whereupon, in this respect, it is better a Prince should be by succession, then by Election, seeing at least, it will bee put into the hand of Fortune, and such a one like to succeed, as a better were not like to be Elected. With this opinion of mine, agrees that which *Capitolinus* in the life of *Messalina* relates, as a Common Proverbe: *Sapienter olim Principes sic ajunt; per Imperitos electi, sic pereunt.* If againe the Election bee made by the Souldiers, as oftentimes was donne at *Rome*, in this case likewise, succession will be better then Election: because Souldiers make Election onely for their profit; and oftentimes to make the like profit, of another, they murther one as soone as they have chosen him: So saith *Plutarch*, in the life of *Galba*; *Et avaritia libidineque Imperatorem Imperii ac velut Clavum Clavo expellebant; & vero palatium Cæsarum domus brevioris temporis spatio quatuor Imperatores excepit, militibus tanquam in Scena, modo introducentibus aliquem, modo educentibus.* If lastly the Election bee by the people, either they are at variance with the Nobility, or Not: if they bee at variance, no doubt they will then make choyce of a Factious person; one of a turbulent

spirit, and an enemy to the Nobles; as they did in the choyce of *Tribunes* in *Rome*, at the time when there was dissention, betweene the Nobility and the people: and though there were no discord between them; yet I could never like of Election by the people, who being for the most part corrupt, and little able to discerne who is good, and who is bad; and apt to value men by riches, and not by vertue, cannot chuse but make a most unworthy choyce. *Neque enim Illis* (saith *Tacitus*) *Iudicium aut veritas.* But if the Senat be at concord with the people, then no doubt, the Election will be excellent, as being made by a number of understanding men; and therefore we see, that *Numa Pompilius* who was thus chosen, proved one of the best Kings, the *Romans* ever had: there concurring in his Election, the choyce of the Senat, and consent of the people. It is true, such Election is hardly made; because few would like to Elect another to that degree, which hee aymes at himselfe: And if any man should object, that it proves well in *Venice*, where the Election of their Duke, is alwayes made by the Senat, I would answer (taking no notice of the kind of that Dignity) that this happens, because that Election is made by most understanding men; who ayme more at the Common-wealths profit, then at their own. But if the Senat or Magistrate, that is to make the Election, be it selfe corrupt: wee may then expect a choyce betweene good and bad; because a very good one, they would not choose, for feare least out of his precisenesse, he should reforme many things to the undoing of the wicked; and a very bad one, they would not choose, for feare least hee should be the undoing of the Kingdome. To which purpose are those words of *Tacitus*, *Ex optimis periculum sibi, ex pessimis dedecus publicum metuebat.*

Here advertise, that neither the Reasons alleadged at first, nor yet this last, are in any opposition to the King-

domes that are at this day, whereof the greateſt part goes by ſucceſſion ; for there is great difference betweene ſpeaking of times, in which were Tyrants ; and times in which are civill Princes ; who have ſo many Counſells, ſo many Orders and Conſultations, that it is impoſſible, but they muſt governe well. No man therefore ought to take my Diſcourſe as a taxing of Princes in theſe times ; but whether it be *Election*, or ſucceſſion, I hold that way alwayes to be beſt in a City, which hath formerly beene uſed.

Laſtly for reſolution of thoſe Arguments which in the beginning were brought againſt *Election*: (Thoſe againſt ſucceſſion being tacitely already anſwered) I ſay, that either wee ſpeake of chooſing a private man to bee Prince; and then thoſe difficulties will bein force; or elſe we ſpeake of chooſing one, who is already mounted to the height of a Prince ; and then thoſe difficulties will be laid aſleepe : and this we ſee notably obſerved at this day, in places of *Election* ; as in creation of the Pope, which can never fall upon a perſon, that is not firſt a Cardinall, It being fit, that one ſhould firſt come out from *Equality*, before he ſhould riſe to the higheſt degree of ſuperiority, and that he ſhould firſt be taken into part of affaires, who is to come afterward to governe the whole. So likewiſe in *Election* of the *Emperours*; we ſee alwayes Princes of ſuch blood to be choſen, that comming to the *Empyre*, they ſeeme not to come to any new greatneſſe.

Tiberius therefore (to come to our purpoſe) having beene choſen by *Auguſtus*, that was a Tyrant, had reaſon to have it beleeved, that he was choſen by the Senat, rather then by old *Auguſtus*, *Comparatione deterrima*, or *per uxorium ambitum* : but if *Auguſtus* had beene an excellent King ; I beleeve hee would then have rather had it thought, that he was choſen by the Prince. So did *Salomon*, who comming to the Crowne after *David*, would have

have it knowne, that hee was made ſucceſſour by his father: *Vt notum fiat univerſo Populo Regem eum a Patre Declaratum.*

Nihil primo Senatus die agi paſſus, niſi de ſupremis *Auguſti*; cujus Teſtamentum inlatum per virgines Veſtæ, Tiberium & Liviam hæredes habuit. Livia in familiam Juliam; Nomenque Auguſtæ adſumebatur. In ſpem ſecundam, Nepotes Pronepoteſque. Tertio gradu Primores Civitatis Scripſerat, pleroſque inviſos ſibi, ſed Jactantia gloriaque ad Poſteros.

Whether Tiberius *did ill, in cauſing* Auguſtus *his will to bee read; and why* Auguſtus *in the third place, made many his heires that were his Enemies.*

The foure and thirtieth diſcourſe.

ONe of the firſt things that *Tiberius* did in the Senat; was the cauſing *Auguſtus* his will to be read; where *Livia* and himſelfe were made his heires in the firſt place: In the ſecond, his Nephewes; and Grandchildren. In the third place: the principall men of the City; many of whom were known to be his enemies. In this, there are two things wee may wonder at; one that *Tiberius* would have this will of *Auguſtus* to bee read openly; the other, that *Auguſtus* had ſet many in his will, that were his *E*nemies.

Beginning with the firſt, I ſay; that *Tiberius* not belonging to *Auguſtus* by any reſpect of blood; but onely by being his Sonne in law; to be preferd by *Auguſtus* will, before *Agrippa Poſthumus*, that was his Nephew, to whom by Right of kinred, the *E*mpyre belonged; It ſeemes that in true politick conſideration, *Tiberius* did

ill,

ill, to cauſe a thing ſo odious to be publiſhed, which he ought rather, if it had beene poſſible, to have hidden: as was ſeene in *Claudius*, who by his Teſtament making his Sonne in Law, *Nero* his heire; and preferring him before *Britannicus*, his true and legitimate Sonne; *Agrippina* a ſuttle woman, after the death of *Claudius*, would not ſuffer his will to be read; leaſt the people ſhould mutiny; to ſee a ſonne in Law preferd before a Sonne: *Teſtamentum tamen haud recitatum, Ne antepoſitus filio privignus, Injuria & Invidia animos vulgi turbaret.* By this example related by the fame *Tacitus*, we muſt neceſſarily ſay, that one of them, either *Agrippina* or *Tiberius* did ill: or elſe we muſt bee driven to ſhew ſome difference betweene theſe two caſes: which may be, and is in many things. Firſt, becauſe *Britannicus* was *Claudius* his Sonne; and *Agrippa*, *Auguſtus* his Nephew, but by the line of women. Secondly, becauſe *Agrippa* was farre off; and perhaps dead, when *Auguſtus* his will was read; *Britannicus* was living, and preſent there in *Rome*: and ſo by his preſence, might have given occaſion to the people, of making inſurrection, which *Tiberius* needed not to feare: and laſtly *Tiberius* was a man of ripe age, experienced in the warres, and converſant in affaires of ſtate, where *Nero* was but a child, & had hitherto given no proofe of himſelfe at all; and beſides, it cauſed much leſſe envy, to ſee a Sonne in Law of ſo excellent qualities, preferred before a Nephew rude and fooliſh, and full of Indignation; then it would have done to ſee a rude Sonne in Law, preferd before a Sonne of ſo great expectation: and becauſe to be made heire by the former Prince, is a great helpe for being accepted by the Subjects, as by the Example of *Salomon* and others, I have elſewhere ſhewed; *Tiberius* knowing, that thoſe things would be no trouble to him, which to *Nero* would have been pernicious; he therefore did very wiſely and

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with great Judgement, to make it knowne to all men; that *Augustus* by his will had left him his heire.

The other Errour which was intimated in the beginning, consists in this: that *Augustus* in his will, naming many of his enemies to be his heires; seemed by this as it were to encourage them to oppose those of his own blood; that so they might come to that, of which his will had given them a hope. And it would not be reasonable to say, that he was moved to doe it; (as at this day in some places is used) as not thinking hee should dye; to the end, that they seeing themselves made his heires, might not longer be his opposites, but rather be tyed to be at his service; an invention which hath no other effect, but to make him that useth it, be knowne for a man of little braine, with prejudice to his Posterity. This reason therefore is in it selfe of little strength; and squares not with *Augustus*, seeing his will was made in secret, and of as little strength is that Reason which *Tacitus* brings, in these words, *Iactantia Gloriaque apud Posteros*; which is, that *Augustus* did it to get himselfe glory in aftertimes, as much as to say, that hee preferd publick profit, before private hatred, and that hee made no reckoning of the injuries done him; no doubt a great Glory; but yet not such, as was worthy of *Augustus* his Consideration.

We may say then, that *Augustus* not without great cunning tooke this course, to secure both himselfe and his successour: seeing, that if any were likely to conspire against the Prince; it was those principall men whom hee named in his will; whereupon by this demonstration of affection, he thought to bind their hands: because beleeving the Prince did truly love them, (men being apt of themselves to beleeve they deserve to be loved) and more, to beleeve those demonstrations, which being made in a last will, seeme to be farre from flattery, they could not chuse but lay away all hatred: and

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though they should be suspitious, though aware of the devise, yet they should have no meanes to conspire against the Prince, seeing the people, they might bee sure, would be against them: as they who looking to the apparence of things, take no notice of fictions, and hate ungratefulnesse; and this was it, that spoyled the conspiracy of *Marcus Brutus*; because the people understood that hee was adopted by *Cæsar* to be his sonne, and named in his Testament, and for him to conspire against him was such an ingratitude, that they were easily perswaded to take revenge; so much is that accursed vice detested.

Non aliud Discordantis patriæ remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur.

That corrupt Common-wealths have need of a Monarch to Reforme them.

The five and thirtieth Discourse.

IF *Agis* the Spartan had knowne the foresaid reason brought by *Tacitus* in excuse of *Augustus*, he would certainely have attained the end he aimed at; which was to restore his Country to the first Ordinances and lawes that the most wise *Lycurgus* had made: but his fault was, that he sought to doe that by many, which he was to have done himselfe alone: which *Cleomenes* perceiving, and advised by the wife of *Agis*, whom after his death he tooke to wife himselfe, and having heard her a thousand times relate the case of her deceased husband, he came to know, that *Non aliud patriæ Discordantis remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur*; whereupon (though wickedly) he put down the Magistracy of the *Ephori*, and easily brought the City to

such termes, that within a few dayes, he was able, without any feare of the Citizens, to leave his Country, and go in person to the warre: and if the City in the meane time ran a hazard; it was not by any default of *Cleomenes*, but for want of money, as *Plutarch* witnesseth, where he saith; *Quemadmodum exercitatione robur membrorum adepti Athletæ, spatio temporis opprimunt atque superant agiles, artificioso que; Ita Antigonus magnis opibus instructus, his que bellum reficiens, defatigavit tandem superavitque Cleomenem, vix habentem, unde tenuiter militibus mercedem, civibus alimenta suppeditaret*: and therefore was forced to give him battaile, where if he could have stayed but onely two dayes, *Antigonus* must of necessity have returned back, into *Macedon*, and *Cleomenes* had remained Lord of all *Greece*.

It is therefore held by all Experienced Politicians, for an infallible Rule, that not onely for the founding of Common-wealths, but also for the Reforming of them; the Government of one alone is necessary; and this, *Romulus* knowing, (though wickedly as for the Act) killed his brother, and was cause of the death of his Compagnion. So *Cleomenes* (as we have said before) desiring to reform his Country of Sparta, which was at the last Cast of Ruine; no lesse wickedly then *Romulus*, killed all those that might oppose his Power, and gave them new lawes and new ordinances for reformation of the City. And not unlike to these was *Hiero* the *Syracusan*, who seeing his Country in a neere degree of ruine, was forced to make use of those Armes to make himselfe Lord of the Country, which he had received for defence of the Country. It is therefore no marvell, that *Augustus* seeing *Rome* so full of Discords, so much degenerated from the antient lawes and customes, and so deepely plunged in a thousand kinds of wickednesse, did imitate *Romulus* in being the cause of his Companions death; did imitate *Cleomenes*, in putting many Senatours to death, that

that might have opposed his greatnesse; and lastly did imitate *Hiero* the *Syracusan*; in turning those Armes against the Common-wealth, which he had received of the Common-wealth, to defend it against *Anthony*; as knowing well, that to rectifie the City and reduce it to reformation, there was no other way, but onely for himselfe to governe alone. For having a purpose to set up an *Aristocracy*; he was first, (as *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* teacheth us) to bow the staffe the contrary way to make it afterward streight; and if in doing this, hee used violence, it was, because it was impossible to doe it otherwise. And therefore *Plato* in his book of lawes, saith; that it is impossible to passe from the Government of a few, to a good Common-wealth: because it is seldome seene, that they who are in authority, will yeeld to any of their fellowes to reforme them; where *Plato* shewing the difficulty of reforming a Common-wealth; sheweth withall, that it must be done, by reducing the government into one mans hand. And if *Augustus* afterward, did not pursue his purpose; and left not the City in liberty; it was, because he saw the Citizens were not fit for it; as *Galba*, in the oration he made at the Adopting of *Piso* said: *Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam libertatem; nec totam Servitutem pati possunt*; and for this cause it was, that *Augustus* made himselfe sole Lord; *Non aliud Discordantis patriæ remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur*; and therefore hee gave them halfe a liberty; leaving a great authority in the Senatours; and not a little in the people; which *Tiberius* afterward tooke away, and he put them in halfe a servitude, being himselfe superiour in all causes. The like conceit had *Galba*, when he made himselfe sole Lord of the Empire, as in the foresaid oration, every one may see. *Augustus* therefore is no more to be reproved, then *Cleomenes*, and *Galba*, and *Hiero* are, and if his purpose tooke not effect, it is not to be attributed to his fault, but to the ill fortune of his successour;

ceſſour, ſeeing as long as he lived himſelfe, till he came to his decrepit age; he maintained the City in great quiet, and the whole world in Peace, *Nulla in præſens formidine, dum Auguſtus ætate validus, ſteque, & Domum, & Pacem ſuſtentavit.* And if to *Romulus* there had ſucceeded *Tarquinius Superbus*, and to *Auguſtus Numa Pompilius*; I verily thinke the City of *Rome* had in her beginning beene ruined; and after by *Auguſtus* beene reſtored. And as after him the City of *Rome* fell to a Tyrant, and the power of the *Ceſars* ended in *Nero*, ſo alſo the Power of *Romulus* ended in *Tarquinius Superbus*, the Power of *Cleomenes*, in himſelfe, that of *Hiero*, in his nephew *Hieronymus*, and finally, that of *Galba*, preſently after his death, fell to a Tyrant: and all theſe Powers, except that onely of *Cleomenes*, came to ruine by wicked ſucceſſours. The reaſon, why theſe mens power was not able to hold out long; and to conſerve their Cities in tranquillity, is by ſome aſſigned, to the accommodations, which either are ſo ordered, that all the parts of the City reſt contented, and then it will laſt; or elſe the Accommodation is founded upon the Perſon, who by his authority makes it apt to continue, and then it will laſt no longer, then while he lives, or at moſt, till it fall into the hands of a wicked ſucceſſour, this, in my opinion, *David* knew well, when in a *Pſalme* he ſaid, *Deus Judicium tuum Regi da, & Juſtitiam tuam filio Regis*; as though he would ſay, it is not enough for the continuance of an empyre, that the firſt King be good; but it is neceſſary, his ſucceſſours be good alſo, and then it is like to laſt a long time. *Et permanebit cum ſole, & ante lunam, in Generatione & Generatione*; but becauſe after *Salomon*, there followed a wicked ſucceſſour, the Kingdome was in part diſſolved. So the Kingdome of *Romulus* ſucceeded well with him, becauſe there came after him *Numa Pompilius*, who by giving good lawes, filled it with Religion, but afterwards in *Tarquinius Superbus*

perbus it came to ruine. So also that of *Hiero* came to nothing, through a wicked successour. So the reformation which *Augustus* made of his Country, succeeded ill to him, because there came after him a *Tiberius*, a *Caius*, a *Claudius*, and lastly a *Nero*, who abrogating Lawes & Religion, it could not choose but come to ruine. The reformations therefore are ill founded, and never last long, that are founded upon the Authority of one, seeing the City is eternall, & the Prince mortall; but then are reformations like to continue, when they are founded upon those that receive them. Wherein, for another reason, I would helpe my selfe with a doctrine of S. *Thomas*, where he saith, That when a forme comes to be perfectly received of the matter, although the Agent that introduced the forme, be removed, yet the forme remaines in the matter still; if Fire be introduced in Wood by another Fire, though the agent be removed, yet the Fire remaines in the Wood still; but when a forme is introduced unperfectly, or to use the word of S. *Thomas*, *Inchoative*; there, if the Agent be removed, either it lasts but little, as water that is heated; or else goes wholly away with the agent, as the enlightning the aire, by the departing of the Sun. So likewise when a Prince hath perfectly introduced good Ordinances in the matter of a City; although he die himselfe, yet they will still remaine: but if they be introduced but unperfectly, that is, not fully established; then certainly, either they will last but little, as water heated, or with his death that introduced them, will die also, as the enlightning of the Aire.

To returne to our purpose, I said before, that the City of *Rome* was not capable of liberty: and therefore that *Augustus* was not too blame, for not giving it liberty; that it was not capable, is manifest, seeing in processe of time, the Empire comming into the hands of such persons as more regarded the good of their

Countrey, then their owne dignity; such as *Trajan*, *Antonines Pius*, *Marcus Aurelius*, and others were: if they had knowne that it had been for the good of the City of *Rome*, to have had liberty, they certainly would have given it.

I have beene willing to give examples of *Hiero*, as being indeed most like to *Augustus*. For he being a Citizen of *Syracusa*, had in his hand an Army for defence of his Countrey; and by devises cut them all in pieces that were not for his turne: and afterward, with those very Armes he made himselfe Lord of *Syracusa*, in which government he raised not himselfe above equality, ruling with much prudence, and contents of the Subjects; as also he enlarged the Dominion of *Syracusa*: and lastly intended to leave it in liberty, but that he did it not, there were two impediment; the first, because the City was not fit for it: and therefore *Livie* saith, *Syracusaque enim breve tempus affulsisset, in antiquam servitutem recciderant.* And in the same booke, speaking of the people of *Syracusa*, he saith, *Aut servit humiliter, aut superbe dominatur, Libertatem quæ media est, nec sternere modice, nec habere sciunt.* A second impediment were the women, who through desire of rule, wrought so with him, that he left his Nephew *Hieronymus* his successour, a most perfidious and cruell man, and farre differing from the conditions of his unkle. *Augustus* likewise was a Citizen of *Rome*, and had in his hand an Army, for defence of his Countrey; when he put all those to death, that were able to oppose him, and then turning those very Armes against his Countrey, he made himselfe sole Lord; in which government he used great equality, shewed great prudence, enlarged the Empire, and lastly had a purpose to leave it in liberty, whereof he had often speech with *Mecænas* and *Agrippa*; and if he left it not in liberty, it was long of two things:

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one, because the City was not capable of liberty, *Non aliud discordantis patriæ remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur*: and as *Galba* said of the Romans, *Nec totam libertatem, nec totam servitutem pati possunt*. A second cause was *Livia*, who having besotted the old man *Augustus*, perswaded him to leave *Tiberius* his successour, a cruell man, and one that was no more of kinne to *Augustus* his conditions then to his blood, as *Tacitus* shewes where he saith, *Alia Tibero morum via*. And thus it appeares that *Augustus* and *Hiero* were very like; but yet in one thing they had very unlike fortune; for the Empire of *Augustus* ended not in himselfe, but was continued in *Tiberius*, who also was able to elect a successour after him; but with *Hiero* it was not so; for his Kingdome ended in his Nephew *Hieronymus*, who was miserably slaine. And the reason of this, is because *Tiberius* in company of many vices had some vertue, (as I said before speaking of *Nero*) but *Hieronymus*, without any vertue, had all the vices of *Tiberius*.

Non aliud discordantis patriæ remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur.

Why the City of Rome from a Regall power under Romulus recovered liberty under Tarquinius, and from the Regall power of Augustus was never able to shake off servitude.

The six and thirtieth Discourse.

TO make that be better understood, which we said before; that the City of *Rome* in the time of *Augustus*, was not fit to receive liberty; I conceive it will be a good helpe to examine the reason, why

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from the Regall power of *Romulus*, it came to liberty under *Tarquinius*; and afterward from the Regall power of *Augustus*, it was never able to free it selfe from servitude.

The first is a generall reason, and brought by all Writers: that is, the imperfection and corruption of the Citizens. For liberty, (as I shall shew in my Discourse of Optimates) requires men perfect, and not corrupt, at least so many as may be enow to make a Senate. But surely, this reason, (with leave of the many great men that alledge it) may be of some force to prove that the City of *Rome* under *Augustus*, was not capable to receive liberty, but it is of no force to prove, that from the Regall power of *Augustus*, it might not as well recover liberty, as it had done from that of *Romulus*. Seeing the City of *Rome* was never so full of imperfect men, in the time of *Augustus*, as it was in the time of *Romulus*, when there was in it indeed a nest of the scumme of the most wicked men, that were in all *Italy*. We may say then, that both the one and the other of these Kings had an intention to set his Countrey in liberty, (as of both of them, in divers discourses, I have made it appeare) but neither of them in his life time, put this intention of theirs in execution. And the reason is, because when men are imperfect, and not fit to tolerate liberty, it is impossible that in the life of one Prince alone, they can be brought to perfection, in such sort, as to be made fit to receive it; but this must be wrought by the continuance of many good successours, who may all of them intend to prepare the Citizens for it: and because it was thus with *Romulus*, therefore after him the Romans obtained liberty; but being not so with *Augustus*, who had many wicked successours after him therfore the City after him continued alwaies in most miserable servitude.

A Second reason, was the slaughter of *Cæsar* : which not being sufficient, to reduce *Rome* to liberty, was therefore sufficient to make the Regall power unalterable. For *Augustus* making himselfe Lord of the Empyre by force ; was able by the same force to secure himselfe in it, the rather under the Excuse of *Cæsars* slaughter ; and the corrupt times of the Commonwealth, which served him for Engines to put many things in execution, that fortified his Power. *Pietatem erga Parentem* (saith Tacitus) *& tempora reipublicæ obtentui sumpta* ; whereupon, the best Politicall instruction, that in like cases can be given, is this ; that when a Familie hath lost the authority it once had in a City ; It is better to yeeld it up with love, then to strive by force to recover it with danger : for this hath beene the cause, that many Cities relapsed under Princes, have never after beene able to recover liberty ; a relapse in all things, being alwayes worse then the first Evill : and of this there want not examples, if there were need to bring them.

A third reason, and of importance is, because the Election was come into the hands of the Souldiers ; who by reason of the gaines they made: and of the unmeasurable Donatives that belonged to them, at the Coronation of Emperours ; would never be brought to give their consent for the introducing of liberty, in which it is wont, to be the first lesson, He that labours not shall have no pay : and so much more, as Common-wealths that are good, need no such guard.

Fourthly, I conceive it to be of some moment, that after the death of *Nero* in whom the house of the *Cæsars* ended ; yet *Rome* was not then reduced to liberty : seeing *Galba* being chosen, every one of those great ones, might begin to hope, that it might be their turne at some time or other, to come to the Empyre ; and consequently very likely, they were not much discontented

tented with that forme of Election: and so much, (in my opinion) did *Galba* himselfe expresse, in the speech he made to *Piso*, when he said, *Sub Tiberio & Caio & Claudio unius familiæ quasi hæreditas fuimus: Loco libertatis erit, quod Eligi cœpimus: & finita Iuliorum Claudiorumque domo, optimum quemque Adoptio Inveniet*: as if he would say, Now that the line of the *Cæsars* is extinct, everyone may hope to attaine that degree; which hope I conceive, may be the cause, that those potent men, in whose hands it is to alter states, like best of that forme, in which the first degree they can hope to attaine, is that of Exceslive greatnesse: and from hence perhaps it was, that *Cæsar* the Dictatour, was never much troubled with the Conspiracy of *Catiline*, but rather excused and defended it, as lesse caring for the Cities liberty, then that it should come under the Power of one alone, which Power hee doubted not in time to attaine to himselfe.

Fifthly, the greatnesse of the Romane Empire, was it selfe, (in my opinion) a great cause, It could never returne to liberty, because at the time of the *Tarquins*, being but in low estate, it was more reasonable, they should desire Equality: which in small things is easily borne: and because else, they must have passed a thousand difficulties: as the subduing of Ryvall Common-wealths, the Conquering of Enemy Princes, and the like, wherein the time of *Augustus*, the City being growne great, & become mistresse of the world; her Ryvalls spent, and all things at Peace and quiet; it was not now easie to support Equality: and therefore from that time afterward, there was no contesting but for the Empyre, and a man will easily hazard both life and reputation, where the reward that may be gotten by it, is both great and secure, but where the reward is but little, full of toyle and danger; there men are contented and glad to have company: and therefore

fore *Brutus* brought *Rome* to be a Common-wealth; whereupon we see in our times, that (Venice excepted) all other Common-wealths are of no great moment, and all this (as I conceive) *Tacitus* very lively expresseth, where he saith: *Vetus ac jampridem insita mortalibus Potentiæ Cupido, cum superiis magnitudine adolevit, erupitque. Nam rebus modicis Æqualitas facile habebatur, sed ubi subacto orbe, & æmulis urbibus Regibusve exsisit, securas opes concupiscere vacuum fuit, prima inter Patres plebemque certamina exercere. Modo turbulenti Tribuni, modo Consules prævalidi, & in urbe ac foro tentamenta Civilium bellorum. Mox à plebe infima Cajus Marius, & nobilium sævissimus Lucius Sylla, Victam armis libertatem in Dominationem vertêrunt. Post quos Cneius Pompeius, occultior, non melior, & nunquam postea nisi de principatu quæsitum.*

A sixth reason may be taken from the Ordinances and lawes of the *Romans*, which though at the first times of the Common-wealth they were good, yet in processe of time they became naught, It being not possible, and indeed not fit, to make a law, that is simply and at all times good, as it happens with Physitians, who cannot prescribe meats that are simply good for all, seeing respect must bee had to temperatures, and bodyes in health *simpliciter*, (to use *Galens* word) that if a meat could be found good for all diseases; that meat simply should be naught. It is necessary therefore that lawes should have conformity, with the men; and with the times, whereupon the law of *Moses* being given to one People, was not simply good; but conteyned in it many precepts, repugnant to our Christian Policy; and if any man object, that the law given by Christ our Lord in the New Testament, is simply good I answer, that this Law was not given to one particular people, but to all the whole world: *Ite per universum mundum, Prædicate Evangelium omni Creaturæ*, saith our Lord in Saint *Matthew*. Now the Lawes and Ordinances

dinances of the *Romanes*, were all intended for encreaſe of Dominion, and conſequently for war: whereupon it is no marvaile ; if that City, having now attained to Peace, and no more need of Augmentation, but onely of Conſervation, became uncapable of receiving liberty ; and being bred and accuſtomed to getting, having now nothing more to get, they all endeavoured by the ſame Arts to get the Empire.

Seventhly and laſtly, I have drawne a reaſon of excellent Doctrine from *Ariſtotle* in his Philoſophie, for knowledge whereof, it is to be knowne, that living bodyes have naturally a Terme and bound beyond which they cannot goe ; as witneſſeth the Philoſopher in his Bookes of Animalls : where he ſaith ; *Perficiendi cujuſque animalis certa eſt magnitudo ; tum ad majus, tum ad minus, quem terminum non ſupergrediuntur, ut vel majora, vel minora evadant* ; and in his Phyſicks he ſaith : *Quod impoſſibile eſt, carnem aut os, aut aliquid aliud, quantumcunque magnitudine, aut in majus aut in minus* ; and finally in his Bookes *de Anima* he ſaith ; *Natura autem Conſtantium omnium Terminus eſt, & ratio Magnitudinis & Augmenti* ; by which authorities it is manifeſt, that all Naturall things, have a certaine bound which they cannot exceed ; and this happens becauſe nature hath made them for their proper operations, which they cannot execute but under a certain and determinate greatneſſe : ſeeing therefore a Commonwealth is nothing but a body conſiſting of many bodies, and ordained to the intent to live well ; It ought to have a due greatneſſe, fit to mainteine it ſelfe ; which greatneſſe if it exceed, it will not bee able any longer to exerciſe its operation, in regard whereof *Lyvie* ſaith ; *Donec ad ea tempora pervenerunt, ut magnitudine propria laborarent* ; whereupon as long as the City of *Rome* ſtayed *within* its certaine bound, ſo long it maintained it ſelfe a Common-wealth ; but after it exceeded

ded this greatnesse; it then fell into the hands of Kings, and could not otherwise have subsisted. This, *Tacitus* in the mouth of *Galba* meant, when he said: *Si immensum imperii Corpus stare ac librari, sine Rectore posset, dignus eram a quo Respublica inciperet.* The body then of the Common-wealth, was growne so vast and great; that it was not able to suffer liberty: for although to possesse much, be commonly good; yet it is not alwayes good for every body: as we see in wrestlers; whose Constitutions, (as witnesseth Hippocrates) have no greater Contestation, then with their owne goodnesse; as being full of so many good humours; that thorough the excesse of them, they are not able to exercise their due operations: and therefore necessarily must either breake or be evacuated. And this happens not onely in bodies, but as well also in Kingdomes and Common-wealths: *Trajan* by subduing an infinite number of Provinces; had so enlarged the Empire, that it was come *Ad Maximum quod non*; to a pitch above the proportion of a Monarchie; and perceiving the danger of it; hee had recourse to the Remedy prescribed by Hippocrates; *Quocirca statim bonum habitum solvere oportet*, and giving some of those Provinces Freedome; he Evacuated (I may say) the Empire; like to this was the counsell of *Augustus* (cited by us before) *Addiderat atque Consilium Coercendi intra terminos imperium.* Likewise in Common-wealths, I think none will deny; but that the *Swissers*, the free Cities, and *Lucca*, the onely Common-wealths (after *Venice*) that are at this day in the world, have for no other cause held out so long, and maintained themselves to this time; but because they have not arrived to that bound, of *Maximum quod non magnitudinis*; and their little Greatnesse hath beene their defence, and made them great. Also to the *Venetians*, it hath beene no small helpe for preserving them in liberty; because

they have not exceeded the bound, of *Maximum quod Non*: And therefore the Image in *Daniel*, assoone as it came to have a head of Gold, was struck by a stone falling from the mountaine, and cast downe to the ground. This Image, by many writers, is taken for the Empire, which having Feet of Earth, no sooner come to have Heads of Gold, but they presently fall; seeing the Circulation of this world, is founded upon Ascending and Descending, and that which is the end of Ascending, is the beginning of Descending, as *Aristotle* learnedly teacheth: where he speakes of a Circle; because humane powers are like to shadowes, which never continue at one stay; as *Iob* excellently saith: *Et fugit velut Umbra, & nunquam in eodem statu permanet*; and in another place, *Elevati sunt ad modicum, & non subsistunt*, where S. *Gregory* citing that place of the 72. *Psalme*, *Deiecisti eos dum allevarentur*, and that of Saint *Iames*, *Quæ est Vita Vestra? Vapor est ad modicum parens*, and expounding that place of the Prophet *Esay*, *Omnis Caro Fœnum: Carnalis Gloria dum nitet cadit; dum apud se Extollitur, repentino intercepta fine terminatur. Sic namque aurarum flatu in altum stipula rapitur, sed casu concito ad Ima revocatur. Sic ad Nubila fumus extollitur, sed repente in nihilum tumescendo dissipatur. Sic ab infirmis, Nebula descendendo se erigit, sed exortus hanc solis radius, ac si non fuerit, abstergit. Sic in herbarum superficie, nocturni roris humor aspergitur: sed diurni Luminis subito calore siccatur. Sic spumosæ aquarum bullæ inchoantibus fluviis excitatæ, ab intimis certatim prodeunt, sed eo celerius dirumptæ depereunt, quo inflatæ citius extenduntur. Cumque excrescunt ut appareant, Crescendo peragunt, ne subsistant.* I cannot bring a better example, in conformity to this Doctrin, then of *Venice*; which was never in any great danger: but when it was at the greatest, as drawing then neere to the bound, of *Maximum quod Non*; whereupon, if it had not beene for the strength of its scituation, (as Historians

storians say) assisted with the great Prudence of the Senatours, and with the great valour of the Citizens, in defending *Padua*, It had utterly come to ruine. And therefore *Augustus* seeing, *Non aliud Discordantis patriæ remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur*, made himselfe Emperour, wherein notwithstanding Christians must not imitate him, whose duty it is, to set Religion before Country and life, and Common-wealth and all: rather suffering death, then be drawne to commit any wickednesse: and rather then imitate *Augustus*; follow the course of *Marcus Aurelius*, who though he saw his Country upon the point of loosing, and himselfe also, thorough the wickednesse of his Compagnion, yet he tooke all things patiently, and would not put him to death, though it was in his power to doe it. For Conclusion I say, that a Prince ought not to governe his Country by force: although force bee sometimes necessary for correcting of Errours: as *Sallust* teacheth where he saith; *Nam Vi quidem Regere patriam, aut Parentes, quamquam & possis & delicta corrigas; Importunum tamen est.*

Comparatione Deterrima sibi Gloriam quæsiviſſe.

That to Elect a wicked successour, thereby to get glory to himselfe; is a beastly Course.

The seven and thirtieth Discourse.

BY that which *Tacitus* and *Dio* relate, many conceive that *Augustus* made choice of *Tiberius*, whom he knew to be a proud and cruell man, to be his successour; to the end, that the ill conditions of *Tiberius* so much differing from his owne, might turne to his

Glory. I cannot indeed deny ; but that a worse successour, is apt enough to make a lesse evill Predecessour be thought a good one : which *Galba* well knowing, speaking of *Piso* said ; *Nero a pessimo quoque desiderabitur. Mihi ac tibi providendum est ; ne etiam a bonis desideretur.* He seeing, that if a wicked Prince, should come after *Nero* ; his errours would be converted, to the others Glory ; and this is so true, that the holy Spirit, in the mouth of *Ezechiel* said, that the wickednesse of the *Hebrewes*, before the comming of our saviour; made the people of *Sodome* and *Samaria* to seeme Just, which could not certainly happen, but long of the Comparison, *Vivo ego dicit Dominus Deus*, (these are the words of *Ezechiel*) *quia non fecit Sodoma soror tua, ipsa, & filiæ ejus, sicut fecisti tu, & filiæ tuæ*, and a litle after ; *Et Samaria dimidium peccatorum tuorum non peccavit, sed vicisti eas sceleribus tuis, & Justificasti sorores tuas in omnibus abominationibus tuis, quas operata es ; Ergo tu confundare, & porta confusionem tuam, quæ vicisti sorores tuas peccatis tuis, sceleratius agens ab eis. Justificatæ enim sunt a te.* And he that would see a passage more like to that of *Tacitus* ; let him reade those words in *Jeremy*, where he saith ; *Justificavit animam suam aversatrix Israel, comparatione prævaricatricis Judæ.*

But yet this way of acquiring Glory, attributed here to *Augustus*, is not to be imitated, not only of Christians, but not so much as of impious *Barbarians* : seeing there are better and directer wayes, (I meane not, to governe well, but speake onely of a successour) because, if they have children to succeed them in the Kingdome, there will Glory enough accrew to the father, if he give them good education ; whereby they may come to prove good : This *Salomon* affirmes in his Proverbs where he saith, *Filius sapiens lætificat patrem*, or as others read it, *Filius sapiens Gloria patris*, that is, a wise sonne is the honour and Glory of his Father,

and

and keepes him alive, after he is dead: and therefore it is said in *Ecclesiasticus*, *Mortuus est pater ejus, & quasi non est mortuus, similem enim reliquit sibi post se*; and therefore Princes need not desire, their successours should be worse then themselves, seeing they may hope for more glory by them, if they shall be better, and therefore *David* tooke great Joy to heare, that *Salomon* was like to be greater, then himselfe had ever beene: *Sed & Salomon sedet super Solium Regni, & Ingressi servi ejus, benedixerunt Domino nostro Regi David dicentes: Amplificet Deus Nomen Salomonis, super Nomen tuum, & magnificet Thronum ejus super thronum tuum*: rather indeed, a wicked succeſſour is a Prejudice to a good Prince. Therefore writers say, that *Marcus Aurelius* had dyed a happy man, if he have not left *Commodus* his succeſſour; for this cause, many of the Antients (as *Aristotle* relates) were of opinion, that Children living, might make their dead fathers unhappy: in such sort, that he who living was happy, yet could not be called happy, if after his death, hee had ill luck and were unfortunate in his children.

To give therefore his succeſſours good education, is a matter of much honour to Princes, and in case they prove not to have those vertues which are required in a Prince, hee must not suffer Paternall piety to prevaile with him, but wholly abandon, and utterly disinherit them of the royall dignity; (though as *Aristotle* saith) it be hard for a father to doe.

This *Plato* expreſſed in his Common-weath, who ordained, that they should be Princes, who in their Nativity had Gold mingled with Earth, meaning, that if their Sonnes had together with Earth, either Iron or brasse in them, they should not then be admitted to the Kingdome. *Quapropter ipsis Principibus, & Primo & maximo Deus praecepit, ut nullius rei majorem curam custodiamque suscipiant, quam natorum, ut dignoscant quid*

ex quatuor his potiſſimum illorum animis ſit immixtum; & ſi quis ex ipſis naſcatur aneus, aut ferreus, nullo pacto miſereantur, ſed honorem illi naturæ conuenientem, tribuentes, interopifices vel agricolas mittant: and therefore *Moyſes* was contented, that our Lord God, ſhould chuſe *Joſuah*, of another Tribe, to be his ſucceſſour, rather then his owne Sonne. In conſideration whereof, Saint *Hierome* ſaith, *Moiſes amicus Dei, cui facie ad faciem Deus loquutus eſt, potuit utique ſucceſſores Principatus filios ſuos facere, & Poſteris propriam relinquere dignitatem: ſed extraneus de alia Tribu eligitur Ieſus, ut ſciremus Principatum in populos non ſanguini deferendum eſſe, ſed virtute*; and this is the true way for acquiring of Glory: ſo much more, as it is more repugnant to Naturall affection.

And if it happen that in default of children, he be to chuſe a ſtranger for his ſucceſſour, what better can he doe, to get himſelfe glory, then to chuſe a perſon of prudence and vertue, in whom, his Iudgement in chooſing may appeare? and if the Prince living be good; it will encreaſe his glory, that he hath choſen another that is good: if bad, it will leſſen his own ill name, to have choſen a good ſucceſſour. So it happened to *Adrianus*, (as *Iulius Capitolinus* and *Spartianus* relate) becauſe *Antoninus Pius* ſucceeding him by way of Election, and knowing that the Senat meant to burne all the Acts of *Adrianus*, as to whom they were deadly enemies, for the many ſlaughters he had committed of the Nobility, he out of his goodneſſe, pacified the Senat: placed *Adrianus* amongſt the Gods, and erected a Temple to his Name. *Igitur ut ipſe* (ſaid he) *Princeps veſter ero, ſi omnia Acta ejus in quibus eſt Adoptio mea, reſcinditis.* This Glory *Galba* ſought after, when adopting *Piſo*, he ſaid, *Vt nec mea Senectus conferre plus Populo Romano poſſit, quam bonus Succeſſorem.*

Thus

Thus a Father receives honour, by a good Sonne, and Predeceſſours, by good ſucceſſours; whereupon, that great Oratour, who ſpake in praiſe of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, could not find any greater praiſe, then that of his ſonne: *Hoc tibi unum ſufficiat, te filium habuiſſe Alexandrum.*

Tacitus therefore is not to be blamed, as he, that alledgeth not his owne opinion; but relates it onely as the opinion of others: for as for himſelfe, he ſhewes rather, he thought *Auguſtus* worthy to be blamed for it; and he had reaſon, becauſe, though a Prince by chuſing a wicked ſucceſſour, make his owne actions to ſeeme good; yet this is ſo farre from making him praiſe-worthy, that it brings him more diſhonour, as being a concurrent cauſe, of all the Evill his ſucceſſour doth.

Let not men therefore blame *Tacitus*, at all adventure, but conſider, that all that which *Tacitus* ſaith; it is not *Tacitus* that ſaith it, neither the things he relates, are they all to be imitated, no more then all thoſe things which *Moſes* relates, who relates a thouſand villanies of the *Hebrewes*: ſeeing it is the part of *Hiſtorians*, to ſpeake of all things, whether good or bad: the good, to the end we may follow them; the bad, to the end we may avoid them; and this, ſaith *Tacitus* in the third of his Annalls, is the end of an Hiſtorian: *Exequi ſententias, haud inſtitui, niſi inſignes per honeſtum, aut notabili dedecore, quod præcipuum munus Annalium reor, Ne virtutes ſileantur, atque gravis Dictis Factisque ex poſteritate, & Infamia metus ſit.*

Tiberioque

Tiberioque etiam in rebus quas non occuleret, ſeu Natura, ſive adſuetudine, ſuſpenſa ſemper & obſcura verba, and a little after: At Patres quibus unus metus ſi intelligere viderentur, in queſtus, lachrymas vota, effundi.

That a Prince ſhould be both loved and Feared.

The eight and thirtieth Diſcourſe.

FRom the obſcure ſpeaking which *Tiberius* uſed, the ſenatours conceived no little feare, and wiſhed, the Prince would ſpeake in ſuch a manner, that he might be underſtood.

I cannot in truth blame Princes, for ſpeaking obſcurely: ſeeing vulgar and too open ſpeech abaſeth them, and make them vilified: the rather becauſe I ſee our Lord Chriſt, (as Saint *Matthew*, and Saint *Marke* relate) *ſolitus erat loqui in parabolis*, and *Salomon*, for the moſt part, uſed to ſpeake Riddles; whereupon, it may juſtly be ſaid of Princes, who lay themſelves open to all mens view, that which *Salomon* ſaith, in the Canticles: *Oculi tui Columbarum, abſque eo quod intrinſecus latet*, that is, the eyes being beautifull of themſelves, appeare more beautifull, when they are ſhaddowed & covered with ſome Feathers; and ſo the Diſcourſes of Princes, will be ſo much the fairer, as they are in ſome part, covered with a little obſcurity; and therefore *Salomon* in his Proverbs, commends much this kind of ſpeaking, where he ſaith; *Mala aurea in lectis Argenteis, qui loquitur verbum in tempore ſuo.*

But becauſe the obſcure ſpeaking of *Tiberius* was not to this end, but onely *ut intro ſpiceret Procerum mentes*: it neither ought, nor can be praiſed; being in truth, the faſhion

fashion of a Tyrant, and thorough which, those Principall Senatours remained full of feare, who were governed before by *Augustus* with so much love; upon occasion whereof, we will make this discourse, what carriage a Prince should use, to make himselfe, to bee both loved and feared.

It hath beene debated in times past, whether a Prince ought tobe loved or feared of his Subjects, or whether loved and feared both at once, yet no writer hath beene found so void of Judgement, as not to know, that nothing is to a Prince more profitable, then to be loved and feared both together, but that they thinke it a very hard, and almost impossible thing they should meet together. So as many have liked, hee should rather make himselfe be loved, then be feared. I therefore will endeavour to make it appeare, that a Prince shall not doe well, to make himselfe onely to be loved. Secondly, that he shall not doe well, to make himselfe, onely to be feared; and lastly, that he ought at one and the same time, to make himselfe, be loved, and feared, both together: shewing, that not onely this is easie to be done, but impossible that a Prince should be good, if he couple not together these two Extreames.

Concerning the first, this is certaine, that if love come not accompanyed with feare, the Prince in short time, will grow into contempt: which *Moses* understanding, who had not perhaps his equall in mildnesse, yet after, for the love hee bore the people, hee had prayed our Lord God, *Aut dele me de libro tuo, aut parce populo huic*: when he came downe from the mount, hee caused many thousands of them to be cut in peeces, thereby shewing, that together with the love of the Prince, there should be severity, which begetteth feare. Therefore Saint *Austin* saith, *Estote misericordes, pensantes quantum Moses misericordia floruit*

propter

propter populum, pro cujus salute petiit deleri de libro vitæ; & quando iterum zelo rectitudinis, cum obtinuisset Veniam, ait ad populum, Ponat vir gladium super femur suum, Ecce quod vitam omnium cum sua morte petiit, paucorum vita cum gladio destruxit. Intus igne amoris, & foris accensus Zelo Iustitiæ & severitatis; where it is plainly seene, that a Prince ought not onely to be loved, but to bee feared also: seeing love alone of it selfe, is cause of contempt: and therefore *Iob* said: *Si quando ridebam ad eos, non credebant*; & *Lux vultus mei non cadebat in terra*, that is, his Gravity was so great, that though he laughed, yet they stood with feare and reverence: where we must weigh those words; *Lux vultus mei non cadebat in terra*, which according to another sense, in the *Hebrew*, is rendred in Latin, *Lucem vultus mei non abiiciebant*: that is, they despised not my mirth. So as, Feare is so necessary, that Domitian, although terrible to the Senat, as governing with feare, yet after his death, he was wished for againe of all men, seeing with that feare, he kept his owne officers in awe; whereupon it happens sometimes, to bee worse for a Prince, with too much mildnesse, to make himselfe be loved, and therefore the Kingdome of *France*, under *Charles* the simple, and *Charles* the grosse, was (as an Authour writes) most miserable, on the contrary, at the end of *Francis* the first, it was a flourishing Kingdome, although they were milde, and he a sharpe and terrible King; afterward againe, in the time of *Henry* his sonne a most gentle Prince, the treasury was all wasted: *Pertinax* and *Heliogabalus* with their mildnesse, had brought the Empire almost to ruine, when afterward *Severus Africanus*, and *Alexander Severus* raised it up againe, with incomparable Severity. It is not therefore enough for a Prince to be loved, but hee must be feared also.

Concerning the second point, which is, that feare

alone is pernicious to a Prince, is eaſily proved: firſt, from that place in *Geneſis* where *Noe* with his ſonnes going out of the Arke, our Lord God ſaid unto him, *Tremor & Timor veſter ſit ſuper cuncta Animalia terræ*: as though he would ſay, you muſt make your ſelves be feared of beaſts, not of men. And therefore *Moyſes* comming downe from the Mount, with a horny ſplendour, and finding that it made his face ſtrike the people into feare, he covered it with a vaile; whereby he ſhewes plainely, that a Prince ought not to make himſelfe onely to befeared. This alſo our Lord Chriſt ſhewes, who amongſt the firſt precepts he gave his Apoſtles, gave this for one, that they ſhould carry no Rod with them; where S. *Ambroſe* well obſerves, that a Prince ought to governe more with love then feare. And in another place he ſaith, *David Rex, cum omnibus æquabat ſuam militiam, fortis in prælio, manſuetus in Imperio; Ideo non cecidit, quia charus fuit omnibus, & diligi a ſubjectis quam timeri maluit. Timor enim, temporalis tutaminis ſervat excubias, neſcit diuturnitatis cuſtodiam.* And therefore it is ſaid in the Pſalme, *Memento Domine David, & omnis manſuetudinis ejus.* Whereupon S. *Bernard* upon thoſe words of the Canticles, *Dilectus meus mihi, & ego illi qui paſcitur inter Lilia*, amongſt thoſe Lillies where the Spouſe feedeth, reckons gentleneſſe and love, by which he reigned. *Specie tua* (ſaith the Prophet) *& pulchritudine tua, intende proſperè, procede & Regna.*

Therefore love alone is not good, becauſe it cauſeth contempt; and feare alone is not good, becauſe it begets hatred. This the Ancients meant to ſignifie, by the Fable of *Jupiter*, who at the Frogs deſire to have a King, gave them a Blocke, and he not ſtirring, the Frogs deſpiſed him; whereupon *Jupiter* changed their King, and gave them a Storke; but he eating them up, they hated him more then they deſpiſed the other:

by

by this they meant to shew, that a King should not be so gentle, to have more of the blocke then of the man; nor yet so severe, as to resemble a beast, in sucking the blood of his Citizens. A Prince therefore ought to joyne the one with the other; which how easie and necessary it is, may easily be knowne, if we distinguish feare into two kinds: one, a feare which is but a reverence, as a filiall feare is, whereof, the holy Text in *Job* saith, *Vir rectus timens Deum.* The other, a feare which is a terrour; and this is that feare which *Adam* had, when he heard the voyce of our Lord God, *Adam ubi es?* and he answering said, *Vocem tuam Domine audivi, & abscondi me & timui, quia nudus essem.* Secondly, we must distinguish of men; that some are perfect, and some unperfect; which is common also to all Cities, whether great or small.

I say then, that if the men be imperfect, it is fit to make them feare; not the filiall, but the servile feare: and therefore *Esay* saith, *Sola vexatio tantum dabit intellectum auditui:* and *Jeremy*, *Per omne flagellum, & dolorem erudieris Hierusalem.* And *Salomon* in his Proverbs saith, *In labiis sapientis invenitur sapientia, & virga in Dorso ejus, qui indiget corde:* by the Rod is meant feare; and by *Ejus qui indiget corde*, are meant the wicked; who are said to be without heart; as *Osee* the Prophet saith, *Factus est Ephraim, quasi Columba seducta, non habens cor.* With these men therefore, it is fit to use a Rod of Iron to make them feare, being the onely meanes to returne the heart into its place. The Ninivites had removed their hearts out of their proper places: and our Lord God, with his Rod, *Ad quadraginta dies & Ninive subvertetur*, brought them againe into their right places. Because (as *Aristotle* in his Physicks saith) Every thing that is made, proceeds from its like; but every thing that is borne, from its contrary. *Quodlibet non fit a qualibet, sed a suo contrario.*

So

So to beget love, where it is not, we must not use Love, but its contrary, which is feare; and as in Generation the Contrary departs, when the thing is generated; so when Love is once generated, the feare departs, whereupon Saint *Bernard* and Saint *Austin*, Compare feare to the Needle, and love to the Thread, because the Needle brings in the threed, and having brought it in, departs away. A Prince therefore ought to make himselfe be feared, even with Servile feare, by the wicked.

It remaines to shew, how a Prince ought to carry himselfe, towards men that are good and perfect, but having shewed before, that love alone begets contempt, and feare hatred, it is fit, he make himselfe be loved, and feared, both at one time; but not with that servile Feare, which for the most part is cause of Rebellions, as was seene at the time, when our Lord God appeared to the *Israelites* upon the Mount; which begetting in them a great feare, there followed a Rebellion; but with that feare, which is a vertue; For knowing of which feare, it is to be knowne, that feare may have two objects; the one is, some terrible mischiefe; the other is the Person, who hath power to doe the mischiefe; as Saint *Thomas* saith: and because our purpose is not in this place, to speake of the first object, but onely of the second; as speaking of a Prince; I say, that he may be considered, in as much, as he hath power to hurt, or in as much, as he hath will to hurt: if we consider him, in as much as he hath will to hurt, in this manner, he ought not to make himselfe be feared; but leave the subjects to feare him of themselves; So our Lord God would be feared, and not be feared; So Saint *Paul* to the *Philippians* saith, *Cum metu & tremore vestram Salutem Operamini*: See here, Saint *Paul* would have us to feare, not of God, that is, that God hath not a will we should be saved; for, *Deus*

vult omnes homines sulvos fieri, but hee would have us to feare, least our actions be such, as to provoke our Lord God to anger. Therefore in the mouth of the Prophet *Esay* he saith, Feare not, Saint *Paul* saith, we must feare, *Esay* saith, wee must not feare, therefore *Esay* meanes, that we must not feare Gods will, and *Saint Paul* meanes, that we must feare our owne workes. So a Prince ought not to carry himselfe in such manner, that there be feare of his will, because his will should alwayes be for the good of his subjects; but that there be feare in the subjects, of their owne workes.

Againe, if we consider the Prince, the second way, that is, in as much as he hath power to hurt, in this sense, he ought so to carry himselfe, that his Person may be feared, because he that hath power to punish, must have (as Saint *Thomas* saith) such eminent authority, as can hardly be resisted, for if it may easily be resisted, it will be no cause of feare. And therefore oftentimes, though there be no feare of mischiefe from One in eminent authority, yet the Reverence that is borne to eminency, is justly called Feare: So in Saint *Luke*, *accepit autem omnes timor, & magnificabant Deum*. So also that place of Saint *Paul* is to be expounded, *Reddite omnibus Debita: cui Timorem, timorem; cui vectigal, vectigal*; and he that will be feared in this manner, must doe some great and wonderfull things; that men admiring them, may acknowledge his eminency above others; whereupon our Lord Christ, stroke a feare into the Jewes, when they saw him doe such great miracles: *Repleti sunt timore, dicentes, quia vidimus Mirabilia hodie*. And the subjects, though good, need not be greeved to feare the Prince in this manner, this being a vertuous feare, which was in Christ also towards his father; as witnesseth Saint *Thomas* in the foresaid place, *Alensis*, *Bonaventure*, *Gabriel*, and with them the whole Schoole of Divines. So as a Prince ought to make himselfe

himselfe universally to be loved, and generally to be feared: in confirmation whereof, S. *Gregory* saith, *Talis debet esse dispensatio Regiminis, ut his qui præest, ea se circa subditos mensura moderetur, quatenus & arridens timeri debeat, & Iratus amari, ut eum nec nimia lætitia vilem reddat, nec immoderata severitas odiosum.* And in another place, weighing those words of *Job*, *Cum sederem quasi Rex, circumstante exercitu, eram tamen mœrentium consolator.* S. *Gregory* exhorts a Prince to doe, as the Samaritan did, who powred into his wound, that was hurt upon the way, Wine and Oyle, *Ut per vinum mordeantur vulnera, per oleum faveantur.* And the Psalmist saith, *Virga tua, & baculus tuus, ipsa me consolata sunt:* The Rod serving to strike, and the staffe, to defend. This also was expressed in the Arke, in which, together with the Table of the Law, was put the Rod with the Manna; there being necessarily required for observing the Law, love and feare. In signe whereof, our Lord Christ in his transfiguration upon the Mount *Tabor*, appeared in the midst, betweene *Elias*, who to move men, wrought by feare; and *Moyses*, who wrought all by love. And therefore in the Scripture, when the qualities of a Prince are spoken of, alwaies with beauty to make him be loved; there is joyned, Power, to make him be feared. Whereupon in *Salomons Epithalamion*, after he had praised the Bridegroome for his Beauty; *speciosus præ filiis hominum*; he praiseth him also for his strength; *Accingere gladio tuo super femur tuum Potentissime.* So in *Genesis* in the Benediction of *Juda*, and in *Deuteronomy*, in the Benediction of *Joseph*: *Quasi primogeniti Tauri, pulchritudo ejus, cornua Rhinocerontis cornua illius.* And in the second of *Kings*, *Saul & Jonathas amabiles & decori in vita sua, & Aquilis velociores, Leonibus fortiores.* And of God himselfe the Prophet saith, *Decorem indutus est, indutus est Dominus fortitudinem & præcinxit se.* and in

the *Proverbs*, *Fortitudo & decor indumentum ejus:* and in the 28. *Pſalme*, *Dilectus quemadmodum filius unicornium*; that is, though as beautifull, he is worthy to be loved, yet as powerfull alſo he deſerves to be feared.

A Prince then ought to make himſelfe be feared of wicked men, with a ſervile feare, and this he ſhall doe if he duely puniſh them for their faults; and he ought alſo to make himſelfe be feared of good men, with a reverentiall feare: and this he ſhall doe, if he give proofe of his valour, by doing great actions: (as I have ſhewed before) which juſtly make a Prince be feared with reverentiall feare. And becauſe above all things, he ought to procure the love of his ſubjects; we muſt know, that never was any Prince ſo good, whom ſome of his ſubjects did not hate; nor ever any ſo bad, whom ſome of his ſubjects did not love: as may be ſeene in *Tarquinius Superbus*, whom ſome of the principall youth of the City ſo much loved, that they made a conſpiracy in his behalfe. So *Nero* (as *Galba* witneſſed) had many that loved him; *Nero à peſſimo quoque deſiderabitur*. And this happens by reaſon of ſympathy of conditions; there being in all Cities, whether little or great, ſome men that are warlike, and ſome peaceable; ſome that are ignorant, and ſome learned; ſome that are good, and ſome bad: whereupon ſeeing a Prince muſt of neceſſity be either good or bad; war-like, or peaceable; ignorant, or learned; it will follow, that if he be learned, he ſhall be hated of the ignorant; if he be war-like, of the peaceable; if good, of the bad. And this is the work of contraries, whoſe nature being to deſtroy one another, it is as impoſſible that one of theſe ſhould love the other, as it is impoſſible, that one ſhould love his owne deſtruction.

The ſecond difficulty, which makes it hard for a Prince to procure himſelfe to be beloved, is juſtice; which if it be not duely adminiſtred, it makes a Prince odious

odious to all good men; and if it be duely executed, either in civill or criminall cauſes, it will be an occaſion every yeere to get him the hate of many, and even of thoſe that are good, there being few men that like of juſtice, when it goes not on their ſide. Theſe many then, whoſe hatred the Prince is like every yeere to incurre, being multiplied many yeeres, muſt needs at laſt make a mighty number; and from hence, (as I conceive) may be drawne an excellent reaſon how it happens in governments, that the firſt yeere for the moſt part Governours are well beloved; the ſecond yeere, they are hated, and the third yeere deteſted: as every one looking into it, of himſelfe may ſee.

Yet a Prince amidſt all theſe difficulties, muſt not be diſcouraged: Firſt, becauſe he need not care much to be loved of any, but onely of the good: to which purpoſe *Galba* ſaid, it needed not trouble them, to ſee *Nero* beloved of the wicked; but this was a matter that needed regard, to give no occaſion, he ſhould be wiſhed for againe of the good: *Nero a peſſimo quoque deſiderabitur: Mihi ac tibi providendum eſt, ne etiam a bonis deſideretur.* Secondly, the end of a Prince, is as of an Oratour, or of a Phyſitian, who being to introduce a forme in another, and not having it in their power to doe it, yet they have diſcharged their office, if they have applied fit meanes to introduce it: no better a Phyſitian is he that heales, then he that heales not; nor any better Oratour he that perſwades, then he that perſwades not; ſo long as they uſe the fitteſt meanes, he to heale, and this to perſwade. So for our purpoſe, ſeeing love is in him that loveth, in ſuch manner, as honour is in him that honoureth: a Prince ſhall have performed his charge, and done as much as he need to doe, as long as he hath uſed all fit meanes, to procure his ſubjects love, by doing good to all, by maintaining them in plenty, by ſhewing himſelfe farre

from cruelty, by defending them from their enemies: and finally, by making it appeare, that he loves them exceedingly; seeing this is a sure rule, He that will be loved, must love.

Vnum esse Reipublicæ Corpus, atque nullus animo Regendum.

Whether an Aristocracy, or a Monarchy be the more profitable for a City.

The nine and thirtieth Discourse.

A *Sinius Gallus* having too sharply spoken to *Tiberius*, and finding his owne errour, and the Princes indignation; meant with a flattering speech, to cover the one, and pacifie the other: and therefore shewed, that for an Empire to be well governed, it was necessary it should be governed by one alone. And because from this place of *Tacitus* many gather, that he held the government of a Monarchy to be better then that of optimates; I conceive it to be no digression from our purpose, that I shew first, according to my understanding, the truth of this question; and then declare, how this place of *Tacitus* must be understood. And herein, no man need to marvell, that I vary from the opinions, or to say better, from the approved opinions, of many excellent men, as though I meant to vilifie them; but I desire they would take into consideration, the River of *Rhone*, which although it seeme by his course, as though it meant to drown the legitimate sons of the *Celti*, yet indeed it exalts them, and gives a true testimony of their legitimate birth to all that see it. So it will be no small matter, if I with my weakness, can make the others worth appeare the greater.

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To come then to the matter: It is commonly held, and all men almoſt are of opinion, that a Monarchy is the better. For proving whereof, there being two waies; one, Authority: the other, Reaſon: in each of theſe, there will not be wanting meanes ſufficient to make it plaine. In conſidering authority, the firſt that preſent themſelves, are the holy Fathers, S. *Chryſoſtome*, *Juſtin*, *Athanaſius*, *Cyprian*, S. *Hierome*, and finally S. *Thomas* in many places. Secondly, come Philoſophers, naturall and morall: *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Seneca*, *Plutarch*, *Herodotus*, and finally amongſt Poets, *Homer*.

If we come to reaſons, there preſent themſelves an infinite number: and firſt, if we conſider profit, we ſhall finde, (as S. *Thomas* ſaith) that a more profitable government cannot be found, then that of a Monarch; ſeeing the profit & welfare of that which is governed, that is, of Cities and Provinces, conſiſts in nothing but in conſerving of unity, which we call peace: at which, they who governe muſt chiefly aime: and ſeeing there is no government ſo fit to preſerve peace, as that of a King, we cannot chooſe but give it the name, to be the better, and the more profitable. Becauſe peace conſiſts in nothing but unity, which certainely is better had in one, who is by himſelfe one, as a King is; then in thoſe that are many, as Optimates are: as we ſee, a thing which is hot of it ſelfe, is a more efficient cauſe of heating, then that which is but hot by accident, the ſtate of Optimates being never good, but in as much as they who govern it, approach by accidentall union, to be one.

But laying profit aſide, and entring into conſideration, which of them is moſt naturall, who ſees not, that a Monarchy is the moſt? ſeeing nature governes and moves all the parts of our bodies, by one onely which is the heart: likewiſe the ſenſitive ſoule is governed by the rationall; and Bees naturally are governed by

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one that is King: and if Artificiall things be ſo much the better, as they imitate nature; and the Artificers worke be ſo much the perfecter, as it holds ſimilitude with nature; then certainely, muſt every one needs yeeld, that in the multitude of governments that State is the beſt, which is governed by one alone.

Againe, if we looke upon experience, we ſhall find, that in a houſe, there is but one Maſter; in a flocke, but one Shepheard; and in the old Teſtament, the Iſraelites were alwaies governed by one alone, whether under Kings, or under Judges.

But laying alſo this aſide, and comming to examine the power: who ſees not that a Monarchy is farre more potent then an Ariſtocracy, conſidering that of the foure Empires and powers of the World: that is, the Aſſyrians, the Perſians, the Grecians, and the Romans; onely one of them was under Optimates.

Then if we conſider order: where is it more found, then in a Monarchy? where every one is ſubject, but he onely that rules the reſt; there being no order betweene equals, but onely betweene ſuperiour and inferiour.

If then we conſider duration and ſtability, this certainely is moſt found in the government of one alone, ſeeing *Omne Regnum in ſe diviſum deſolabitur*: and every one knowes, that diviſion fals out more eaſily in an Optimacy, then in a Monarchy: as experience hath made it manifeſt in the Monarchy of *Ninus*, which continued without interruption, a thouſand two hundred and ninety yeeres. If then we conſider, which is furtheſt off from diſcords, we may take example in *Rome*, which was never without diſcords, but when it was under Kings.

But laying all theſe conſiderations aſide, it will be proofe enough of this aſſertion, to conſider the ſimilitude, that is betweene the government of God, and

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that of a Monarch, becauſe as he rules all the World, ſo a King rules all his ſubjects.

By theſe reaſons it might be concluded, that a Monarchy, as being moſt profitable, moſt naturall, moſt potent, moſt durable, moſt orderly, moſt free from diſcords, and finally moſt like to the government of God, ſhould without compariſon be better, then a State of Optimates. But ſeeing there are many difficulties in the queſtion, I hope I ſhall have leave to examine the truth of it a little better. And where it may be diſcourſed of in two ſenſes; the ſpirituall, and the temporall: In the ſpirituall, it cannot be denied, againſt *Calvin* and other hereticks, but that a Monarchy is the beſt kind of government that can be given: and of this there needs be no diſputing, being as cleare as the Sunne, both by authority of Scripture, by determination of Councels, by conſent of the Church, and finally by the common opinion of all the Fathers, ſuch a Monarchy having been inſtituted by our Lord Chriſt himſelfe.

But in the ſecond caſe, which is, conſidering it in the temporall ſenſe; I hold the Queſtion may hold diſputation, and be handled politically: where we ſhall not find, all the reaſons that were in the former: becauſe a King, as a King, may erre a thouſand times a day: but the Pope, as Pope, can never erre, as being aſſiſted by the Holy Ghoſt. Whereupon, as it is undoubted, that in the ſpirituall, there cannot a better government be then a Monarchy: ſo in the Temporall, every one may be left to take which ſide he likes beſt. The firſt queſtion being betweene an Iſraelite, and an Egyptian, was conſequently eaſily determined by *Moſes*; but the ſecond betweene the Iſraelite, and the Iſraelite, was very hard to be determined. And therefore as S. *Gregory Nyſſen* well obſerves, by killing the Egyptian, *Moſes* ended that ſtrife, but for

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the ſtrife between the two Iſraelites, he was never able to accord them. So the ſtrife, which we had with Heretickes may eaſily be determined, by killing them with the holy Scripture, but with ſtrifes that grow between our ſelves, are left to every ones free liking: and therefore very hardly can be ended.

He then that would hold an Ariſtocracy to be better then a Monarchy, might eaſily prove it by reaſon, and by authority. By reaſon, becauſe (as S. *Thomas* ſaith excellently well) that government is the beſt, and the moſt profitable, that can beſt procure the unity of the Cittizens: whereupon we muſt neceſſarily confeſſe, that an Optimacy is the beſt; for ſeeing that an univocall riſeth not but from an univocall; and that the unity of the Optimates is more univocall to that unity which is required in the people, then the unity of a Monarch is; therefore alſo it is more fit, and able to produce it: for, the unity of the Prince, is an unity of perſon, and of end: unity of perſon, as much as to ſay unity of number: as being one alone, unity of end, becauſe all his cares are directed to one ſole end, which is the good of his ſubjects; but the unity of the Optimates, is an unity of end, in plurality of perſons, I ſay plurality, but not diſunion; becauſe the Optimates being many perſons, cannot have unity of number, but agreeing in the end which is the good of the City, in this they are one. And the unity of ſubjects ought to be an unity of end, in plurality of perſons: ſo as by this, it manifeſtly appearing that the unity of the Optimates is more univocall with that of the people, then the unity of the King is; therefore conſequently it muſt be granted, that it is more able to produce it. There being two things neceſſary to generation, (as *Cajetan* ſaith) firſt, the diſtinction of that which is generated, from that which generates: the ſecond, that there be a ſimilitude in nature, be-

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tweene the one and the other, becauſe, that which Generates, intends to introduce a thing like to it ſelfe, and therefore (ſaith he) where there is more Identity and ſimilitude in nature, betweene that which Generates and that which is generated, there the generation will be perfitter, and more eaſie, and from hence it comes that the Univocall generation is more excellent then the Equiuocall, and therefore, ſeeing the Identity, betweene the unity of the Optimates, and that of the People, is more then the unity of the Prince, and that of the People; it followes, that the generation ſhall be more noble, more perfit and more eaſie, and the more, ſeeing that unity of a King, which is unity of number, is rather contrary to the union we ſpeake off, becauſe as one in number is a denying of more parts; So unity in number, is an affirming of more parts, rather that one, which is of number, is the ruine of a City; as *Ariſtotle* prooves ſtrongly againſt *Plato*, where he ſaith; *Atqui conſtat, quòd ea ſi procedat, ut una fiat magis Civitas non erit. Eſt enim Civitas multitudo quædam, ſecundum Naturam, quæ dum fit una magis Domus erit ex Civitate, & homo ex Domo. Vnam enim magis Domum cenſemus eſſe quam Civitatem, & hominem unum quam Domum; quare etiamſi poſſet quiſquam hoc facere, tamen non eſſet faciendum, quia perimit Civitatem.* So as, a City ſhould not make it ſelfe one in number, but in diſcipline, as the ſaid *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *Oportet cum Civitas ſit multitudo, per Diſciplinam communem facere.* And although, to ſhew that the unity of a King is better, then that of Optimates; It might be ſaid, that the unity of number ſhewes Perfection; God being one by reaſon of Perfection: and many holding, that in every ſort of Angells, there is one chiefe: as that which concernes their Perfection; yet I could eaſily anſwer with Saint *Thomas*: that one as it implies Negation, addes nothing to the

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Perfection of being ; and if we take one as excluding other things, and as in its formall ſenſe, it ſignifies to be alone and ſolitary : This of it ſelfe expreſſeth no Perfection, but rather many times imperfection, becauſe in God, the being alone by Eſſence, proceeds from Perfection ; but if he ſhould be one in Perſon, it ſhould be an imperfection. So as one, if you take it for ſolitary ; ſignifies not ſo much Perfection, as imperfection.

But if we come to conſider the Naturalnes of this government; we cannot then have a better thing, to make it manifeſt, then the government of our body, which according to the doctrin of *Plato* (with the conſent of *Ariſtotle*) is governed by nature Ariſtocratically, with three faculties, The ſenſitive, the Animall, and the Vitall; the ſenſitive, conſiſting in the Braine, which is the Beginning of all the ſinewes; the vitall, in the heart, the beginning of all the Arteries ; The Animall in the Liver, the Fountaine of all the veines: whereupon every member containing Arteries, Nerves and veines, they conſequently are governed by three, by the liver, by the heart, and by the braine ; and therefore that Doctrine of the heart, which is brought in oppoſition, is falſe, which *Ariſtotle* in his workes of Phyſick, hath many times confuted. And their Reaſon, to ſay a houſe is governed by one alone, is of no force : which rather is a reaſon that makes for us, ſeeing that, as nature, amongſt things that are unequall, as thoſe in a houſe are, hath ordained the Government of one alone, ſo betweene thoſe that are Equall, as it is in a Citty, there ſhould be an Optimacy, which by *Ariſtotle*, in the firſt of his Politicks, is plainly Intimated. Neither is it of any force to ſay, that Bees naturally are governed by one alone, or that the ſenſitive ſoule is governed by the Rationall, or that a Flock is guided by one Shepheard, ſeeing the King of the Bees (as

Pliny

Pliny saith) is much greater then any of the other bees, & the rationall faculty is so much more noble then the sensitive that hardly there can be assigned any proportion: & finally, the shepheard is so beyond comparison superiour to the flock, that it is most reasonable & indeed most naturall, hee should command; and therefore when in a City, there is any one found, so much superiour to all the rest, as the King of the Bees is in greatnesse to the other Bees; or so much in Nobleneſse, as the rationall faculty is to the sensitive, or so much in ability, as the Shepheard is to the flock; then such a one in all reason should be King; as *Aristotle* grants where he saith: *Quemq; tertur distant tantum quantum Animus a corpore, & homo a bestia, per hunc modum se habent*: having said before, *Hic imperans, illa verò parens*: And in another place he saith, if any one in a City, be found so much excelling all the rest, as *Jupiter* excells men; that man by right should be made King: *Sed si quis excellat virtute, quid de eo sit faciendum? Non enim dicendum est, ut talis vir sit de civitate pellendus: atqui neque gubernationi aliorum, talis vir erit subjiciendus; perinde enim est, ac si qui Jovem Gubernare velint.* This very thing God meant to shew, when he gave to man the rule over beasts as *Salomon* Interprets it, when asking wisedome, to the end God should give it him, he said *Et sapientia tua constituisti hominem ut Dominaretur*; as though he would say, as thou hast shewed, in giving Regall Dominion to man, that hee who will governe others, should in wisdome be as much superiour to his subjects, as a man is to Beasts: so you are bound, having made me King over so many People, to give a like proportion of wisedome, as not able otherwise to deserve to be a King.

With this supposition then we may grant, that the government of a monarch is the better, as whereof we have an example in the Pope: but this is to handle the question *Secundu quid*: for if we handle it *simpliciter*, we deny it.

If we come to consider the Power, which is required for Augmentation, I then verily thinke there is

none ſo ignorant, but that he knowes, how much an Optimacy is fitter for augmenting, then a Monarchie, whereof we have Example in *Athens*, which, aſſoone as it freed it ſelfe from the Tyranny of *Piſiſtratus*, It preſently grew to be of ineſtimable greatneſſe. And if you will not ſtand to this Example, then take *Rome*, which was no ſooner freed from Kings, but that it came to ſo great greatneſſe, that it could not be oppreſſed but by it ſelfe. And it availes not to ſay, that of the foure Empires, one onely was a Commonwealth, that is, that of the *Romanes*, and that the other three were Monarchies, as that of the *Aſſyrians*, of the *Perſians* and of the *Gracians*, becauſe if this reaſon were of any force, It would prove, that a Tyranny is the beſt government of all, ſeeing it is then a Monarchie, when the ſubjects are uſed, as Children, and not as the *Perſians* and *Medes* did, and at this day, the *Turke*, who uſeth his ſubjects as ſervants, or to ſay better, as ſlaves.

In comming to conſider duration; I care not to prove, that Optimacy continues longer, then Monarchie, ſeeing this would not ſerve to prove my intent that therefore it is better, for duration as *Ariſtotle* ſaith, encreaſeth not goodneſſe, and therefore one white thing, that continues longer then another, is not thereby whiter then the other; but rather the beſt things of this world, as they are hard to find, ſo being found, they are ſooneſt loſt, as *Galen* ſaith of bodyes, that are come to the height of health; and *Tacitus*, the like of ſtates; whereupon it is no marvell, that the Monarchie of the *Aſſyrians* continued longer, then any Common-wealth ever did, which happened, becauſe Tyranny held a proportion with that People, ſeeing People that are imperfit, are neceſſarily to be governed by a Monarch, and not by Optimates. And therefore our Lord God, alwayes governed the Iſraelites by one alone, becauſe that rude people was not

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able to ſuffer Liberty, as liking better to live under a Tyrant, as they made appeare; when they demanded a King of *Samuel*; for though he threatned them, they ſhould have a Tyrant, yet this made them not give over their demand. So when the Senat of *Rome* granted liberty, to *Paſtagonia* and *Cappadocia*; the *Cappadocians* ſaying they could not live without a King, the Senat was faine to ſend them *Ariobarzanus*, to be their King; whereof *Livie* ſaith, *Barbari quibus pro legibus ſemper Dominorum Imperia fuerunt, quo gaudent, Reges habeant*; and *Ariſtotle* ſpeaking of this ſhewes, that they were by Nature made to ſerve; *Obidenim* (ſaith he) *quia magis aptæ ſunt Natura ad ſerviendum Nationes barbarum quam Græcorum; & eorum qui in colunt Aſiam: quam eorum qui Europam, per ferunt ſervile Jugum æquo animo, & ob hoc Tyrannica ſunt hujuſmodi Regna.* And therefore from hence, there can no argument be drawne, that Monarchie, is a better government then Optimacy, ſeeing (as *Ariſtotle* ſaith) although one Forme of Common-wealth be in it ſelfe better; yet for ſome people, another that is not good, may be more profitable. There might alſo be brought another Reaſon, why Tyrannies are of longer Continuance, then *Ariſtocracies*, a Reaſon, which hath beene intimated, by a certaine Author; and it is becauſe they are more hard to be ſurpriſed, becauſe where all are ſervants, there can be none to lend a hand, to let in ſtrangers, as hath beene often done in *France*, in *England*, and other places: which will alwayes happen, and hath often happened to Monarchies, becauſe ſuch Princes hold their ſubjects rather as Companions, then as ſlaves; and therefore in this point, the *Turke* ſtands ſecure; and if *Alexander Magnus* overcame *Darius*, it was his owne Act. It is indeed true, that as *Monarchies* are more hardly taken then Common-wealths; ſo more eaſily they are held, where common-wealths are eaſily taken, (all the ſubject Cities being male content, & conſequently ready to

assist strangers; but being taken, they are hard to be held by reason of the name of Liberty; which makes them apt every minute to fall into rebellion. Tyranny then is the most durable of all kinds of states, and if the reason above alleaged were of force it would prove it also to be the best, which no man that hath braines will say. But let us come to consider the order of *Optimates*; which is the same, that is in an Instrument of Musick, order so much commanded by all the Holy Fathers, and by all Philosophers; where many Diverse sounds make but one sound, of which order, Saint *Chrisostome* in admiration saith *Et est videre mirabilem rem: in multis unum: & in uno multa.* And then, if they will consider, the unaptnesse it hath to Discords, let him take the City of *Venice* for an example, which for many ages together, hath never had any. And it availes not to say, that where many are, they may be at ods betweene themselves, but one cannot be at oddes with himselfe, for I answer with *Aristotle*, *Quod studiosi viri sunt omnes ut Ille unus.* And the Example of *Rome* is of no force, because when the Discord entred betweene the Nobility and the People, it was not then an *Optimacy* but a mixt Estate: and by reason of the predominating Element, might be called a Popular state, and if ever it were an *Optimacy*, it was in the beginning, in which they lived in exceeding great concord, untill the state came to be corrupted, and here we must advertise, that when we compare a Monarchie with an *Optimacy*, wee compare them in their perfection, and not in their corruption: because it is of the Essence of an *Optimacy*, that all in it should be good men, for else we should dispute Æquivocally.

But to let many other things passe, who knowes not that a City will be better governed by *Optimates*; then by a Monarch? seeing the most vertuous, Governes best, and a King being but one vertuous, and the *Optimates* many vertuous, seeing many know more then

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one, although that one, in some thing may exceed those many, as *Aristotle* excellently shewes in his Politicks, yet if you grant that the Optimates be all vertuous men; you must withall grant, that they are able to governe better, then any King whatsoever; and the rather, because a King deserves then most praise, when he is governed himselfe by good counsellours, and consequently in as much as he is ruled by many, in the manner of Optimates. So our Lord God appointed *Moses*, that he should rule by the counsell of *Iethro*. And this me thinkes might serve to make men capable, that an Optimacie is better, then a Monarchie, yet there is a further Reason. For not onely an Optimacy may Governe better, as being more vertuous; but as being more then a King; who not being able himselfe alone, to governe all the state; *Solus illud non poteris sustinere*; he must of necessity commit it to officers; and who knowes not, with how much more love and Iustice the people are governed, by the Lords themselves being vertuous, then under a King by officers that are strangers; they governing their owne, and these another mans; and therefore *Aristotle* speaking against *Plato* saith; that Propriety, a thing being ones owne, is a speciall cause of love, and makes the greater care be taken of it, *Namque propriis maxime Curant homines*; and if men (as he shewes) use little diligence, in things that are common; they will use much lesse in things that are neither common nor proper: as we see it daily, (though it be but a homely instance) that a husband-man will till land better, that is his owne possession, then that which he is hired to till; as in that, regarding his owne particular profit; in this, the Common: in the one, the present onely; in the other, the present and the future both. And if it be answered, that a King may have good officers; I say, that when we grant the government of a King, to be good, wee meane, that he be good himselfe; but it followes not,

that a good King muſt neceſſarily have good Officers, ſeeing it is not a thing eſſentiall to him: and though we ſhould grant it to be eſſentiall, yet it is not conſtituent, but onely conſequent; though I rather thinke it is neither one nor other; but for the preſent, let it it be as it will: This is moſt certaine, that in Optimacy, for all to be good, is both eſſentiall and conſtituent; for otherwiſe (as I have ſaid) we ſhall but labour in Æquivocals.

Alſo ſecrecy gives an Optimacy right to be preferred before a Monarchy: for proofe whereof, the example of onely the Venetians may ſuffice, who (as *Guicciardine* relates) have alwaies kept their counſels ſecret: a thing which Princes cannot doe; who being to conſult with perſons, not interreſſed in the affaires that are handled, can never be ſure, but that they may revealt them. And though none of theſe reaſons were ſufficient to winne perſwaſion to this opinion, yet this certainly muſt needs be ſufficient, to ſhew, how much the government of God, is more like to an Optimacy, then to a Monarchy: and this will be eaſily ſhewed, becauſe our Lord God operates *Immediatione virtutis*; and is, in all things, *Immediatione ſuppoſiti*: to which kind of operating and being, the Optimates approach neerer, then the Monarch; who muſt of neceſſity make uſe of Officers, as not able being but one, to be himſelfe in all places: whereby it often happens, that a State is more governed by the Officers vertue, then by the vertue of the Prince. But the Optimates being many, may all together doe that of themſelves, which a Prince doth together with officers, and may governe the State by their owne vertue, and conſequently operate *Immediatione virtutis*: yet I meane it, in the manner, that a ſecond cauſe can operate: knowing well, not onely in Theologicall verity, but alſo in Philoſophicall doctrine, that all vertue proceeds from

Heaven

Heaven: as *Ariſtotle* in his Meteors teacheth us, where he ſaith, *Oportet hunc mundum inferiorem, ſuperioribus lationibus eſſe contiguum:* and therefore in a certaine manner, the government of Optimates is more like to that of God. And it availes not to ſay, that our Lord God is but one alone, that governes the whole world; becauſe in him is one Eſſence, indeed one Will, one Soule, one Intellect onely; but then in three Perſons really diſtinct, in three *Suppoſiti*, in three *Hypoſtaſes*, in three Subſtances; (as ſubſtance is diſtinct from Accidents, which are *In alio tanquam in ſubjecto.*) And finally in three Subſiſtences, as ſubſiſtence ſignifies *Eſſentiam per ſe ſubſiſtentem*: which three Perſons, doe in ſuch ſort governe the univerſe, that although the workes of Creation be attributed to the Father, the workes of Wiſedome to the Sonne, the workes of Love and Grace to the Holy Ghoſt; yet all the three concurre equally in all workes *ad extra*, which are common to them all. The Univerſall therefore is governed by three Perſons with one will alone: and the Divine Unity, is an unity of end in plurality of Perſons, ſuch as we have ſhewed the unity of Optimates to be. And this is that unity, which our Lord Chriſt, deſires ſhould be in us, as being like his owne, as he ſheweth in S. *John*, where he ſaith, *Pater Sancte ſerva eos in nomine tuo* (ſpeaking to his Father) *quos dediſti mihi quid ſint unum ſicuti & nos.* And a little after, *Non pro eis rogo tantum, ſed & pro eis qui credituri ſunt per verba eorum, in me; ut omnes unum ſint, ſicut tu Pater in me, & ego in te.* So this is a cleere Text, and by every one interpreted to be meant of that unity, which ought to be in all the faithfull, which our Lord God would have to be like the unity of the Divine Perſons: and as in them there is a reall diſtinction of perſons in unity of Eſſence; ſo in the many faithfull, there ought to be one Spirit, one love, one will. They then that have plurality of perſons

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in one will, are in that manner one, as the Father, the Sonne and the Holy Ghoſt are, as in the Goſpell our Lord Chriſt expounds it.

And now who is he, that by the force of ſo many reaſons, will not confeſſe, that an Optimacy, as being more profitable, more Noble, more potent, more naturall, more ſecret, more concordant: and finally more like to the government of God, is farre a better kind of ſtate then Monarchy.

As for authorities, I commonly make no great reckoning, but only of thoſe which I am bound to beleeve, by commandement of the holy Church; other authorities muſt convince by reaſon: and this leave S. *Auſtin* gives me, where he ſaith, *Neque quorumlibet diſputationes quamvis Catholicorum & laudatorum hominum velut Scripturas Canonicas habere debemus; ut nobis non liceat, ſalva Honorificentia, quæ illis debeatur hominibus, aliquid in eorum ſcriptis improbare, atque reſpuere, ſi forte invenerimus quod aliter ſenſerint, quam veritas habet, divino adjutorio, ut ab aliis intellecta vel a nobis. Talis ego ſum in ſcriptis aliorum, quales volo eſſe intellectores meorum.* And in another place he ſaith; *Sacræ Scripturæ eſt adhibenda fides, aliàs autem Scriptores licet nobis impugnare.* But becauſe it becomes not my youth and weakneſſe, to ſtand in defiance with ſo many excellent and worthy men; I will endeavour to make it appeare, that ſome of the Authours cited before for the contrary, ſpake not in our ſence; and that ſome of them ſpeake of our ſide; ſome of them irreſolutely, and ſome again, with paſſion.

Beginning then with the holy Fathers; I ſay, they ſpake in another ſence, meaning it of the ſpirituall Monarchy: and though many times they ſpeake generally, which may reach as well to a temporall Monarchy, yet this they did to the end, that Heretickes ſeeing it granted them, in the government of Cities, an

Optimacy

Optimacy to be better then a Monarchy, should not from hence take occasion to affirme the like of the spirituall Monarchy. And this is a course, that hath been much used by the holy Fathers, who sometimes have not yeelded to things most cleere and evident, onely because they would not give hereticks occasion, by ill interpreting them, to make simple people encline to their opinions. It is a matter cleere and evident, and granted by all Divines, that in God there are three Hypostases, and yet many of the holy Fathers, and particularly S. *Hierome*, have not been willing to grant it; for no other reason, but least Catholicks granting three Hypostases, hereticks should thereupon make simple people beleeve, that in God there were three Essences: and this interpretation is made of it, by all the Doctours upon S. *Thomas*.

Leaving then the opinion of these Fathers, who speake in another sense, let us come to Philosophers; where I cannot but account my assertion safe; having *Aristotle*, *Plato*, and *Pythagoras* of my side. And it availes not to say, that *Aristotle* in his Ethicks understands it one way; and in his Metaphysicks another: seeing *Aristotle* when he speakes of the same things in divers Bookes, speakes of them divetsly; and Arts and Sciences consider oftentimes the same things, and yet not in the same manner. A Philosopher and a Physitian, both of them consider the same body; but a Physitian considers it as it is capable of healing, and a Philosopher as it is capable of motion. So as I never make reckoning of the authority of *Aristotle*, but in places, where he handles *Ex professo*; because many times, he discourseth in one manner morally in his Ethicks; and in another manner diversly in his Politickes; so in his Rhetoricks, he speakes of felicity in one manner, and in his Ethicks in another. In his Physicks he discourseth as a Philosopher one way, and another way in his Problemes.

blemes. The authority then of *Ariſtotle* in matters Politicall, muſt be taken from his Politicks; where I am much deceived, but he is of my opinion: though all men cite him for the contrary; I know not how he could poſſibly ſpeake more plainely, then where in his Politicks he ſaith, *Si ergo plurium Gubernatio bonorum autem virorum omniæ Optimatium dicitur, unius autem Regnum, aptabilius eſſet civitatibus ab optimis Gubernari, quam a Rege.* And in a thouſand other places, whereof ſome are cited here and there in my Diſcourſe; and other, every one may looke out of himſelfe, being all ſo cleere that they have no need of my interpreting them. It is true indeed, that once he was tranſpoted to ſay, that the Regall government is the beſt of all; becauſe a Tyranny is the worſt: but he ſpake then in *Idæa*, meaning if there could be found one as much ſuperiour to others, as God is to men: and therefore in another place, where he leaves his *Idæa*, and comes to *Facti*, he ſaith, that all Kings are tyrants: ſeeing there cannot any one be found, ſo much ſuperiour to others in goodneſſe, as that he ſhould be worthy to command alone. *Non ſiunt nunc amplius Regna* (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) *ſed ſi qua ſiunt, Monarchiæ, & Tyrannides magis ſunt; Ob id quia Regnum ſpontanea Gubernatio eſt, ac Majorum proprie, & plurimi pares ſunt, neque uſque adeo præſellentes, ut ad magnitudinem, dignitatemque hujus gradus ſe poſſint attollere.* And then that reaſon, which *Ariſtotle* brings, *Corruptio bona peſſima*, is falſe; and is not to be underſtood as men commonly take it. To prove it to be falſe, is eaſie, ſeeing not onely *Plato*, but *Ariſtotle* himſelfe ſaith, that the government of Optimates, is better then the popular: yet in the ſecond of his Politicks he ſaith, that the worſt formes of government, are a Tyranny, and a Democracy; ſo as if that reaſon were true, the corruption of Optimates ſhould be worſe then that of the people. Beſides I ſhould alwaies hold, that the corruption

ruption of an Optimacy is worſe then that of a Monarchy; ſeeing an evill is ſo much worſe as it is multiplied: ſpecially, being impoſſible that thoſe few ſhould ever be in concord. And in truth, this reaſon may be ſtrongly fortified by example; ſeeing in the government of *Cæſar*, *Pompey*, and *Craſſus*; and in that of *Lepidus*, *Anthony*, and *Auguſtus*, both of them compriſed under the worſt forme of a few, aſſigned by *Ariſtotle*; the Commonwealth of *Rome*, was more torne and waſted then under *Nero*, or any other Tyrant whatſoever. Then againe, the propoſition is not ſo to be underſtood, but thus, that an evill will appeare ſo much worſe, as a man hath beene accuſtomed to a greater good, as it would be a greater evill, to a Prince who hath alwaies lived deliciouſly, to be caſt into priſon, or into ſervitude, then to a Husbandman that hath beene uſed to digging and hardneſſe; becauſe in the Prince is corrupted a greater good: but in *Genere ſuo*, the ſame evill is all one, to a Husbandman, and to a Prince. Thus much by way of digreſſion.

To returne to our purpoſe. As concerning *Plato*, although he be alledged for the contrary, yet ſeeing he is but wavering, and ſpeakes diverſly; ſometimes, as in his Dialogues of a Common-wealth, that an Optimacy is the beſt; and ſometimes as in his Dialogues of a Kingdome, that a Monarchy is the beſt: and oftentimes, that a government mixt of People and Tyrant is the beſt: we ſhall doe well to waive his words, and have recourſe to that he ſhewed in deeds, as better expreſſing mens minds then words. And *Plato* being aſked of *Dio*, how a Common-wealth might beſt be governed, he found fault with Monarchy, and counſelled him to bring in Optimacy: by which it appeares, that this indeed, was his very opinion. Now for *Pythagoras*, we ſay, The Pythagorans endeavoured all they could, to bring into *Italy* the government of Optimates: and

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if it ſucceeded not, yet that happened not for want of judgement, but of forces. Then for *Plutarch*, if he underſtood it otherwiſe, we may ſay he had reaſon, as being the Schoolmaſter to an Emperour; and therefore ſhould have ſhewed himſelfe very ſimple, to blame a Monarchy. As for *Homer*, he no doubt is moſt fit to be brought in proofe of that, which I my ſelfe in another Diſcourſe, have reſolved; which is, that an Army indeed, ſhould be governed by one alone, the Verſe which is commonly alledged out of *Homer*, being ſpoken by *Agamemnon* to the Army. And laſtly, *Herodotus* alſo had reaſon to conclude, that amongſt the Perſians, a Monarchy was a fitter government then an Ariſtocracy; becauſe the Perſians were a rude imperfect Nation, as we have ſhewed in another place.

But becauſe the moſt of the Arguments, brought againſt my opinion, are taken out of a booke of S. *Thomas*, intituled, *De Regimine Principis*: I deſire men would take notice, that I goe not about, to impugne the Doctrine of that Saint, of whom I have made choice for my Advocate with God, and for my Maſter in all Sciences: but the truth is, that booke is none of S. *Thomases*, as is eaſily proved, ſeeing in that booke many perſons are ſpoken of, which lived not till long after S. *Thomas* his time, as in the 20. Chapter of the third Booke, *De Regimine Principis*, it is ſaid, that *Adulphus* ſucceeded *Rudolphus* Count of *Habſpurg* in the Empire, which hapned in the yeere 1292. full eighteen yeeres after S. *Thomas* was dead; and in many other places, which for brevity I omit. But let the booke be whoſe it will, there is nothing in it againſt my opinion; ſeeing he meanes onely, that a Monarchy is the better, where the people are imperfect: and this is no more, then what I have ſaid my ſelfe. As in his fourth book, and eighteenth Chapter he ſaith, *Quedam autem Provincie, ſunt ſervilis nature, & tales Gubernari debent*

Principatu

Principatu Deſpotico; Includendo in Deſpotico etiam Regale, qui autem Virilis animi, & audacia Cordis, & in Conſidentia ſua, Intelligentiæ ſunt; tales regi non poſſunt, niſi Principatu Politico; communi nomine extendendo ipſum ad Ariſtocraticum. This Text ſufficiently ſhewes the Authours opinion, and it differs not from mine.

As for the authority of *Tacitus*, before alleadged; it is eaſily anſwered, if we conſider, that he ſpeaks not thoſe words as his owne opinion: but by the mouth of *Aſinius Gallus*, who having offended the Prince before, meant afterward by flattering words to pacifie him.

In the laſt place I advertiſe, that I counſell not People to change their government, though it be not an Optimacy; but rather, I like that every Country ſhould keepe the forme of government they have; *Ferenda Regum Ingenia* (ſaith *Tacitus*) *neque uſui crebras mutationes*; and in another place, *Ulteriora mirari, Præſentia ſequi: bonos Imperatores Voto expetere, qualeſcunque tolerare*, becauſe to alter the forme of government, is a miſchievous thing: not onely when it is good; but even when it is bad; whereupon it is better to endure a Tyrant, then to riſe up againſt him: for if he ſhould prevaile, he would grow more cruell, as having beene provoked; and if he ſhould be put downe, there would grow a thouſand differences about ordering the government: and oftentimes he, that was the forwardeſt to put downe the Tyrant; would be the readieſt to be Lord in his place, and would then governe the more cruelly, for feare to be put downe, as his Predeceſſour was. And this is his Doctrin, that made the Booke *De Regimine Principis*. Let People therefore keepe that forme of government they have; and remember that notable Aphoriſme of Hippocrates, *Conſueta longo tempore, etiamſi deteriora, Inſuetis minus moleſta eſſe ſolent.*

Laſtly I advertiſe, that governments would be proportioned to the Nature of the People; and therefore in ſome places a Monarchie may do well, where an

Optinacy would not ; whereupon, we ſee many Cities in *Italie*, as *Perugia*, *Florence*, *Siena*, *Bolonia*, & others, which never were in peace, till they came to be under a Prince.

Nec ideo Iram ejus lenivit pridem invisus, tanquam ducta in matrimonium, Vipsania Marci Agrippæ filia, quæ quondam Tiberii uxor fuerat; pluſquam Civilia agitaret.

That it is a great helpe for attaining a Kingdome, to have a wife of the blood Royall: and in what danger a Prince is, that hath none but daughters.

The Fortieth Diſcourſe.

HAving at this time, no conveniency to Diſcourſe upon all the Bookes of *Tacitus*: I am forced to take all occaſion, though never ſo ſmall, to handle thoſe things, which more properly would be treated of in another place; I ſhall therefore deſire my reader, that if in theſe Diſcourſes, I open many Sentences of *Tacitus*, which might fitter be opened ſomewhere elſe; it may be rather attributed, to defect of occaſion, then to want of Judgement.

This Paſſage of *Tacitus*, in which *Tiberius* ſhewed himſelfe doubtfull of *Aſinius Gallus*, that *Pluſquam Civilia agitaret*, as having taken one to wife, that had beene his wife before: gives me occaſion, firſt to ſhew there is great reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch, as get them wives of the blood Royall; as being a ſpeciall helpe for attaining the Empire, and having attained it, to maintaine it. Secondly, to ſhew the danger a Prince is in, that hath none but Daughters; and laſtly to ſhew the courſe he ought to hold, that would ſecure himſelfe in theſe caſes. *Saul* had reaſon to doubt *David*, having taken his daughter *Michol* to wife, and knowing this important point of ſtate; he ſought by a thouſand impertinencies to free himſelfe, but being forced at laſt to give her to him, the

Scripture

Scripture relates, that he then began to feare *David* exceedingly, whereupon it is said, *Dedit que ei Saul Micholl filiam suam*, and it followes, *Michol autem diligebat eum, & Saul cæpit timere David.* The most wise *Salomon* who also knew this danger, when *Bersabee* unadvisedly asked *Abisac* the *Shunamite* for *Adoniah*, answered, *Quare postulas Abisac Shunamite Adoniæ? Postula ei & Regnum*; and as he denyed to *Adoniah* his wife, so *Tiberius* denied to *Agrippina* her husband, whereof *Tacitus* speaking, saith; *Cæsar non ignarus, quantum ex Republica peteretur, ne tamen offensionis aut metus manifestus foret, sine reponso, quanquam Instantem reliquit.* Likewise the same *Tiberius* knew, that when *Seianus* demanded *Livia*, who had beene the wife of *Drusus*, it was as much as to demand the Kingdome, and therfore denyed her to him, saying *Falleris enim Seiane si te mansurum in eodem Ordine putas, & Liviam quæ Caio Cæsari, mox Drusi, nupta fuerat, ea mente acturam ut cum equite Romano senescat.* It is no marvell also, if *Vitellius* shewed to be afraid of *Dolobella*, as being in the same case *Tiberius* was with *Asinius Gallus*, having taken her to wife, who had beene his wife before; *Vitellius metu & odio* (saith *Tacitus*) *quod Petroniam uxorem ejus mox Dolobella in matrimonium accepisset, vocatum per epistolas, vitata Flaminiæ viæ celebritate, divertere Interamnam, atque ibi Interfici Iussit.* And therefore *Phalti* shewed great iudgement, who when *Micholl* marryed before to David, was given him by *Saul*, yet he never touched her, but (as *Rabbi Salomon* saith) laid a sword betweene *Micholl* and himselfe, when he was in bed with her, to keepe him from touching her: and indeed it was well he did so, seeing no sooner was *Saul* dead, but that *David*, not thinking himselfe King, if his wife were married to another, said to *Abner*, *Non videbis faciem meam antequam adduxeris Micholl filiam Saul.*

This therfore is a special help, for attaining a kingdom; & our Lord God, although he be able of himselfe, to accomplish whatsoever he pleaseth; yet as willing to make

uſe of ſecond cauſes; he cauſed *David*, to the end he might more eaſily attaine the Crowne, to which hee was deſigned *Ab æterno*; and to which *Samuel* had anoint-ted him, to take to wife a daughter of *Saul's*. And *Salomon* who was all wiſedome and prudence, ſhews it us himſelfe and finally the moſt ſubtile *Seianus*, having an intent to get the Empire, knew this way to be, if not neceſſary, at leaſt moſt profitable.

Thus my intention is proved by Examples, but becauſe there is more force in Reaſons to move the underſtanding; and therefore Philoſophers never ſpeak, but they bring their reaſon; I have therefore ſought out one, which I have found, me thinkes, in *Ariſtotle*, in his Books of generation; where ſpeaking how Elements are tranſmuted, he ſaith: *In Elementis habentibus Symbolam qualitatem, facilior eſt tranſitus.* As the Earth which is cold and dry, is more converted into water, which is cold and moiſt; then into aire, which is hot and moiſt; as agreeing with that in one quality, of cold; and diſagreeing with this in both: So in our caſe; the attaining to a Kingdome, being in a private perſon, a tranſmutation more difficult then that of the Elements, it will more eaſily be attained, where there is one ſymbolizing quality, then where there is none.

He therefore is more likely to attaine the Empire, who being himſelfe a privat man, ſhall have a wife of the blood Royall; then he, that both himſelfe and his wife are of private eſtates.

A Second Reaſon (omitting Philoſophicall, to come to a Politicall) is, that people bearing affection to their Prince, more eaſily ſuffer themſelves to be governed, as long at there remaines in the Kingdome any ſpark of his blood. *Darius* a man of exceeding great Judgement, comming from a private man to be a Prince; for confirming him in the Empire, tooke to wife a daughter of *Cyrus*; as knowing, of how great importance it was, to have a wife of that blood, which had been

becue King before ; where of *Iuſtin* ſaith ; *Principio igitur Regni Cyri Regis filiam Regalibus nuptiis Regnum ſumaturus in matrimonium accepit ; ut non tam in extraneum tranſlatum, quam in familiam Cyri reverſum videretur.* The like conſideration had the ſonnes of *Tigranes* ; and if with them, it had not good ſucceſſe, this happened upon other occaſion ; and therefore good cauſe had *Tacitus* to marvell, where he ſaith ; *Nec Tigrani diuturnum Imperium neque liberis ejus, quanquam ſociatis more externo in matrimonium Regnumque.* This brought *Demetrius* to be King of *Macedon* ; that he had *Fila* to wife, who was daughter to the old King *Antipater.*

From this paſſage now ſpoken off, with good conſequence comes in, the ſecond : that a Prince is in great danger, who hath none but daughters : ſeeing if he marry them, hee can never be ſecure, that his ſonne in law will not take the Kingdome from him : for the facility, we have ſhewed to be by this occaſion.

To meet with this danger, many have taken divers courſes : the firſt hath beene to marry them to meane men ; and ſuch, as may have no thought of comming to the Empire, before the time ; becauſe ſuch a one ſeemes rather likely to be aſſiſtant to the Prince, in his affaires ; ſeeing he may juſtly hope for more faithfulneſſe from a Sonne in law, then from ſtrangers ; and need not make doubt of a perſon, that is not of any Noble Lynage. This conceit was in *Auguſtus* ; and *Tacitus* expreſſeth it in the Perſon of *Tiberius* ; *At enim Auguſtus filiam ſuam Equiti Romano meditatus eſt. Mirum hercule, ſi cum in omnes Curas diſtraheretur ; Immenſumque attolli provideret, quem Conjunctione tali ſuper alios extuliſſet Cæſon Proculeium, & quoſdam in ſermonibus habuit ; Inſigni tranquillitate vitæ, nullis Reipublicæ negotiis permixtos.*

This indeed would be no ill courſe, ſo long as thoſe perſons of meane condition, be not of a ſpirit to aſpire to the Empire, ſuch as thoſe named by *Tiberius* were ; in whom, thoſe words of *Tacitus* are to be conſidered : *Tranquillitate*

quillitate vitæ: as though he would ſay, a man free from audacious & haughty thoughts, and ſuch may ſafely and without danger be advanced to honour. Whereupon *Ariſtotle* in his Politicks, meaning to teach, what kind of men may ſafely be raiſed & made great, he ſaith, *Quod ſi quę extolleręoporteat, non tamę eum qui ſit nobilis audaxq; nam hujuſmodi homines aptiſſimi ſunt, ad inuadendū circa reſonines.* And if *Auguſtus* gave her afterwards to *Agrippa, Ignobilem loco bonum Militia, & victoriæ ſocium*: this happened becauſe he could not chooſe but feare *Agrippa*; whereupon he was forced, either to put him to death; a thing moſt ſcandalous not onely in a Chriſtian, but even in a Heathen; or at leaſt to put him in ſome certaine hope of cõming to the Empire. This, *Dio* in the mouth of *Mæcenas* teacheth us, who ſpeaking of *Agrippa* ſaith, that when a Prince makes a ſervant too great, and advanceth him too highly, giving him exceſſive and unlimitted authority, he hath then no way to ſecure himſelfe, but either to kill him, or by ſome match to make him his kinſman.

Cyrus alſo followed this courſe, who married his ſiſter to *Sibares*, a perſon of moſt baſe eſtate: & as he took the ſame courſe that *Auguſtus* did, ſo it was upon the ſame occaſion that *Auguſtus* had, whereof *Juſtin* ſaith, *Sybarem Cæptorum quem juxta nocturnum viſum ergaſtulo liberaverat comitemque in omnibus rebus habuerat* (all one with thoſe words (*Victoriæ ſocium*) *Perſis præpoſuit, ſororemque ſuam ei in matrimonium dedit*. And becauſe *Galba* tooke not this courſe with *Otho*, which *Cyrus* tooke with *Sybares*, and *Auguſtus* with *Agrippa*; It loſt him the Empire, as in the firſt booke of *Tacitus* Hiſtories, is to be ſeene.

But yet in truth, this courſe ſeems to me both very dangerous, and very uncertaine, becauſe although he to whõ their daughter or other of their blood is married, be himſelfe a man ignoble and of little ſpirit, yet he may have a ſonne, that may reſemble his grandfather more then his father. *Aſtyages* was of this opinion, and put it in practice, doubting the future husband of his daughter,

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and no leſſe, the nephew that ſhould be born of them: *Neque Claro viro* (ſaith *Juſtin*) *neque viri dedit filiam, ne paterna maternaque nobilitas Nepotis animum extolleret: ſed de gente obſcura tunc temporis Perſarum Cambyſi mediocri viro in matrimonium tradidit.* And ſee how vaine his conceit was; ſeeing of her was born *Cyrus*, who in few yeers took the Kingdome from his grandfather *Aſtyages* by force.

Again this courſe takes ill ſucceſſe oftentimes, through the haughtineſſe of the women, who though married to men of meane ſpirits, and quiet diſpoſitions, yet ſtirre them up, and provoke them to doe things which of themſelves they would never doe, or at leaſt, not doe ſo ſoon. *Tullia* the daughter of *Servius* was one of theſe, who impatient to wait upon ſucceſſion, forced in a manner her husband *Orontes Tarquinius*, to enter upon the Kingdome, with the death of her father; thinking it but fit, that being borne of the Blood-Royall, ſhe ſhould be able both to give and to take away the Kingdome at her pleaſure, whereof ſhe oftentimes complained, *Ipſa Regio ſemine orta, nullum momentum in dando adimendoque Regno faceret.* Thus *Tarquinius* by the inſtigation of this infernall fury, got poſſeſſion of the Kingdome: and it made *Servius* no whit the ſafer, that he had married his daughter to *Orontes Tarquinius*, a man (as *Livy* reports) of a mild and peaceable diſpoſition, *Mitis ingenii Iuvenem.*

To be briefe, the daughters of Kings, either cannot, or know not how to live in a private eſtate. And therefore *Damarata* the daughter of *Hiero* King of *Syracuſa*, and married to *Andromadorus*, with ſuch violence inſtigated her huſband, that ſhe forced him extremely againſt his will, to take poſſeſſion of the Kingdome; which *Livy* ſhewing, where he alledgeth the reaſon, why *Andromadorus* was moved to ſeaze upon the Kingdome ſaith, *Qui ſeſſus tandem uxoris vocibus, monentis nunc eſſe tempus occupandi Regnum.*

A ſecond way uſed by ſome, for freeing themſelves of this danger, hath been to make ſuch women to enter

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into Monasteries, or to speake after the custome of the Ancients, into Temples, and so remove them from their husbands and sonnes, of whom there might be feare: to the end, that they in such places observing chastity, the Princes might live secure from the one and the other. This course was followed by *Amulius*, who having driven out *Numitor*, and killed his sonne; he made his daughter who only remained, under colour of honour to become a vestall Virgin, thinking by this meanes to secure himselfe, both from her, and from any whom she should marry, and from any sonnes that should be born of her: where of *Livius* saith, *Fratris filia Rheæ Silviæ per speciem honoris cum vestalem eam legisset perpetua virginitate spem partus adimit*. But neither did this course do *Amulius* any good: for of her were borne *Romulus* and *Remus*, who deprived him of his Kingdome.

I finde therefore another way perhaps better: and it is to keepe these women at home with him, of whose husbands or sonnes there may be any doubt, bearing many Princes in hand, he meanes to marry her to them; but in the meane time, not to bestow her upon any: for by this meanes, not onely they shall be safe from any danger of their owne, but from any also that may arise by enemies, either forraine or at home: seeing out of this hope, every one will be ready to defend them; and where by marrying her, they might have one defendour indeed, but him with danger, now holding them all at a bay, they will have many defendours without danger. This course was notably put in practice by the Duke of *Burgundy*, who (as *Argenton* relates) having one onely daughter, he Promised her to the Duke of *Guyenne*, and to *Nicholas* Duke of *Calabria*, and to *Philibert* Duke of *Savoy*; and finally, to *Maximilian* Duke of *Austria*: and (as *Argentone* verily thinks) never meant to marry her to any at all, as long as himselfe lived. And in truth, if this Duke had carried himselfe as wisely in other things as in this, he had never so foolishly overthrowne himselfe, as he did.

Quippe

Quippe Auguſtus ſupremis ſermonibus cum tractaret, quinam adipiſci Principem locum ſuffecturi abnuerent, aut impares vellent; vel iidem poſſent cuperentque: M. Lepidum dixerat capacem, ſed aſpernantem; Gallum Aſinium avidum, at minorem: L. Arruntium non indignum, & ſi caſus daretur, auſurum.

Whether it be better to refuſe Dignities, or to ſeeke after them.

The one and fortieth Diſcourſe.

AMongſt the laſt ſecrets of State, with which *Auguſtus* before his death acquainted *Tiberius*, he propounded three for the Empire, in a ſeverſe manner: One that deſired it, but was unworthy: Another that was worthy, but deſpiſed it: A third able to diſcharge it, and if occaſion ſerved, would attempt it: Of which three, when *Auguſtus* dyed, there was none left living but *Marcus Lepidus*, who was the man that was worthy of it, but deſpiſed it. *Omnéſque præter Lepidum, variis mox criminibus ſtruente Tiberio, circumventi ſunt.* We ſhall not need to examine which of theſe would have done beſt, in the caſe propoſed by *Tacitus*, but rather conſider the like perſons in a Dignitie or Office, which the Prince ſhould give. We will therefore examine, Firſt, which is beſt; either to deſerve an Honour, and deſpiſe it; or elſe not deſerving it, to ſeeke it. Secondly, whether hee that deſerves ought to ſtay till the Prince offer it; or elſe put himſelfe forward by ſome honeſt wayes to obtaine it.

Concerning the firſt: It ſeemes, that as to deſire Honours, of which one is not worthy, is a preſuming of himſelfe, and as an act of Pride, is worthy of blame;

So not to accept thoſe Honours, of which a man is worthy, as being an act of Humility, is exceedingly to be commended.

But if I ſhall ſpeak my minde freely, I conceive that he is more to be blamed, and commits a greater errour; and deſerves the Princes diſpleaſure more, who refuſeth Honours out of contempt, then he that ſeekes them without merit; becauſe the one by deſiring them, ſhews he holds them in great account; the other by ſlighting them, ſhews he makes no reckoning of them. Whereupon, as contemning is odious to a Prince, and valuing pleaſeth him; ſo more diſtaſtfull muſt he needs be, that being worthy rejects an Honour, then he that ſeekes it, and is not worthy: And this is Saint *Chryſoſtomes* Doctrine, where hee ſaith, *Quare judicio quidem meo, qui iſtos deſpiciunt, contemnunt que, multo ſceleratiores, & pejori ſupplicio digni fuerint, quam fuerit Dathan unà cum ſuis omnibus. Illi enim, tametſi Principatum ad ſe non ſpectantem ſibi vindicabant; tamen miram quidem de eo Principatu animo opinionem conceperant: Id quod declaravit, ingens rei concupitæ ſtudium.* And a little after: *Neque enim perinde eſt ad deſpicientiæ rationem ſubducendam, honorem aliquem indebitum appetere, & tot tantaque bona faſtidire: verum facinus hoc tanto eſt illo gravius, quanto inter ſe diſſident intervallo, Faſtidium & Admiratio.* So as he not onely incurres the Princes diſliking, but deſerves alſo his reprehenſion; ſeeing he that ſeekes a Dignitie without deſert, comes within compaſſe of being proud by admiring; where he that deſerving it deſpiſeth it, is as proud as the other, if not more, as counting himſelfe worthy of greater honours; and while he deſpiſeth honours equall to his merits, hee falls into as great a degree of preſumption as the other, and is guilty of contempt beſides. This *David* underſtanding, although hee knew he could not fight with *Goliah* in armour, yet

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(as *Robert Abbat* obſerves) to the end hee might not ſeeme to deſpiſe the honour the King offered him; he put on *Sauls* Armor, and tryed whether he could uſe it. *Accinctus ergo David gladio ejus ſuper veſtem ſuam, cœpit tentare ſi armatus poſſet incedere; non enim habebat conſuetudinem, dixitque David ad Saul, non poſſum ſic incedere:* and ſo hee laid away thoſe Armes thorow impoſsibility, which if he had laid away thorough contempt, it might have made him odious. *Marcus Fabius*, when the Senate offered him the honour of Triumph, refuſed to accept it, and thereby got the greater glory: whereof *Livy* ſpeaking, ſaith, *Adeo ſpreta in tempore gloria, interdum cumulatior redit:* where the word *In tempore* is to be noted; as though hee would ſay, if he had refuſed it at ſome other time, he might be thought to refuſe it out of pride, as accounting the honour too little for his merits: whereupon ſee (as *Dio* relates) that *Cæſar* never refuſed any honour the Senate offered him, to the end they might not thinke him proud.

Another errour alſo hee falls into, that deſpiſeth a Dignitie conferred upon him; and it is, that he ſhews himſelfe unfit for it: ſo much *Plutarch* makes *Numa Pompilius* tell his father. And *Junius Bleſus*, when the great men who hated *Vitellius*, went about to make him Emperour, and he refuſed it; for ſo doing was thought unworthy.

Concerning the ſecond: Whether he that is worthy of a Dignitie, and deſpiſeth it not, ought when occaſion is offered, then to ſeek it, or elſe to ſtay till it be offered.

In this caſe, I diſtinguiſh of Offices, which may either be of Honour, or of Danger: In this laſt caſe, there is no doubt, a man ought not to ſtay till his Prince require him; but finding himſelfe fit for it, he ought to offer himſelfe; becauſe Princes oftentimes in

ſuch caſes, would have their Subjects to underſtand their thoughts, without further expreſsing. Our Lord God had a purpoſe to ſend one to threaten the Iſraelites, a perfidious Nation, and that uſed to ſtone and kill the Prophets, but not willing to impoſe the charge of this meſſage upon any; hee ſeemed as though hee knew not whom to imploy: as it is written in *Eſay*, *Quem mittam, aut quis ibit nobis?* Then *Eſay* knowing perhaps by a Propheticall ſpirit, that this was an imployment of danger, ſtayed not to be required, but readily offered himſelfe, ſaying, *Ecce ego, Mitte me:* Where beſides the reaſon alleadged before, there may an excellent leſſon be learned, either little knowne, or little uſed now adayes in Courts: and it is, that *Eſay* offering himſelfe, ſpake in generall, *Ecce ego, mitte me*; as though he would ſay, Send me whither you pleaſe, I am ready to goe: But on the contrary, I have ſeene men offer their ſervice unto the Prince, as if they would put a halter about his neck, ſtanding upon termes; If you will beſtow upon me ſuch or ſuch an honour, I will then ſerve you: and when offices are to be beſtowed, ſet themſelves downe for one of the chiefeſt; a faſhion much uſed, but with little judgement: becauſe by ſo doing, they manifeſtly ſhew they ſeeke to ſerve themſelves, and not the Prince. The obedience of *Abraham* was not of this ſort: who, when our Lord God commanded him to goe out of his Countrey, ſaying, *Egredere de terra tua, & de domo Patris tui, & veni in terram quam monſtravero tibi*; preſently without asking whither hee ſhould goe, hee put himſelfe on his journey. So alſo it is written in the Apocalyps, where Saint *John* ſpeaking of the Elect, ſaith, *Et ſequuntur agnum quocunque ierit.* Whereupon the Prophet compares himſelfe to a beaſt, *Ut jumentum factus ſum apud te*, A beaſt carryes that which his owner layes up on him, and doth that which his owner pleaſeth; he is

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not aſhamed if hee carry Earth, and hee growes not proud if hee carries Gold: So ought the Servants of Princes to doe, goe whitherſoever they command them: carry Earth, or carry Gold; that is, goe in imployments great or ſmall, as occaſion is offered. This is the conceit of Saint *Gregory*, upon occaſion of that place of *Eſay*, *Ecce ego, mitte me*: and although he apply it to Preachers, yet I conceive it may not unfitly be applyed to our Diſcourſe.

But to returne to our purpoſe, and come to the ſecond caſe propoſed before, and is a little more difficult, which is, if occaſion be preſented of beſtowing an honour, whether a man ought to offer himſelfe, and ſeek it; or otherwiſe ſtay and waite till the Prince appoint him?

Every one perhaps (at leaſt the greateſt part) will thinke it better, he ſhould be required: Firſt, becauſe it is a ſigne of leſſe ambition. Secondly, becauſe when a Prince, of himſelfe puts a ſervant in any imployment, hee is bound to defend him in it; if in any thing hee ſhould erre. Thirdly, by the example of *Moſes*, who when God ſaid, he would make him Leader of his people; not onely he ſtayed to be required, but he alſo refuſed it: And in truth I was once of opinion, that from hence might bee gathered the reaſon why *Eſay* (not being required) offered himſelfe; and *Moſes* being required, refuſed; and it is, becauſe *Eſay* knew he went in an imployment of danger, and *Moſes* in an imployment of honour: whereupon it ſeemes that we alſo, in ſome occaſions ſhould ſtay to be required, and in ſome other offer our ſervice.

Yet notwithſtanding all theſe reaſons, I ſhould alwayes hold the contrary: and for the firſt reaſon, that it is leſſe ambition; I know not what ambition can be greater, then to deſire an honour, to deſerve it, and yet looke to be required.

As for the ſecond reaſon, which is, That the Prince is bound to defend him, if he commit any errour: I am eaſily able to prove the contrary, both by reaſon and example. *Saul* the ſonne of *Cis* ſought not after the Kingdome of Iſraell, but ſought after his Fathers Aſſes; and meeting with *Samuel*, who had much talke with him about the Kingdome, hee ſhewed himſelfe wholly averſe from it: and if it had not beene that God commanded him expreſly by the mouth of *Samuel*, he would never have ſuffered himſelfe to be annoynted King. *Moſes* alſo in like manner feeding his ſheep, without the leaſt thought of governing the Iſraelites: when God commanded him to undertake it, yet with great importunity he oppoſed it. So likewiſe *Eli* the Prieſt, not onely ſought not to be Iudge over the people, and the Prieſthood, but was indeed not capable in regard of his Familie: whereupon after ſome repulſe he accepted it. Yet neither *Saul*, nor *Moſes*, nor *Eli*, were the more excuſed of God, for having offices put upon them without their owne ſeeking: but the firſt committing a notable errour, after the victory of *Achab*, was by our Lord God (by the mouth of *Samuel*) deprived of his Kingdome, which was transferred upon *David*; and finally brought to a miſerable end. And *Moſes*, when water failed, had condigne puniſhment, being denyed to gather the fruit, which in ſo many yeares, and with ſo much ſweat and labour he had ſowed. And laſtly *Eli*, for too much bearing with the faults of his Sonnes, was by our Lord God ſeverely indeed, but yet juſtly puniſhed.

Theſe men therefore if they erre, not onely will not be excuſed, but will perhaps become more odious to the Prince, and be more ſeverely puniſhed for their doings. Whereupon our Lord God, (as *Origen* obſerves) when *Saul* left to governe after his Commandements, denyed that hee had made him King, and

therefore

therefore hee ſaith in *Oſea*, *Ipſi regnaverunt, ſed non ex me*; *Principes extiterunt, & non cognovi.* The reaſon is, becauſe they who are thus choſen, not onely erre in prejudice of themſelves and their office, but in prejudice alſo of the Princes diſcretion; who ſhewes little judgement to make choyce of a perſon that is not fit for the charge: and ſo, he that ſhould be a Protectour to defend the errour of another, ſhall need a protection himſelfe for his owne errour. So as the Prince will have no place to ſay, that his Servant erred thorough ignorance, becauſe by ſaying ſo, hee ſhould preſently ſhew himſelfe of little judgement, to imploy a man whom hee did not know; and therefore the Servant muſt needs ſhew hee hath committed errours of malice, and conſequently to have done the Prince diſhonour; at which the Prince muſt needs take greater indignation: and all theſe things being not found in him, that hath an Honour, or Office, upon his owne requiring it, makes him more eaſily excuſed by the Prince, who erres in an imployment himſelfe hath ſought for, than him, who of the Princes owne motion is elected; and is therefore more obliged to demeane himſelfe well in it.

Concerning the third reaſon brought of *Moſes*, I ſay that we are not in his caſe; ſeeing *Moſes* refuſed the Dignitie, not onely becauſe it was a place of Honour; but becauſe, and the more, becauſe he thought himſelf not fit for it: and this is not that we ſpeak of, preſuppoſing a fitneſſe alwayes. That he knew himſelfe not to be fit is apparent; where he ſaith, *Quis ſum ego ut vadam ad Pharaonem, & educam filios Iſrael de Ægypto?* as though he ſhould ſay, I am a worme, unfit for ſo great a dignitie, which afterwards hee ſhewes againe in *Exodus*; where anſwering God, hee ſaith, *Obſecro Domine, Non ſum Eloquens*: as though he would ſay, this is an imployment that requires an Eloquent man;

man; and as for me I can ſcarce ſpeake: whereby it manifeſtly appeares, that *Moſes* refuſed it not for the greatneſſe onely of the dignitie, which certainly hee eſteemed highly; ſeeing in thoſe words, *Mitte quem miſſurus es*, he ſhewes it was an office fit for the Meſſias; but for this rather he refuſed it, becauſe he knew himſelfe unworthy, and not proportioned for ſuch a place.

Whereupon, the reaſon why *Eſay* offered himſelfe without being required; and *Moſes* being required, excuſed himſelf, and *Ieremie* would not have preached to the Hebrews, in my opinion is this, becauſe *Eſay* could not ſay, he was unfit; ſeeing, although at the firſt, till an Angell had purged him with a coale, he ſtood mute, bewailing his inabilitie to ſpeake; *Va mihi quia tacui, quia vir pollutis labiis ego ſum*: yet after hee heard the Angell ſay, *Et auferetur iniquitas tua, & peccatum tuum mundabitur*; as thinking himſelfe now fit for any imployment whatſoever, ſince hee had his lips touched with a coale: that is, ſince he had God in his mouth, he made no ſtay, but offered himſelfe preſently. And *Moſes* alſo, after he heard he ſhould have this coale in his mouth, *Et ero in ore tuo*, he never offered to make any reply to God. So *Ieremie* at the firſt ſaid, *A, A, A, Domine Deus; Ecce neſcio loqui, quia puer ego ſum*; but when he heard God ſay, *Ne timeas à facie eorum, quia tecum ego ſum, ut eruam te, dicit Dominus. Et miſit Dominus manum ſuam, & tetigit os meum, & dixit ad me; Ecce dedi verba mea in ore tuo*: he alſo finding that coale in his mouth, prepared himſelfe to performe the imployment which was commanded him. And now I conceive the reaſons alledged to the contrary, are ſufficiently anſwered; whereby it is manifeſt, that it is better to ſeeke a dignitie not deſerving it, then deſerving it to deſpiſe it: And again, that it is better, when one deſerves it, and deſpiſeth it not, to offer himſelfe, then to have it put upon him.

Nihil

Nihil in vulgo modicum, terrere ni paveant,
Vbi pertimuerint, impune contemni.

That it is eaſier to paſſe from one extreame to another, then from an extreame to the middle.

The two and fortieth Diſcourſe.

SEeing Vertue is ſcituate and conſiſts in the midſt, no marvell if the ignorant multitude, leaving one extreame, inſtead of comming to the middle, goe to the other extreame: whereupon *Averroes* ſaid exceeding well, that a Coward becomes ſooner bold, then valiant; *Facilius eſt à ſuperabundantia ad defectum venire; & ab hoc ad illam, quam ad medium.* And a little after, *Timidus enim facilius aliquid audax operabitur, quam fortis.* It is therefore no marvell, if the people paſſe from Timiditie to Boldneſſe; ſeeing it paſſeth alſo from baſe ſervitude to proud domination: *Aut ſervit humiliter,* (ſaith *Livy*) *aut ſuperbo dominatur; Libertatem quæ media eſt, neque ſpernere ſatis, neque habere ſciunt.* It may be ſaid by ſome, that I contradict my ſelfe; having ſaid in another diſcourſe, that it is a moſt difficult thing to goe from one extreame to another, without paſſing by the middle firſt. And beſides, a Text in *Ariſtotle* may be brought for it; where hee ſaith, *Medium eſt in quod continuè mutans prius devenit quam in ultimum*: For anſwer whereunto, wee muſt know that there are two middles; one which is *Secundum Mutationem*; (give me leave to uſe theſe termes) and in this, it is more eaſie to goe from one extreame to the middle, then from one extreame to another: and this is that which *Ariſtotle* meanes in his Phyſicks, and I in my other Diſcourſe. The ſecond middle is called *Per Abnegationem*, and it is the middle, which is betweene

tweene Exceſſe and Defect; and in this, it is more eaſie to paſſe from one extreame to the other, then from one extreame to the middle: and this is the midſt, I meane, in this Diſcourſe.

Fauſtis in Germanicum ominibus, & ſi vellet imperium promptos oſtentavere.

That Germanicus *could not carry himſelfe in ſuch ſort, as to keepe* Tiberius *from ſuſpecting him; and that he refuſed the Empire for feare of death, and not out of goodneſſe.*

The three and fortieth Diſcourſe.

Germanicus being invited by the Legions in *Germany*, while they were in mutinie, to take upon him the Empire; not onely was diſpleaſed with it, but in great choller refuſed it; by occaſion whereof, I conceive it fit to examine, whether this act of *Germanicus* were done out of goodneſſe, or out of feare.

All Authors for the moſt part are of this opinion; that he refuſed the Empire, as one that was moſt free from any ſuch ambition; ſeeing, having the love of the people, as by a thouſand Demonſtrations was apparent; and withall an Army in his hand: It ſeemed an eaſie matter for him to have made himſelfe Emperour, if he had affected it; and in truth, hee ſhewed partly his good intention, ſeeing, when it was offered him by the Army, he not onely came downe from the Tribunall in a great chafe, but alſo fell preſently into prayſes of *Tiberius*: *Tunc à veneratione Tiberii orſus, flexit ad victorias triumphoſque Tiberii, præcipuis laudibus celebrans; quæ apud Germanias illis cum legionibus pulcherrima feciſſet.* An excellent courſe in truth, and uſed alſo by

by Saint *Paul*, and Saint *Barnabas*, who having done a miracle in *Lyſtra*; and ſeeing the people ready to offer ſacrifices to them, as to *Iupiter* and *Mercury*; *Vbi audierunt* (as is written in the *Acts*) *Apoſtoli Barnabas & Paulus, conſciſſis tunicis ſuis, exilierunt in turbas clamantes & dicentes: Viri quid hæc facitis? & nos mortales ſumus, ſimiles vobis:* and then fell preſently to preach Chriſt Ieſus.

Yet looking a little narrower into this Fact of *Germanicus*, I am of opinion, he did it more for fear, then love; there being no doubt, but that men, although aſſured of ſucceeding in an Empire, yet to make that preſent which is future, they will not ſtick to hazard their very lives; a ſmall preſent pleaſure, being alwayes a ſtronger motive, then a much greater that is future: And the reaſon is, becauſe the will which hath good for its object, in ſuch manner, as the externall ſenſes have theirs, is not moved with any, but that which is preſent. But it may be ſaid unto me, that the future alſo may be preſent, *In eſſe cognito, & objectivo*; to which I anſwer, that this Abſtractive preſence hath not the like force as the Intuitive hath; ſeeing the Intuitive even in future things is much more perfect then the Abſtractive is; whereupon thoſe Divines who hold, that future things are not preſent with God, but onely *In eſſe cognito*; affirme, that the having them *in eſſe cognito*, is as much with him, as for us to have them preſent; and therefore this knowledge in God they call intuitive, grounding it upon a doctrine of *Ariſtotle*, in his Books *De Anima*; where he ſaith, if the *Species* of things could be conſerved in ſuch manner as they are, our ſight would never be altered, although an object farre off were made to be preſent. Indeed, that which is good, or true, or appearing ſo, and is preſent, doth ſo much the more forcibly move, then that which is future, that many men for things preſent, which are not truely good,

good, but onely in appearance, loſe the eternall good of the beatificall viſion. So as it is no marvell, if many men, though in other things wiſe, have beene content with a doubtfull end to prevent a ſecure ſucceſsion; as *Abſolon*, and infinite others, of whom Hiſtories are full. Whereupon I cannot chuſe but thinke, that if *Germanicus* could have come ſecurely to be Emperour, he would never have beene ſo angry at the Souldiers invitation: but becauſe he knew it was not without infinite difficulty to be effected, he therefore ſhewed himſelfe averſe from harkning to it. And it availes not to ſay, hee had the Army of *Germany* in his power; ſeeing there wanted not Legions and Armies in *Hungarie*, in *Sclavonia*, and other places, that would have ſtood for *Tiberius*; and this no man knew better then *Germanicus*, as appeares; where ſpeaking to the mutinous Army, he ſaid, *Non mihi uxor aut filius Patre & Republica cariores; ſed illum quidem ſua Majeſtas, Imperium Romanum cæteri exercitus defendent.* And of as little force is the ſecond reaſon, for his being beloved of the people; ſeeing when there are Souldiers in a City, the people are able to doe little: as it happened to the people of *Tarentum*, who favoured the *Carthagenians*; to the people of *Vicenza*, who favoured the *Venetians*; to the people of *Milan*, who favoured *Franciſco Sforſa*; and whereof there may be found a thouſand Examples.

Many other difficulties *Germanicus* ſhould have met with; and this amongſt others is not of leaſt moment, that *Auguſtus Cæſar* had declared *Tiberius* to bee his Succeſſour; in which conſideration, *Bathſheba* uſed meanes that *David* ſhould declare *Salomon* for his Succeſſour; knowing, that whomſoever he ſhould name, though he were not the eldeſt, yet ſhould be accepted. *Verumtamen Domine mi Rex, in te oculi reſpiciunt totius Iſrael, ut ni dices eis quis ſedere debeat in ſolio tuo poſt te.*

Which

Which words *Hugo Carenſis* thus expounds; *Ille quem voluerit regnabit poſt te, & hunc quaſi Regem ſequetur populus, & non alium.* Beſides, *Tiberius* had gotten the hearts of the Prætorian Souldiers; and to make a Prince be accepted, it is a matter of great importance to come accompanied with the guard of the deceaſed King: and therefore the Holy Scripture in the Book of *Kings*, reckoning thoſe up who went with *Salomon*, makes mention of the Captaine of the Guard with his Souldiers. *Deſcendit Sadoc Sacerdos, & Nathan Propheta, & Banaias filius Iehojadæ, & Ceretbi, & Phèleti:* Whereupon *David* ſaid a little before, to *Sadoc* and *Banaia*, ſending them to *Salomon*; *Tollite vobiſcum ſervos Domini veſtri*; meaning they ſhould take with them the Souldiers of his Guard. To all theſe difficulties may be added the knowledge *Germanicus* had of *Tiberius*; to be a man of excellent vertue, and of ſingular wiſedome; *Maturum annis, ſpectatum bello*; which things all together, made the difficulty ſo great, that I cannot chuſe but beleeve, *Germanicus* refuſed the Empire, as *Claudius Pompeianus* did, when it was offered him; *Sed ille recuſavit, quia Imperatorem Pertinacem videbat.* So *Scipio* the *Carthaginian*, when he was proclaimed King by the Army of *Spaine*, would not accept it; *Quia Romæ intolerabile nomen Regium erat.* It is therefore no marvell, that *Germanicus* entred into choller upon it; ſeeing to aſcend to the Empire, is a thing that requires two extreames; either to ſhew himſelfe deſirous, and at the ſame time to be neare at hand for procuring it; or elſe, to ſhew himſelfe wholly averſe from it, not onely in effects, but in deſire; becauſe they who ſtand farre off in effects, and neare hand with deſire; eaſily in a little time come to ruine. *Eſſe privatis cogitationibus progreſſum*, (ſaith *Tacitus*) *& prout velint plus minuſve, ſumi ex fortuna imperium cupientibus nihil medium inter ſumma aut præcipitia.* Chriſt our Saviour was as farre

from deſiring to be a worldly King, as could be; and therefore being called to be a King by the people, hee preſently got himſelfe farre off from the multitude, becauſe his houre being not yet come, in which hee meant to expoſe himſelfe to die; hee knew it ſtood him upon, to avoyde ſuch apparence: and more (as *Robert Abbat* obſerves) our Lord Chriſt never ſpake of his being a King, till the time of his Paſsion; knowing that the very name of a King carries death with it. If *Germanicus* had done thus, after he had quieted the mutinies of the Army; had returned to *Rome*, and had left the Legions behind, that had called him Emperour, he had then freed *Tiberius* from ſuſpition; who underſtanding the inclination of the Army, could not chuſe but be in continuall feare, leaſt the Empire ſhould be taken from him: Whereupon, knowing the danger he ſtood in, he was not willing that *Germanicus* ſhould conquer *Germany*; leaſt having once made himſelfe Lord of that Country, he ſhould doe as *Caſar* did, having conquered *France*. Seeing victorious Armies are formidable and invincible things, and in this caſe the more; *Germanicus* being much more like to *Caſar*, then to *Cato*; the one, (as *Saluſt* ſaith) aſpiring to the Empire; the other, deſirous to preſerve the Common-wealth: betweene themſelves, both like and unlike; like in Age, in Eloquence, in nobleneſſe of minde; and finally in glory: but unlike in this, that *Caſar* made himſelfe famous by his ſervices and curteſies; *Cato* by ſincerity and holineſſe of life: *Caſar* got him a name, with being gentle and merciſull; *Cato* by being ſevere and ſterne. He by giving, by helping, by pardoning, came to be famous: This by finding fault with Donatives, and by not pardoning any, nor ſo much as himſelfe, came to be adored: *Cato* was the ſcourge of the wicked; and *Caſar*, the refuge. *Caſar* was commended for affabilitie, and *Cato* for

for conſtancy; and becauſe *Cæſar* aſpired to the Empire, and *Cato* was alwayes a good Cittizen; we may therefore ſay, that the manners of *Cato* ought to be imitated of thoſe that are not ambitious; and the manners of *Cæſar*, of thoſe that are: and therefore ſeeing *Germanicus* (as may be gathered by his life) had all thoſe manners and faſhions of *Cæſar*; I cannot but conclude, but that his ambition was to aſpire to the Empire. So as indeed, hee was not well adviſed to take ſuch courſes, and give Donatives to the Souldiers; *Quibus niſi ab Imperatore, neque præmia accipere par eſſet*, as *Tacitus* in the ſecond of his Annals ſaith: where we may ſee, that *Tiberius* knew well of what great importance Donatives are to corrupt the Souldiers. Secondly, *Germanicus* was not well adviſed, to procure the applauſe of the Legions, with ſuch artifice as he did; and then mannage it onely with curteſie and love, which perhaps I ſhould not blame, if hee had beene Lord of *Rome*: but ſeeing not onely he was not Lord, but was ſuſpected of him that was Lord; hee ſhould not have uſed the Souldiers with ſuch plauſibleneſſe as hee did. And it availes not to ſay, that if he would do any good in *Germany*, it behoved him to procure the love of the Army, ſeeing he might have done as much good with feare, as hee did with love; and never have put the Prince into jealouſie: and Generalls in warre proceed and proſper, as well with the one as the other. *Scipio Africanus* proſpered with love, and *Hannibal* with feare. The courſe of *Scipio* will alwayes doe well, where the Commander is Prince; at leaſt, if he can avoid contempt; a companion oftentimes of mildneſſe: and indeed, *Scipio* by his mildneſſe fell ſo farre in contempt, that if at laſt he had not turned his courſe to a way of feare, he had beene in danger to bee utterly undone.

I have the more willingly uſed the example of *Scipio*

in this caſe, becauſe indeed in many things hee was moſt like *Germanicus*: As *Scipio* was ſent into *Africk*, where his father had mannaged the warre before; ſo *Germanicus* was ſent into *Germany*, and might follow the ſteps of his father *Druſus*, who had beene there before. *Scipio* was a young man of moſt goodly preſence, and *Germanicus* a young man of moſt beautifull aſpect. The one, and the other, of moſt pleaſing carriage towards confederates; towards friends & enemies. Againſt *Germanicus* the Legions in *Germany* rebelled, upon the death of *Auguſtus*; againſt *Scipio* the Armies in *Spaine* rebelled, upon the falſe report of his death: both of them tooke the ſame courſe for reducing the Armies to obedience, and both of them were blamed for it: *Germanicus* by *Tiberius*, as a corrupter of the Army; *Scipio* by *Fabius Maximus*, for the like; *Natum eum ad corrumpendam Diſciplinam arguere; ſic in Hiſpania plus propter ſeditionem militum, quam bellum amiſſum.* Each of them was more able to commit no errours themſelves, then to correct the errours committed by others. Both of them victorious in battailes; and as *Scipio* at laſt made the Senate ſuſpect hee meant to make himſelfe Lord of *Rome*; ſo *Germanicus* made *Tiberius* ſuſpect he meant to make himſelfe Emperour of *Rome*. To *Scipio* the Army offered the Empire, and hee refuſed it; to *Germanicus* alſo the Army offered it, and he with great indignation likewiſe refuſed it. *Scipio* after all his victories died in exile, thorough the ungratefulneſſe of the Senate; and *Germanicus* died out of *Rome*, thorough the ungratefulneſſe and practiſes of *Tiberius*. To the one and the other was ſent a Succeſſour, to the end they ſhould not finiſh the warre: and if *Germanicus* were in this not well adviſed, as I have ſhewed before; and perhaps had a meaning to make himſelfe Prince; certainly *Scipio* was not much better adviſed; of whom that Tribune in *Livy* ſaith, *Dictatorem eum conſuli non legatum*

legatum in Provincia fuiſſe, neque ob aliam rem eo profectum, quam ut id quod Hiſpaniæ, Galliæ, Siciliæ, Africæ jampridem perſuaſum eſſet hoc Græciæ, Aſiæque; & omnibus ad Orientem verſis regibus gentibuſque appareret; unum hominem caput columenque Imperii Romani eſſe. Theſe are not wayes for men to uſe, that have no other end then to be good Citizens; rather, their courteous carriage towards the Souldiers, was done with a minde to make uſe of them in the Citie; as *Livy* in another place ſhewes: *Scipionum nomini auſpiciiſque omnes aſſuetos quos ſecum in patriam ad meritum triumphum deducere velitis, quos conſulatum petenti, velut ſi omnium communis agatur honos, ad futuros ſperet.* It is therefore no marvell to ſee ſo great likeneſſe between theſe two Captaines, ſeeing *Germanicus* tooke *Scipio* for his example to imitate; as may be ſeene in the voyage hee made in *Ægypt: Sine milite incedere, pedibus intectis, & pari cum Græcis amictu; Publii Scipionis æmulatione, quem eadem facilitaviſſe apud Siciliam, quamvis flagrante adhuc Pœnorum bello, accepimus.* Yet in matter of fortune they were ſomething unlike; for *Scipio* was able to ſettle, and I may ſay to finiſh his victory, which *Germanicus* was not ſuffered to doe: but if the warre which the *Romans* had with the *Carthagenians*, had beene *Ob amiſſum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum, potius quam cupidine proferendi Imperii*, as that of *Germanicus* was, I make no doubt but *Scipio* would have beene as little ſuffered to finiſh the warre, as *Germanicus* was. Now if we aske which of them deſerved moſt praiſe, and was moſt worthy of commendation, I account *Germanicus* ſo much worthy of more, as he was able in ſo great vertues to be like *Scipio*, in a time ſo unlike; and under a Tyrant Prince: and though by a little unadviſedneſſe hee fell to be ſuſpected of *Tiberius*, yet he is more to be excuſed then *Scipio* was; ſeeing a Tyrant Prince is ſooner put into ſuſpition, then a

well-govern'd Common-wealth. And therefore *Corbulo* (as *Tacitus* relates) being hindred by a Letter from *Claudius*, for going forward with his enterprise; called the ancient *Romane* Captaines happy: *Jam Castra in hostili solo molienti Corbuloni hæ litteræ redduntur; ille ve subita, quamquam multa simul offunderentur, metus ex Imperatore; contemptio ex Barbaris; ludibrium apud socios; nihil aliud prolocutus, quam beatos quondam Duces Romanos.*

Periculosa severitas, flagitiosa largitio: seu nihil militi; seu omnia concedentur, in ancipiti Republica.

That it is a hard matter to settle the Insurrection of an Army.

The foure and fortieth Discourse.

BEing a little after to examine the wayes, how to settle and compose the Insurrection of an Army; I will in this place, by occasion of this Text, only say, That to grant them all their demands, is dangerous; because they will make it but a steppe to make greater demands. The *Ianizaries* made an Insurrection against *Amurath* the Great Turke, demanding the head of *Ebraim Beglerbey* of *Greece*; and the Great Turkes entirest friend; and when *Amurath* gave consent to their demand, they then fell to demand a thousand other extravagant things, and put the Great Turke into no small danger. On the other part, to grant them nothing they demand is as bad: as that, which exasperates them in such a degree, that they can hardly be ever pacified after; as in the case of *Galba* was seene. All this we have now said, is expressed in *Polybius*, by a most excellent similitude, whose words as most worthy

worthy to be read, I have thought good to ſet down at large, as they are tranſlated into Latine, *Si quis hæc recte intueatur* (he ſpeakes of the Carthaginian Army being in mutiny) *non dubitet affirmare eum modo corpora hominum, & quædam in illis ulcera, ita interdum crudeſcere, ut ſanari nullo modo poſſint, ſed id longe magis humanis animis accidere; ut enim in ulceribus evenit, ut ſi illis medicamentum curandi gratia adhibeas, ulcus ipſum vi medicaminis augeſcit, ſi vero curam ejus negligas, longe ſua ipſius natura extenditur, neque prius deſinit, quam totum ſubjectum corpus corruptum labefactumque ſit: ita animis quoque conſimiles interdum morbi ac tabes accidunt, ut nullum ex reliquis animalibus homine avidius atque efferatius ſiat, cui ſi interdum veniam aut impunitatem aliquam conceſſeris, aut aliter benignitate eum proſequutus fueris, id omne dolum fraudemque exiſtimans, deterior ſit, & erga beneficum longe magis inſidus; ſi vero te contra oppoſueris, nihil eſt adeo durum, crudele, nefarium, quod non facile aggrediatur; laudem ſibi eam temeritatem exiſtimans, donec ad extremum omnino, efferatus animus humanam naturam exuat.*

Eo in metu arguere Germanicum omnes; quod non ad ſuperiorem exercitum pergeret; ubi obſequia, & contra rebelles auxilium, ſatis ſuperque miſſione & pecunia & mollibus conſultis peccatum; vel ſi vilis ipſi ſalus, cur filium parvulum, cur gravidam conjugem inter furentes, & omnis humani juris violatores haberet? Illos ſaltem uno & Reipublicæ redderet.

In what kinde of affaires, it is fit to carry their Wives with them.

The five and fortieth Diſcourſe.

UPon this paſſage, there are two Diſcourſes ſeem to offer themſelves: The firſt, whether it be fit for Governours to carry their Wives with them, and conſequently whether *Germanicus* did well, to have his Wife and Children in the Army. The ſecond, how inſurrections of Armies may be quieted.

Beginning with the firſt, I ſay, that Officers may be ſent by the Prince, in three kindes of imployment: in governments, in war, or in Embaſſages. If they go to be Governours, it is then a fair courſe, and far from being dangerous, as was agreed upon in the Senate, in favour of *Valerius Meſſalina* againſt *Cæcina*, that they might take their Wives with them: *Neque enim ut olim obſideri urbem belli, aut Provincias hoſtiles eſſe.* But yet in my opinion, it is fit in this matter to proceed with diſtinction, becauſe if we ſpeak *ſimpliciter*, I ſhould thinke it better, they ſhould not leade their Wives with them, as thoſe who for the moſt part can do little good, by reaſon of their unskilfulneſſe in affaires, and may do much hurt by reaſon of their avarice and pride; whereupon as *Cæcina* well ſaid, there ſeldom came any appeales againſt the Governours of Provinces,

vinces, for oppreſsing the people, but they were more againſt the Women than the men, *Cogitarent ipſi quoties repetundarum aliqui arguerentur, vlura uxoribus objectari.* To this may be added, that by reaſon of their weakneſſe, they give ear to the moſt wicked of the Province, they keep a Court of themſelves, give audience, divide Tribunals, and cauſe a thouſand other errours, which by the foreſaid *Cæcina* are well expreſſed, *His ſtatim adhæreſcere deterrimum quemque Provincialium, ab his negotia ſuſcipi, tranſigi, duorum egreſſu coli, duo eſſe Prætoria,* and that which followes: whereupon I have reaſon to believe, that the antient Romans made the Laws, that it ſhould not be lawfull for Governours of Provinces, to carry their Wives with them, not ſo much for the danger they incurred, by being in Countries of little ſafety, as leaſt the people newly come under the Roman Empire, ſhould through the avarice and pride of the Women be provoked to rebell. The reaſon that *Valerius* brings to beat down that of *Cæcina*, is this, that to charge Women for doing ill Offices in a Province, is but a weak argument, ſeeing it is their Husbands fault, who allow their Wives to take more upon them than is fit: *Fruſtra noſtram ignaviam alia ad vocabula tranſferri, nam viri in eo culpam, ſi fœmina modum exceſſit:* and therefore *Sara* in the holy Scripture knowing this, when *Agar* conteſted againſt her with proud termes, ſhe complained not of her, but of *Abraham*, as knowing it to be the mens fault, if their Wives grow inſolent. This reaſon makes a fair ſhew, but it cleareth not the difficulty, ſeeing it makes no matter, when a Province is ill governed, whether it be long of the Man, or of the Woman, ſo long as it is done; whereupon I ſhould thinke it better, to provide for things before they be done, according to the advice of *Agricola*, who *Officiis & adminiſtrationibus potius non peccaturos*,

turos, quam damnare cum peccaſſent: then to watch with danger when they ſhall be done; and conſequently, if it may be, to leave their Wives at home: and the rather, ſeeing Princes commonly ſend perſons of age to be Governours, and conſequently eaſie to be led by their Wives, as in another Diſcourſe is ſhewed: yet it is true, as I ſaid before, that I would make an Exception to this Rule, when Women are judicious and very wiſe, for then no doubt, they may be of great aſſiſtance in the Government. The other reaſon which *Valerius* brings, that Wives are a recreation to their Husbands, and make them the better able to bear the labours of their Government, is a meer mockery, ſeeing men that take upon them ſuch charges, ſhould have no thought but of the Princes ſervice, nor take pleaſure in any thing but in diſcharging their places.

But be it as it will, it imports us little for the preſent: this at leaſt is clear, that in imployments of war, it is never fit to carry their Wives with them, and therefore the Romans (as *Cæcina* reports) would have them when they went into forreigne Countries, where there was danger of war, to go alwayes without their Wives, *Haud enim fruſtra placitum olim, ne fœminæ in ſocios, aut gentes externas traherentur, ineſſe mulierum comitatui quæ pacem luxu, bellum formidine morentur*: Therefore as *Ariſtotle* ſaith well, ſpeaking againſt *Plato*, Women in the warres are good for nothing but to be a let, and reckoned *inter impedimenta*, which is then the more to be obſerved, when they go with an Army that may be likely to mutiny, and therefore when the Army of *Germanie* fell to mutiny, *Germanicus* at laſt perceived what a miſchief it was, to have Women amongſt ſeditions: and who knowes but he forbore to uſe diſcipline and force againſt them, onely for the Womens ſake? We may then conclude, it was not well done of him, to carry his Wife with him in the Army.

Army. Our Lord God, Maker and Governour of all things, knew the Israelites would rebell against *Moses*, whereupon having made him his Captain Generall; and he upon the way with his Wife *Sephora*, God met him, and threatned to kill him; *Cumque esset in itinere, in diversorio occurrit Dominus, & volebat occidere eum*: which Saint *Austin* interprets thus, that God made this shew, because *Moses* led his Wife with him, as not being convenient, when a man goes about great affaires, he should be troubled with Women, and therefore he saith, *Forsitan in hoc loco possum intelligere quod displicuerit Deo, quare Moses tanta mirabilia facturus, uxoris impedimentum secum ducere vellet in Ægyptum.*

But if now he go upon Embassage, then if the Women be but mean of understanding, let them never be carried, as those that may do much hurt; but if they be discreet and wise, it will do well to take them along, as those that may do much good, because one of the chief things an Embassadour is to look to, is to understand and finde out secrets, and none fitter to finde them out than discreet Women, seeing oftentimes, either Senators in Common-wealths, or Princes in their Kingdomes, or their Officers and Secretaries, discover unadvisedly to their Wives many secrets of State, which they afterward being in company with Embassadours Wives, (to shew their intelligence in great matters) easily blab out again, and are apt to reveal, and in this manner in some Courts of *Italie*, matters of great consequence have been boulted out by some discreet Embassadours. And how came *Tiberius* to know that *Augustus* went to visit *Agrippa Posthumus* in the Island of *Planosa*, but by this meanes? For *Augustus* having *Fabius Maximus* in his company, he unadvisedly told it to his Wife *Martia*, and *Martia* as unadvisedly told it to *Livia*, and *Livia* to *Tiberius*, which was the cause of *Fabius* his death, and as it is thought

thought of *Augustus* his too. *Quippe rumor incesserat, paucos ante menses, Augustum electis consciis, & comite uno Fabio Maximo Planasiam vectum, ad visendum Agrippam, multas illic utrinque lachrymas, & signa charitatis, spemq; ex eo fore, ut juvenis penatibus avi redderetur. Quod Maximum uxori Martiæ aperuisse, illam Liviæ, C. Navum id Cæsari.*

We may then conclude, that mens secrets come easily to be known by the meanes of Women, and therefore Tyrants (as *Aristotle* saith) allow oftentimes great Authority to Women, to the end, they may reveal their Husbands secrets.

Satis superque militi & pecunia & mollibus consuluit peccatum.

Whether Germanicus *did well to grant so many things to the Army being in mutiny, what other course he might have taken; lastly, that in diversity of times, and upon diversity of occasions divers courses are to be taken.*

The six and fortieth Discourse.

Germanicus returning from collecting the taxes, found the Legions in mutiny, demanding that the veteran souldiers might have leave to go home, and to have their pay increased, and also to have the Legacy left them by *Augustus*, and he to quiet them, yeelded to many of their demands, for which he was by many much blamed, as in the words here alleaged appeares. By occasion whereof, we purpose to examine what courses are fit to be taken, when Armies are in Rebellion.

I say then, that all mutinies and insurrections require not one kinde of Remedy, but according to the divers

divers times in vvhich they happen, to the divers occasions upon vvhich they happen, and lastly, to the divers Captaines under vvhom they happen, a divers remedy is to be applied. For if the Generall be a man of vvhom the Army stands in avve, he may expose himselfe to any danger vvithout any danger, and have all things succeed vvell. The *Macedonians* in *Asia*, being quite tired with the War, and far from their Country, fell to mutiny under *Alexander Magnus*, standing upon the like termes as they in *Germany* did, where *Cicatrices ex vulneribus, verberum notas exprobrant*, so here, *Omnes simul missionem postulare cœperunt, deformia ora cicatricibus, canitiemque capitum ostentantes*. whereupon *Alexander* calling the souldiers together, to hear him speak, no sooner ended his speech, but he thrust into the midst of those infuriated beasts: and caused the most insolent of them to be taken, and not a man of them durst offer to make resistance, *Desiluit deinde* (saith *Quintius Curtius*) *frendens de Tribunali, & in medium armatorum agmen se immisit, notatos quoque qui ferocissime obloquuti erant, singulos manu corripuit, nec ausos repugnare, tredecim asservandos custodibus corporis tradidit, quis crederet sævam paulo ante concionem obtorpuisse subito metu? & cum ad supplicium videret trahi, nihil ausos graviora quam cæteros.* And thus this brave Resolution in a Generall of whom they stood in fear, sufficed to pacifie this great insurrection. But if a Captain be onely loved and not feared, let him never put himselfe upon such adventure, or thinke in such sort to cyment the matter, for it will undoubtedly be his death; whereupon we see that *Germanicus* though he exposed himselfe to no danger, yet was not far from losing his life, as by reading *Tacitus* we may perceive. And the reason of this difference is, because as Choller overcomes Love, so Fear overcomes Choller, which (as *Aristotle* saith) being with hope of Revenge, as far

as is possible, that Hope is taken away by Fear, and in the place of it enters Sorrow, as *Avicen.* excellently shews in his Book *De Anima*. And for this cause also it happens, that more Armies mutiny under Captaines that are loved, than under Captaines that are feared, as was seen in the Army of *Alexander* the Great, and in that of *Annibal*, Captaines that were feared, the contrary in the Army of *Germanicus*, and in that of *Scipio*, Captaines that were loved.

It is very clear, that *Germanicus* was never able to take any of these violent Resolutions, yet I commend not the course he took to pacifie the mutiny of his Army, by yeelding to them in so many things, because being suspected of the Prince, any course had been better for him than this, by which he corrupted military discipline, and by giving of his own, he as it were bought the Army, and therefore when *Tiberius* heard, in what manner he had pacified them, it troubled him not a little, *Nuntiata ea, Tiberium latitia curaque adfecere, gaudebat oppressam seditionem, sed quod largiendis pecuniis & missione festinata, favorem militum quæsivisset, bellica quoque gloria Germanici augebatur*. And so much more as there wanted not other wayes to have appeased the sedition, and the first way for him being so well beloved, had been that which in matters of love is of such force, and that is, by making them jealous he would leave them, and go to some other Army, shewing how little he regarded this mutinous Army; and in truth, if any notice might have been taken of such conditionall propositions I verily thinke the sedition by it selfe only would have bin appeased, and there are two things that move me to thinke so; One, the Example of *Alexander* the Great, who in a mutiny making shew as though he regarded not his *Macedon* souldiers, by taking *Persians* for the Guard of his Body, and doing them other Honours, all the *Macedonians*

prostrated

prostrated themselves, and in most humble manner sued unto him, whereof *Quintus Curtius* saith, *Postquam vero cognitum est, Perses ducatus datos, barbaros in varios ordines distributos, atque Macedonica iis imposita nomina, se vero ignominiose penitus rejectos esse, non jam amplius conceptum animis dolorem perferre potuerunt, sed concursu in Regiam facto, interiori duntaxat retenta tunica, arma ante januam, pœnitentiæ signum projecerunt, ac præ foribus stantes, intromitti se, sibique ignosci suppliciter atque flentes orabant, utque Rex supplicijs suis potius saturet se, quam contumelijs, ipsos nisi venia impetrata, non discessuros.* See here the fruit of jealousie. The second thing that makes me beleeve, this way would have succeeded well with *Germanicus*, is the Example we have, in the very mutiny it selfe of the same Army, wherein when the granting them so many things, would not yet pacifie the sedition, then *Germanicus* (not to this end, but to set them out of danger) was sending away his Wife and Children, to be out of the reach of this tumultuous Army, which the souldiers perceiving, and thereupon growing jealous that any other strange people should keep their Captaines Wife safer than Roman Legions; to the end, he should not send her away, they presently grew quiet, *Sed nihil æquè flexit* (saith *Tacitus*) *quam invidia in Treueros; orant, obsistunt, rediret, maneret; pars Agrippinæ occurrantes, plurimi ad Germanicum regressi.* And if the departing of his Wife onely could prevail so much, what jealousie would they have had at the departing of their beloved Captain? certainly, without making them any other promises, this alone would have pacified the sedition: and in case this jealousie alone had not been sufficient, he might then have gone to the other Army, and sent messengers to let them know, that if they delivered not up into his hands the heads of the Rebellion, he would come and cut them

in pieces good and bad, a thing which without doubt would have done much good, as was seen, when at last he was forced to use such termes with his souldiers under *Caecina*, *At Germanicus quanquam contracto exercitu, & parata in defectores ultione, dandum adhuc spatium ratus, si recenti exemplo sibi ipsi consulerent, praemittit literas ad Caecinam, venire se valida manu, ac ni supplicium in malos praesumant, usurum promiscua caede.* This once heard by the souldiers, they presently cut them all in pieces that were guilty of the mutiny: and if this way yet would not have been sufficient, seeing this tumult was grown out of idlenesse, and he was not willing to use violence, he might have taken the other Army, and put himselfe in the way to go against the Enemy; this course *Caesar* took, who when the Army in *France* rebelled, he took one Legion which he specially favoured with him, and gave leave to the mutinous Legions to go home to *Rome*, which once seen, there was not a souldier that left not presently his mutinying & followed him: a most easie way, for if any thing hinder an Army that is in mutiny (I mean not out of hatred) from pacifying and appeasing, it is a fear they have to be punished, which fear ceaseth as soon as they are taken to go against the Enemy, every one hoping by some notable deed to cancell the blot of their Rebellion, and therefore as soon as those first Legions were quieted, they presently demanded to be led against the Enemy: *Puniret noxios, ignosceret lapsis, & duceret in hostem.* Whereupon we see that after such mutinies, Armies commonly shew more valour than at any time before, as *Livie* shews in a thousand places; and this *Germanicus* knew full well, who after the slaughter the souldiers of *Caecina* had committed, led them presently out against the Enemy. *Truces etiam tum animos cupido involat eundi in hostem, piaculum furoris, nec*

aliter

aliter poſſe placari Commilitonum manes, quaſi ſi pectoribus impiis honeſta vulnera accepiſſent; ſequitur ardorem militum Cæſar. And further, if *Germanicus* were not willing to depart from the Army, being in mutiny; yet the mutiny, having beene cauſed by a ſudden motion, he needed not have beene ſo haſty, to ſeeke the appeaſing of ſo new a mutiny, but might have given the Souldiers deliberation; and then reaſon taking place, hee might without doubt have quieted them at his pleaſure. Our Lord Chriſt in a parable, would not have the tares to be rooted out with the corne, as long as it was in blade and greene; but appointed to ſtay, till they were dry; and then dividing them, caſt the tares into the fire: ſo ſhould he doe with Armies that are in mutiny, that ſeekes to preſerve them, and not to deſtroy them all.

He had another excellent way, and moſt worthy for a Generall to follow; and it was, to threaten, that whoſoever did not follow him, ſhould be counted a Rebell; and as a Rebell, ſhould be proceeded againſt; a way of exceeding great force, and eſpecially in tumults, where there is not a head; and where they are all equally ſtubborne, and every one feares for himſelfe, as was ſeene in *Saul*; who being declared King, was yet not followed, but onely of ſome few; whereupon, an occaſion falling out for relieving the Citie of *Jabs*, to the end the whole Army ſhould follow him, he cauſed two Oxen to be cut in pieces, and be ſpread about all the borders of Iſraell; threatning, that whoſoever did not follow him, ſhould have all his heards of cattell cut in pieces, as thoſe Oxen were: *Quicunque non exierit, & ſecutus fuerit Saul, & Samuel; ſic fiet bobus ejus:* and where the Iſraelites before would not all follow him, now out of feare of the particular puniſhment, there was not a man that did not follow him. *Invaſit ergo* (it followes in the holy Text) *Timor Domi-*

ni populum, & egressi sunt quasi vir unus. Now that it had beene easie for *Germanicus*, by taking this course, to have quieted the tumult, is very evident; seeing *Menius*, onely by this course, brought one of those Legions to returne backe into their Quarters; where finding a particular punishment was designed, where before they had a purpose to kill him; now every one readily was content to follow him: *Raptum vexillum ad ripam, & si quis agmine discessit pro desertore fore, clamitans, reduxit in Hyberna turbidos; & nihil ausos.*

Germanicus also might have used another excellent way; and it is, he should have caused some trusty Centurion or Souldier, to declare to this mutinous multitude, the danger into which they were fallen, and the errour they had committed; for such people commonly give credit to men of such ranke, as was seene in *Iulius Aruspex*; who shewing to the people of *Germany* the danger they should incurre, by rebelling against the *Romans*; he easily quieted them, though he had *Iulius Valentinus* that opposed him. *At Iulius Aruspex è primoribus Remorum vim Romanam pacisque bona dissertans; & sumi bellum etiam ab ignavis, strenuissimi cujusque periculo geri; jamque super caput Legiones, sapientissimum quemque reverentia, sideque; juniores periculo ac metu continuit; & Valentini animum laudabant, consilium Aruspicis sequebantur.* So *Cerealis* also speaking to the *Treviri* after that manner, appeased them; as by the processe of that Oration he makes in *Tacitus*, may be seene. The very same manner *Drusus* used with the Legions of *Illyricum*; imploying one *Clement* a Centurion, in grace with the Souldiers, for his meanes to pacifie that sedition. *Accitur Centurio Clemens, & si qui alii bonis artibus grati in vulgus; in Vigiliis, stationibus; custodiis portarum se inserunt; spem offerunt; metum intendunt.* And that this way would have beene available also to *Germanicus*, is evident; seeing *Cæcina* making use here-

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of, with two of thoſe Legions; he ſo wrought them, that they ſpared not to puniſh the chiefe of the ſedition.

Another way alſo he might have uſed, and that was, to have pretended himſelf their Captain in the Sedition: or if not himſelfe, (which in many reſpects was not fit for *Germanicus*) at leaſt, to have cauſed ſome other principall man to feigne himſelf to be of their opinion; and all other remedies fayling, I ſuppoſe this might have ſtood *Germanicus* in great ſtead; becauſe men commonly give great credit to their counſels, who are intereſſed in the matter, as beleeving they ſpeak ſincerely. For this cauſe, *David* cauſed his truſty friend *Chuſai* the Arachite, to feigne himſelfe of *Abſaloms* ſide; to the end he might hinder the counſell of *Achitophel*, and it happily ſucceeded. So *Gamaliel* ſtanding amongſt the Prieſts, was a meanes to ſave *Peters* life. *Spurinna* being in *Placentia*, for defence of that Citie; and ſeeing the Souldiers bent to fight with the *Vitellians*, who farre exceeded them in number, and in all advantages; feigned himſelfe to be of their opinion: ſeeing them in ſuch a tumult, and thereupon leading them forth, hee eaſily made them ſee their errour, and perceive the danger; and ſhewing them good reaſons, he reduced them to obedience. *Fit temeritatis alienæ comes Spurinna; primo coactus, mox velle ſimulans, quo plus authoritatis ineſſet conſiliis, ſi ſeditio miteſceret.* And a little after, *Ipſe poſtremo Spurinna, non tam culpam exprobrans, quam ratione oſtendens, relictis exploratoribus, cæteros Placentiam reduxit minus turbidos, & imperia accipientes.* The *Nolani* alſo, ſeeing the people bent to take part with *Hannibal*, feigned themſelves to be of the ſame opinion; and by this means gained time till *Marcellus* came: *Ubi Senatum metus accepit, ſi palam contra tenderent, reſiſti multitudini concitatæ non poſſe; clam ſimulando dilationem mali inveniunt: placere enim ſibi defectionem ad Annibalem ſimulant.*

mulant. This in truth is an exquiſite way, when a people cannot be maſtered, then to ſecond them; becauſe, being not ſuſpected, they may doe much good: an example hereof we have in the firſt booke of *Tacitus*, of that *Clement* the Centurion; who ſpeaking to the Army, ſaid not, doe you, and ſay you; but let us doe, and let us ſay; thereby to ſhew he was intereſſed as well as they; *Quanquam filium Imperatoris obſidebimus, quis certaminum finis? Percennioni & Vibuleno ſacramentum dicturi ſumus?*

Seeing then *Germanicus* had ſo many wayes, availeable to appeaſe the Inſurrection, and he made uſe of the worſt; I cannot but think he was either very unadviſed, or very malicious.

Having now diſtinguiſhed the Captaines; it remaines (for performance of my offer) to diſtinguiſh the occaſions and the times. The occaſions then, may in part be juſt, or wholly unjuſt: Of the firſt kinde, are want of Pay, want of Victuals, and ſuch like; and in ſuch inſurrections, it is neceſſary, if hee can, to give the Souldiers ſatisfaction; if hee cannot, to ſhew at leaſt that he is not any cauſe of the want: and if it be in default of Victuals, the Captaine ſhall doe well to eate in publike of the ſame meates that others eate; to ſhew, that hee himſelfe ſuffers as well as the Army: This way hath often beene uſed, and alwayes with good ſucceſſe. The occaſions that are unjuſt, are wont to happen, either out of ſome ſudden anger, upon denyall of ſome particular demand; or elſe out of hatred, and a reſolution not to ſerve. In the firſt caſe, it is no doubt, more eaſie to pacifie an Inſurrection, then in the ſecond; becauſe hatred is much more durable and incurable, then anger is; as that which growes from a more durable occaſion then anger doth: that growing out of a habit, and this out of paſſion; and as a paſſion paſſeth away ſooner then a diſpoſition, or a habit;

habit; ſo anger is ſooner paſſed over and gone, then hatred: Beſides, it is alſo much the worſe, becauſe hatred wiſheth an enemy evill, as it is evill; whete heo that is angry wiſheth an enemy evill, but not as evill: but *Sub ratione boni*, (to uſe this terme) eſteeming the evill to be juſt, as being vindicative; and ſeeing it is manifeſt, (according to Saint *Thomas*) that to wiſh evill under the colour of good, hath leſſe evill in it then to wiſh evill ſimply: it followes, that hatred is not only of more continuance, but of a worſe condition alſo then anger is. In the firſt caſe then, that is of anger, a valiant Captaine ſhall either by temporizing, or elſe by bold oppoſition, which is indeed more becoming a generous ſpirit, eaſily appeaſe them. The Legions in *Germany*, under *Flaccus Ordeonius*, were in mutiny, and would kill the Captaine for putting a Souldier in priſon: whereupon *Vocula*, Legat of a Legion, being a bold and couragious Captaine, gave order the priſoner ſhould be put to death; which ſo affrighted the Souldiers, that they were preſently quiet: for indeed, it is the nature of common people, if they feare not others, they will make others feare them; but if they feare, they will be as quiet as Lambes; and a childe may beat them: according to that place of *Tacitus*; *Terrere ni paveant, ubi pertimuerint, impune contemni.* And ſometimes they love a man the better for making them feare, as admiring the greatneſſe of his ſpirit: whereupon we ſee, that thoſe Legions, after that *Vocula* had put the Souldier to death, would have him to be their Captaine: *Conſcendit Tribunal Vocula* (ſaith *Tacitus*) *mira conſtantia; prehenſumque militem ac vociferantem duci ad ſupplicium juſſit. Et dum mali pavent, optimus quiſque juſſis paruere. Exin conſenſu Ducem Voculam poſcentibus, Flaccus ſummam rerum ei permiſit.* Another time thoſe Legions mutinying again, tooke that *Flaccus Ordeonius* and bound him, but upon the comming

ming of *Vocula*, they presently unbound him: and *Vocula* meaning to punish this disorder, forbore for a time, till their choler were over; by which means the day following, he easily put to death the Authours of the mutiny. *Is postera die, authores seditionis morte affecit; tanta illi exercitui diversitas inerat, licentiæ patientiæque.*

But if the occasion grow from hatred, and from a resolution to serve no longer; I then see not any way there is to pacifie it: because if they demand Pay, or such like, they doe it to this end; that being denied it, they may have colour for their insurrection; and to grant them that which they demand, is to give them occasion to aske afterward things impossible. This very thing happened to *Flaccus*; who having sent certaine companies of *Batavians* towards *Rome*; and they by the way receiving Letters from *Civilis*, fell to demand a thousand impertinencies: of which, when *Flaccus* had granted them a part; they then tooke occasion to demand farre greater. *Iisdem diebus, Batavorum & Caninefatium cohortes, cum jussu Vitelli in urbem pergerent; missus à Civile nuntius assequitur. Intumuere statim superbia, ferociaque & pretium itineris Donativum, duplex stipendium: augeri equitum numerum, promissa sanè à Vitellio postulabant, non ut assequerentur, sed causam seditioni. Et Flaccus multa concedendo, nihil aliud effecerat, quam ut acrius expoſcerent, quæ sciebant negaturum.* The like befell the *Carthagenians*, whose rebelling Souldiers finding many of their demands granted, they became more insolent then before: for it is not alwayes true, that Humilitie is opposite to Pride; but sometimes, and particularly in this case, Humility makes the Pride the greater: such men thinking, that whatsoever is granted them, is not granted them out of humanity, but out of feare; and thereupon taking heart, they grow to demand farre greater matters. This,

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those Senatours in *Livy* meant to inferre, when they said, *Certum habere majores quoque si divinassent, concedendo omnia, non minorem in se plebem, sed superiorem; alia ex aliis iniquiora postulanda, cum prima imperarentur.* And *Tacitus* also, when in the life of *Agricola*, he saith, *Nihil proficit patientia, nisi gravia, tanquam ex facili tolerantibus imperentur.* Whereupon against such there is no better way then to shew teeth; (as the *Italian* Proverbe is) which is, to be rough with them: seeing it is easie for one to make himselfe be feared, if from being vilified before thorough mildnesse; he suddenly, contrary to expectation, alter his countenance, and looke bigge.

There is another way also that may be used, and it is, to goe gaining of time so long, till all things needfull may be provided; and then, to cut them all to pieces: seeing, (as I said before) that to quiet such, is a thing impossible. He that would now see a manifest example of the difference that is betweene an Army, that mutinies out of hatred, and a determinate will, and an Army that mutinies upon some other occasion, let him look upon *Vocula*, who two severall times found it easie to appease a sedition, growne in the Army out of anger; but the third time, when out of a determinate will and hatred they rebelled, and meant to run to the Enemy; he then seeking to quiet them, was instantly by them slaine. And thus much concerning the occasions.

Now for the times; either they are of peace, or of great enterprises that are in hand; or of the Enemies approaching. In the first, there want not wayes, seeing they can never doe much hurt. In the second, though it seemes hard, yet it is but easie; and the best way is, to make a shew, not to regard them. The Souldiers of *Augustus* fore-seeing a warre which was like to be against *Anthony*, (as *Dio* relates) desired leave to

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be excused from the service; not because they would be so indeed, but because they meant to hold *Augustus* (as the saying is) to hard meat, and make him grant what they demanded, for feare they should leave him; and he as crafty as they, finding it not fit, for a Captaine to submit himselfe to the Souldiers wils, answered them, They had reason to aske leave, and gave it them; retayning onely those that had served in the warres ten yeares: and thus by slighting those other, and shewing he cared not whether they stayed or no; There was not a man went from him, but all stayed with him. The last time is of all the hardest, or rather is impossible; and that is, when they are in face of the Enemy: and in this case, the best way is, to seeke to quiet them by any means, though never so bad, and by granting them all they demand; whether it be just, or unjust. The *Romans* having their Enemies at hand, and being at variance with the people, who retyred to the Hill *Aventine*, and would not stirre a foot against the Enemies, unlesse they might have their demands granted: the Senate resolved to satisfie them howsoever, and therefore granted all they demanded; *Eam per aqua, per iniqua, reconciliandam Civitati esse.*

At Romæ nondum cognito, qui fuisset exitus in Illyrico; & Legionum Germanicarum motu audito; trepida Civitas incusare Tiberium.

That Tiberius *did well not to stirre from* Rome.

The seaven and fortieth Discourse.

ALthough the Citie of *Rome*, when they heard the Armies of *Pannonia* and *Germany* were in sedition, openly complained of *Tiberius*; and blamed

blamed him, that he would not goe in person to appease those tumults; yet *Tiberius* for all that, was resolved not to stir from the Citie: which resolution, though it succeeded well with him, yet it is not necessarily to be commended, seeing oftentimes a Councell not very advised, hath yet through the favour of fortune, had admirable successe; and on the contrary, a mature deliberation, an unhappy issue. So as, seeing wise men ought not to judge of Deliberations, which are subject to Accidents, by onely the understanding: It is no marvell if some imagine, that *Tiberius* understood not this, who would stay in *Rome*, when the Armies were in such confusion. Seeing in Insurrections, the authority of a Prince, and specially when he is *Spectatus bello*, is able to prevaile much: Nothing in such cases being of greater moment then Majestie; by means whereof, not onely *Augustus*, (who by one word speaking, appeased a great Sedition) but infinite others have had in tumults happy successe. Yet notwithstanding all this, I am of opinion, that in so great a man as *Tiberius* was, the Deliberation was not lesse advised, then the successe was happy; seeing (as *Tacitus* saith) if he had gone, he must of necessity have gone to one Army, before he went to the other; and by so doing, should have shewed himselfe partiall, the onely way to have lost their love to whom he went last, as in the processe of *Tacitus* his Histories is often to be seene. To this may be added the danger, that if the Army by his comming should not have beene quieted, there had beene afterward no other refuge: And therefore for my part, I should thinke it the best course, when rebellions arise, to send thither some such person, that if he be slighted, another greater may be sent, and not to shew the uttermost at first. This is made plaine to us by our Lord God in Saint *Matthew*, where in a Parable he saith, that a Father of a Family, seeing the hus-

bandmen of his Vineyard ſuffering all things to go to wrack, and having none to ſend to them but ſervants and his ſonne: at firſt he ſent ſervants, and them they killed and ſtoned; and then at laſt he ſent his ſonne, which was the laſt refuge in this caſe, as *Tiberius* was in ours: Whereupon he ſaith, *Pater familias Dominus Vineæ miſit ſervos ad Agricolas, qui ex illis alios occiderunt, alios lapidaverunt; Noviſſime autem miſit ad eos filium ſuum, dicens, Reverebuntur filium meum; hoc eſt enim ultimum refugium.* Thus our Lord God ſent firſt his Prophets, to pacifie the Rebellion of men; of whom when part were ſlaine, and part deſpiſed, he came at laſt himſelfe in perſon. It is therefore the beſt courſe, to try firſt all other wayes, before a Prince expoſe himſelfe amongſt Rebels; for if he ſhould be ſlighted, there then remains no further refuge. *Quod aliud ſubſidium, ſi Imperatorem ſprevisſent?* and therefore *Galba* had counſell given him, to try the mindes of the Prætorian Souldiers, being in mutiny, by ſome other: *Nec per ipſum Galbam cujus integra authoritas majoribus remediis ſervabatur*; and ſo much the more, becauſe the Prince being away, the Souldiers perhaps will beare reſpect to his Miniſters; as fearing otherwiſe, leaſt the Prince may ſeeke to be revenged: but if the Prince goe himſelfe in perſon, and be killed, what feare can they have of any to revenge it? whereupon it is written in Saint *Matthew*, *Hic eſt hæres; venite occidamus eum; & occupemus hæreditatem ejus.* To this may bee added, that if *Tiberius* had gone himſelfe to theſe Armies, he muſt have beene forced to cut in pieces the whole Legions: for if the Army in *Germany* ſhould have ſtood upon ſuch termes with him, as it did with *Germanicus*, he muſt for his honours ſake have made them reſent it in a very great degree, and could never have condeſcended to many things which *Germanicus* granted: *Majus enim quid à Principe expectatur*: ſeeing

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ing there are many things tolerated by Generalls of Armies, which if the Prince were there himſelfe, would never be tolerated. Whereupon, when *Moſes* prayed God that he would be the Armies Guide into the Land of Promiſe; He anſwered him, I will ſend an Angell to be their Guide; for if I ſhould goe my ſelfe, and the Army happen to rebell, I ſhould be forced utterly to deſtroy them. *Non enim aſcendam tecum, quia populus durę cervicis eſt; ne forte diſperdam te in via:* and therefore Princes oftentimes ſhould avoide ſuch encounters, that they may not aggravate their Subjects faults. And for this, *Germanicus* ſaid, he would ſend away *Agrippina* from the Army, leaſt her death ſhould be the more grievous for aggravating the Souldiers fault. And *Ieremie*, when the Synagogue went about to kill him; ſeemed to grieve for nothing ſo much, as that his death ſhould aggravate their offence. *Cognoſcite, quia ſi occideritis me, ſanguinem tradetis contra vos-metipſos.* Laſtly, if there were no other reaſon for it, this one would much prevaile with me: that a Prince come newly to his State, and but ill beloved of all, ſhould upon no occaſion ſtirre out of the Citie, and ſpecially in his beginning; ſeeing the preſence of the Prince is of greateſt force to hinder Rebellions. Whereupon it is no marvell, that *Piſtoia* rebelled againſt *Aguccio* of *Fagivola*, as ſoone as they ſaw him gone out of the Citie. And likewiſe *Florence* againſt *Charles* the King of *France* his brother. And the people of Iſrael fell one time to mutiny, for no other cauſe, but becauſe their Leader *Moſes* was gone from them, being called up by our Lord God into Mount *Sinai*. If then the people of Iſrael ſo much bound to *Moſes*, and after ſo many yeares, who had freed them from the bondage of Ægypt, had nouriſhed them with Manna in the Wilderneſſe, had made water flow out of Rocks, and many ſuch like benefits; yet onely becauſe

he was gone up to Mount *Sinai* to speake with God for their good, could finde in their hearts to rebell: what would have beene done against a Tyrant, a perfidious man, an enemy of the Citie; and in the beginning of his Empire, if he had gone into *Germany* to pacifie those tumults? and so much the more, as not having any trusty person to leave behinde him in his stead, for the Senate was his enemy, his mother repented that ever she holpe him to the Empire: and as for the Traytour *Sejanus*, what trusting was there to him? And indeed, if there had beene any whom he might have trusted, it would have done him no good; no more then it did *Moses* to leave *Aaron* in his place. Also *Abimelech* Prince of the *Sichemites*, going out of the City, in the beginning of his Empire, left in it his assured friend *Zebul*, yet it did him no good; for no sooner was he gone, but the people mutinyed, and made *Gaall* their Prince; as plainly appeares in the Book of *Judges*. So as we may conclude, *Tiberius* should have hazarded himselfe exceedingly if he had left, and thereby lost the City of *Rome*: which he knowing (saith *Tacitus*) *Fixumque Tiberio fuit, non amittere caput Imperii.* For, having the Senate and people his enemies; These for taking away their Liberty, Those for taking away their Authority; and then the Armies in mutiny, and calling upon *Germanicus* to be Emperour, he might well thinke, that if *Germanicus* had once seene him out of *Rome*, he would never have refused the Empire in choler. To this I adde, that though *Tiberius* had beene sure of the Citie of *Rome*, yet he had no reason to put himselfe into the hands of the Army; which having intended to kill the Legates, and *Germanicus* himselfe; plainly shewed, they had cast off all respect and reverence. *Ne in colluvione rerum Majestatem suam contumeliæ offerret.*

As for the reasons before alleadged, they are of no force;

forces to ſay, that Majeſtie is able to appeaſe tumults. *Ire ipſum & opponere Majeſtatem imperitoriam debuiſſe:* for Majeſtie when it is not accompanied with force, runnes alwayes a hazard; at leaſt, for the moſt part, as was ſeene in the Prophets, who came unarmed; which the Romane Souldiers well perceived, in a diſcord they had with the people: In which *Livy* ſaith, *Huic tantæ tempeſtati cum ſe conſules obtuliſſent, facile experti ſunt, parum tutam Majeſtatem ſine viribus eſſe:* ſeeing (as he ſaith a little after) there is not a more weake thing then Majeſtie is, when it is alone. *Nihil contemptius, neque infirmius, ſi ſint qui contemnant:* Yet I ſay not but that Majeſtie may do ſome good at a firſt brunt, before it be found to be nothing but a ſhadow without ſubſtance, conſiſting onely in opinion. I doe not therefore marvell that the Emperour *Rodolphus* paſſing in his Coach to the Army that was in mutiny, without ſtaying a jott, in manner of a lightening, was able to quiet it. For ſo alſo it ſucceeded well with *Caius Fabius*, who paſſed from the Capitoll to the Mount, where he meant to ſacrifice, thorough the *French* Army, in habit of a Prieſt; ſeeing it was done in ſo ſhort a time, and upon ſuch a ſudden, as they had not ſpace to take notice of it: Whereupon we ſee, that *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*, going forth amongſt the people in a tumult, ſuddenly appeaſed it; but then upon conſideration of this reaſon, he preſently returned into his Caſtle. And for this it was, as I conceive, that when *Druſus* had quieted the Legions of *Illyricum*, he would not ſtay the comming of the Embaſſadours; but inſtantly went away to *Rome:* Whereupon thoſe old Senatours, who at the firſt taking of *Rome*, ſtayed in their houſes in their Senatours Robes, were by the majeſty of their perſons for a little time defended; but it was not long ere the *French* perceived that this majeſty of theirs was without any power, onely in opini-

on; so as they began at first to scorne them, and at last to kill them.

It may therefore be concluded, that to trust to Majesty without force, is a dangerous businesse; and therefore *Tiberius* meaning tacitely to answer the objection, said, *Majestate salva, cui è longinquo major reverentia*; meaning to shew, that Majestie doth not the like good neare hand, as it doth a farre off; seeing the further it is off, the greater it growes; the nearer it comes, it growes the lesser. This was plainly seene, when *Scipio* and *Lucius Quintius* standing in competition for the Consulship, it was given to *Lucius Quintius*, for no other cause but this: whereof *Livy* saith, *Accedebat quod alter decimum jam prope annum assiduus in oculis hominum fuerat: quæ res minus verendos magnos homines ipsa satietate facit.* And of this, besides Examples, there may be given Philosophicall reasons: The first, because reverence to a man farre off, must needs grow from Fame; and Fame cannot come, but it must needs passe by the mouthes of many; so as the first mouth which begins to relate it to another, alwayes addes something out of love and affection to him, whose actions he relates: and the second mouth when it comes to his turne, cannot relate againe, without adding something of his owne; and so that other to another, *In infinitum.* Seeing we consist of parts that have a naturall instinct, never to returne things in the same manner they receive them, without imparting something of theirs: so the stomack converts the meate into *Chylus*; the liver, the *Chylus* into bloud; and so from hand to hand: Whereupon, not without cause it is said of Fame, that it increaseth as it flyes, like a snow-ball falling from a hill; which, though little at first parting, yet every place where it passeth adding snow unto it, It growes at last to a huge bignesse; and this greatnesse it gets by removing farre off from its beginning.

Another

Another reaſon, if I be not deceived, may be drawn from the conception of the underſtanding, as being able to forme in it ſelfe a conceit of things, more or leſſe perfect, then it is it ſelfe; If of things more perfect, then it formes a conceit more imperfect, as while it conceives God: If of things leſſe perfect, then it formes a conceit more perfect; and therefore in Gods underſtanding, all things are in ſuch a manner, as he himſelfe is. In underſtanding, materiall and ſenſible things are much more perfect then they are in themſelves: the underſtanding being more perfect, becauſe ſpirituall; whereupon all Philoſophers hold, that the patterne of a Houſe is more perfectly repreſented in the underſtanding, then the fabrick of the Houſe it ſelfe is in exiſtence: ſo as by this reaſon, it is plaine, that a thing is greater contemplated then ſeene: And ſo it followes, That the Majeſtie which is contemplated, as repreſented onely to the underſtanding; is greater then that which is beheld, as preſented to the ſenſe. Whereupon the Prophet *Eſay*, meaning to ſhew, who they are would follow Chriſt moſt; ſaith, *Et qui non audierunt contemplati ſunt*: as though he would ſay, that they were moſt like to admire the Majeſtie of Chriſt, who had neither heard him, nor ſeen him, but only contemplated him. *Plato* therefore ſpake not idly when he ſaid, That love encreaſeth by remoteneſſe, in regard of the Idæa. And *Ariſtotle* ſaid well, That when men are not knowne, they are reverenced; and when knowne ſlighted: which was found true in *Saul*; who when at firſt he was choſen King, the people deſired infinitely to ſee him; and aſſoone as they ſaw him, they began to deſpiſe him.

It is therefore manifeſt enough, that remoteneſſe is an encreaſe; and by the contrary, that neareneſſe is a diminiſher: For the vulgar ſort, of whom we now ſpeake,

ſpeake, judgeth things according to ſenſe, from without and in the barke; ſo as comming to have thoſe things to be preſent, which they conceived to be great; and not judging them anſwerable to their expectation, they quickly grow to contemne them, and count all but fables they had heard of them: Therefore our Lord God knowing that this race of people ſtands onely upon apparences, he gave them *Saul* to be their King; which *Procopius* relating, upon thoſe words; *Fœnitet me quod conſtituerim Saulem*, ſaith, *Saulem elegit propter egregiam ſtaturam; non quod ipſe qui omnium eſt Opifex, tanti eam faceret: ſed propter populum, qui ea quæ ſenſibus apparent pulchra, tantum inſpicit, & admiratur.*

This alſo may happen thorough mens defects, as well in their mindes as bodies; ſeeing there is no man ſo perfect, but he hath ſome defect or other; which Fame carryes not abroad, but Neareneſſe diſcovers. No marvell therefore that the common people of *Rome*, ſeeing *Galba* not to be ſo handſome a man as *Nero*, began to deſpiſe him: which happened alſo to *Lewis* the eleventh. With good reaſon then, and notably well did *Tiberius* make anſwer to the objection of the Citie; *Ire ipſum, opponere Majeſtatem*: by ſaying, *Majeſtate ſalva; cui è longinquo major Reverentia.*

De

De sententia legati statuunt tempus, quo sedi-
tiosissimum quemque & seditioni promptum,
seruo invadant. Tunc signo inter se dato, irrumpunt
contubernia, trucidant ignaros.

That to punish seditious Soulaiers, by the Souldiers own hands, is very profitable, and that ministers for the most part, in punishing exceed their limits.

The eight and fortieth Discourse.

AS soon as *Germanicus* had punished the heads of those Legions, that were amongst the *Cauci*, those other Legions, which were governed by *Caecina*, went away to the *Ubij*, whereat *Germanicus* taking great indignation, was preparing to oppresse them by force, who thus voluntarily had revolted from him, yet he would first send letters to *Caecina*, advertising him, that if the souldiers did not themselves punish their seducers, hee would come upon them with his Army, and kil both good and bad together; when they who were free from the contagion heard this, they determined between themselves (yet with *Caecinaes* consent) to kill all those souldiers that had any hand in the Rebellion, and after the signe given for the Execution, they fell with great confusion to cut in pieces, as well good as bad, in such sort, that *Germanicus* comming to the Campe, with teares reproved them, for so severely executing his will, and passing their bounds.

By occasion of this passage, there are many things that offer themselves to be discoursed of; the first what the occasion was, why in the former Rebellion, onely the Heads were punished, and in this were punished all that any way were guilty of it; secondly, whether this way of punishing by their own Companions be

good.

good. Thirdly and laſtly, by occaſion of theſe ſouldiers, who in puniſhing their Companions, farre exceeded the command given them; we will ſee whether this happen not alſo in the Officers of Princes, and why for the moſt part, they puniſh more, and reward leſſe than they are commanded.

Concerning the firſt, there was great reaſon why theſe ſhould be more ſeverely puniſhed than the other, becauſe having their Example before them, they yet perſiſted in the ſame rebellious courſes, as *Tacitus* ſhewes in theſe words, *At Germanicus quanquam contracto exercitui, & parata in defectores ultione, dandum adhuc ſpatium ratus, ſi recenti exemplo ſibi ipſi conſulerent.* But ſeeing their Example did not mend them, they were juſtly puniſhed more than the other. So God puniſhed *Lamech* more than *Cain*, and yet *Lamech* had not killed a brother, but onely becauſe he was not amended by the others Example, and thus *Theophylact* upon Saint *Matthew* expounds it in thoſe words, *Ut veniat ſuper vos omnis ſanguis juſtus, qui effunditur ſuper terram, à ſanguine Abel juſti, uſque ad ſanguinem Zachariæ*, whereupon this Authour ſaith, *ſuper Iudæos illos, qui tunc erant, dicit, veniat omnis ſanguis injuſtè effuſus, plus enim punientur quam patres ſui, nam neque poſt tanta exempla emendati fuerunt, ſicut enim Lamech poſt Cain, plus enim punitus fuit, licet non interemiſſet fratrem, eo quod non fuiſſet ad exemplum Cain emendatus.* Good reaſon therefore had *Germanicus* to have them be more puniſhed, who were not amended, by having an Example before their eyes, ſo *Scipio Africanus* did, and many others: but becauſe contrariwiſe, the firſt oftentimes are more puniſhed than the ſecond, as was ſeen in *Ananias* and *Saphyra*, in the Acts of the Apoſtles; in the Deluge, in the ſubverſion of *Sodome*, & infinite many in our time, who committing the ſame faults, yet have not the ſame puniſhments, (I ſpeak not of the Eternal) I would therfore make

make diſtinction, either it is the ſame party that commits both faults, and then the Law is, he ſhould be more puniſhed, for the ſecond time offending, or elſe they are ſeverall parties, and then, either of faults committed againſt ſome new Law, and then the firſt are more to be puniſhed than the ſecond, to the end there may grow no abuſe, and that the Law with more care may be obſerved, or elſe we ſpeak of faults committed againſt a Law already eſtabliſhed, and then the ſecond is more to be puniſhed than the firſt, in regard of the Example he hath before him. To come finally to the particular of theſe Rebellions; if the firſt time, the fault be ſeverely puniſhed, it will be a cauſe, that hardly it will be committed the ſecond time, but if by ill fortune, it be committed, and they rebell the ſecond time, there will be then little hope to quiet them; becauſe the feare to be puniſhed, as at the firſt time, will hinder them from quiching; and if in the firſt inſurrection there be not uſed an exceſſe of rigour, it will be an occaſion, they will eaſily make inſurrection the ſecond time, but yet it will be eaſie then to quiet them, as it hapned to *Scipio*.

Concerning the ſecond, to puniſh the ſeditious by the ſouldiers own hands, is occaſion of many laudable effects. Firſt, the hatred goes alwayes againſt them that act the puniſhment, and therefore when the Army now quieted, would have *Germanicus* to puniſh the offendours, he anſwered, *Ipſi exequerentur*; whereof *Tacitus* a little after ſhewing the reaſon, ſaith, *Nec Cæſar arcebat*, (meaning that had done the ſlaughter) *Quando nullo ipſius juſſu, penes eoſdem ſævitia facti, & invidia erat.*

A ſecond reaſon is, that ſeeing all the ſeditious cannot be puniſhed, but onely the Heads; unleſſe he ſhould deſtroy the whole Army, it ſeemes that if the baſer ſort be not puniſhed, it will give them meanes to be

be able, and occasion to be ready upon every light distaste to mutiny again, which by punishing the Heads by the proper hands of the multitude, will be remedied and prevented, because they will finde none afterward forward to incite them, when they see such an Example of their ungratefulnesse towards them them that incited, and were their Heads before, and of themselves, they will be never able to make any innovation, *Nihil ausuram plebem principibus amotis.*

Thirdly, because the Generall by this meanes will remove the hatred which might grow by such slaughters, from himselfe to the souldiers; this way *John Bentivoglio* in *Bolonia* took, when being advertised by his Adversary Duke *Valentine*, that many of the principall of the City had a meaning to receive him into *Bolonia* with an Army, which perhaps *Valentine* did, to the end that *Bentivoglio* might shed the blood of his Nobles, and thereby make the Heads of them his Enemies, and finally be murthered by them, but he giving credit to what *Valentine* writ, caused his son *Hermes* and the greater part of the young Nobles of *Bolonia* to go and commit those slaughters, to the end that they imbruing their hands in the blood of *Bentivoglio* his Enemies might run the same fortune with himselfe, and consequently never after abandon their Prince, because if he should chance to be driven out, they might be sure themselves to fare no better; so as *Bentivoglio* made that a meanes to make himselfe secure, which *Valentine* intended should have made him odious. *Herod* fearing *John* the Baptist, and meaning to put him to death, invited to supper all the principall men of *Galile*, to the end that they also might have a part in the slaughter, and thereby be tied to defend him, if there should be need, of which the holy Text in Saint *Marke* saith, *Herodes autem metuebat Johannem, sciens eum virum justum & sanctum, & custodiebat eum;*

&

& audito eo, multa faciebat, & libenter eum audiebat; & cum dies opportunus accidiſſet, Herodes natalis ſui cœnam fecit, Principibus, & Tribunis, & Primis Galilæ, and that which followes. A peſtilent courſe, becauſe as well in the caſe before as in this, there was a moſt cruell and unlawfull Execution. But if (as in our caſe we preſuppoſe) there ſhould be an occaſion deſerving death, I then conceive, it would not do well, unleſſe execution of the ſlaughter were conferred upon their owvn companions; And thus did *Moſes*, vvho almoſt juſt in the ſame manner as *Cæcina* did, puniſhed his people vvhen they rebelled againſt him, or rather againſt God, in vvorſhipping the golden Calfe, for he cauſed the Tribe of *Levi*, to enter into the Campe, and to go from one end to the other, forward and backward, and cut them all in pieces whom they found to have upon them a certain marke, which what it was I will not at this time ſtand to ſpeak of; *Si quis eſt Domini*, (ſaith *Moſes*) *jungatur mihi; congregatiq; ſunt omnes filij Levi ad eum, quibus ait, Hæc dicit Dominus Deus Iſrael, Ponat vir gladium ſuper fœmur ſuum, ite & redite de porta uſque ad portam, per medium caſtrorum, & occidat unuſquiſque fratrem & amicum, & proximum ſuum*: and therefore the way which *Cæcina* uſed in the Rebellion was a good way.

Fourthly, thoſe Souldiers which were no partakers in the Rebellion are the gladder, if they can waſh their hands in the blood of the offenders; *Lætabitur juſtus, cum viderit vindictam, manus ſuas lavabit in ſanguine peccatoris.* Whereupon in that firſt ſedition, when the Souldiers had killed them that were guilty, as though that ſlaughter were their own abſolution, they rejoyced; *Gaudebat cædibus miles, tanquam ſemet abſolveret.*

It remaines to ſhew whether it be true, that Officers in execution of puniſhments uſe to exceed their

commiſsion: and that it is true, is plainly ſhewed by Saint *John* in the *Apocalyps*, where a voyce ſaying to the ſeven Angels, *Ite & effundite ſeptem phialas iræ Dei in terram*: they went and powred them out, not onely upon the land, but upon the rivers alſo, upon the fountaines, upon the ſea, and even upon the ſun: upon the ſame occaſion, in another place of the *Apocalyps*, an Angel cried aloud to four Angels, to whom power was given to hurt the Earth and the Sea, ſaying, *Nolite nocere terræ & mari neque arboribus*: he needed not have ſaid, *arboribus*, ſeeing thoſe Angels had power to hurt but onely the Earth and the Sea, he therefore cried ſo (as a Writer obſerves) becauſe he ſaw thoſe Angels interpreted the power given them to hurt, in too large a ſenſe, as meaning to hurt not only the Earth and the Sea, but the trees alſo; or perhaps he doubted, leaſt as Officers interpret alwayes too largely the power given them to inflict puniſhments, ſo they ſhould interpret too narrowly, the power given them to beſtow benefits; whereupon he thought it not enough to ſay, *Nolite nocere terræ & mari*, and therefore added, *neque arboribus*: ſo alſo in *Eſay*, our Lord God commanded that the Iſraelites ſhould be humbled by the King of the *Aſſyrians*, and he intended to deſtroy them, God commanded him to tread upon them, and he went about to put them all to the ſword.

This therefore is an ordinary thing with Officers to reſtrain favours, and inlarge puniſhment, which growes upon this, becauſe as building their fortunes upon the Princes treaſure and honours, they thinke every thing loſt to themſelves which is given to another, and therefore alwayes interpret favours narrowly, and puniſhments largely, as well to ſecond the Prince in his anger, and make him the more gracious to themſelves, as taking to heart the wrongs that are offered him, as alſo to make the delinquents faults ſeem

greater

greater than they are; to the end, the Prince ſeeing them ſo cruell to them, that ſo perfidiouſly had vvronged him, may take notice hovv faithfull they are in his ſervice, and hovv much they reſent his injuries.

Iunctoque Ponte tramittit duodecim millia Legionibus ſex, & viginti ſocias cohortes, octo Equitum Alas, quarum ea ſeditione integrata modeſtia fuit.

Whether an Army be apter to rebell, that conſiſts of one Nation onely, or that which conſiſts of many.

The nine and fortieth Diſcourſe.

BY occaſion of auxiliary Souldiers, (vvhich for any thing can be gathered from the forealleaged vvords of *Tacitus*) ſtood alvvayes quiet, and kept themſelves in good order, vvhen the Roman Legions oftentimes fell into ſeditions, I am dravvn to think, that Armies compoſed of divers Nations, are leſſe apt to be mutinous than thoſe which are all of one Nation, having a manifeſt Example thereof in the Army of *Hannibal*, which being compoſed of an infinite number of Nations, differing in Language, in cuſtomes, in Religion, yet they never mutinyed nor rebelled, although they had a thouſand times occaſion, by the many wants they ſuffered, which *Livy* wondred at, ſaying, *Quippe qui cum in hoſtium terra, per annos tredecim jam procul à domo, varia fortuna bellum gereret; exercitu non ſuo civili, ſed mixto ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis, alius habitus, alia veſtis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia ſacra, alii prope dii eſſent, ita quodam uno vinculo copulaverit eos, ut nulla nec inter ipſos, nec adverſus ducem ſeditio exſtiterit.* The

reason of this is, because being of divers language, they do not so easily accord, and if one part should happen to mutiny, it is easie to oppose it with another, which either through emulation, or some other cause, can seldom times be brought to agree together; besides it happens, because if one of those Nations chance to mutiny, and abandon the Army, yet the Army will not be much weakened by it, as a thousand times hath been seen in *Flanders* in the King of *Spaines* Armies, and other places. When *Hannibal* meant to passe into *Italy*, the *Carpetani* forsook him, and he making shew he had given them leave, made no matter of it, and his Army was not thereby vveakened, vvhere if his Army had consisted of one Nation, he had never been able to passe into *Italy*. And this *Ludovico Il Moro* found, against whom vvhen his Army rebelled, vvhich consisted all of *Swissers*, he vvas forced to loose his state, and be taken prisoner.

But if by ill fortune an Army consisting of divers Nations happen to mutiny, as it is hard to happen, so if it happen, it is impossible to appease it, of vvhich the *Carthaginians* had a notable experience, vvhen having an Army of that sort, they vvanted not much of loosing their whole state, and *Carthage* it selfe. The reason is, because there cannot be speeches made to the whole Army, when it consists of divers Languages, as there might be if it consisted but of one.

An Army then, if onely one Nation, is more apt to mutiny, but is withall more easie to be quieted; an Army of divers Nations is lesse apt to mutiny, but if it mutiny, is impossible to be quieted: moreover, it is to be knowvn, that as such Armies seldom grow tumultuous against their Commanders, so amongst themselves, there grow tumults often, and of these cases Histories are full, their being alwayes discord where there are divers Nations. *Rebecca* being great

with

with childe by *Iſaak*, and having in her wombe *Jacob* and *Eſau*, ſhe felt a great ſtriving of theſe two ſonnes, which put her to much pain, whereof complaining to our Lord God, he anſwered, *Duæ gentes ſunt in utero tuo, & duo populi ex ventre tuo dividentur*: as though he would ſay, Marvell not if they ſtrive together, ſeeing they are two divers Nations, which thou haſt in thy body.

Alia Tiberio morum via, ſed populum per tot annos molliter habitum, nondum audebat ad duriora vertere.

That to paſſe from one extreme to another is dangerous, and how it happens that ſucceſſours commonly take courſes differing from their predeceſſours.

The fiftieth Diſcourſe.

TO paſſe from one extreme to another without comming to the middle, not only is dangerous, but in many things is held impoſsible, as in motion, in ſuch manner that ſome Divines deny, that Angels can move from one extreme to another, without paſsing by the middle, ſo as *Hippocrates* with good reaſon in his book of Aphoriſmes, miſlikes the paſſing from a ſurfet to a diet; and yet a ſurfet is bad, a diet good, but the paſsing from a ſurfet to a diet is moſt dangerous, whereof *Ariſtotle* in one of his Problemes, brings *Dionyſius* the Tyrant for an Example, who in the ſiege of his City, forbearing to eat and drinke as he was wont, by this paſsing from Intemperance to Temperance, he fell into a Leproſie. What is worſe than a corrupt Common-wealth? What better than a regall Government? yet he that hath gone about to

passe from the one to the other, as it were at one jumpe, either it hath not been successfull, or it hath not been durable: whereupon we see that Musicians will not make a passage from a Discord (as a seventh) to a perfect Concord, as a fifth, without passing first to a sixth, and when they mean to make good a second they go to a third, and not to an eighth. By these degrees the Common-wealth of *Rome* came to a regall power; for from a Democracy, it passed to an Oligarchy; from that, to the Government of One; and this One not willing to make that jumpe, conceived himselfe to be called Dictator, for if he had been called King, he had run a manifest hazard, as was plainly seen, when *Antonius* would have put a Crown upon his head; and indeed *Cicero* said, that *Anthonius* tongue calling him King, was more the occasion of *Cæsars* death than *Brutus* his dagger. After him comes *Augustus*, and *Cæsar* having passed from one extreme, it was now easie for him to passe toward the other extreme, and therefore he was able after taking upon him the Tribunitiall dignity, to take upon him also that of Emperour; but he came not full out to the other extreame, seeing hee carried himselfe as a companion, an equall, and as it were a Citizen with the rest, at least in shew; as leaving some authority to the people, and deliberating in a manner of all things with the Senate. After *Augustus* came *Tiberius*, and he was able fully to reach the other extreame; but yet not all at once: For, first he raised himselfe from equality; then he took from the people that little authority they had; and then lastly would be feared, and acknowledged for Prince. *Alia Tiberio morum via: sed populum per tot annos moliter habitum, nondum audebat ad dura vertere.*

Augustus then, a Prince of that Prudence, as every one knows, not onely ordained new sports for recre-

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ation of the people, but he in person would be present at them. *Tiberius* on the contrary, an excellent man, full of all the State wisedome that can be in a Prince, was farre from delighting in the sports, yet durst not take them quite away. Whereupon, it should seeme to him that would consider these things to the full, that one of them did doe well, the other ill: seeing of two contraries, when one is good, the other must needs be bad. Yet I am of opinion, that both of them did well, and if they had done otherwise, they would have met with difficulties. For as for *Augustus*, there was reason, that the people, who for so many yeares had beene toyled with continuall warres, should be refreshed with some recreations, as *Augustus* did, by ordaining of sports, and himselfe oftentimes to be present at them, that he might not at first shew that inequality, from which but a few dayes before he had beene raised: But because, as after a cruell Prince, if there come another that is cruell, he easily, by reason of the peoples hatred, runnes a hazard: So if after a Prince so milde, that rules onely with love, there come another Prince of like nature, he easily falls into contempt, and thereby stands in hazard of his state. It was therefore necessary, that *Tiberius*, to make a compleat setling of his power, should use a little rigour; and differing from *Augustus*, should shew how much a Prince differs from a private person, by getting himselfe not onely love, but fear also; which cannot well be maintained by him that carryes himselfe mildely, and suffers himselfe to be often seen. *Tiberius* then, being to use a diverse manner, hee could not in those beginnings, *Addurions vertere*; seeing (as I have said) that passing from one extreame to another, is extreamly dangerous, and was it that ruined *Galba*; for the people and the Souldiers being accustomed to the bounty of *Nero*, finding themselves upon a suddaine

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restrained, could not endure it; *Nocuit antiquus rigor: & nimia severitas cui jam pares non sumus*: and therefore they who conspired the first time against *Nero*, meant to make *Piso* Emperour; a man that favoured sports and pleasures exceedingly: *Idque pluribus probabatur, qui in tanta vitiorum dulcedine, summum Imperium non restrictum, nec perseverum volunt.* The City of *Ferrara* was accustomed under Duke *Alphonso* of glorious memory, to live in delights and sports; and therefore when it came into the hands of Pope *Clement* the eighth, a man of singular prudence, and never enough to be commended; he would not upon the suddaine restraine the people, but leaving them their delights, maintained them with sweetnesse in the Vigils, and Turneaments, and other generous Exercises.

But that *Tiberius*, Successour of *Augustus*, was unlike to his Predecessour, is no marvell, seeing it is commonly so, and in all times hath ever beene so. *Numa Pompilius* was most differing from *Romulus*. *David* a war-like man, had for his Successour *Salomon* a peaceable man. To *Moses* a Law-giver, succeeded *Josua* a warriour. I forbeare to bring moderne Examples, as a thing odious; and looke, that every one should of himselfe consider, that he who in a government succeedes another that is cruell, is commonly mercifull; and he who succeedes one that is growne odious to the people, makes himselfe commonly odious to the Nobility. And this is so true, that I thinke it more needfull to seek out the reason, then to doubt the effect; and although the search of it be difficult, yet I would say first, that every one having a certaine inbred desire to outgoe his Predecessour, which is a thing easier to be done, in matters wherein he either excelled not, or did *ill*, they betake themselves to a contrary course. Whereupon, if *Numa Pompilius* would have gone about to exceed *Romulus* in warre, he had never attained it; but

but to excell him in Religion, which by his Predeceſſours was little eſteemed, was eaſily done. *Druſus* alſo going into *Germany*, if he would have meant to exceed his Predeceſſour *Germanicus* in glory of Armes, it would not perhaps have ſucceeded with him, but to exceed him in craft and ſtratagems, it eaſily ſucceeded. From hence it is why many believed (as *Plutarch* relates) that *Tiberius Gracchus*, ſeeing he could never be able to exceed *Fluvius Poſthumius* in glory of warre, ſought to get himſelfe fame by peace; and by bringing in new Laws among the people.

Secondly, Princes and Governours have before their eyes a politicall paſſage, which is held for an infallible rule; that Governours ought to imitate their Predeceſſour in things commended, and not to imitate him in things diſtaſted: and ſo much *Nero* in *Tacitus* promiſed to doe. And therefore a Prince, finding that his Predeceſſour had made every one his enemy thorough cruelty; he too much deſiring to avoid the like, endevours by all meanes to win their love with mildneſſe; into which he tranſports himſelfe, ſometimes ſo farre, that to avoid hatred, he falls into contempt.

Thirdly, Princes and Governours carry a certaine envy towards their predeceſſours, and deſire to be more beloved then they: whereupon for example; if the predeceſſour were beloved of the Nobility, he will ſeeke to be beloved of the people, by being their protectour. Firſt, becauſe the people will be gladder of his comming to be Prince, then the Nobility will be; as thoſe that cannot looke for more at this Princes hands, then they had at the others; and conſequently cannot chuſe but ſhew ſome paſſion, at either the death, or at the departing of the predeceſſours; which how odious a thing it is to a new Prince, *Tacitus* teacheth us, where he ſhewes, that after the death of *Auguſtus*, the Senatours made ſhew to have no leſſe joy in

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the new Prince, than they had in the old: *At Romæ ruere in Servitium Consules, Patres, Equites: quanto quis Illustrior, tanto magis falsi ac festinantes, vultuque compositi; ne lati excessu Principis, neu tristiores primordio lachrymas, gaudium, quæstus, Adulationes miscebant.* Secondly, because it is more easie to content the part oppressed, then the part advanced; as every one knows: and thus much for this.

Simul Segestes ipse ingens visu, & memoria bonæ societatis impavidus; verba ejus in hunc modum fuere.

What course is to be used in demanding Peace, and when is the fit time.

The one and fiftieth Discourse.

SEgestes boldly and without any feare, being brought before *Germanicus*, with great confidence delivers his Speech; though it might bee doubted, he had a hand in the death of *Varro*, and of the three Legions that were with him: and because this place of *Tacitus* containes in it many Arguments of Discourse; I will first examine, when it is a fit time for men to seek friendship with their Enemies, and in what manner they ought to excuse themselves; and though I may seeme to goe astray from this place of *Tacitus*, yet I will not omit to explain the words it containes; that we may see why *Segestes* speaking of himselfe, spake with great boldnesse: and comming afterward to speake of his sonne, with great humblenesse craves pardon. *Pro Iuventa & errore filii, veniam precor.* Wherein wee may see, how men that desire to cleare themselves of any thing laid to their charge, ought to treat for procuring of Amity.

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Such men therefore, either they have committed ſome fault, or they have not: if they have committed any fault, either they were at firſt friends, and afterwards are become enemies; or elſe they have been alwayes enemies. If they have beene alwayes enemies, either they have beene Principalls, or but Adherents. Beginning then with the laſt; if theſe enemies that deſire to become friends, were onely Adherents; they may then doe it, by abandoning their friends in danger without any cauſe given them; but then withall, they muſt doe it with much bluſhing, or elſe will never be accepted. Seeing hee becomes for ever odious to the world, whoſoever is ſtained with ſuch a blot; as was ſeene in *Bernardino Corte* of *Pavia*; who being left by *Ludovico Moro*, to keep the Caſtle of *Milan*, rendered it up to *Lewis* the twelfth; and finding himſelfe afterward blamed for it of the *French* themſelves, he died with griefe. I cannot forbeare to relate an example of hatred that is borne to Traytors; which *Guicciardine* reports in the perſon of *Burbon*, whom the King of *Spaine* imployed, to require a Captaine to deliver up his Pallace to the King of *Spaine*; who anſwered, he could not deny the King; but that aſſoone as *Burbon* was gone out of it, he would ſet it on fire, as a place infected, and unworthy to be inhabited by men of honour. It is true, that this anſwer, in my opinion, contained under it another myſterie, which I cannot now examine, as being out of my roade; and therefore will leave it for the Reader to conſider it of himſelfe. This at leaſt is a cleare caſe; that Traytours are odious even to thoſe, in whoſe favour they have done the Treaſon; whereof many reaſons may be given. And firſt, a reaſon taken from the danger they incurre; who keepe ſuch fellows about them; and are like to do as much to them as they have done to others: ſeeing a man that is growne infamous, cannot do better, then to

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make a gaine of his infamy; as the Lawgiver ſaid, ſpeaking of Harlots. Secondly, becauſe Obligation is a heavy burthen, which men willingly disburthen themſelves of, aſſoone as they finde any little colour likely to doe it: A Prince therefore being obliged to one for becomming a Traytour for his ſervice, payes him willingly with becomming ungratefull for his reward; and thinks the hatred that is borne to Traytors is colour enough for it. A third reaſon may be taken from the pleaſure men ſeeme to take, in overcomming rather by Force, than by Fraud; and therefore oftentimes they kill the Traytors. So the *Sabines* did to the daughter of *Spurius Tarpeius*, who had opened to them the Caſtle of *Rome*: *Seu ut vi capta Arx videretur.* So the *Romans* taking the Fortreſſe of *Tarentum*, by the treaſon of the *Brutii*; put them all to the ſword. *Brutii quoque multi interfecti, ſeu per errorem, ſeu vetere in eos inſito odio; ſeu ad proditionis famam, ut vi potius atque armis captum Tarentum videretur.* Fourthly, they are ſo odious, that they are alwayes in danger, in regard of the Example; for if Princes ſhould make much of them, and hold them in any account; they ſhould give an Example to encourage others to doe the like to themſelves: This reaſon *Livy* alſo alleadgeth in the fore-ſaid caſe of the *Sabines*; *Seu prodendi Exempli cauſa, ne quid uſquam fidum proditori eſſet.*

Laſtly, *Segeſtes* ſaith of ſuch, *Nam proditores etiam iis quos anteponunt inviſos:* and in truth, theſe reaſons are ſo cleare, that I ſhould marvell there could be any Traytours; if it were not for the force which particulars have to darken an underſtanding, that is cleare in univerſals.

Secondly, this may happen for ſome ill uſage from them, to whom he adheres; and in ſuch caſe, he may ſpeak without bluſhing: but yet he ought not to ſtaine his honeſt parting with taking reward. And ſo much

much *Indibile* did, when passing with his Souldiers from the *Carthagenians* to the service of *Scipio*, he rather excused himselfe for abandoning his friends, then expected thanks for the ayde he brought. Whereof *Livy* saith; *Prætorque excusans transitionem, ut non esset invisa; quam glorianti eam vidit primam sensisse novum regem. Sæpe enim transfugæ nomen execrabile mutatibus sociis recens suspectum esse: neque enim se reprehendere mortem hominum, si tam anceps odium causa non novem faciat: Mentem deinde suam in Duces Carthaginenses mutasse, quorum contra eorum superbiamque, & omnis generis injurias ipse, atque populares. Itaque corpus duntaxat suum eo id tempus apud eos fuisse: animum jampridem illi esse, ubi jus ac fas crederet coli: se id Scipionem orare; ut transitio sibi, nec fraudi apud eum, nec honori sit.* Likewise *Segestes* in his speech to *Germanicus*, amongst other principall things he saith, this is one, that he had not left his friends to get reward; *Neque ob præmium, sed in memoriam perfidiæ evulsam*: but because, knowing Peace to be more profitable, he advised those people to give over warre: and *Antheny*, who by meanes of his faction prevailed, thought the contrary; therefore for his owne safety, and that he might not be oppressed, he had left that side, and was come to the *Romans*. The very like to this doth *Livy* relate of *Appius Claudius*, who advised the *Sabines* not to enter into warre with the *Romans*; and finding he was not able to withstand the faction, which perswaded the contrary, he went away to *Rome*; *Cum Dacia ipsa Author, à turbatoribus belli præmuniretur, nec par factioni esset; ab lacu Regillo magna clientium comitatus manu, Romam transfugit.*

Thirdly, it may happen by his being dead, to whom he adhered; and then, though the case may seeme more difficult, yet it is more easie, at least, if he can make it appeare, that he adhered to the other, more for love to him, then for any hate to the contrary side;

and in ſuch caſe he may ſpeak boldly, and the more boldly the better. *Herod* the great had followed the fortune of *Antonius* untill his death, not for any hate he bore to *Auguſtus*, whom he never knew, but for the love he bore to *Marke Antony*, from whom he had received benefits, after whoſe death he feared not to preſent himſelfe before *Auguſtus*, to whom he ſpake with a gravity becomming a King, and by this meanes was received of *Auguſtus* into a firme league of friendſhip: the reaſon of this is, becauſe the cauſe of their enmity being ceaſed, which was the love to the perſon now dead, and the profit growing by him, they will thinke to have them hereafter their true friends: as conceiving they will be the ſame to them as they were to the other before, whereupon we reade in *Tacitus* that *Otho* ſeeing how faithfull *Celſus* had been to his enemy *Galba*, took him out of the hands of the Souldiers, by putting him in priſon, and then gave him a charge, and held him as his ſpeciall friend, and *Celſus* ſerved him as faithfully, as he had ſerved *Galba*, *Celſus conſtanter ſervatæ erga Galbam fidei crimen confeſſus, exemplum ultro imputavit, nec Otho quaſi ignoſceret, ſed ne hoſtium metum reconciliationis adhiberet, ſtatim intra intimos amicos habuit, & mox bello inter duces dilegit, manſitq; Celſo velut fataliter, etiam pro Othone fides integra & infœlix.*

Such then as theſe ſhall not need to make any excuſes, but onely ſhew the love they bore, and the faithfulneſſe they uſed towards their friends now dead, and that they did nothing for any hatred they bore to this ſide, but for the love they bore to the other; out of this reſpect I conceive it was, that *Cæſar* pardoned all thoſe that had borne Armes againſt him, ſaying, that they who had taken part with *Pompey* out of friendſhip had done him no wrong: to theſe things may be added, the force that a free confeſſing hath (not onely

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in this caſe, but in all other) to procure ones pardon; and the Reaſon is, becauſe one cannot voluntarily confeſſe an errour, but he muſt withall at the ſame time commend and praiſe him to whom he confeſſeth it; ſeeing no man would willingly confeſſe an errour, if he did not hope it would be pardoned: and out of ſuch hope he grows confident, and fals to praiſing the Prince for his clemency; things of great force to move one to pardon: whereupon not without myſtery, the word *Confiteor* in the holy Text ſignifies not onely to confeſſe, but alſo to praiſe: and we ſee that our Lord Chriſt, who being without ſin needed not to make Confeſsion to his Eternall Father, yet notwithſtanding he ſaid, *Confiteor tibi Domine cœli & terræ*; which meanes nothing (as Saint *Auſtin* and all the Fathers expound it) but, I praiſe thee Eternall Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth. We may juſtly ſay then, that this word *Confiteor* ſignifies as well To praiſe, as to confeſſe, ſeeing in confeſsing, one is praiſed. And thus much for Adherents.

Now concerning a Principall: if he have been alwayes an Enemy, either it is in time of war, or in time of peace; if in war, either he is ſuperior, or inferior; if ſuperior, either he knows he is able to hold out, or elſe he doubts he is like to go down: if he know he be able to hold out, he ought not then to ſeek after amity; and therefore the *Romans* meaning to deſtroy *Carthage* refuſed peace: but if he doubt himſelfe, and finde difficulties in it, he ſhall then do well to accept of peace, if it be required. This made *Lutatius* the Conſul (as *Polybius* relates) after he had overcome the *Carthaginians* by ſea, not to refuſe peace when it was offered him by *Amilcar*, becauſe he found there were many difficulties yet remaining, before he could get an abſolute victory; rather if he ſtand in doubt he ſhall come to be inferiour, he ſhall then do well, not onely to accept of

peace, if it be required, but to require it himſelfe: it is true, it is an hard matter to perſwade men againſt reputation, whereupon we ſee, it ſucceeded not well with *Hanno*, when after the defeat the *Romans* had at *Canna*, he counſelled the *Carthaginians* to demand peace, whoſe counſell was rejected, not ſo much for his being of a contrary faction to that of *Hannibals*, as for the reputation. I cannot therefore but account the Senate of *Venice* to be full of men of great wiſdom, who after the victory the Chriſtians had gotten in a naval battell, yet taking into conſideration the depth of things, they made a peace with the Turke, accounting it leſſe evill for the conſervation of their State, to live in peace, than to be turmoiled with war.

But if ſuch a one be inferiour, either he knowes he is like to be inferiour ſtill, or elſe he is in hope to get the better; if thus, not onely he ought not to ſeek for peace, but not to accept it, if it be offered. *Perſeus* having overcome the *Romans* in battail, by the advice of his friends demanded peace, but the Conſul denied it. So *Pyrrhus* after he had won the firſt battail demanded peace, and was denied it. But if he be inferiour, and hath no hope to get the better, he ſhall do well not to ſtay to the laſt, ſeeing as long as he hath any ſtrength left, he may demand peace with the more boldneſſe, and make the better conditions: ſo *Hannibal* before his laſt battail demanded peace of *Scipio*, with great majeſty; where if a man ſtay till he be at the laſt caſt, he muſt come as a ſuppliant, and aske with ſubmiſsion, and be fain to take what conditions he can get, and it is great foolery to go to aske pardon, with boaſting of his merits, and ſtanding upon termes. And this our Lord Chriſt expreſſed in the Parable of the Phariſee and the Publican; where the Publican humbly asking pardon for his ſinnes was heard, and the Phariſee not, becauſe inſtead of humbling himſelfe,

ſelfe, he boaſted of himſelfe, ſaying, *Deus, gratias agoti-bi quia non ſum ſicut cæteri hominum, raptores, injuſti, adulteri, velut etiam hic Publicanus, jejuno bis in ſabbato, decimas do omnium quæ poſſideo.* The reaſon of this ſaying is, becauſe when one confeſſeth his errours he makes himſelfe judge, and conſequently him his advocate, to whom he confeſſeth, vvhere he that ſpeakes vvith inſolence makes himſelfe his ovvn advocate, and conſequently him judge to vvhom he ſpeakes; vvhereupon hovv much it is better for a delinquent to make him he hath offended to be his advocate than his judge, ſo much it is better to aske pardon with humility than with boaſting: and therefore, when after the *Romans* had entred *Aſia*, and had gotten ſome victories, an Ambaſſador comming to *Scipio* from *Antiochus*, to demand peace; he was anſwered by *Scipio*, *Quod Romanos omnes, quod me ad quem miſſus es ignorare minus miror, cum te fortunam ejus à quo venis, ignorare cernam; Lyſimachia tenenda erat, ne Cherſoneſum intraremus; aut ad Helleſpontum obſiſtendum, ne in Aſiam trajiceremus, ſi pacem à ſollicitis de belli eventu petituri eratis, conceſſo vero in Aſiam tranſitu, & non ſolum freni, ſed etiam jugo accepto, quæ diſceptatio ex æquo cum imperium patiendum ſit, relicta eſt?* And finally he gave him this counſell, *Nuntia meis verbis, bello abſtineat, pacis conditionem nullam recuſet.* For this cauſe the *Etolians* did ill to ſpeak ſo boldly after they were brought to the laſt caſt, and that they would not accept of ſuch conditions of peace as the *Romans* offered them, ſeeing it is a meer foolery to ſtand upon termes with a Conquerour, as they at laſt perceived, when the Conſul bringing out his Forces, they were glad to humble themſelves, and abate their boldneſſe; *Tunc fracta Phanea ferocia Ætoliſq; aliis eſt, & tandem cujus conditionis eſſent, ſenſere, & Phaneas ſe quidem, & qui adſint Ætolorum ſcire facienda eſſe, quæ imperentur.* There is therefore

in ſuch caſes no better courſe than to lay conditioning aſide, and to put ones ſelfe into the victors hand, who no doubt will remit the more when he findes it is left in his power to do it: ſo *Alorcus* counſelled the *Saguntines* to do, that ſeeing they had now no hope left, they ſhould rather put themſelves into the victors hand, than ſtand upon conditioning; *Haud deſpero, cum omnium poteſtas ei à vobis facta ſit, aliquid ex his rebus remiſſurum*: which when the *Saguntines* would not do, they were all put to fire and ſword.

I cannot omit by way of digreſſion, to ſpeak of a cuſtome the *Romans* had, which at firſt ſight ſeemes to have been a great errour, and it is, that they offered the ſame conditions of peace in the uncertain beginning of a War, as after they had gotten an abſolute victory; as by the anſwer of *Scipio* to the Ambaſſadours of *Antiochus* may appear, *Romani ex his quæ in deorum immortalium poteſtate erant, ea habemus quæ dii dederunt, animos, qui noſtræ mentis ſunt, eoſdem in omni fortuna geſſimus, geſtimuſq; neque eos ſecundæ res extulerunt, nec adverſæ minuerunt; ejus rei, ut alios omittam, Annibalem veſtrum vobis dabem teſtem, niſi vos ipſos dare poſſem: poſteaquam Helleſpontum trajecimus, prius quam caſtra regia, prius quam aciem videremus, cum communis Mars, & incertus belli eventus eſſet, de pace vobis agentibus, quas pares paribus ferebamus conditiones, eaſdem nunc victores victis ferimus.* This way of doing ſerved, it ſeemes, to no other purpoſe, but to encourage their Enemies, to cyment their fortune, till they ſhould be brought to extremity, and I make no doubt but that *Antiochus* having before him the Example of the *Carthaginians*, would never be brought to accept conditions of peace till he was brought upon his knees with the War. To take away this difficulty, it would not ſuffice to anſwer, as *Scipio* ſaid, that it came from generouſneſſe of ſpirit, that they altered not for fortune, ſeeing little

praiſe can be given to ſuch a dangerous and prejudiciall Generouſneſſe, and therefore I ſhould rather attribute the cauſe to too great a greedineſſe of getting that which is anothers; ſeeing the *Romans* made war with *Antiochus*, and with the *Carthaginians*, as thinking they could not be quiet, if the one were Lord of this ſide the mountain *Taurus*, and the other were poſſeſt of *Africke*, and this being their motive, there is no doubt but the War would neverend, till they had triumphed both over *Africa*, and over *Aſia*. Whereupon when War is waged with ſuch people, we muſt make account either to get the victory, or otherwiſe to be abſolutely deſtroyed: and therefore when *Samuel* meant to ſhew *Saul*, that God intended to root out his Houſe, to the end he might know he would not pardon him till he were utterly deſtroyed, he called our Lord God by the Name of Triumpher, *Porro Triumphator in Iſrael non parcet*: as though he would ſay, as they who fight to triumph, do not pardon till they have utterly deſtroyed their Enemies, ſo O *Saul*, will our Lord God do with thee. But to returne to our purpoſe, if they who would come to amity were friends before, and are afterward become Enemies, they muſt then come with bluſhing and with great humbleneſſe, at leaſt if they can ſhevv no juſt occaſion, but let them not then ſtay til they come to extremity, for then they vvil never be accepted: therefore the *Capuans* did ill, not to open their Gates to the *Romans* vvithin the time given them; for vvhen they vvere come to extremity, it availed not then to open their Gates, but all of them vvere miſerably put to the ſvvord.

The laſt caſe is of him that demands amity, and comes to excuſe himſelfe, as having never committed any fault, alvvayes really been a friend, and never done them any vvrong; and ſuch an one may, or rather muſt ſpeak boldly. Such a one vvas *Segeſtes*, vvho

ſpeaking

speaking of himselfe, *Memoria bonæ societatis impavidus*, never asked pardon. Such then may speak with confidence, and ought to be hearkened to of the Prince with patience: and this way was a great helpe to *Terentius* in *Tacitus*, who being accused for having had friendship with *Sejanus*, he confessed it boldly, shewing not onely that he was his friend, but that he had laboured much to come to be so, as seeing him a Companion of *Cæsar* in his Consulship, a Kinsman, an inward friend, and a stay of the Empire; and this constancy of his prevailed so far that not onely he was pardoned, but his accusers also were ill intreated. *Saul* must pardon me, if I thinke him in this case, a more Tyrant than *Tiberius*, seeing when *Abimelech* the Priest was accused for giving *David* meat, and the sword of *Goliah*, and was charged for it by *Saul*, he made the like answer as *Terentius* did, *Et quis in omnibus servis tuis sicuti David fidelis, & gener Regis, pergens in imperium, & gloriosus in domo tua.* But the boldnesse and innocency of *Abimelech* was not so great, but the cruelty of *Saul* was greater, who for this cause put him to death; certainly a most perfidious act, seeing as I have said, and say still, He that is innocent & comes without fault, both ought to speak with boldnes, and ought to be heard with patience: and herein Princes should imitate our Lord God, who takes pleasure in such disputes, as S. *Austin* witnesseth in his exposition of those words in the Psalme, *Jucundum sit ei eloquium meum*; which he reades thus, *Suavis sit ei disputatio mea*; and then saith, *Ostendit Propheta suavem Deo esse disputationem, & argumentationem gratam, quæ post peccatorum pœnitentiam fit, cum eo pias querelas proponendo & iræ illius resistendo viriliter*: so *Job* spake, pretending to be innocent, *Ad Omnipotentem loquar, & disputare cum Deo cupio*; and a little after addes, *Quis mihi tribuat ut cognoscam & inveniam illum, & veniam usque ad solium ejus, ponam coram eo judicium, & os meum*

um replebo increpationibus, ut ſciam verba quæ mihi reſpondeat. And therefore *Eſay* having in his firſt Chapter ſaid, *Lavamini & mundi eſtote*; he addes, *Venite & arguite me*; which Saint *Gregory* interpreting, ſaith, *de ſi patienter dicat; recta agite, & animad verſionis meæ motibus non jam per deprecationem gemitus, ſed per fiduciam authoritatis obviate*: whereupon after *Job* had ſaid, *Tædet animam meam vitæ meæ*, with great confidence he addes, *Dicam Deo, Noli me condemnare*; as the foreſaid S. *Gregory* in a thouſand places excellently obſerves: with good reaſon therefore *Terentius* ſpoke boldly to *Tiberius*, rather as diſputing than as intreating; with good reaſon *Segeſtes* in our caſe ſhewed he did not fear, ſeeing neither the one nor the other had committed any fault: whereupon there was no juſt cauſe that *Tiberius* ſhould not accept *Terentius* for his friend; and *Germanicus*, *Segeſtes*.

Vt quibus initiis, quanta Tiberii arte, graviſſimum exitium irrepſerit, dein repreſſum ſit; poſtremo arſerit, cunctaque corripuerit, noſcatur.

With what cunning Tiberius *introduced and augmented the Law of Treaſon.*

The two and fiftieth Diſcourſe.

PErſuaded by the foreſaid words of *Tacitus*, in which he ſhewes what cunning *Tiberius* uſed to bring in the Law of Treaſon; I have much muſed in what that cunning conſiſted, ſeeing neither *Tacitus* declares it, but would have us gather it out of the Hiſtory our ſelves, neither can I thinke, I have fully apprehended his meaning, I will therefore onely ſay that little which my weakneſſe hath been able to conceive

ceive of it, that ſome ſtronger brain may thereby the more eaſily finde out the truth.

Firſt then it might be ſaid, that he uſed this cunning, when being asked, *An judicia Majeſtatis redderentur?* He anſwered, *Exercendas eſſe leges.* The cunning conſiſts in this, that being asked in a particular which concerned onely himſelfe, he anſwered in a generall, which concerned the profit of the whole City; as though he ſhould ſay, for as much as concernes me, which is the particular of Treaſon, I make no reckoning, nor require any to be made; but as much as concernes the Law, I would have that to be obſerved, ſeeing it is of great importance, that Lawes be not abuſed: and in confirmation of this his will, he granted pardons to all thoſe who at that time were accuſed of any crime, and conſequently with great ſweetneſſe gave a beginning to a moſt bitter thing; becauſe by his pardoning the Law was ſet on foot, and he brought it in, with ſuch a kinde of clemency, that it remained ever after in the Princes power to take it away again.

But in the introducing this Law by *Tiberius*, his cunning may perhaps be better conſidered another way; for underſtanding whereof, we muſt take into conſideration, two caſes that are in *Tacitus*; the firſt, is in this place, where *Falanius* and *Ruberius* being both of them accuſed, *Falanius* for placing amongſt certain prieſts of *Auguſtus* one *Caßius* a Buffone; *Ruberius* for violating with perjury the name of *Auguſtus*; *Tiberius* with divers wayes colouring their errour, cleared them both; *Scripſit conſulibus, non ideo decretum Patri ſuo cœlum, ut in perniciem civium is honor verteretur, Caßium hiſtrionem ſolitum inter alios ejuſdem artis intereſſe ludis, quos mater ſua in memoriam Auguſti ſacraſſet: nec contra religiones fieri, quod effigies ejus, ut alia numinum ſimulachra, venditionibus hortorum, & domuum accedant.*

accedant. Jusjurandum perinde æstimandum, ac si Jovem fefellisset. Deorum injurias dis curæ. It was not long after, but *Marcellus* was accuſed for ſpeaking ill of *Tiberius*, vvhereat though he ſeemed a little angry, yet he ſuffered him notwithſtanding to be acquitted. The ſecond caſe we are to conſider, is written in the ſecond Book of his Annals, where *Apuleia Varilla* being accuſed of Adultery, & for ſpeaking ſcandalous vvords of *Auguſtus*, of *Tiberius* and of *Livia*, he gave ſentence, that for what ſhe had ſpoken againſt *Auguſtus* ſhe ſhould be puniſhed, but for what ſhe had ſpoken againſt himſelfe, he vvould have no matter made of it, and being then asked by the Conſul, vvhether ſhe ſhould not be puniſhed for the vvords ſpoken in diſgrace of *Livia*, for that time he made no anſvver, but the day followving he deſired in his mothers name, that the vvords againſt her, might be no prejudice to *Apuleia*.

Novv if theſe caſes be vvell underſtood, vve ſhall eaſily diſcover the cunning of *Tiberius*, vvhich conſiſting in the vvay of introducing and enlarging the Lavv, hath need to take in a former conſideration; and it is, that the Lavv of Treaſon, as concerning the name was in uſe alſo in the time of the Common-vvealth, but contained not the ſame Heads, he onely being then intended to fall into this crime, vvho practiſed any thing againſt the Common-vvealth, either by raiſing of Armies, or by making ſeditions amongſt the People, never making reckoning of vvords, nor of ſuch ſmall matters, but onely of hainous things, as *Tacitus* in this place delivers.

To come then to our purpoſe, *Tiberius* being asked, if he vvould have the Lavv of Treaſon to be obſerved, anſvvered, the Lavves muſt be obſerved, as though he would ſay, he would have them in uſe, as they were in the time of the Common-wealth: whereof he gave a proof in the firſt caſe, where *Auguſtus* and

and *Livia*, and himſelfe being injured, he pardoned all: and ſo you ſee the birth of the Lavv. Afterward in the ſecond caſe, where himſelfe and *Auguſtus* and *Livia* were injured, where in the firſt he had ſaid, *Deorum injurias diis curæ*; ſpeaking of *Auguſtus*: in the ſecond, he would have *Apuleia* for the words ſhe had ſpoken againſt *Auguſtus*, to be puniſhed; for the injury done to himſelfe and *Livia*, he pardoned her: and ſo you ſee the growth of the Law: in confirmation whereof, *Tacitus* hath theſe words, *Adoleſcebat interea lex Majeſtatis*. And here is to be conſidered, that *Tiberius* meaning to begin the growth of the Lavv of Treaſon, vvould not begin it, vvith making it be obſerved in his ovvn caſe, but in the caſe of *Auguſtus*, requiring that boldly for another, vvhich vvithout bluſhing he could not have required for himſelfe: and ſo much more in this caſe, as the demand vvas coloured vvith paternall piety, and therefore obliged the Senate the more, to puniſh them alſo who ſhould uſe any ſuch vvords againſt himſelfe. Finally, there paſſed not much time, but by meanes of this Lavv, not onely they vvere puniſhed who committed crimes againſt the Prince, but it came to that paſſe, that to every petty fault, and though but againſt a private perſon, they gave the name of Treaſon, that ſo they might have colour to inflict capitall puniſhment at their pleaſure, as in a thouſand places of *Tacitus* his Bookes is written.

Id

Id quoque Tiberii morum fuit, continuare Imperia, ac plerosque ad finem in iisdem exercitibus aut Iurisdictionibus habere.

Whether it be good, that Officers should continue in their Places; and why this course was observed by Tiberius.

The three and fiftieth Discourse.

Tiberius (by as much as these words of *Tacitus* shew) used not to change his Officers, whereby it happened, that oftentimes they died in their charge; but because *Tiberius* had many particular occasions that made him observe this custome, which in other Princes are not usuall; We will first speak of it in generall, whether it be a good course; and then in particular; and lastly we will give the reasons of all.

Concerning the first; We cannot proceed without distinction: when the question is therefore, whether it be good to continue Officers, We may either mean it of Officers of Warre, or of those of Peace: If we speak of Officers in Warre, either it is in a warre where the Prince desires to make new Acquests, or else in a war which he makes onely for reputation, or some other small interest. If he make it, with a purpose of enlarging his Dominion; I cannot then commend the change of Officers, so long at least as there is no demerit in the Captaine; (and this, for the many reasons I have shewed in a Discourse before:) but if hee have no other end, but onely to continue the warre, he may then change them as he pleaseth: whereupon we see, that *Tiberius* himself making warre in *Germany* for Reputation onely; *Potius quam cupidine proferendi imperii*; changed his Generall, calling home *Germanicus*.

If we ſpeake of Officers in Peace; either they are meane places, which can neither bring honour nor damage to the Prince, or ſome midling places, that have other Officers above them; or elſe they are chiefe & Principall places, that have none above them; and in theſe (to begin with the laſt) to continue the ſame men, is in a manner neceſſary (ſo long at leaſt as they carry themſelves worthily) as well becauſe they are better acquainted with buſineſſes; as alſo becauſe it is a hard thing to find men able to diſcharge ſuch places: and laſtly, becauſe if they ſhould be removed, to exalt them, is impoſsible, they being now at the higheſt; and to abaſe them, is dangerous: whereof in the Booke of Kings we have a notable Example in *Ieroboam*, who rebelled againſt Solomon (as ſome Rabbines interpret, and very well in my opinion) onely for being put in an Office meaner than that he had before: For where before, he was collectour of the Tributes, of the Tribes of *Manaſſes* and *Ephraim*, he was now made overſeer of the building of *Millo*, a much inferiour place than the other. In this caſe therefore it ſhall do well to uſe the cuſtome of *Tiberius*, to continue them in their places, during their lives: provided that they be not made hereditary, as in ſome Kingdomes hath been done, with much detriment to the Prince.

Again, if we ſpeake of midling places, to ſuffer them to continue, without hope of being changed, brings forth commonly many evil effects. The firſt is becauſe all men labour for advancement, and their aime is always at principal places: endeavouring ſo much the more to do good ſervice, as they know it to be a means to raiſe them higher; there being no doubt, but he will ſerve better, that hath advancement for his end, than hee that hath onely conſervation for his Object: as we ſee, that young men eat more than old, becauſe the end of theſe is onely to conſerve themſelves; but of the other,

ther, to augment themselves. And therefore *Sinan* the Primovisior Generall of the Turke, against the Persians, knowing he could rise to no higher Dignity than he had already, was willing to hearken to Treatyes of peace, and pursued the war but coldly. Whereupon *Benhadad* (as in the sacred Text is written) had good counsell given him, that where in his armye hee had Two and thirty Kings, he should put in their places as many other valiant men, because They being at the highest, would never strein themselves much to fight, as knowing they could rise no higher: where other men to get advancement, would bestir themselves with greater vigour. This reason Abulensis brings in these wordes. *Amove Reges singulos ab Exercitu tuo, & pone pro eis principes.* For confirmation of this I have now said, the Example of *Seianus* (in my opinion) serves very fitly, who as long as hee had any hope to be advanced higher, he continued a good servant, and an excellent counsellour to his Prince: *Quia Seianus incipiente adhuc potentia, bonis consiliis votescere volebat*, but as soon ashe was got to such a heigth that he could not hope to rise any higher, he then fell from his good service, and plunged himselfe in manifest villanyes. This reason *Tiberius* understood well, and therefore when *Sejanus* was growne to a mighty heigth of greatnesse, to the end he might have occasion to continue his good service, made a shew he would yet raise him higher, *Ipse quid intra animum voluta verim, quibus adhuc necessitudinibus immiscere te mihi parem, omittam ad præsens referre. Id tantum aperiam, nihil esse tam excelsum, quod non virtutes tuæ, tuusque in me animus superent.* This is an excellent way, and ought to be observed with those who hold the prime places. Those therefore that are in midling places, should not be continued still, but have hope given them, that by their good service they may rise higher. Otherwise, besides the

reaſons alleadged, there would follow another inconvenience, that when they of the chiefe places die, the Prince ſhould want others to put in their roomes; and conſequently ſhould be driven, to goe begging in forraine parts for principall Officers: who not being acquainted with buſineſſes, and little affectionate (unleſſe for their owne ends) to the Prince; they were like, (in my opinion) to doe but ill ſervice, as neither knowing, nor being knowne. Whereupon the Appoſtles, being to make an Election, did not uſe this manner, *Oportet ex his viris qui nobiſcum ſunt congregati, in omni tempore*: and as it follows. To this may be added, that Princes ſhould continue meaner Officers in their places, but to make them fit for greater. This courſe the *Venetians* have alwayes uſed, and it was the ancient cuſtome of the common-wealth of *Rome*, that when by the death of Senatours there were places void, they would fill them up out of the rankes next below them: an excellent courſe certainly; for their carriage being continually ſeene in leſſe matters, It may eaſily be gathered what good ſervice they are like to do in greater. From hence it was, that *Fabius Maximus* knew, that *Titus Ottacillus* was no fit man to governe an Army; *Titi Ottacilli in minore re experti operam tuam ſumus, haud ſane cur ad majora tibi fidamus, documenti quicquam dediſti*: But though I like well the changing of Officers, yet I like not they ſhould bee changed often. Firſt, becauſe it is the property of them that are to leave a place, to burne (as the Proverbe is) their Cabbins; not ſo much for any hatred or envie they beare to their Succeſſours, as for their owne benefit: Whereof we have an example in Saint *Matthew*; where he relates, that one had beene poſſeſſed with a Devill many yeares, and never found any hurt by the evill Spirit all that while; but when the Devill perceived he was to go forth of his body, he then fell to tearing

ring him in moſt cruell manner. And juſt ſo it is with ſome that are in offices; if they thinke they ſhall ſtay any while in their places, they do not then ſo ſuddenly fall to fleece the Subjects; but if they finde they ſhall ſhortly leave them, they then begin to uſe extremities. And therefore the Officers of *Galba*, (as *Tacitus* reports) doubting they ſhould ſtay but a ſmall time in their places, by reaſon of the Princes old age, fell to fleecing: *Jam afferebant venalia cuncta prætorum liberti. Servorum manus ſubitis avida; & tanquam aperturus ſenem feſtinantes.* But ſeeing it is neceſſary ſometimes to change them, (as wee haye obſerved before) whether the change be ſooner or later; the beſt courſe is to do it upon a ſuddaine; that they may not do as Farmers uſe to do, when they are to part with a Farme, who to make the greater Vintage in their laſt yeare, care not how barren they make the Vines for the yeare following.

Now if we ſpeak of thoſe meane places, which bring ſome profit to the Officers, without any danger to the Prince, as ſome Magiſtrates that ſerve for ſhew, with little ſubſtance; in theſe the changes ſhould be often; as well to the end, many may come to partake of the profit, as alſo thereby to get the love of all. And this differs not from the opinion of *Tiberius*; who when the Senate would have perſwaded him to make a Magiſtrate, that continued in his place but one yeare, to continue in it five; he would not grant it. *Grave moderationi ſuæ tot eligere, tot differre; Vix per ſingulos annos offenſiones vitari; quamvis repulſam propinquas ſpes ſoletur; quantum odii fore ab his, qui ultra Quinquennium proficiantur.* I know well, that this was not the meaning of *Tiberius*; but yet the ſentence hee gave may ſerve for my purpoſe. It remaines to ſhew, why *Tiberius* would never be drawne to change thoſe he had once put in Offices: The firſt reaſon which *Tacitus*

alleadgeth, is ſet down in thoſe words; *Tædio novæ curæ, ſemel placita pro æternis ſervaviſſe*: that is, *Tiberius* finding it a trouble to make new Elections, was willing to continue the old; but ſeeing *Tacitus* tels not why it ſhould be a trouble, it ſeemes to be but a cold reaſon which he brings: we may therefore rather ſay, that (as other Authours relate) *Tiberius* had in ſuch manner uſed cruelty againſt any that had any vertue in them; that unleſſe he ſhould place men in Offices, that were unfit, he had much adoe, and hardly could finde any: and therefore no marvell, having once found ſome, if he were afterward loath to remove them. To this may be added (as *Tacitus* a little after ſaith) that though he ſaw many great wits in the Citie, that would have beene able to diſcharge ſuch Offices; yet he, ſtanding in feare of ſuch men, choſe rather to let them die in idleneſſe, as ſeeking to put men in places, to which they were onely equall: *Neque ſupra*; that is, ſuch as ſhould not be good at making Innovations: of which ſort of men, there is in all places great ſcarcity; and therefore when he once found ſuch a one, he was never willing to change him; as by whom he might have good ſervice done him; and that without danger. And this is an Exception to the Rule I made before; when they who are imployed are but equall to their imployment, and cannot hope to be imployed in any greater buſineſſe; not for default in the Prince, but of ability in themſelves. Again, it put him to the more trouble, as having a moſt acute wit; and conſequently a wavering judgement, as *Tacitus* ſhewes us in thoſe words: *Ut callidum ejus ingenium, ita anxium judicium*; a thing which alwayes happens to ſuch perſons, becauſe being men that know much, they pierce into all difficulties; and conſequently hardly reſolve upon any thing, finding the darkneſſe of difficulties even in the light it ſelfe: as *Moſes*, the firſt time that God called him,

him, having yet but a groſſe braine, thought every thing Light; but the ſecond time, when his braine was purged, he thought every thing Darkneſſe. The laſt reaſon, which *Tacitus* brings, (for the other to my ſeeming are but confirmations of the firſt) is ſet down in theſe words; *Quidam invidia, ne plures frueretur*; that is, *Tiberius* would not change his Officers, becauſe he would not have many to be enriched by them. This conceit I cannot beleeve, that either *Tiberius*, or *Tacitus* had; but that it is a meere idle fancie of the vulgar; ſeeing amongſt the chiefe Precepts that *Ariſtotle* gives to Tyrants, this is one; Not to ſuffer Riches to be reduced into few hands: And beſides, we may give the words a fitter expoſition; which is, That *Tiberius* having very few friends, if he ſhould change his Officers often, he ſhould be forced at laſt to bring in ſome that were his enemies: Whereupon out of very envy, leaſt any enemy of his ſhould grow rich, or get reputation; he was never willing to change his Officers often: which, when at laſt he could not avoid, but had placed in the Provinces certaine of his enemies, he would never ſuffer them to goe to their charge, but kept them alwayes neare about him, a courſe which many Princes take vvith their enemies; as by a thouſand Examples (which for brevity I omit) may eaſily be known: wherein it happens to Princes, contrary to that of private men; for theſe are ſafeſt, when their enemies are furtheſt off; but Princes, when they are neareſt: and to this purpoſe are thoſe words of *Tacitus*; *Quæ hæſitatione poſtremo eo provectus, ut mandaverit quibuſdam Provincias, quos egredi urbe non erat paſſurus.* I ſhould not give this ſenſe to this place, if my interpretation were not made good by a paſſage in *Suetonius*; where hee ſaith, *Unum & alterum conſulares, oblatis Provinciis, non auſus à ſe dimittere, eoſque adeo detinuit, donec ſucceſſores, poſt aliquos annos præſentibus daret.*

I conclude then, that *Tiberius* did well to continue Officers in their charges, as well for the scarcity he had of fit persons, as also; and more, because he used to imploy men that were onely equall to the businesses. Other Princes shall do well to avoid all extreames.

One onely thing remaines to be advertised; that when I commend the course, not to change Officers often; I meane it should proceed from the Princes owne will, not thinking it fit he should binde himselfe to let them stay in their places any determinate time, as three yeares, or five, or more; without leaving himselfe a power to remove them: For this would be to the Princes great prejudice; which *Tiberius* considering, made the fore-alleadged answer to *Asinius Gallus*; *Grave moderationi tuæ*, and as it followes: whereby we may plainly see, that though *Tiberius* did not like to change his Officers often, yet he liked well to have it in his power to change them often.

* * *

FINIS.